DFID KENYA: IMPROVING COMMUNITY SECURITY PROGRAMME
BUSINESS CASE
INTERVENTION SUMMARY
What Support Will the UK Provide?
1.1 Over the next three and a half years the UK will provide a foundational
programme of support to 6-8 violence-affected counties in Kenya. This time
period also allows provision for tailored support to the next elections in 2017.
The programme invests in a package of violence reduction and coordination
measures to reduce fragility and therefore improve Kenya’s long-term
development prospects. Should this programme be successful, a larger
programme could be developed to reinforce gains made and include more
counties.
1.2 This business case requests approval of £13.7 million. The programme
will be delivered by a private sector contractor in partnership with international
and local non-governmental organisations. The programme will start in
October 2014 and finish in March 2017. A six-month inception phase will be
required to develop detailed baseline knowledge and finalise other
arrangements.
Why is the UK Support Required?
1.3 The Improving Community Security programme will meet a key objective
laid out in DFID Kenya’s 2011-2015 Operational Plan by supporting police
and conflict management to improve safety and security for women, girls,
boys and men and their communities. This will help remove barriers that are
holding back Kenya’s graduation from aid.
1.4 Reducing levels of insecurity and conflict is important to achieving British
High Commission Nairobi’s objectives, including: working with the
Government of Kenya to minimise and deal effectively with security threats to
Kenya and UK interests. ICS will take a longer-term complementary approach
to other UK projects on police reform, criminal justice, and counter-terrorism
as well as US and Swedish programmes on policing (through a UNODC
basket fund), peacebuilding and gender-based violence (GBV).
What are the Expected Results?
1.5 These results are based on an indicative methodologyi and will be refined
during the inception phase but by 2017 the ICS programme is likely to support
the following at:
Outcome level:
 833,494 Kenyans (51% women) benefiting from more effective
prevention and response mechanisms (GBV, crime and conflict).
 34 Police Stations demonstrating improved handling of GBV cases,
community policing dialogue and referrals.
Output level:
 1,190,706 Kenyans (51% women) with improved awareness of police
services, GBV services, complaints procedures and conflict
mechanisms.

