Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost
Fire Review, Umpqua National Forest, U.S.
Forest Service
National Oversight Review
National Incident Management Organization
5/8/2014
Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 1
Purpose............................................................................................................................................ 2
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Objectives of the Review ................................................................................................................ 6
Fire Chronology .............................................................................................................................. 7
Observations ................................................................................................................................. 11
Discussion by review objective .................................................................................................... 12
Attachments .................................................................................................................................. 22
Key Fire Events............................................................................................................................. 23
WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Rationale) ................................ 24
Operational Map (August 16, 2013) ............................................................................................. 38
Public Information Map (August 14, 2013) .................................................................................. 39
Progression Map (August 12, 2013) ............................................................................................. 40
Umpqua National Forest Interview Schedule ............................................................................... 41
Objective of this Review
The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document risk
management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect effect
on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management for
incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive analysis of
incident documentation.
This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and
facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an
opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the
effectiveness of implementation in the field.
The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning
environment
and continued
improvement
fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
Whiskey
Complex
Programmatic/Cost
FireinReview
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
Review Objectives:
Objectively look at actions
taken by the Incident
Management Team and the
local Agency Administrator
to meet the direction
provided by the Forest
Service Chief
Asses the consideration and
effectiveness of applying risk
management concepts to
incident cost through the
associated decisions and
expenditures as an outcome
Identify Best Business
Practices Used on Fires This
Past Season
Identify How Social and
Political Issues Factored Into
Our Decision Making
Identify Which Current
Procedures Can Be Enhanced
or Expanded
Identify Improvements That
Can Be Made In Sharing and
Clarifying Expectations
Review Team Members:
Tom Johnston, SOF-NIMO
Tim Sampson, Fire Staff,
Colville National Forest
Joe Krish, Fire Operations
Specialist, Regional Office
Carla Schamber, IBARegional Office
Gabe Dumm, Fire Planner,
Umpqua National Forest
Kris Ericksen, PIO-NIMO
Purpose
In December 2012, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation
Management requested that the National Incident Management
Organization (NIMO) assign team leaders for the ten selected fires
within Forest Service Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. The NIMO
Executive Committee assigned James “Tom” Johnston to be the
National Programmatic/Cost Fire Review Team Leader for the
Whiskey Complex (OR-UPF-130132) on the Umpqua National
Forest and the Vinegar Fire (OR-UMF-000845) on the Umatilla
National Forest, both in the Pacific Northwest (PNW) Region. The
review team consisted of: Tom Johnston (Safety Officer-NIMO);
Carla Schamber (IBA-PNW Region); Mike Ferris (Public
Information Officer-Writer/Editor-NIMO); Gabe Dumm (Fire
Planner-Umpqua National Forest); Tim Sampson (Fire Staff-Colville
National Forest); Joe Krish (Fire Specialist-PNW Region); Kris
Eriksen (Public Information Officer-NIMO); Dana Reid (Finance
Section Chief-NIMO); and Terri Knauth (Safety Officer-NIMO).
The team reviewed numerous documents located on the Forest,
from the Incident Management Teams (IMT), within the Whiskey
Complex ftp site and on InciWeb. Documentation that was
reviewed included: Incident Action Plans (IAPs); Wildland Decision
Support System (WFDSS); Incident Status Summaries (209’s); fire
maps; Delegation of Authority (DOA); Key Decision Log (KDL);
WFDSS-After Action Reviews (AAR) information; and the
Rehabilitation Plan. Twelve on-site interviews were held in
Roseburg, Oregon on March 12-13, 2014. Those interviewed