18 county forums on safety and security which are socially
representative and responsive to citizens’ needs including girls’,
women’s and other vulnerable groups.
These results will be measured by a combination of: household perception
surveys in the target counties; police station and violence recovery centre
data; and local expert assessment of policing, peacebuilding and GBV
interventions in target counties.
1.6 VfM will be achieved by close monitoring using the VfM actions template
and budget format developed by DFID Kenya, as well as regular reporting of
key costs, budget performance and measurements that will be finalised during
the inception phase.
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I:
STRATEGIC CASE
Context, Need and Opportunity to Intervene
2.1 Poor and marginalised Kenyans suffer from a multiplicity of violent
attacks. Almost 500 Kenyans were killed and over 55,000 displaced due to
inter-communal violence and resource conflicts during 2013ii. Women and
children were most affected by the brunt of sexual violence, killings, injuries,
loss of property and displacement that occurred. Reports state that
approximately 67 people died as a result of the Westgate attack in September
2013, and over 100 have died in attacks in two coastal counties during the
past two months in an upsurge of terrorism. A nationwide perception survey
reported that approximately 20% of respondents had been victims of crime or
violence during the preceding yeariii. Countrywide, 39% of Kenyan women
aged 15-49 have experienced sexual or physical violence, according to the
latest Kenya Democratic Health surveyiv.
2.2 The post-election violence of 2007/8 in Kenya led to the development of
one of the most progressive constitutions in Africa. There is recognition that
much of the Constitution is still to be implemented, particularly security issues.
The Government of Kenya (GoK) recognises that economic growth and
development is being held back by high levels of insecurity and its impact on
individuals (the Global Peace Index puts the cost of violence in Kenya at
US$5,205,000,000 last yearv). There is intense media and public debate in
Kenya about the costs of violence and increased insecurity to the country,
both economically and socially. Insecurity erodes trust between neighbours
and communities. We know from evidence that governance is also weakened
when people do not trust the state to fulfil its core function and protect them.
Individual strategies to avoid violence (eg. keeping silent, purchasing
weapons, relying on non-formal security groups) also undermine efforts for
long-term violence prevention and social cohesion.
2.3 The deep levels of marginalisation (ethnicity, gender, religion, age) within
Kenya are being addressed through devolution as mandated in the 2010
Constitution mandates on devolution. New county security and peace
committees are being established to bring decision-making and public
participation by all closer to citizens. These provide a good opportunity to
engage but may also pose a risk in that a small minority of people mayl try to
exploit the new resources flowing from the central government.
2.4 The presence of conflict in a country reduces GDP by around 2% per
yearvi and can have impacts on regional and international growth vii. Men
suffer directly from their involvement in violence but girls and women suffer
the effectsviii. DFID Kenya has been supporting local conflict management
mechanisms and the police reforms required under the Constitution for the
last three years. We have some evidence that improvements to security and
constraints to violence in Kenya come about with the active participation of
communities, local administration and police working together to prevent
conflicts turning violent - this approach worked during a period of heightened
tension, during the 2013 elections. But there is little broader evidence of the
development of strong and sustainable institutions that can manage disputes
before they turn violent. Some commentators suggest that the national level
government can seem disinclined to engage early in inter-communal conflict
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in more remote parts of Kenya until the situation becomes very serious, eg
despite over 150 deaths and 200,000 IDPs this year, the national government
has done little to address the Wajir/Mandera conflict.
2.5 Police reforms have largely focused on legal and institutional changes
which have not yet produced measurable improvements in security for women
and men. There is reluctance about providing a service to the people of
Kenya from the top of the government and police, and even a push-back on
legal gains made so far, eg, broadening the use of lethal force to protect
property as well as life. A strong culture of corruption is endemic to the
policeix, alongside a general disregard for human rights. We should recognise
that some of the key elements to police reform are long term and difficult for
external actors to always effect change.
2.6 However, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority has just issued a
report critical of the levels of human rights abuses and corruption used in a
recent policing operationx which is a new and welcome step forward. Also, a
different set of incentives is emerging at the county level. Security is a
national function, however, insecurity within a county reflects on the county
governor, some of whom are loudly voicing concerns, eg in Mombasa, or
taking matters into their own hands and purchasing additional police vehicles
as in Machakos.
There is increased pressure for police divisional
commanders to deliver as county governments start to provide a counter
force. This provides an opportunity for engaging in these new dynamics whilst
continuing to seek entry-points at the national level to improve policing
policies and strengthen systems which make corruption harder to commit and
get away with over the longer term.
2.7 The lack of adequate institutional and human resources at police stations,
proper record keeping facilities, gender desks or violence reporting desks at
police stations, language and communication barriers especially at local
levels, and poor storage of evidence obstructs access to justice for victims of
violence. Lack of political will, the lack of involvement of men and boys in
promoting gender equality, and the fragmented approach in coordination of
response to survivors also remains a major challenge for security agencies
and communities. Awareness campaigns and prevention programmes on
GBV in Kenya, implemented by NGOs and the media, have had some effect
on legislative reforms, increasing visibility of GBV, and gender inequality more
generally. But there is more to do from the government to develop a topdown, comprehensive structure from the government. This would usefully
include GBV policies being developed by experts within the National Police
Service and led by the Inspector General for change to happen. To effectively
provide security to individuals and communities it is necessary to take into
account that women, girls, boys and men face different insecurities based
upon socio-cultural gender roles. GBV, including sexual assault, is one of the
largest threats to human securityxi.
2.8 The combination of insecurity, weak accountability, a political change
(devolution) and nascent institutional reforms offer opportunities for long-term
transformation and provide a compelling reason for DFID to invest now in the
ICS programme:
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The GoK is under increasing pressure to strengthen security and safety in
Kenya.
There has been a political commitment to change in the political
establishment, the bureaucracy and security establishment, evidenced in
support for devolution.
The security and conflict management architecture is nascent and unclear
over roles and responsibilities at county level.
The police suffer from low levels of capacity, public trust and confidence.
Limited accountability of security providers fuels insecurity.
The devolution process has not yet addressed safety and security issues.
The GoK’s inability to address this can lead to greater violence and
conflict.
Why DFID?
2.9 There are three reasons for DFID/HMG added value to conduct this
intervention:
Strategic fit – HMG.
2.10 Reducing levels of insecurity and conflict is key to achieving British High
Commission Nairobi’s objectives, including to: Work with the government to
minimise and deal effectively with security threats to Kenya and UK interests.
By focusing on delivery at community and county level, the programme will
complement existing support to the national security architecture and training
to the National Police Service carried out through the Africa Conflict
Prevention Programme and other parts of the British High Commission’
Business Plan. The wider UK-Kenya relationship has been affected by a
number of issues, eg the rising levels of insecurity causing changes to the UK
travel advice. This relationship is important as it could positively or negatively
influence the county and national partnerships that are critical for this
programme.
Strategic fit – DFID.
2.11 DFID Kenya’s analysis demonstrates that the basic conditions for
Kenya’s sustainable exit from poverty reduction are not in place. Key risks
are that:
 Violence, instability and inequality in Kenya limits prospects for growth,
especially given newly discovered natural resources, and has knock-on
effects on Kenya’s and the Horn of Africa’s wider stability;
 Kenya’s security services have weak accountability and do not provide a
service for allxii;
 Ethnic marginalisation, as well as alleged abuses by security forces xiii,
leaves some tribes feeling disenfranchised from national development
efforts and open to violent extremism.
2.12 DFID Kenya is concurrently designing additional new & scaled-up
programmes on devolution, and accountability and the electoral cycle to
 Encourage a long-term shift from ethnic to issues-based politics (so that
leaders are enabled topromote poverty reduction)
 Improve state capability (so that leaders are able to promote poverty
reduction).
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These programmes will provide a three-way mutual reinforcement with the
ICS programme.
2.13 If the GoK is better able to provide conflict resolution, community safety
and reduced gender-based violence in 6-8 counties, then those counties will
be more peaceful and will benefit from increased public empowerment,
economic development and better access to other services. Integrating
gender issues in justice and security increases the effectiveness of service
delivery by: strengthening responses to GBV and creating more responsive
security sector institutions, and building women, men, girls’ and boys’ ability to
challenge violence and strengthening community responses to GBV.
Addressing these key risks to stability in Kenya means building blocks
towards the basic conditions for inclusive growth and poverty reductionservices, safety, and gender equality. Conflict sensitive programming will be
critical. We must continually ensure the appropriateness of our intervention to
the context, understand and manage the perceptions of beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries, and ensure equitable delivery in target areas.
Value added: why DFID has a comparative advantage on this.
2.14 Our support for conflict management work has given the UK a good
working relationship with the police and to local communities and officials
across the country and, to a lesser degree, at national levels. Other donors
have tended to take a more segmented approach, either working only through
community organisations for peacebuilding work or supporting programmes
working in parallel (eg, police and community work), which makes it harder to
demonstrate linkages and sustainable impact. A key comparative advantage
of the UK is that it has a track record in many developing countries of support
to security institutions, community policing, institutional reform and community
security through longer term sustainable solutions, and collected best practice
will be drawn upon to inform this programme.
2.15 The ICS programme will support the achievement of a number of DFID
global and portfolio priorities, for example, supporting capable and
accountable safety and security institutions that can uphold the rule of law and
are part of the ‘Golden Thread’xiv of successful development. Building peace
and effective, open and accountable institutions for all is one of the five big
transformative shifts called for by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on
the Post-2015 Development Agenda.
2.16 The ICS Programme will also address DFID’s practice on Building
Peaceful States and Societiesxv by:
(a)
Addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility by improving
the provision of safety and security;
(b)
Developing core state functions by building the capacity of both formal
and informal safety and security service providers;
(c)
Responding to public expectations by investing in organisations that
facilitate safety and security providers listening and responding to local
requirements for the most marginalised. We will work through nonstate actors to provide these services.
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(d)
Supporting inclusive political settlements through all of these activities.
The ICS Programme will support viable peace processes and/or the
positive outcomes of any accords as appropriate to the context.
2.17 Although the ICS Programme will be implemented by third parties and no
direct financial support will go to the GoK, in accordance with best practice in
fragile states, the programme will seek to align with government of Kenya
policies and priorities where these are consistent with our own principles and
standards around poverty reduction, inclusion and human rights compliance.
Impact and Outcome statements
2.18 Our intended impact over a three and a half year period is “increased
security and safety for women, girls, boys and men in Kenya through greater
capacity to prevent and respond to violence.” There are some key risks which
could affect the extent to which the intended impact can be achieved,
including insufficient political will for police reform, and instability in the run-up
to the 2017 elections.
Flexibility has been built into each level of the
programme to adapt and respond to this context which will allow us to exploit
opportunities as well as close down exposure to newly emerging risks.
2.19 The ICS programme outcome statement is: ‘Improved safety and
security institutions at national level and in 6-8 counties that provide more
effective, accountable and responsive services to a public that is actively
engaged in improving safety and security.
Impact on Gender Equality
2.20 Women, girls, boys and men in Kenya will benefit from programme
interventions and the most vulnerable will be protected from further harm.
Gender equality initiatives will focus on enhancing the security sector’s
awareness of and response to the different security experiences, needs and
roles of men, women, girls and boys. ICS views interventions to promote
gender equality as intrinsic to programme design, implementation, and
monitoring and evaluation. The development of policy, implementation
guidance, and training curricula at national and county levels will include
gender aspects. A gender analysis will be conducted in each of the 6-8 focal
counties during the inception phase to understand 1) how violence affects
women, girls, boys and men and 2) how the programme can design and
measure interventions that particularly impact on women and girls, but also
men and boys. The length, depth of analysis and approach will be different for
different interventions. Interventions to reduce GBV will aim to have a direct
impact on girls, however, conflict and crime reduction will have a more indirect
effect so the programme will not include specific child-related measures. A
gendered approach to the programme will be integrated using the following
principles:
 Participatory approach that involves both female and male designed
interventions, to ensure activities take into account gendered differences in
needs, shape interventions and give due regard to dimensions of equality
and diversity.
 Promotion of gender equality outcomes within government and among
partners.
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Establishment of links with organisations that have similar goals to
leverage for greater impact.
Integration of gender into the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework
with all outcomes and outputs promote benefits for women, girls, boys and
men. The M&E team will seek to assess the views of both men and
women during their evaluation. Regular monitoring of the programme’s
progress will address the immediate and underlying barriers that prevent
many girls and women from accessing opportunities created identifying
any need for revisions within the interventions and activities. Outcomes
and outputs will be measured using sex disaggregated data.
Challenge and change negative ideas, beliefs and practices informed by
an understanding of likely behavioural change, of social norms, structures
and societal change and power dynamics of formal and informal rules
institutions.
The intervention will enable poor women, men, girls and boys at
community level to raise awareness of legal rights and entitlements while
keeping the institutions and players more accountable to them.
II: APPRAISAL CASE
Our Approach to Improving Community Security in Kenya
3.1 From 2010-2013, DFID Kenya successfully focused on delivering support
to elections that were free, inclusive and largely without political violence, by
helping to ensure strong electoral and conflict management systems able to
prevent or deal with election-related disputes. Subsequently, a more peoplecentred, long term approach is needed to address violence prevention and
social cohesion in Kenya in a viable way.
Devolution provides the opportunity to bring centrally-held delivery bodies
closer to the people and make them accountable. This business case
identifies options for a first phase of support, over the next three and a half
years. Further programmes in this policy area could be implemented following
the completion of ICS and a thorough assessment of its performance to
carefully identify key lessons and refine programme designs. A three month
design phase has drawn on both international and local Kenyan evidence,
lessons from previous programmes, key informant interviews, and two field
visits to identify what gaps DFID support might fill and where support would
have the biggest impact. The design phase has set the direction, identified
need, including in counties, and identified the outcomes and outcomes. Six
months will be necessary to build on the design phase and finalise the detail
of the programme.
3.2 A number of assumptions underpin the ICS Programme:
 GoK/NPS will use trained personnel in appropriate posts in target
counties.
 Oversight bodies remain free from corruption and political influence
 GoK/NPS implement and abide by recommendations made by
oversight bodies
 Oversight and police institutions promote gender equality as an integral
part of every aspect of police policies and practices.
 National and county governments increasingly engage earlier in
peacebuilding
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These assumptions are particularly focused on demonstrating government
political will. If these assumptions are upheld then the programme has more
potential to be sustainable.
Where in Kenya?
3.3 All of Kenya’s 47 counties suffer from an array of conflict, insecurity,
poverty and political challenges. A compelling argument could be made for
security support to the majority of them. However, attempting to engage
nationwide with the size of resources available for this programme would limit
the scale of interventions to such a degree that a meaningful impact would be
highly unlikely in any county. As a result of these resource constraints, the
activities of ICS must be more narrowly focused.
3.4 DFID has identified 16 counties that are particularly prone to violence due
to particular tensions, ethnic composition and a previous history of violence.
These 16 have been clustered together along different conflict, socioeconomic and regional groupings, shown in Table 1 below. Based on levels of
expenditure in other successful programmes, the design phase determined
that due to the resources available the ICS programme needs to focus on 6-8
counties to maximise the impact of the resources deployed. These focus
counties will be selected from the 16 shortlisted counties during the inception
phase, based on criteria outlined in Table 1 and:
 present the range of challenges that the programme is seeking to
address;
 be counties where the programme partners assess that it is likely that
the programme could have a positive impact;
 deliver innovative programming;
 fill a gap, or complement the work that others are doing.
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3
4
Busia
818,757
2.12%
331 411,016
(-)
1
3
2
2
2
3
3
4
1
Rift Valley
Nyanza
Nyanza
Nyanza
Nairobi
Rift Valley
Coast
Coast
Coast
Western
512,690
1.33%
61
1,152,282
2.98%
874
917,170
2.38%
355
968,909
2.51%
482
3,138,369
8.13% 4516
1,603,325
4.15%
214
1,109,735
2.87%
91
649,931
1.68%
79
240,075
0.62%
7
1,375,063 3.56%
623
357,858
69.8%
917,433
79.6%
262,936
28.7%
463,139
47.8%
706,133
22.5%
642,933
40.1%
792,351
71.4%
486,798
74.9%
184,618
76.9%
862,764 62.7%
2
Western
North
Eastern
Eastern
North
Eastern
743,946
325,546 43.8%
57.4% 36% 19%
50.2% 36% 19% Pastoral land and ethnic conflicts
5
6
Mandera
Marsabit
1
1
Wajir
1
1.93%
457
1,025,756
291,166
2.66%
0.75%
40 900,614
4 242,250
661,941
1.71%
12 556,030
Description and
types of conflict
Rift Valley
SGBV
(-)
GBV
50 318,892
Poverty rate
1.44%
No. of Poor
555,561
Average population
per km2
Rift Valley
Former Province
4
DFID Priority Level
Population (% of
total)
2
Baringo
Trans
Nzoia
West
Pokot
Kisii
Migori
Kisumu
Nairobi
Nakuru
Kilifi
Kwale
Tana River
Bungoma
Population (Census
2009)
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County
Cluster
Table 1: County clusters and data
36%
57%
57%
57%
36%
29%
32%
32%
32%
45%
19%
32%
32%
32%
19%
15%
16%
16%
16%
25%
High level of sexual violence and inter-ethnic /
communal conflicts
Urban centres with high levels of inequality and
marginalised groups as well as crime
Coastal regions with issues of extremism,
extractive industries, inter-ethnic / communal
conflict
Cross border areas, high levels of intercommunal violence, land issues and high levels
45% 25% of crime
87.8% 32%
6% Pastoral areas along the Somali / Ethiopia
83.2% 33% 17% border with high levels of poverty,
marginalisation and cross-border violence
84.0% 32%
6%
What activities would ICS undertake?
3.5 The precise activities undertaken by the ICS programme will vary by county,
according to their particular requirements. The types of violence experienced in
Kenya are not uniformly distributed, as shown in the cluster descriptions and as a
result particular locations have specific security problems, requiring carefully
tailored activities as part of the intervention. Diagnosis of the priority weaknesses
cannot occur until the locations are determined during inception. Despite this, the
possible activities that together constitute this intervention fall into three broad
categories; supply side, demand side and a blend of supply and demand.
3.6 Supply side activities seek to address weaknesses in the delivery of security
services, for example, by building ‘capacity’, ie training, advice and sometimes
equipment. This usually refers to enhancing the ability of individuals to perform
their duties, or of the institution to coordinate the activities of its members. For
example, by providing core skills training to front line staff and managers, providing
policy support to senior leadership, or providing key equipment. Supply side
interventions may also attempt to address the willingness of individuals to perform
their duties according to the law, for example reducing corruption and improving
adherence to procedures. However, this sort of change is often very hard to affect
or measure and is often considered part of the culture. In our view this should not
be regarded as a reason to do nothing, but is an important consideration in
programme design.
3.7 On its current trajectory, rapid changes to the culture of policing delivery in
Kenya are unlikely to occur due to entrenched corruption and lack of high level
leadership. Changing the willingness of individuals to perform their duties can only
be achieved slowly, through gradual shifting of ability of people to perform their
duties and with accountability institutions refusing to allow impunity.
3.8 Demand side interventions seek to improve the degree to which individuals
understand what services they should receive, at what quality and timeliness, and
to provide them with tools to hold the suppliers of those services to account if they
are abusive or neglect their duties. For example, these interventions include
community liaison committees including marginalised groups, TV and radio
messages, text services, leafleting, theatre performances, education curricula,
police station open days, sports events between opposing groups etc.
3.9 These interventions will not be sustainable if change does not happen relatively
quickly or if those who demand justice or change are able to be threatened by the
perpetrators of violence and abuse. Again this is not a reason to do nothing;
careful analysis must be done to ascertain what is appropriate for the context.
What was not included:
3.10 In the design phase we considered a range of areas and modalities for
inclusion in the programme. Some were rejected, for example, national level crime
statistics in most developing countries, including Kenya, are weak and unreliable
but necessary to give a fuller understanding of the problems faced, and useful to
help generate change. However support nationally to this area would be
expensive, therefore funding would be better spent elsewhere. Instead a focus on
selected county level statistics will help test the theory of change to prove success
or otherwise before investing more broadly, as well as providing essential data for
GoK and civil society. On modalities, for example, we assessed the value of
providing financial support to other donor programmes rather than setting up a new
programme. However, other donors focus on specific parts of the sector, eg
national level police reform or community level GBV. These projects do not
address the aims of the programme, ie broader, problem-solving approach to
violence reduction and it would be very difficult to make the individual projects add
up to more than the sum of their parts.
The three month design identified four options:
Option 1: The counterfactual; do not conduct the ICS programme
3.11 In this case DFID Kenya’s existing programmes would continue. Our view on
the likely development of community security within Kenya in this scenario forms
the counterfactual for the consideration of the ICS programme.
3.12 DFID Kenya already has some engagement at county levels through for
example, the Accountable Devolution Programme (implemented through funding to
World Bank) and is designing a new four-year programme to continue our support
deepen democracy through improving electoral cycle management and further
parliamentary and institutional accountability. A new devolution programme will
provide core capacity and systems support to county governments. In addition,
there is on-going work on preventing violence against girls through the DFID
Kenya Adolescent Girls Action Research Programme.
3.13 The selection of the counterfactual case means that DFID will not incur
additional costs on spending related to security and safety. However, DFID will
also not achieve the expected benefits (as explained below) from increased
efficiencies of state security actors, averting economic losses at firm and sector
levels, strengthening responses to GBV and developing a stronger evidence base.
As a result Kenyan society in the intervention areas will be worse off than they
could be. Additionally, a strategic opportunity for DFID Kenya to be more involved
in the devolution process will be missed.
3.14 Analysts widely regard successful devolution as vital to Kenya’s stability in the
short term and social and economic success over the medium term. Whilst security
is not a devolved function, accountable county administrations provide a new
opportunity for Kenyan citizens to obtain a voice to communicate their concerns to
county governments and for the latter to represent their voices at a higher level of
government. Failure of the devolution process could significantly damage
democratic reform in Kenya.
Option 2: Supply side only: Technical assistance to finalise key national violence
reduction policies and implement them in 10 counties.
3.15 In this option activities would concentrate on providing assistance to
institutions involved in the provision of security services, with the aim of improving
their ability to develop policy and manage safety and security services. Activities
would also aim to improve coordination between national policy strategies and
local offices and county development plans. Relevant national level institutions,
including the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of
National Government, have indicated their support for the technical assistance that
could be provided at national and county levels on policy development and
guidelines to roll out policy in the 47 counties over a period of time.
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3.16 The intention is to both assist in the cascading of national best practice and
enhance awareness at the local level of national strategies. The theory is that
greatly extending awareness and understanding of how safety and security
services should be provided will catalyse the new democratic institutions to apply
pressure for adherence to these principles of provision and begin to change the
institutional willingness to deliver. It is envisaged that the activities of this option
would concentrate on:
National level:
- Support to Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the
National Police Service, the National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding and
Conflict Management, the Gender Directorate, and potentially the Director of
Public Prosecutions to coordinate, develop and finalise key violence reduction
policies, including community policing, peace, GBV, and NPS Standard
Operating Procedures.
- Support planning and guidance for how these policies will be implemented at
county level.
- Coordinate and oversee safety and security delivery to ensure quality and
adherence to human rights.
County level:
- Train and mentor police in 10 counties to implement community policing and
police standard operating procedures.
- Train and mentor county policing authorities, county peace committees, and
GBV referral centres in violence reduction policies within their county contexts.
- Develop a monitoring tool for police, peacebuilding service delivery at county
level.
- Ensure coherence between county security planning (national function) and
county development plans and budgets (devolved function).
- Adapt lessons from national and district peacebuilding structures into the newly
devolved context.
- Support data management and collection in key safety and security institutions
at county level.
Option 3: Demand side only: Awareness-raising of rights and violence reduction
services by civil society, and police complaints mechanisms covering 10 counties.
3.17 Option 3 activities would concentrate on helping the public to: state more fully
their concerns about violence-related issues to the county government and security
authorities; understand what they should expect from safety and security providers
in their counties, and where/how to complain if services are not provided or are
abusive. It will also provide assistance to institutions involved in the oversight of
security services, with the aim of reducing levels of corruption and abuses. The
theory is that greatly extending demand and expectation for good quality safety
and security services at the new county level should catalyse pressure for
response by institutions and begin to change the institutional willingness to deliver.
It is envisaged that the activities of this option would concentrate on:
National level
- Support the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) and National
Police Service Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) to decentralise to the sub-national
13
-
-
level in 2-3 locations and to prioritise and investigate complaints (including into
GBV cases).
Coordinate practice and lessons between IPOA, IAU and the National Police
Service Commission (NPSC) to improve coordination and implementation, and
advice to the NPS on recommendations.
Increase the research capacity of oversight institutions, for example, by
supporting IPOA to undertake a police service delivery and accountability
survey (including levels of public awareness of oversight institutions) in target
counties.
County and community level
- Identify community safety and security priorities in 10 counties through focus
groups and communicate these effectively to county governments and security
authorities.
- Build civil society ability to work productively with county governments on
implementation and accountability.
- Raise public awareness in 10 counties through media campaigns on laws,
community policing policy, procedures, peacebuilding, and GBV prevention and
response.
- Build the capacity of community policing forums to monitor conditions of arrest
and detention, to ensure compliance with legislation and international human
rights standards.
Option 4: A blend of supply and demand: 6-8 county governments and security
authorities understand and implement key violence reduction policies and the
public are able to raise concerns and lodge complaints.
3.18 This option would have a smaller and tighter geographical and institutional
focus, ie reduced reach to citizens, counties (6-8), and national level institutions.
However, it would combine key elements of both supply and demand side
interventions to be delivered simultaneously. It would build the capacity of the
police, county committees and referral centres with improved policies, guidance
and training, whilst concurrently increasing citizens’ knowledge of what to expect,
and reducing scope for police human rights abuses and corruption.
National level
- Support National Police Service, the National Steering Committee for
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, the Gender Directorate to develop
and finalise the community policing & GBV policies and develop guidelines for
implementation.
- Support the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) and National
Police Service Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) to decentralise to the sub-national
level in 2-3 locations and to prioritise and investigate complaints (including into
GBV cases).
County and community level
- Train & mentor selected county level government, police, peacebuilding
committees & GBV responders to implement national policies in 6-8 counties,
- Joint trainings for the Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the Police Service
in crime investigation and how to work effectively together to attain
prosecutions,
14
-
-
Raise public awareness on safety and security issues in selected counties on
laws, community policing policy, procedures and complaints systems,
peacebuilding and GBV prevention and response in 6-8 counties.
Identify communities safety and security priorities through partner NGOs and
CSOs and to advocate for their inclusion in county development plans
Provide operational research, analysis and selected data collection/surveys to
inform and support interventions on GBV, peacebuilding and policing.
Evidence
3.19 During the design phase the ICS Programme drew on a range of evidence xvi
both international and specific to Kenya. Internationally there are few rigorous
evaluations of conflict prevention and resolution, security and justice, or GBV, and
even fewer systematic reviews of that evidence. Domestically, many safety and
security related projects have been piloted in Kenya and few donors have
delivered large scale programmes or included this range of violence reduction
interventions, therefore, the test of implementation on the ground is a significant
one. The following findings have been drawn upon in a balanced way from that
range of evidence:
Supply side:
3.20 An evaluation of EC support to Justice and Security System Reform xvii
concludes that: “building the institutional capacity of security and justice bodies
helped strengthen governance but had a limited impact on improved service
delivery if insufficient emphasis was placed on involving end-beneficiaries
perspectives in addressing the constraints to service delivery.”
3.21 Similarly AusAid concludes, in their evaluation of Australian Law and Justice
Assistancexviii, that: “when law and justice programmes focus solely on top-down
organisational capacity building, they struggle to demonstrate real results for their
intended beneficiaries”.
3.22 In Kenya, the assistance that was provided to build the capacity of Peace
Committees helped to ensure that those districts with Peace Committees reported
fewer incidents during the outbreak of violence during the 2007/8 electionsxix.
Demand side:
3.23 A DFID evaluation of citizen voice and accountability interventions in 2008
concluded that despite evidence of positive results in terms of awareness-raising
and accountability, impact has remained limited and experience suggests
initiatives are difficult to scale upxx. A study of nine countries, found that only 10
per cent of women physically abused sought support services, for the most part
due to lack of effective services and not due to a lack of awareness of these
servicesxxi. There is limited evidence that strengthening external accountability and
oversight structures has a direct impact on reducing police misconduct and
corruption. But enhancing external accountability structures can improve
perceptions of the police and enhance public trustxxii.
3.24 Information-sharing across agencies prior and during the 2013 elections in
Kenya led to early warning and response; enhanced conflict sensitive reporting by
the media; increased mediation capacity among various actors including the
political parties; and also led to the realisation of a peaceful processxxiii.
15
Supply and Demand side:
3.25 An examination of ‘the impact of initiatives to reduce risk and incidence of
sexual violence…’ by Spangaro et alxxiv found, from the little existing evidence,
that: ‘Interventions need to be integrated and multifaceted and should include as a
minimum: responses to the needs of survivors; community engagement (including
identification of local risk factors); and preventive systems, which may include
security, personnel and infrastructure measures.’
3.26 Hanna et alxxv looked at ‘The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy’, found
that: When attempting to reduce the capture of public funds and resources, several
strategies appeared to be effective in various sectors and settings across six
studies: decentralisation, institutional monitoring with non-financial incentives,
community monitoring with non-financial incentives, and open procurement
auctions. Of relevance to the Kenya context, the study found that: ‘Decentralisation
is a promising intervention, especially when pre-implementation includes building
capacity of local officials and infrastructure…. Additionally, success appears more
probable when the programme is coupled with an increase in community
participation and interest in addressing local public service issues because it
increases the implementer’s accountability to the population. Furthermore, the
initial level of community cohesiveness and inclusion of citizens from all socioeconomic classes may also greatly influence the level of success in reducing
corruption and not merely shifting corruption from central government officials to
local elites.
3.27 A Saferworld community policing project in Kenyaxxvi focused on training and
institutional capacity development within the police, as well as building trust
between the community and the police through, among other things: a 20 member
steering committee of key stakeholders including community based organisations,
women, youth leaders, religious leader and senior local police officers; a joint
community forum and a police open day. By generating a shared sense of
ownership and trust, the local population was more comfortable with what it
perceived as a more effective police force and played an active role in the security
of its local region.
3.28 The examples detailed above indicate that there is some evidence that supply
side interventions have impact, ie that policy development, training and so on can
improve the ability of institutions to deliver. Overall there is some, but limited,
evidence to suggest that a demand-led, and people-centred approach can achieve
transformative change on its own. For the combined supply and demand side
interventions, stronger evidence exists that positive impact can result, ie that
improving governance and capacity of safety and security institutions, along with
improved oversight and accountability and public awareness yields more
significant impact.
Appraisal
3.29 We have undertaken a two stage appraisal; first an assessment to select a
preferred option from the 3 proposed interventions, second a break-even analysis
to assess the likelihood that the selected intervention would generate benefits at
least as great as the costs.
16
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA)
3.30 MCDA is a technique involving the application of scores to options against
weighted criteria. This allows the selection of a preferred option based on the
consensus judgement of the professionals involved, some of whom must be
independent from the programme – in this case the appraising economists and
review team. The criteria, weights and scores were determined by consensus of
the design team and subject specialists in DFID-Kenya. Each option is given a
score between 1 (lowest) and 5 (highest) against the criteria. The criteria refer to a
set of practical delivery and potential impact considerations, with weights to
illustrate the relative importance attached to each consideration. A weighted score
is calculated for each option by multiplying the score by the weighting. The option
with the highest total weighted score is the preferred option.
3.31 Figure 1 shows the results of the MCDA. Option 1 – “do nothing” – has been
omitted from this analysis since it is intended to select an intervention option for
assessment against the counterfactual. The criteria assess the anticipated impact
of the interventions on community security; the flexibility of the options to change
interventions depending on the political situation; the anticipated impact of the
interventions on gender based violence; the degree to which the interventions are
likely to add value to other development interventions in the areas; the
sustainability of the changes the interventions bring about; the degree to which the
interventions can fill gaps in other security interventions and lastly the degree to
which the interventions are likely to be scalable. The scalability of the interventions
receives a low weighting since what matters is the nature of the activities and
these are currently undetermined.
3.31 As shown, demand side interventions alone, option 3, is the least preferred
option with a weighted score of 3.2, significantly lower than supply side only
interventions, with a score of 4.1. This result makes sense in light of the evidence
that was presented earlier. Ultimately the provision of safety and security is a core
state function. Where this function is weak, enhancing the ability and willingness of
state actors to confront security challenges is likely to be a higher priority than
enhancing the ability of communities to better voice their demands and frustration.
In an environment where state capability is the main limiting factor, a focus on
demand side interventions alone is unlikely to be effective. It may cause more
distress to citizens as they become better informed of their rights, more able to
voice them, but with little effect.
Figure 1: Multi-criteria Decision Analysis
17
Option 4 Blend
Option 3 Demand side
3
4
3
3
3
Option 3 Demand side
4
3
4
5
4
Option 2 Supply side
20%
20%
15%
15%
15%
Weighted Score
Option 4 Blend
Impact
Flexibility
GBV Impact
Adding Value
Sustainability
Option 2 Supply side
Criteria
Weighting
Score~
4.5
5
4
4
5
0.80
0.60
0.60
0.75
0.60
0.60
0.80
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.90
1.00
0.60
0.60
0.75
Gaps
Scalability
Total
~ 1 = Lowest , 5 = Highest
10%
5%
100%
5
5
30
3
3
22
4
4
31
0.50
0.25
4.10
0.30
0.15
3.20
0.40
0.20
4.45
3.33 The MCDA shows that a blend of supply and demand side interventions is
likely to be the best option, with the highest weighted score of 4.45. This is also in
alignment with the evidence gathered in the design phase, which suggested that
simultaneously improving the capability of state actors to provide security services
and of citizens to engage in a democratic dialogue to represent their needs,
frustrations and the short comings in security they experience, will lead to the best
foundation for sustainable security reform.
Feasibility and Sustainability
3.34 Tackling insecurity is a major priority for the Government of Kenya to meet the
aspirations of Vision 2030, however, no other donor is programming on safety and
security at county level. The Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Interior and
Coordination of National Government has affirmed his support to the ICS
programme, and appreciates the linkage between national and counties, as well as
community security. It has outlined concerns about the programme which are that:
security is a national government function and the programme must respect this
when working at county level; the programme uses local, experienced, CSOs to
implement GBV aspects, and that the programme should be holistic and support
key community policing components like equipment, training, etc. These concerns
will all be addressed positively but a thorough risk assessment would be conducted
before providing and equipment to the NPS.
3.35 Improving safety and security in Kenya is a long-term task and cannot be
achieved by a 3.5 year programme. ICS has therefore been specifically designed
with sustainability in mind and to ensure that lessons learned are captured to help
improve the effectiveness of future programming:
 The programme will develop and test an approach to managing safety and
security through the devolution process in 6-8 counties. This approach can be
rolled out to other counties and lessons brought up to national level to inform
government policy and guidelines, ensuring sustainability.
 The programme will have to link county experiences to the national level. It is
acknowledged that reforms at national level are slow but sustainable change at
the county level will not be possible without these reforms.
 The programme will focus on building the capacity of safety and security
institutions for service delivery, which will lead to improved state service
delivery, but it will not provide the direct delivery of services as these could not
be sustained once the programme ends.
 The programme has a clustered approach where counties from different
clusters can be ‘twinned’ to share experiences and learn lessons to establish
best-practice on how communities and county government structures can
collaborate more effectively. This enhances sustainability by establishing what
works and enabling to transfer lessons to other counties in Kenya.
 By promoting public empowerment, the programme will stimulate external
pressure for reform that will outlast the programme and will help enhance the
sustainability of other programme elements.
18