included the: Forest Supervisor; Deputy Forest Supervisor; Forest
Fire Management Officer; Timber Planner, Fire Planner; Incident
Business Advisor; and the Public Affairs Officer on the Umpqua
National Forest. Also interviewed were the Tiller District Ranger
and District Fire Management Officer and three Douglas Forest
Protection Association (DFPA) personnel. Phone interviews were
Dana Reid, FSC-NIMO
Terri Knauth, SOF-NIMO
Mike Ferris, PIO-NIMO
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
held with the three Incident Commanders (ICs), two Deputy ICs and an Operations Section
Chief from February 3-20, 2014.
The team found that there were many factors that influenced the outcome of the Whiskey
Complex. It was a complex incident, consisting of four fires (two eventually merged-Big
Brother and Whiskey), located in difficult terrain, with mixed conifer fuel type, on DFPA
lands, timber sales and with scattered parcels of private land/residences. The fire also
impacted one of the most important fisheries habitat(s) in the Pacific Northwest. Severe
weather, fuel conditions, initial lack of available resources (equipment and personnel),
wide geographic distribution of the four fires, other wildfires burning in the immediate
area and in the Region, also contributed to the complexity.
Background
The 2013 Programmatic/Cost Fire Review(s) are grounded in the objectives of the 2013
Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season. The reviews provide an opportunity to
evaluate the clarity of communication of Leader’s Intent and the effectiveness of
implementation in the field. The results of the reviews provide information critical to the
well-established learning environment and continued improvement in fire management in
the U.S. Forest Service (FS).
The Chief’s stated vision for success continues to be defined as safely achieving reasonable
objectives with the least firefighter exposure necessary, while enhancing stakeholder
support for our management.
Building on lessons learned in 2012, utilizing all aspects of risk management continues to
provide the best framework to successfully achieve this vision. Sound decision making
relies on identifying reasonable objectives for protection of critical values at risk (VAR),
while considering the amount and quality of firefighter exposure and probability of
success. The format/protocol is broken down into three sections: Pre-Season (Engaging
the fire before it starts); During Incident (Managing incident uncertainty and inherent
risk) and After Incident (Learning and Improving).
Pre-Season preparedness is critical to success when a fire starts. In addition to pre-season
preparedness (annual fire refresher, work capacity test) we need to build decision maker
and key stakeholder capacity to manage the uncertainties and inherent risks associated
with fires. Specifically, we need to increase understanding of risk management with key
stakeholders and partners, cooperators and collaborators. We have to increase Line Officer
Agency Administrators (AAs) capacity as risk managers and improve IMT skills in
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
operational risk management. In addition, the units need to establish landscape level risk
assessments, compare them to the goals and objectives in the Land Resource Management
Plan (LRMP) and identify a common understanding of values to be protected by answering
four questions; “What is important” “Why is it important?’ How important is it?’ and “How
much risk are you willing to take to protect it?” And lastly, complete a risk analysis with
partners to predetermine strategies for protecting VAR while balancing risks across all
categories and in time.
The During Incident phase tests our pre-season work and our ability to apply risk
management principles. As acknowledged by the National Cohesive Strategy for Wildland
Fire Management: “Safe aggressive initial attack is often the best suppression strategy to
keep unwanted wildfires small and costs down.”
This strategy will be applied to initial attack (IA) where the pre-identified values to be
protected are at the greatest risk. Decisions will be based on firefighter/aviator/public
safety, VAR, and the probability of success. Sound financial management and costs are an
output of the best risk informed decisions. To be successful in this phase, we (IMTs and
Units) should follow the objectives listed below in the Standards for Managing Incident
Risk:
Seven Standards for Managing Incident Risk
1. Complete an Incident Risk Assessment.
 What is at risk, probabilities of harm, and possible mitigations?
2. Complete a Risk Analysis.
 Consider alternatives (objectives, strategies and tactics) against desired
outcomes, responder exposure, probability of success and values to be
protected.
3. Complete Two-way Risk Communication.
 Engage community leaders, local government officials, partners and other key
stakeholders associated with the incident to share the risk picture and request
input.
4. Conduct Risk Sharing Dialogue (“Red Book”, Chapter 05.11, framework 10
questions).
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014