Local partner organisations will play a key role in delivery, and the programme
will seek to build their capacity to support reform processes long-term.
3.36 Option 4 is the preferred option because it aims to follow a two-pronged
approach which addresses both supply side (institutional) and demand side
(demand driven accountability) issues. It can provide a higher flexibility which
enables the programme interventions to be tailored to local insecurity contexts and
needs, though always supported by investments in data to enhance understanding
of the local priorities. The programme can test and innovate among many
interventions, identifying and delivering quick wins both from supply and demand
side of accountability, It is the most sustainable option as it will work on both sides
of the governance/ accountability equation and is focused on linking community,
counties and national levels. We propose that these links will strengthen the
coordination of state actors providing security services, improving their
responsiveness to the needs of the communities they serve.
Economic Appraisal
Costs
Costs to DFID:
3.37 Options A, B and C are envisaged to use the same total budget of £14 million,
with a breakdown as shown in table 2. The total costs to DFID will be higher when
we factor in the DFID staff time to manage the programme. We estimate that a
proportion of the time of three members of DFID staff will be required to manage
the contract with the programme implementing partners, at a total estimated cost of
£75,000 per year. However, this administrative cost utilises full time staff already
under employment in DFID-Kenya. In this sense these costs may be considered
‘sunk’. That is, if DFID chooses not to fund the ICS programme these members of
staff will be deployed to other activities and this cost to DFID will remain. Moreover
the amount of administration time is expected to be the same for all three options.
As it is a sunk cost that does not vary with the selection of option, it has been
omitted from an assessment of the programme costs.
Table 2: Breakdown of programme costs
Cost (£) for
programme
duration
Item
1. Technical and administrative
costs for ICS including
research and M&E.
13,702,765
Explanation
To implement the programme. This includes
delivery costs, research and M&E costs.
Up to £300k and one-off for the design of the
297,235 programme, to be paid to the company that was
selected following the competitive tender.
2. Design costs
Total
14,000,000
19
3.38 Technical and administrative costs include all programme management costs
from the programme implementing partners and all input costs for activities to
generate the programme outputs.
3.39 Table 3 showing incremental costs over the programme years is provided
below. These figures are indicative and will be finalised during inception, with
inputs and agreement from DFID Kenya programme management. Both absolute
and discounted costs are shown. Discounting is a process by which costs and
benefits are adjusted for the schedule in time in which they are incurred to reflect
the rate of social time preference – the fact that present consumption is preferred
to future consumption due the uncertainty over future events that increases with
time. In order to adjust for this preference, expenditure in the future is valued lower
in present terms to demonstrate the cost of forgone consumption that is incurred
by committing funds to certain future activities. DFID applies a social discount rate
of 10% to Kenya for all programmes. Therefore the totals in the discounted
columns represent the net present value of the allocated expenditure.
Table 3: Incremental costs
Year
2014/15
2015/16
2016/17
2017/18
Total
Undiscounted (£'000s)
Research
Outputs
Total
and M&E
193
2,452
2,652
2,652
7,949
606
1,815
1,815
1,815
6,051
799
4,267
4,467
4,467
14,000
Discounted (£'000s)
Research
Outputs
Total
and M&E
193
2,229
2,192
1,993
6,607
606
1,650
1,500
1,364
5,119
799
3,879
3,692
3,356
11,726
Costs: Beyond DFID
3.40 There are a variety of additional costs beyond those incurred by DFID. These
costs are different in the counterfactual and intervention cases (options 2 – 4). In
the intervention cases, these costs largely involve the opportunity cost of
participating in the programme interventions rather than engaging in usual daily
activities.
3.41 Kenyan communities currently incur wider costs of weak community security.
These form the core of the picture in the ‘Do nothing’ counterfactual and will
continue to be incurred if the ICS programme does not get approved. The benefits
of the ICS programme interventions involve mitigation of these costs and as such
they appear in the benefits section.
Costs to GoK
3.42 In any of the ICS programme intervention options involvement of Kenyan civil
servants generates an opportunity cost of those civil servants’ time. However, slow
reform within the sector and analysts’ reports of productivity within the Kenyan
public sector suggest that this cost is relatively low. Should the activities that ICS
involves civil servants in lead to an improvement in their productivity or work
quality, then any short-run opportunity cost of civil servants’ time is likely to be
superseded by benefits as the ICS investments begin to germinate. As exact
activities under ICS are currently unknown it has not been possible to quantify or
monetise these costs.
20
Costs to Communities and Civil Society
3.43 As above, there may be opportunity costs related to the time invested in the
project activities by these participating actors. However, it is also the case that
longer term benefits will be anticipated to compensate for these costs. The
research and evaluation component will help reveal and understand such costs
better. As exact activities under ICS are currently unknown it has not been possible
to quantify or monetise these costs.
Benefits
3.43 The incremental benefits common to all funding options compared to the
counterfactual are explained in detail below. Potential differences between the
options in terms of their effectiveness in delivering the benefits are then discussed.
Benefits to the Private Sector
3.44 Kenya has one of the highest expenditures on private security related
measures (insurance and infrastructure) with businesses estimated to be spending
between 7 and 11% of annual revenue1. These costs are considerably higher than
in all other comparator countries, including South Africa, in which these costs
reach only 1.5%. This cost to business is an operating cost that reduces resources
available for investment in productive assets, leading to business growth and job
creation.
3.45 Some estimates put the cost of insecurity in Kenya at US$ 5.2bn in 2013xxvii
which equates to 12.9% GDP (GDP data from World Bank WDI). According to
World Bank (2013)xxviii, security poses significant challenges to Kenya’s economic
prospects and these are most prominent in tourism (12.5%) and FDI inflows
(0.6%). Together, they accounted for 13.1% of GDP as at 2012. In early 2014 a
weak security situation in the coastal counties and a heightened threat of terrorism
in urban centres lead to a number of western countries, including the UK issuing a
travel advisory to their citizens not to travel to these areas. As a result of this
advice forward bookings in the tourism industry are reported to be down by 25%
and anecdotal evidence suggests a high number of job losses from resorts along
the coast. Precise data on the impact of insecurity on tourism and broader
economic output, are unlikely to be available until the start of 2015.
3.46 Stability at a county level can improve receipts from tourism and help
encourage foreign direct investment into the area. Importantly improved security
will enable increased investment by local businesses, leading to faster business
growth and job creation, despite some losses in the private security industry in the
short-run. A reduction in costs from security may be expected to disproportionately
benefit small and medium sized local enterprises that are underserved by the
financial markets in Kenya and are therefore more dependent on retained profits
for investment finance. Growth of these businesses may also be expected to
disproportionately generate jobs for Kenya’s poor.
Benefits to communities and civil society
3.47 Strengthening security institutions and working with local organisations
promotes the agency of women, girls, men and boys to challenge the culture of
violence leading to ability to participate, contribute to and benefit from
1
Alda, E. 2009 “Preventing Crime and Violence in Africa: A Silent Emergency
21
development. Benefits to these groups are extremely hard to monetise, but may be
considered to be the most important justification for a programme such as ICS.
The primary function of the state is to provide security for its citizens and the ability
to live free from arbitrary violence and persecution is a fundamental human right.
DFID has made a commitment to assist the world’s poorest and most marginalised
people and has made additional commitments to support women and girls.
3.48 Success of the ICS programme would contribute to increased safety and
security for women, men and children in Kenya through greater capacity to prevent
and respond to violence through community forums, as well as a better response
to such violence from security authorities. Women and girls would benefit from a
reduction in GBV and gain the ability to respond to incidences of such violence
through strengthened mechanisms for prevention and response. Authorities would
be assisted to better account for this form of violence in their County Development
plans.
3.49 GBV involves two types of costs: direct and indirect. Direct costs are
expenditure on services such as health, police and judicial process. Indirect costs
are measured as a loss of potential (or ‘output loss’), such as working days lost to
violence, or school dropouts as a result of violence. In this regard GBV carries a
heavy economic burden and the negative impact on girls’ access to education and
consequent damage to employment prospects has been well documented. An
ICRW study in Uganda estimated that nearly 10 percent of incidents of intimate
partner violence resulted in women losing paid work days, an average of 11 days
annuallyxxix. Unfortunately no such study exists for Kenya, but survey data
indicates that levels of GBV are high.
3.50 The activities of ICS are anticipated to strengthen the mechanisms by which
civil society organisations are able to represent the communities they serve. For
example, at least 20 CSOs work in the areas of security, safety and GBV in Kenya.
We propose that improved policy dialogue through strengthened CSOs will boost
coordination of state actors providing security services.
Benefits to Government of Kenya
3.51 Strengthened coordination by GOK institutions, County administrations and
civil society stakeholders should result in efficiencies in allocation and use of
resources at national and county levels. Improved coordination is expected to
result from increased civil society scrutiny and the enhanced capabilities of state
security actors. These efficiency savings could be significant.
3.52 When benchmarked against international standards, there is significant room
for increased effectiveness and efficiencies in state provision of security and
safety. For example, according to the Baseline Survey on Policing Standards and
Gaps in Kenyaxxx, 64% of the felony cases reviewed never met the minimum
evidentiary threshold to charge a person with an offense. A further example is that
the ratio of police officer to population at 1:1550 (as at 2009) is still short of the
recommended UN ratio of 1:1450. Although GoK has been trying to address this
shortfall with new recruitment, a gap still persists meaning the existing police
officers must increase their productivity if Kenya is to deliver the standard of
security services its citizens deserve.
22
3.53 ICS aims to invest a significant amount (approx. £1.4m) for funding research,
learning, monitoring and evaluation. It is intended that this funding will result in
improved data and statistics on crime and violence, including GBV in Kenya.
Improved statistics will enable better programming, both for GoK and development
partners, leading to enhanced value for money. Development Partners (DPs)
spending on governance and security is expected to be worth around £500m within
the next 5 years.
Economic appraisal method
Break-even analysis
3.54 There are numerous practical and conceptual difficulties in monetising many
of the hypothecated benefits outlined for the ICS programme. Chief among the
practical difficulties at this stage is the lack of clarity regarding the locations where
the programme operates. Without this information there is a great deal of
uncertainty around the likely beneficiary numbers, the economic characteristics of
the area and the types of insecurity and violence experienced by the population.
The shortlist of 16 counties has a wide variation in these characteristics, as can be
seen in table 1.
3.55 The average county population for the short-list of 16 counties is 985
thousand, leading to a likely target population for 6 counties of 5.9 million. By
contrast the aggregate population of the 6 most highly populated counties is 9.4
million and of the 6 least populated 2.9 million. This is an increase in target
population of 223% between these two extreme sample groups. The high
population group of counties includes concentrations of economic activity
characterised by crime and productive regions characterised by ethnic conflicts
over scarce resources. The low population group of counties mainly consists of
arid and semi-arid lands with very little productive economic activity, subsistence
activities, high rates of emigration and very low population densities, significantly
driving up programme costs.
3.56 As a result of these differences the expected returns to ICS would be very
different. High economic returns would be more likely to be realised in the high
population group than the low one. However, conflict in many of the low population
areas is driven by competition for scarce resources, which may be more amenable
to management at the local level.
3.57 Even with a clear picture of the target area, a number of conceptual difficulties
remain with regard to monetisation of key benefits. These are acutely
demonstrated when considering inter-communal violence in low productivity areas
(where financial costs are likely to be small), sexual violence (which may not
impact greatly on productive activity) or violence against children (which may
impact school performance and job performance in the future, but with a low
present value, due to discounting). Any of these observations may be strictly true,
but all miss the point. The right of any individual to live free from the fear the fear of
violence or arbitrary persecution has a high inherent value. Where that value
cannot be satisfactorily quantified or monetised for standard appraisal techniques
to be employed, it is appropriate to clearly set out both the costs and benefits and
present the question: Do we value those benefits at least as highly as the costs
incurred in their acquisition?
23
3.58 The present value of the programme costs is £11.85 million. The question
above asks whether the present value of the expected benefits from the
programme will be at least as highly as this. Where benefits are non-monetisable
and non-quantifiable (due to the current lack of programme details) this judgement
is ultimately subjective. However, a detailed appraisal will be undertaken during the
programme inception phase, informed by the greater specificity available at that
time to approach the question more objectively.
3.59 Efficiency savings may be considered as an indicative measure of the
likelihood that the benefits produced will at least equate to the costs. Efficiency
savings refer to improvements in the provision in services that result from, for
example, better information, better stakeholder engagement, better equipment and
improved skills. The Government of Kenya currently spends KES 67 billion (£490
million) per year on security services (budget 2013/14). Much of this involves
wages for police officers. As discussed earlier, given the low ratio of police officers
to the public, it would be reasonable to expect that productivity must improve in
order to deliver the standard of security that the Kenyan population demand and
deserve.
3.60 Efficiency savings may be considered as an indicative measure of the
likelihood that the benefits produced will at least equate to the costs. Efficiency
savings refer to improvements in the provision in services that result from, for
example, better information, better stakeholder engagement, better equipment and
improved skills. The GoK currently spends KES 67 billion (£490 million) per year
on security services (budget 2013/14). Much of this comprises wages for police
officers. As discussed earlier, given the low ratio of police officers to the public,
productivity must improve in order to deliver the standard of security that the
Kenyan population demand and deserve.
3.61 Efficiency savings result from having to spend less to achieve the same
result, or achieving more with the same budget. Assuming that the national
security spending is evenly distributed across all counties in Kenya, the GoK
allocate an annual budget of £65.3 million for 6 counties. And assuming the
Kenyan Government maintains the same level of spending in nominal terms and
discounting at 10% annually, this equals a cumulative budget of £174.7 million in
present value in the 5 years after the ICS programme completes. For simplification
we assume that no benefits are realised until after the programme completes.
Given these assumptions, in the 5 years after the programme completes, efficiency
savings of 6.78% are required from the £174.7 million budget for the ICS
programme to break even.
3.62 Required efficiency savings of 6.71%, based on our assumptions, gives us
confidence that the benefits will at least match the costs – and probably exceed
them. Our assumptions are unlikely to hold, spending is likely to increase, benefits
are likely to be realised in the 4 years the programme is running and any shortfalls
are likely to be made up by other benefits that we have been unable to monetise.
3.63 We expect the GoK to increase the security budget in nominal terms over 9
years (4 programme years and 5 years afterwards) in order to avoid significant
reductions in real terms. This will dramatically increase the security budget in
nominal terms and reduce the required efficiency savings measured as a
percentage. It is also excessively restrictive to assume that no benefits will be
24
realised until the programme activities completes and the sooner that benefits are
realised the higher their value is in present terms, further reducing the efficiency
savings required. Moreover this analysis does not account for any benefits other
than efficiency savings from the public budget, which is only one small sub-set of
possible benefits from the programme. Other benefits will make up any shortfall in
the efficiency savings, but we have been unable to estimate them here due to the
methodological issues discussed earlier.
3.64 All benefits accrued by communities, individuals, businesses, reduced strain
on scarce natural resources and any multiplier effects between these are excluded.
All of these benefits will reduce the efficiency savings required to break even. In
our view, full consideration of these benefits would demonstrate that this
programme will easily break even.
Institutional Appraisal
3.65 A lack of institutional capacity is a barrier to deliver safety and security in
Kenya. The institutions to be supported to strengthen capacity transparency and
strategic approach include: MoICNG, NPS, NSC, MoDP’s Directorate of Gender,
County Peace Committees, County Security Committees and County Policing
Authorities. The county level bodies are nascent, and need to develop skills and
responsiveness which offers an opportunity to shape service delivery. Oversight
bodies and independent commissions for police, gender equality and
peacebuilding/reconciliation have predominantly been established in the last three
years so are likewise an opportunity for a new way of addressing violence in
Kenya. The ICS Programme will develop guidance to implement new policies, to
pilot and roll them out in target counties, ensure social representation, and pilot
new approaches to the delivery of these services that influence changes in policy.
Building institutional capacity to recognise and respond to the needs of vulnerable
groups, notably girls and women, will be critical for effecting sustainable change.
Environmental Appraisal
3.66 This programme is considered to be low risk to the environment, so no
environmental impact assessment has been conducted. The management of
natural resources, particularly access to pasture and water, is a major driver of
conflict in dryer areas of Kenya and climate change can exacerbate it. It can also
increase women and girls’ workload (e.g. water, food and firewood collection) and
may expose women and girls to increased risks of sexual and domestic violence.
The preferred option, by improving peace and security could contribute to creating
conditions that enable greater freedom of movement and access to important
resources that pastoralist groups depend on to cope with and adapt to severe
drought. In addition, building the capacity of civil society and community groups
could provide long-term entry points for climate adaptation and mitigation activities,
such as through peace committees, etc.
Social Appraisal
3.67 Social impacts of the ICS Programme from the effect of reducing levels of
violence in different parts of Kenya are expected to be significant. Many of the
women and girls at greatest risk of violence live in poverty, but poverty is not what
puts a woman at risk. She is at risk because she is female and the cultural and
25
traditional environment is generally hostile towards women regardless of income.
GBV literature overwhelmingly points to the view that changing social norms on
gender though seemingly a daunting task—is what is required to make
communities in which girls and women can live without fearxxxi. The programme
specifically targets girls and women with the aim that the combined effects of
improved public safety and security, more appropriate responsive mechanisms
including access to justice, healthcare and psycho-social support will reduce strain
on individual and household violence-coping mechanisms. In turn, these will help
prevent early marriage and early pregnancy and this has a significant impact on
girls’ education, causing early drop out. Less education, coupled with early/forced
marriage increases the risk of girls experiencing violence.
3.68 It is expected that an inception period of six months will be required given the
volatility of the security and political situation, the newness of the devolution
security agenda, the need to assess political will in counties and to select the right
ones in coordination with GoK and other donors.
Theory of Change
3.69 On the basis of the preferred option outlined below, we have developed a
Theory of Change (Figure 2) that elaborates what will be done over the next two
and half years to improve lives for Kenyans. Using the political space that is
developing at county level, we intend to build a stronger role for the state to
accountably respond to disputes and grievances, as well as for citizens to know
what to expect. If the assumptions underpinning the ICS programme are accurate,
as well as improving safety and security, this should improve citizen-state
relationships. In order to achieve this, state capacities to respond to these
grievances need to be improved, so all components will have strong capacitybuilding elements.
Outputs
3.70 As a result of the theory of change, four indicative programme outputs have
been developed which will be reconfirmed during the inception phase:
1) Improved governance and coordination of safety and security institutions at
national level and in 6-8 counties.
2) Enhanced capacity at community level within 6-8 counties of policing,
peacebuilding and GBV institutions and mechanisms, along with improved
data collection and operational research
3) Improved oversight of safety and security institutions in 6-8 counties
4) Increased public awareness of right and responsibilities in 6-8 counties,
including on GBV, conflict and policing, and improved responsiveness in by
police stations.
26
27
Value for Money (VfM)
3.71 Until the programme details are established in the inception phase a
thorough VfM analysis is not possible. Some short-listed counties carry high
costs due to reduced access and remoteness, which will reduce the initial cost
efficiency of the programme. By contrast the nature of conflict in these areas
may be more suited to locally driven solutions, improving the probability of
success and the ultimate cost effectiveness
3.72 VfM in the programme will be assessed using the ‘three Es framework:
Economy, efficiency, effectiveness. Additionally the programme will utilise
the VfM tools developed by DFID Kenya, disaggregated VfM into actions
taken to improve VfM and measurements of it. Actions will be compared to the
best practice examples the DFID Kenya office is collating. ‘Actions’ refer to
the strategies that are employed to improve the VfM of the programme at
each of the 3 ‘Es’. Measurements will be selected to determine whether these
actions have been successful, as well as for comparison to similar
programmes. They will assess unit costs at each level; Economy procurement (prices); Efficiency - cost efficiency; and Effectiveness - cost
effectiveness.
3.73 DFID Kenya will work with the implementing partner to utilise a budget
format that identifies key costs for regular monitoring (major cost components
and highly variable costs that affect budget control) and allocates the budget
to output lines. This format will enable the simple calculation of unit costs and
regular assessment of budget performance.
3.74 Table 4 sets out the VfM indicators that are under consideration.
Ultimately these will be finalised during the inception phase, following the
development of programme activities and VfM actions. These will be tracked
at annual reviews and through monitoring and evaluation activities.
Table 4: Value for Money Indicators
Economic
Efficiency
Effectiveness