Engage senior line officers (AAs) and political appointee (as appropriate) in
dialogue aimed at understanding, acceptance, and support for the alternatives
and likely decision(s).
5. Make the Risk Informed Decision.
 Develop a time frame to revisit the decision.
6. Document the Risk.
 Document the assessment, analysis, communication(s) sharing, and decision in
WFDSS.
7. Continue Monitoring and Adjusting.
 Monitor and adjust as necessary or as conditions change. Monitor incident;
revise the risk process as conditions change and reengage stakeholders and
senior officials as appropriate. Significant changes will likely require updates to
the WFDSS (published decision and risk support work).
In areas identified pre-season as having low threats to values to be protected, and
engagement strategy designed to meet restoration objectives may be considered. Line
officers using fire for multiple objectives must follow the Seven Standards for Managing
Incident Risk to the highest level of performance and accountability.
To be clear, Standards 1, 2, 3 and 4 need to be completed pre-season; All standards apply
during the incident.
And lastly, the effective interaction between AAs and ICs is essential to safe efficient and
effective management of incidents, utilizing: the Right Plan; in the Right Place; at the
Right Time; with the Right Assets (personnel and equipment); and for the Right
Duration. Careful attention to these five “Rights” will limit unnecessary exposure to
firefighters and expenditure.
The Third Phase, After Incident indicates as a learning organization we should strive to
improve how we do business and seek to learn from each incident. Engage key
stakeholders in an AAR, noting what was planned, what worked and how can we improve.
Engage a peer review, with other units having a similar incident to learn strategies for
improvement and identify personnel that will ensure improvement plans and lessons
learned are implemented.
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
Objectives of the Review
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Identify best business practices used on fires this past season.
Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making.
Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded.
Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations.
Identify actions taken by the IMT and Forest to meet the intent/direction of the
Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol.
6. Identify practical application of risk management concepts that generate positive
outcomes (public safety, firefighter and cost).
Fire Environment
The previous week, a strong storm front with dry lightning was predicted within southern
Oregon. Based on the information, FS units increased their resources (engines, crews and
aviation) preparing for IA. The front moved through the area with no fire starts. Units
downsized their fire organizations based on the lack of fire activity.
The next week, on July 24-25, 2013, an unexpected thunderstorm produced about 600
lightning strikes on the Umpqua National Forest and surrounding area. Eight fires were
detected on the Forest on July 26, 2013 and numerous others were detected on the DFPA
area. Four of the IA fires were contained and the other four resulted in the Whiskey
Complex, consisting of the Smith Ridge, Whiskey, Big Brother and Buckeye fires.
At the time the fires started on the Umpqua National Forest, the PNW was at Preparedness
Level (PL) 4 and the National PL was 3. In addition to numerous small IA fires, the
lightning event produced several other complex large fires (Douglas, Big Windy).
Resources (equipment, personnel and aviation) were becoming scarce within the system
and the local and regional fire caches (where fire equipment is stored) were behind in
filling orders for equipment and supplies.
The environmental factors and fire behavior witnessed throughout the Whiskey Complex
resulted in high resistance to control and presented management challenges (steep terrain,
heavy fuel loads in “big timber,” lack of safety zones, access, etc.) from IA through multiple
IMT transitions.
Fire behavior on the Whiskey Complex from the day of IA on July 26 through September 15,
2013 was influenced by heavy fuel loadings (dead, down mixed conifer), remote access,
warm temperatures in the 75 to 80 degree range, low relative humidity (25%), gusty winds
from the west/northwest up to about 12 m.p.h., and unstable atmospheric conditions as
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
reflected by the Haines Index of 5 with multiple Red Flag days (wind and low RH). These
conditions produced a high intensity fire with torching, crowning, and spotting from half a
mile to one mile. Fire spread is normally to the south, southeast due to the prevailing
winds, which is typical of most fires on the Umpqua National Forest. However, topography,
wind channeling down canyons and lichen caused the fires (Whiskey, Big Brother and
Buckeye) to move at times with high intensity and fire behavior. The Smith Ridge Fire,
located to the northwest of Whiskey, did not have any significant fire growth.
Fire Chronology
Note: Acres column: Complex total-t; Whiskey-w; Big Brother-bb; Buckeye-b and Smith Ridge-sr
fires; the second number in the Person Column are reportable injuries-Starting 8/5 Big Brother-bb
no longer existed, it merged with Whiskey.
Date
7/26
7/27
%
0
0
Command
Initial Attack
T2 R. Williams
Acres
7/28
5
T2 R. Williams
7/29
7
T2 R. Williams
7/30
10
T2 R. Williams
7/31
15
T2 R. Williams
8/1
18
T2 R. Williams
1,960 t
1,600 w
120 bb
210 b
30 sr
2,530 t
1,900 w
200 bb
400 b
30 sr
3,080 t
2,250 w
250 bb
550 b
30 sr
3,948 t
2,830 w
300 bb
788 b
30 sr
4,185 t
2,980 w
375 bb
800 b
30 sr
+
1,800 t
1,500 w
100 bb
200 b
No Smith Ridge
160
100
20
10
0
570
300
80
190
0
550
350
50
150
0
868
580
50
238
0
237
250
75
12
0
Comments
Start - 0230
Unified Command- DFPA
Active, long range
spotting
VAR Structures/ Private
Timber
Unchecked perimeter, Big
Brother and Whiskey;
Initial attack area
identified.
Person
Cost
243
100,000
410
518,000
VAR - TES, fisheries,
private timber,
inaccessible terrainDirect Attack not feasible.
774
1.1 mil
Ash Valley threatened
and level 3 evacuation,
Red Flag T-storms and
dry lightning,
814
1.8 mil
Red Flag, Spot S. of
Beaver creek, night shift
initiated, structure
protection Ash Valley
886
Indirect strategy on
Whiskey, weather
moderating, continuing
burn-outs.
880
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2
2.6 mil
3.6 mil
Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
8/2
20
T2 R. Williams
4,839 t 654
3,300 w 320
449 bb 74
1,060 b 260
30 sr
0
5,567 t 728
3,524 w 224
700 bb 251
1,313 b 253
30 sr
0
6,245 t 678
4,767 w 1243
1,448 b 135
30 sr
0
8/3
20
T2 R. Williams
8/4
25
T2 R. Williams
8/5
30
T2 R. Williams
7,409 t 1164
5,700 w 933
1,679 b 231
30 sr
0
8/6
30
T2 R. Williams
8/7
35
T2 R. Williams
8,340 t 931
6,628 w 928
1,682 b
3
30 sr
0
10,248 t 1908
8,536 w 1908
1,682 b
0
30 sr
0
8/8
40
T2 R. Williams
8/9
40
T2 R. Williams
8/10
40
T2 R. Williams
10,658 t
8,946 w
1,682 b
30 sr
8/11
40
T2 D. Johnson
8/12
50
T2 D. Johnson
10,947 t 289
9,242 w 296
1,682 b
0
23 sr - 7
11,082 t 135
10,469 t 221
8,757 w 221
1,682 b
0
30 sr
0
10,658 t 189
8,946 w 189
1,682 b
0
30 sr
0
0
0
0
0
Active fire, running; area
closure on Whiskey and
Big Brother fires,
continue protection VAR
905
4.3 mil
Smoke and air quality an
issue, spots discovered E
of Big Brother. Smith
Ridge 100% contained.
953
5.4 mil
Big Brother and
Whiskey grown
together Burnout
continues, Prepare
indirect lines on Whiskey
Unchecked perimeter on
SS & E of Whiskey, night
operations continues,
Smith Ridge in Patrol
status.
Smoke hampering
aviation support, Red
Flag tomorrow, steep
rocky terrain, poison oak,
982
6.53 mil
957
7.5 mil
IA today and NF assist
night operations
continue, but-out, direct
attack still problematic
/terrain.
Weather drying, smoke is
hindering aviation;
Planning rehabilitation
where possible.
931
9.5 mil
911
10.4 mil
Red Flag tomorrow, low
precip. Scattered over
fire, mop-up on
containment lines. Aerial
ign. Planned for interior.
Expect little movement,
high Rh, low temps. Road
and area closures still in
effect. Mop-up continues.
Oregon Team 1
shadowed.
Predicted weather drier,
burn-outs slowed higher
Rh, Continue mop-up
where feasible.
819
11.2 mil
848
11.9 mil
691
12.5 mil
Ash Valley evacuation
595
13.2 mil
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917
1
8.6 mil
Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
9,376 w 134
1,683 b
1
23 sr 0
8/13
55
T2 D. Johnson
11,260 t 313
9,554 w 178
1,683 b
0
23 sr
0
8/14
55
T2 D. Johnson
11,471 t 211
9,765 w 211
1,683 b
0
23 sr 0
8/15
55
T2 D. Johnson
8/16
65
T2 D. Johnson
12,070 t 599
10,364 w 599
1,683 b
0
23 sr 0
12,406 t 336
10,700 w 336
1,683 b
0
23 sr 0
8/17
65
T2 D. Johnson
8/18
65
T2 D. Johnson
8/19
75
T2 D. Johnson
8/20
75
T2 D. Johnson
17,293 t 432
15,587 w 432
1,683 b
0
23 sr
0
8/21
80
T2 D. Johnson
17,339 t
15,633 w
1,683 b
23 sr
12,556 t 150
10,850 w 150
1,683 b
0
23 sr 0
16,611 t 4055
14,905 w 4055
1,683 b
0
23 sr
0
16,861 t 250
15,155 w 250
1,683 b
0
23 sr
0
46
46
0
0
reduced to level 2, firecreeping and smoldering,
but fire spread expected
to increase – hotter and
drier
Buckeye 100%
contained
Smoke and fog continue
to hamper aviation
support. Continue to
Mop-up and support IA
and Forest.
Creeping, smoldering w
group torching. Smoke
and fog continue to
hamper aviation support.
Continue to Mop-up and
support IA and Forest.
Fire spread S & E, Smoke
and fog hamper aviation
support, find alternate
site for helicopter use!
558
13.9 mil
510
14.6 mil
486
15.0 mil
Little movement, but
possible toward RogueSiskiyou NF, Mop-up
continues, burn-outs
successful.
Road and area closures
remain in effect. Mop-up
continues burn-outs
successful.
490
15.6 mil
454
16.2 mil
Acreage increase reflects
burnout within
containment lines and
large interior islands.
453
16.7 mil
Fire backing and
creeping, fire should stay
within containment lines.
Road and Area closures
in effect.
Fire backing and
creeping, showers and
thunder storms
predicted. Red Flag
predicted, burn-outs
continuing.
Fire backing and
creeping, showers and
thunder storms
predicted. Red Flag, burn-
487
17.2 mil
453
17.7 mil
422
18.1 mil
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
8/22
85
T2 D. Johnson
8/23
90
T2 D. Johnson
8/24
100
T2 D. Johnson
17,891 t
16,185 w
1,683 b
23 sr
0
0
0
0
9/11
100
T3 J. Poet
17,891 t
16,185 w
1,683 b
23 sr
0
0
0
0
9/15
100
T3 J. Poet
17,891 t
16,185 w
1,683 b
23 sr
0
0
0
0
3 Teams
17,891 acres
52 days
17,420 t
81
15,714 w 81
1,683 b
0
23 sr
0
17,891 t 471
16,185 w 471
1,683 b 0
23 sr 0
outs. Buckeye road 28 &
portions of road 29 open
today.
Little spread, light
precipitation and higher
Rh. Smoke hampering
aviation support.
367
18.5 mil
All growth from interior
islands. Preparing
transition to Southern
Cascades T3 IC Poet on
25th.
Smoke hampering
Aviation support. T3 Poet
shadows today, Mop-up
and rehab in all divisions.
!00% Containment.
Cumulative fatigue,
numerous hazards and
unburned islands are
main control issues.
Rehab in all Divisions.
4 Total Reportable
accidents. Creeping and
smoldering interior fire
behavior. Turn back to
District tomorrow 9/16.
356
18.9 mil
332
19.1 mil
181 1
21.6 mil
111
22.1 mil
4 Reportable injuries
333,360 personnel hours
22,224
22.1 mil $
Critical Values at Risk
VAR in the fire area were identified by the FS, Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), DFPA,
cooperators/partners, and stakeholders. These stakeholders included: firefighters and the
public as well as homes and businesses. The values included: five sold timber sales (FS),
private timber (Seneca-Jones active logging operations and plantations); Native American
and heritage sites; threatened, endangered, and sensitive species (TES); (Coho salmon,
steelhead, spotted owl, etc.) habitat; recreation sites; communication sites; and
public/cooperator/partner relationships. Resource values, such as wildlife habitat,
watershed values, aesthetics, etc. were identified by agency personnel. No homes or
businesses were destroyed or damaged, but several units within the sold timber sales were
burned. Private lands, infrastructure and timber important to (Seneca-Jones) were
threatened and required aggressive fire management.
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
Observations
The review team was cognizant of not being influenced by hindsight bias when reviewing
documents or interviewing people. The team had open discussions with personnel
regarding the incident, their interactions, and what they thought was important to share as
lessons learned.
The following are observations the team made in the report:

The control line in Beaver Creek was implemented to establish an anchor point to
protect VAR including private land, structures and sold timber sales. This control
line resulted in the cutting of 12 key salmon/steelhead structures in Beaver Creek.
This control line was later abandoned when the fire spotted across Beaver Creek.
This damage resulted in very expensive suppression rehabilitation work to
reconstruct these structures and was a source of tension between the local unit,
resource advisors and the fire management organizations during the different
phases of the fire.

Within a couple of hours of the IMT being mobilized, three Type 2 Operation Section
Chief(s) (OSC2) on the team roster were made unavailable due to fire activity on
their home unit(s). The IMT mobilized using two OSC2 from the alternate list as
well as one trainee OSC2. One of the original OSC2 joined the IMT three days later.

The lend-lease (aviation) agreement, possible between large fires within the PNW
Region provided for outstanding cooperation and cost efficiencies for IMTs. In
addition to this informal agreement, the FS (Umpqua National Forest), the ODF and
the DFPA also have agreements to share equipment and personnel between fires.

The agreement (formal and informal) between the PNW Region and the ODF
provides many benefits to organizational strengths. The sharing, training,
collaboration and cooperation of resources (personnel and equipment) pre-season,
as well as during and after the season provides for support during critical times.
This is an exceptional relationship that needs to be considered within other regions.

Unified Command (DFPA, ODF and the FS) was initiated and implemented at the
start of the Whiskey Complex and was an outstanding success. Though having
differing suppression philosophies, the entities had great communication, mutual
understanding and worked together meeting the objectives of the Complex,
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
enhancing community relationships and keeping personnel safe through risk
informed decisions.

Despite the presence of numerous priorities and VAR, leader’s intent was focused on
minimizing impacts to private property, keeping fire from entering additional
private property, protecting the community of Ash Valley, protecting and
minimizing impacts to sold timber sales and strengthening relationships.

Line Officer’s Strike Team (LOST) went to the Whiskey Complex to gain more skill,
knowledge and experience with managing large complex fires. The intent of LOST is
to expose them to the process of making risk informed decisions on wildfires. The
visitation and meeting(s) was very successful and will help build capability and
capacity within the PNW Regions fire management organization.
The review team made other observations and developed lessons learned based on
personal and phone interviews and written documentation. The team is available for
future discussions as needed regarding the materials included in this report.
Discussion by review objective
The following observations and Lessons Learned are organized by the four objectives of the
review.
1. Identify Best Business Practices Used On Fires This Past Season
The Whiskey Complex burned 17,891 acres on the Umpqua National Forest. The largest
was Whiskey (16,185 acres) which directly threatened Beaver Creek (Coho salmon habitat
and fish structures) and Seneca-Jones private timber lands. The Buckeye Fire burned 1,683
acres and affected the private inholdings in Ash Valley and National Forest timber lands.
The Smith Ridge Fire was held at 23 acres and had no growth.
Direct attack became ineffective due to fuel type (mixed conifer), poor access, complex
terrain features, lack of control features, inconsistent aviation support (due to smoke/fog),
poor burn-out opportunities (due to sporadic precipitation), mid-to-long range spotting
from wind channeling in canyons and a highly flammable lichen component. Because of
these factors, it was acknowledged that this was a long duration incident that would need
to be managed for a season ending event. Tactics and strategy on the Whiskey Complex
changed from “full suppression” to a mix of direct (as opportunities arose, changes in
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Whiskey Complex Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
weather, etc. and indirect strategies that best minimized fire growth by using all
available/reasonable resources at their disposal.