Salary structures,
consultancy fee rates
and per diems
compared to similar
programmes
elsewhere.
The ratio of
management costs to
total costs or
programme costs/ total
costs.





Budget forecast vs.
actual expenditure
(budget utilisation).
Efficiency savings
documented and
recorded, eg, cost
sharing opportunities
with other
programmes.
Unit cost of training per
mentor/ researcher/
unit
Quality and accuracy
of police records of
incidence of crime.
Research completed
on time and on budget.
28



Rate of Return: The
break even analysis
results can be updated
at the project end
evaluation to verify the
assumptions related to
the efficiency of public
spending on security.
Cost per beneficiary in
programme
interventions
Cost per community
safety plan developed
and implemented.
% change in adults
who reported a crime
to the police and are

Number of papers
published related to
programmatic
evidence on what
works, what does not
and why.

satisfied with their
response (by sex and
ethnic group).
Evidence of girls,
women and children
able to access
grievance redress
mechanisms.
Value for money statement
3.75 We assess this preferred option to represent VfM given that:
 It is preferred to the counterfactual, do nothing, option.
 It is the preferred option from the options for intervention
 Its VfM will be tracked closely using the VfM actions template, budget
format and measurements that will be finalised during inception.
III:
COMMERCIAL CASE
4.1 We have chosen to implement the ICS Programme through a third party
contractor which will ensure a tighter control over a multi-pronged, complex
programme, as well as ensuring relevance to the context and helping us to
manage the high risks we are taking on. The programme will have multiple
components at national, county and community levels, including policy
development as well as programme. All these aspects will be coordinated
through a single service provider to ensure coherence of results, risk
management and VfM.
Direct Procurement
4.2 Our chosen route was for a mini-competition design and implement
contract, drawn from the governance and security framework managed by
PCD, and to take advantage of the pre-selection of preferred supplier with
proven capacity to deliver. We considered separating the design phase from
the implementation phase for the contract, however, there are a very limited
number of potential suppliers and they were highly unlikely to bid just for
design without possibility of implementation too. The design report from the
service provider, Coffey International, showed that there are a number of
areas of improvement required for the inception and implementation phases.
These will be addressed through a detailed delivery plan for the inception
phase as well as key concerns being negotiated before the contract is agreed.
4.3 DFID Kenya will develop an agreed workplan of deliverables prior to the
inception phase commencing, and will also include a formal contract break
clause between inception and implementation phases to enable DFID to
assess performance, re-negotiate the contract or, in cases of poor
performance, terminate it. This will again apply after two years of
implementation. Of the range of programme implementation under ICS, it is
likely that the service provider will directly provide technical assistance; a
number of CVs will be submitted to DFID for approval beforehand. Cost
savings were achieved for the design phase through negotiations following
29
the selection of the preferred bidder and again will be renegotiated for the
subsequent phases.
4.4 During implementation, the supplier will be required to attend quarterly
supplier management meetings. Payments will be made on a quarterly basis
and will be subject to key performance indicators that measure performance
against milestones, the performance of the supplier and the impact of the
programme against the intended programme outcome. Under standard
contractual arrangements, procurement of goods and services over £100,000
will be contracted out to DFID procurement agents. All contracts have the
facility to be extended by up to two years, depending on performance, and
assuming no additional cost.
Indirect Procurement
4.5 The service provider will be in partnership with a small number of local
NGOs to deliver the programme, particularly at county and community level,
as well as a research institute. Some of these partners were involved in the
service provider’s bid and in the design phase through sub-contracts. The
final decision on the local partners will be made during the inception phase
and be dependent on geographical location as well as priority needs in the
target counties. There is a limited range of quality partners in these thematic
areas in Kenya so procurement procedures will have to take that into account.
IV: FINANCIAL CASE
5.1 The total budget of the ICS Programme is £14 million, of which £300k has
been spent on the design phase. £5.06 million is available under the DFID
Kenya framework to March 2016 and has been allocated indicatively beyond
that. The inception phase will reconfirm the budget profile but it is indicatively
laid out in Table 5. A degree of financial flexibility within the overall approved
budget will be required to respond to success and failure within the
programme and variations within the context, particularly based around the
risks outlined in Table 7. Decisions on financial reallocations within the
approved budget envelope will be taken by the ICS Programme Advisory
Committee (see management case).
Table 5: ICS Budget (Resource) per Output by Year
Preferred Option (£000's)
Design (included in total budget figures)
Inception
Output 1: Improved governance and
coordination of safety and security
2014/15
300
499
619
648
2017/18 Total
300
499
648
1,916
Output 2: Enhanced capacity and response
of safety and security institutions
1,239
1,297
1,297
3,833
Output 3: Improved oversight of safety and
security institutions
1,239
1,297
1,297
3,833
Output 4: Increased public awareness of
rights and responsibilities, including on
GBV, conflict and policing
757
793
793
2,342
30
2015/16 2016/17
Research, Monitoring, Evaluation &
Learning
Total
799
413
432
432
1,278
4,267
4,467
4,467
14,000
5.2 After mitigation, the risk of fraud and corruption is considered to be low.
The service provider will be required to submit a financial management
manual to cover itself for approval by DFID Kenya during inception, and it will
be the provider’s role to review partners’ finance manuals. The main routes to
audit discharge will be through: rigorous assurance by the service provider of
at least quarterly invoices to ensure that DFID funds are being spent in
accordance with agreed workplans; the contractor will also ensure that audit
reports for funds dispersed and also those by local partners will be made
available to DFID. The contractor will also have an obligation to make all
records available for audit by DFID. Due diligence has been conducted on the
service provider at its HQ offices by DFID centrally. The provider will be
expected to conduct due diligence assessment to a DFID standard on all its
local partners and any sub-grantees. Spot checks will be conducted on the
service provider in Kenya.
5.3 Some assets may be procured under this project for the establishment of
oversight bodies’ offices at county level, eg office furniture, IT equipment, and
potentially bicycles or motorbikes. These will remain DFID assets and we will
make recommendations as to their disposal at the end of the programme.
The service provider will maintain a register of assets and will provide DFID
with an updated list of all assets purchased on an annual basis.
V: MANAGEMENT CASE
Inception phase
6.1 Six months will be spent on the ICS programme’s inception phase. This
period of time will be necessary to:
 Finalise the criteria and determine the target counties, and agree the
decision with target county and national governments;
 Conduct crime, conflict and gender assessments in those counties;
 Procure and conduct a household survey in the target counties;
 Assess level of police station and other relevant data in the target
counties, and finalise what support to give;
 Decide the scope and questions for the operational research;
 Revise and finalise the economic appraisal;
 Finalise the VfM appraisal and indicators;
 Finalise the budget across FY 2014/18 and across outputs;
 Refine the logframe to ensure it aligns with changes made during the
inception phase and add milestone and target data;
 Finalise management arrangements.
An assessment against the inception phase delivery plan will be used to
ascertain whether the service provider has satisfactorily fulfilled its
requirements.
31
ICS Programme Management Arrangements
6.2 Principle DFID staff members involved in implementing and overseeing
the ICS programme will include:
 Senior Governance Adviser / Team Leader (A1) providing an programme
oversight role as well as high level political advice
 Conflict Adviser (A2) fulfilling the Senior Responsible Officer role in
ensuring the programme delivers results, VfM, M&E and manages its risk,
as well as being lead adviser for conflict, security and conflict sensitivity
issues.
 Social Development Adviser (A2(L)) advising on adherence to the Gender
Equality Act, gender mainstreaming, and gender-based violence.
 Senior Programme Officer (B1) leading on contract management,
reviewing reports, payments, annual and project completion reviews
 Programme Officer (C1) supporting payments, asset management, audit
discharge etc.
6.3 The day-to-day running of the programme will be managed by the service
provider. The main counterpart in the GoK will be the Ministry of Interior and
Coordination of National Government (MoICNG) which covers the policing
and peacebuilding aspects and the Directorate of Gender in the Ministry of
Devolution and Planning (MoDP). The ICS programme will not use
government systems for delivering its results. DFID Kenya has judged that
the Partnership Principles do not apply in the detailed management and
monitoring of this programme.
6.4 Key points of assurance throughout the programme are:
 Quarterly submission of financial and progress reports by suppliers which
DFID Kenya will judge against contract management performance.
 Quarterly Programme Advisory Committee meetings, attended by DFID,
HMG, government and civil society representatives, which will review
progress against agreed workplans, review the risk management matrix
and ensure political support for implementation. Large or contentious
decisions will be elevated from the Steering committee for senior
management or Ministerial steer or approval.
 Quarterly DFID / service provider meetings will monitor the programme’s
relevance to the context and theory of change, review the risk
management matrix, VfM and consider recommendations for any changes
to the programme that can be accommodated within standing approval
limits. These meetings will also track progress against the programme
delivery plan developed by the service provider and approved by DFID.
Frequent security assessments and situation updates will also be
discussed in these meetings or more frequently as necessary.
 Six-monthly Performance Contract Reviews will assess how the service
provider is delivering on its contract and whether performance is good
enough to ensure achievement of impact
 Annual reviews of the programme which will be conducted by independent
evaluators to specifically review whether the overall package is: delivering
against the logframe milestones and targets, relevant to the context,
managing its risk and finances, and providing VfM.
32


Key Performance Indicators are used throughout implementation to judge
contractor performance and to provide criteria for payment of invoices. If
KPIs are not met, contractors will not be paid and performance
management measures may be put in place.
Mid-term Review and Project Completion Review will be led by
independent providers to assess if the programme is responding correctly
to the context or if a different approach is required as well as if the
programme delivered on its logframe, and what lessons can be learnt for
future programming.
ICS Programme Governance Arrangements
6.5 The ICS Programme Advisory Committee will be an important mechanism
to provide advice from FCO and OGDs, civil society and/or academia,
MoICNG & MoDP, and ensure a wider perspective is taken into account in
managing the programme. Ultimately the SRO is responsible for managing
the programme and delivery, however it is recognised that this task is
facilitated by working with experts, ie an Advisory Committee fulfils this expert
function. The relationship between the Advisory Committee and the SRO
should be a mutually supportive one. The service provider will provide
quarterly narrative and financial reports to the Programme Advisory
Committee (PAC).Likely PAC functions will include:
 Developing an overview of the ICS, with particular reference to the broad
aims of the programme and its ongoing development.
 Ensuring that links and synergies between outputs are identified and feed
into the overall running of the programme
 Offering advice to the programme on developing practices and standards
that should be incorporated into the programme.
 To offer advice on dissemination, exit strategies and M&E for the
programme.
 Identifying synergies with organisations both outside and within the
violence reduction community
6.6 Members of the PAC will also feed into GoK’s Police Reform Steering
Committee and the higher level Police Reform Governance Committee, both
of these are supported by the Police Reform Secretariat.
Risk
6.7 The ICS Programme is judged to be a medium-to-high risk programme.
This is due to high political, security and reputational risks. Table 7
summarises the main risks associated with the programme. These risks
represent our operating environment: we cannot avoid them and have to work
with and mitigate them if we are to achieve the intended impact of the ICS
programme.
6.8 Working in this high risk environment dictates that we must apply some
operational principles that frame the approach we will take. These are:
 That the ICS programme is a long-term proposition and that the impact
represents an incremental step towards longer-term safety and security in
Kenya;
33



We will continually review and update our understanding of the context
and make this understanding the driving factor of programming decisions;
We will be open about the risks we are taking through this intervention and
will set out how we will mitigate them, but we recognise that mitigation is
not guaranteed.
Progress towards the outcome will not be uniform. We will scale-up our
successes and learn from our mistakes.
Table 7: Summary of Key Risks and Mitigation Measures
(red = high, amber = medium, green = low)
Risk
Probability
A.
Impact
Mitigation Measures
Political
1.
Political
support for
programme at
national and county
level counties
deteriorates




2.
Resistance
to change too
embedded to
overcome





3.
County
level actors drive or
exacerbate conflict



DFID & HMG to closely work with gov’t coordination
bodies such as the National Steering Committee, and
Police Reform Steering Committee to support mutual
understanding and agreement
Counties are selected following intense consultation
during inception phase with both national and county
level GoK and non-government stakeholders
DFID and service provider (SP – which includes local
partners) to ensure minimal engagement and
relationships are established with 1-2 additional
counties so programme can easily scale up if so
required.
SP to ensure high profile nature of ICS through
communications and strategic engagement based on
evidence
DFID, HMG & SP to maintain organisational
awareness and periodic PEA to identify key drivers
and incentives for change in the Ministry, and strategy
developed to maximise their impact.
SP to ensure flexible adaptive and opportunistic
approach to programming, allowing the programme to
move quickly into areas where progress is possible,
while in parallel working to unblock constraints
encountered in other areas.
SP to choose partners carefully so they represent
citizens’ voice and work towards constructive
engagement with the government.
DFID, HMG, Programme Advisory Committee (PAC) &
SP identify influential actors who can work with
national and county levels to mitigate risks or any
deterioration of relationship.
DFID, HMG & SP to identify potential “spoilers” and
development of strategy to overcome blockages they
may cause.
In-depth conflict analysis will be conducted annually by
the SP to assess roles and incentives of key actors.
Conflict sensitivity training will be delivered by SP &
local partners to major stakeholders.
DFID, HMG & SP to identify potential “spoilers” and
development of strategy to overcome blockages they
may cause.
34
Risk
Probability
Impact
Mitigation Measures
4.
GoK
relationship with
western donors
worsens.

5.
Lack of
leadership and
capacity to
improve
governance and
accountability
(especially at
county level)

6.
Trained
personnel not used
in appropriate posts
at national, and
county government
which hinders
reform progress

7.
Failure to
change cultural
norms &
behaviours on
women and
children’s rights in
target institutions
and counties.








8.
GoK fails
to implement
oversight bodies’
recommendations
and/or the latter are
involved in
corruption and
political influence.
9.
Counties
neglecting the
community level.
10.
Programm
e fails to promote
sustainability and
ownership


B.
SP to identify capacity gaps and incentives at
leadership level to improve requirement for
accountability and good management and design
training to adapt.
SP to conduct PEA for candidate provinces to identify
most favourable conditions for capacity development.
SP to ensure training best fits the time constraints of
senior officials.
SP to design TA and programmes to allow repetition
and reinforcement when need be and ensure that the
programme has multiple access points for
counterparts during the lifetime of the programme.
DFID, HMG, PAC & SP to develop relationships with a
broad range of GoK officials to ensure that the
programme has broad-based GoK support that can
influence decision-making.
SP to identify different entry points for addressing
women and children’s rights.
Political economy analysis and research conducted by
the SP to understand the potential blockages to
changes in behaviour
SP to balance approach to coordinate with
organisations around these issues and with
communities to raise awareness
SP Advocacy and communication at national and
county level to raise awareness of these issues
DFID, HMG, PAC & SP to develop relationships with
a broad range of GoK officials to ensure that the
programme has broad-based GoK support that can
influence decision-making.
DFID, HMG, PAC & SP to work with political,
institutional and parliamentary leadership to ensure
buy-in to accountability.

SP to work closely with the national level, county level
and community level and ensure that the community
level is not neglected whilst encouraging engagement /
creating a channel between all levels of GoK.

SP to provide capacity building, mentoring and training
to promote citizen mobilisation and government
ownership; TA will enable piloting of locally led
programmes
SP to identify project priorities to be undertaken in a
participatory and iterative manner reflecting priorities
of local stakeholders.

11.
High levels
of staff turnover in
counterpart staff
DFID, HMG, PAC & SP maintain close engagement
with relevant government counterparts throughout
process
Work with partners that have good working
relationships with GoK.

SP to implement measures to mitigate the impact of
staff turnover through institutionalised support.
Financial
35
Risk
Probability
1.
Misuse of
grant funds by
service provider or
grantees
Impact
Mitigation Measures



2.
Vested
interest and
corruption causing
disruption to the
programme
C.


The SP to factor measures to combat the effects of
corruption and vested interest in its engagement at all
levels
The SP to factor in types of partnerships appropriate
for the programmes approach, tackling vested interest
and assessing the barriers to change.
Security
1.
Security
situation
deteriorates




2.
Major
incidents on Health
Safety Security
Environment
undermine the
programme & team
D.
DFID to conduct due diligence, spot checks, audit
discharge on the SP.
The SP to conduct due diligence prior to grantee
awards, regular monitoring and spot checks, TA to
combat weaknesses, and audit compliance.
Funding released against verification of agreed
milestones


SP to design a security structure including identification
of alternative delivery strategies
DFID, HMG, PAC and SP to establish presence in
geographically diverse locations to minimise
security risk impact.
SP to operate remotely by a minimal presence on the
ground in very insecure contexts.
SP to deliver through locally accepted implementing
partners (conflict sensitive delivery) that have been
assessed for due diligence requirements.
SP to implement rigorous recruitment standards,
including psychological and health testing, of all team
members.
SP to establish close working relationships with key
counterparts to distance the team from any international
incidents.
Reputational
1.
A major
scandal negatively
affects the UK’s
ability to partner
with the police and /
or GoK (corruption,
human rights, ICC)
2.
ICS work
is perceived to, or
associated with,
strengthening
security forces’
ability to oppress
and conduct
operations in
violation of human
rights, particularly
those of minorities


DFID & HMG red lines are identified and human rights
concerns communicated clearly and regularly to police
and Ministry during implementation.
SP to ensure flexibility to shift to other partners and
deliver impact.

DFID, HMG, PAC & SP will focus on institutional
capacity building and will provide no tactical
training support or provision of weapons that might
be put to use in breach of human rights

DFID, HMG, PAC & SP will integrate accountability
at all levels
 SP to ensure human rights concerns, including
mistreatment of minorities, will form regular part of
dialogue with all partners
Human Rights Risk
6.9 An Overseas Security and Justice Assistance assessment (OSJA) has
been conducted on the policing component. This concludes that the benefits
of the ICS Programme, in terms of Kenya’s adherence to human rights
36
standards, outweigh the potential risks of engagement. The design has
proposed a number of different implementation partners (GoK, NPS, civil
society, oversight institutions and communities). Working with each of these
partners carries a different degree of reputational risk to DFID on human
rights grounds:
 Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government
represents a medium risk in terms of adherence to its civilian oversight
role over the police.
 The National Police Service represents a high reputational risk arising
from DFID commencing police partnership at a time where police
modus operandi is widely criticised and in breach of human rights and
freedoms. Difficult to mitigate given the ongoing publicity.
 Oversight institutions and civil society carry a low human rights and
reputational risk overall, although ineffective oversight institutions could
be viewed as condoning police practices that violates human rights.
 Traditional Elders carry a medium to low risk, due to discrimination
against women and girls and minorities.
6.10 The breadth of partnerships within the programme allows for more
effective flexibility and mitigation by a) promoting accountability and b) limiting
amount of resources invested directly in the police. Where we hear of credible
allegations of human rights abuses, we will:
 Press the Government of Kenya to undertake an appropriate
investigation and take action;
 Seek further information ourselves.
If the result of either or both the government’s investigation or our own
enquiries give us reasonable concern to suggest that there has been a
significant (understood to be significant or widespread) abuse, either in
relation directly to the programme or the immediate operating environment for
the programme, we would then refer the matter to Ministers for advice on
action to be taken. We will revise our Overseas Security and Justice
Assessment on an annual basis to reflect an updated assessment.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring
6.11 The ICS Programme will develop and implement a monitoring framework
at the outcome, output and activity levels during the inception phase and will
include:
a. Baseline analysis and surveys in 6-8 target counties which will
include:
i.
gender analysis to be conducted by local partners on an
annual basis,
ii.
conflict and political economy analysis to be conducted by local
partners on an annual basis,
iii.
household survey in selected areas of the target counties to be
procured and conducted every 1-2 years,
iv.
assessment of police station log books, probably by local
partners and ongoing monitoring on an annual basis
37
v.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
collection of other relevant data, eg in referral centres, probably
by local partners, on an annual basis
Operational research methodologies (see evaluation section below).
Delivery Reporting: Project milestone and outputs on technical
assistance and delivery through monthly, quarterly, annual and midterm reports, as well as specific highlight reports identified in the
inception phase. The Annual and Mid-Term reviews, to be conducted
independently, will inform us as to the relevance of our Theory of
Change, and political and conflict sensitivity: decisions as to whether
changes are needed to the programme will be made on this basis.
Financial Reporting: The management agent will provide quarterly
financial reports and an annual independent audit statement to DFID
which clearly identifies DFID funds. Forecasts and bi-annual financial
expenditure reports, audits, annual reviews and a project completion
report.
Implementation plans: the service provider will be required to develop
an implementation plan, agreed with DFID Kenya specifying outputs
at regular stages of implementation.
During the inception phase the cost-benefit analysis will be updated
once the specific activities, locations and logframe indicators are
agreed, and the VfM measures finalised. These measures will then be
reported on annually
Other assessments: Frequent security assessments and situation
updates, as well as annual field-level assessments to all focal
counties.
A programme steering committee will be established to provide
oversight, strategic management, and advice. It will be made up of
representatives from the Government of Kenya, the UK Government
and civil society.
6.12 Part of the programme aims to improve data collection in the focal
counties, this will be confirmed during inception, and could include GBV
reporting levels at police stations as well as follow up actions after reporting.
Evaluation
6.13 The M&E framework will also test assumptions made in the Theory of
Change and the evidence behind it, for example, levels of impact of technical
assistance on governance and coordination of safety and security at the
national level; training of new county officials improves delivery of safety and
security; or assessing different types of awareness-raising.
6.14 There have been many shorter-term, pilot-type projects on safety and
security in Kenya which have produced useful lessons but many fewer largescale, consistent programmes. Many academics and practitioners have
studied safety and security in Kenya but few have drawn this together to
inform implementation on broad approaches to violence reduction. The design
phase confirmed that different counties of Kenya experience violence in
different proportions, e.g. GBV rates are highest in western Kenya, intercommunal conflict highest in the north and east.
38
6.15 The programme will need a variety of responses to these needs and,
therefore, an impact evaluation will not be applicable. Instead, an operational
research approach, to be managed by the service provider through a separate
contract with a research institute, will be developed which:
a) conducts secondary data analysis on former pilot projects and other
programmes;
b) learns from the wealth of literature and consolidation of experience
from small projects;
c) works alongside the monitoring component to provide deeper analysis;
d) draws in beneficiaries as part of the learning process to generate
qualitative evidence;
e) revisits the programme design and ongoing implementation in light of
this additional and ongoing information generation.
6.16 This would need to be finalised early on in the inception phase and may
decide, as the range of issues that counties could prioritise from is broad, that
a specific emphasis on one of the four outputs, or 1-2 counties, or a theme,
such as policing, peacebuilding or community security, may be more valuable
to analyse. This research would inform not only the programme but also
communities, civil society, county governments and national institutions.
6.17 The service provider will explore whether any of the benefits identified in
the cost-benefit analysis can be estimated through case studies of project
interventions in particular communities.
Endnotes
i
These results are indicative and will be refined during the inception phase once the
necessary baselines have been developed. The current figures are based on:
 For no of beneficiaries reached: average population of 6 counties is 5,953,532. Of
that figure, 40% are likely to be reached. Of those reached, 50% are likely to report
actual improved awareness = 1.19 m (based on DFID Ethiopia’s Community Security
& Justice programme, and USAID’s Peace Initiative Kenya but reduced as some
counties have wide geographic dispersal of the population) .
 Of those reached, 70% are likely to benefit = 833k (based on DFIDE CSJ prog).
 There are 456 stations in Kenya, divided by 47 counties and times by 6 focal counties
= 58. This figure is then reduced by 30% as some counties have wide geographic
dispersal of police stations = 34.
 The no related forums in each county vary but there are a minimum of 3 (eg, County
Policing Authority, County Security Committee, County peace fora), based on 6
counties.
ii OCHA: Impacts of Communal Conflict, Kenya (2013).
iii Small Arms Survey: Availability of small arms and perceptions of security in Kenya (2012).
iv National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro (KNBS and ICF Macro) (2010) Kenya
Demographic and Health Survey 2008–09. Calverton, Maryland: KNBS, page 247
v http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2014/KEN/OVER
vi OECD (2011). “Breaking Cycles of Armed Violence: Key Issues in Armed Violence
Reduction.
vii The World Bank estimates that countries experience a 0.7% reduction in GDP for each
neighbouring conflict-affected country, World Bank (2011). “World Development Report 2011:
Conflict, Security and Development.”
viii World Bank (2011). Op.Cit.
ix Transparency International’s East African Bribery Index 2013 rated the Kenyan National
Police Service as the most corrupt institution in Kenya.
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000096215
39
xhttp://www.ipoa.go.ke/images/press/IPOAOperationUSALAMAWATCHSanitizationEastleighF
inalReport3Jul2014.pdf
xi Kristin Valasek. “Security Sector Reform and Gender.” Gender and Security Sector Reform
Toolkit. Eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UNINSTRAW, 2008
xii
http://ipoa.go.ke/images/press/MONITORING%20REPORT%20ON%20OPERATION%20(US
ALAMA%20WATCH)%2017%207%202014.pdf
xiii Ibid
xiv
In 2012 the UK’s Prime Minister set out his new direction for development which included,
"the golden thread" of conditions that enable open economies and open societies to thrive:
the rule of law, the absence of conflict and corruption, and the presence of property rights and
strong institutions”.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204712904578090571423009066?mg=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052970204712904578090571423009066.html
xv DFID Practice Paper: Building Peaceful States and Societies (2010).
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67694/Buildingpeaceful-states-and-societies.pdf
xvi Key sources of evidence:
Mc Evoy, Claire, “Battering, Rape, and Lethal Violence: A Baseline of Information on Physical
Threats against Women in Nairobi”, The Small Arms Survey (2012), Switzerland, page 55.
xvii Thematic Evaluation of European Commission support to Justice and Security System
Reform’, European Commission, 2011
xviii AusAid (2012) ‘Building on Local Strengths: evaluation of Australian Law and Justice
Assistance
xix A. Odendaal, “An Architecture for Building Peace at the Local Level: a Comparative Study
of Local Peace Committees” UNDP (2010).
xx Rocha Menocal, A. and Sharma, B, “Joint Evaluation of Citizens’ Voice and Accountability:
Synthesis Report”, DFID (2008), http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/3425.pdf
xxi World Development Report 2012: Gender and Equality Development”, World Bank (2012)
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/77781051299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf
xxii UK Stabilisation Unit (2014), ‘Policing the Context: Principles and Guidance to Inform
International Policing Assistance
xxiii http://www.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/operations/projects/peacebuilding/uwianopeace-platform-project/
xxiv Spangaro J, Zwi A, Adogu C, Ranmuthugala G, Davies GP, Steinacker L (2013) What is
the evidence of the impact of initiatives to reduce risk and incidence of sexual violence in
conflict and post-conflict zones and other humanitarian crises in lower and middle-income
countries? A systematic review. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit,
Institute of Education, University of London.
http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jGcUl_oxGng%3d&tabid=3405
xxv Hanna, R., Bishop, S., Nadel, S., Scheffler, G, Durlacher, K. (2011) The effectiveness of
anti-corruption policy: what has worked, what hasn‟t, and what we don’t know –a systematic
review. Technical report. London: EPPI-Centre, Social
Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London.
ISBN: 978-1-907345-14-2
xxvi Saferworld: Preventing Violent Conflict. Building Safer Lives, Annual Review 2012-2013
xxvii Global Peace Index 2013: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peaceindex/2014/KEN/OVER.
xxviii World Bank Economic Update, December 2013, p.27.
xxix ICRW & UNFPA: Intimate Partner Violence: High Costs to Households and Communities
(2007). http://www.icrw.org/files/publications/Intimate-Partner-Violence-High-Costs-toHouseholds-and-Communities-Brief.pdf
xxx Baseline Survey on Policing Standards and Gaps in Kenya, Study Commissioned by
IPOA, 2013, p.8. Hard copy provided by IJM.
xxxi OXFAM, 2007 Violence Against Women: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania,pg.8.
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