An important lesson learned was to involve key stakeholders very early, and
establish a dialogue on values, priorities, firefighter exposure, and risk verses gain
and fire strategies.
Because of the relationship(s) between the
partners/cooperators, the forest chose to go into Unified Command with the ODF
and the DFPA very quickly on the Whiskey Complex. Because of clear leader’s intent
and aggressive communication strategies, IMTs were able to keep up with local
contacts and notifications. Communicating with and gathering local input was
essential to success - utilizing the landowners, permittees, and especially local
Forest Service personnel knowledge and expertise of the area aided the out-of-area
responders in strategies, tactics, VAR, and community interactions.

Open communication between the ODF, DFPA, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National
Forest and the other large fires within the area and the PNW Region was displayed
on the Whiskey Complex. The Forest Supervisor, Deputy Forest Supervisor and fire
staff from the Forest made contact with their FS partners, cooperators and key
stakeholders well before the Whiskey Fire even started and continued until after the
Complex was contained.

The lend-lease (aviation) agreement within the PNW Region between large fires
provided for outstanding cooperation and cost efficiencies for IMTs. In addition to
this informal agreement, the FS (Umpqua National Forest), the ODF and the DFPA
also have agreements to share equipment and personnel between fires.

The agreement (formal and informal) between the PNW Region and the ODF
provides many benefits to organizational strengths within both agencies. The
sharing, training, collaboration and cooperation of resources (personnel and
equipment) pre-season, during and after the season provides for support during
critical times. This is an exceptional example of a relationship with the State that
needs to be considered within other regions and nationally. Effective pre-season
communication about risk levels, VAR, and firefighter exposure with communities,
stakeholders, landowners, partners and adjacent units (Rogue River-Siskiyou NF)
was critical to success during this incident. The public, communities, cooperators
and partners basically understand fire suppression activities and have a good
relationship with the FS and the ODF. ODF, however does have different
suppression philosophies that favor aggressive efforts to minimize fire spread and
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duration rather than drawing a bigger box and relying on existing containment
features or changes in weather to manage a wildfire to balance firefighter exposure
and costs with VAR. It is important to note that Oregon law defines all uncontrolled
fires a nuisance and ODF/DFPAs are required to abate the nuisance. The District
Forester stated “we agree to disagree” on different approaches to fire suppression,
but both do agree on protecting private property, sharing resources, limiting
firefighter exposure and performing risk analysis to make informed decisions.

The Dutch Creek Protocols and procedures, approved by the National Wildfire
Coordination Group (NWCG) have been in place for several years. Establishing a
point of contact, performing patient assessment, stabilization and transportation
(ground and/or air) within the proper time frame (situation dependent) to
appropriate emergency health services is vital to the process. Assigning ground
ambulances, EMTs and paramedics to strategic locations near high risk operations
was appropriately practiced on this incident. The IMTs/IMOs used the Nine Line
Protocol, which does not specifically utilize Dutch Creek Protocols to their best
advantage. The review team gave all three ICs, the bullet statements of the Dutch
Creek Protocols for use in the IMTs ICS-206 Medical Plan during their next
deployment.

Communication(s) with private landowners and elected officials is very important
to the success of the IMT and the local forest. The Forest Public Affairs Officer, prior
to each fire season, regularly develops a contact list and communications plan for
incoming IMTs. In addition, Tiller Ranger District personnel have developed a
community telephone tree to be able to give timely fire status and updates to key
stakeholders. Computer and web-service is not adequate in some rural areas and a
phone tree is an excellent method for communication.

The Forest ordered a Strategic Operations Planner (SOPL) when it was determined
that the fires were going to stay fairly complex and be long duration (length from IA
to Forest turn back - 52 days). The SOPL is often used to develop alternatives and
possible courses of action on long duration events based on VAR, terrain features,
fuel characteristics and firefighter exposure. There has been considerable
discussion who should supervise the SOPL: the IMTs would like him/her to be at the
Incident Command Post (ICP) for continual contact and the Forest would like
him/her at the Supervisor’s Office to be able to brief the Line Officer. In either case,
the expectations for this position should be clearly defined and the SOPL must be
readily available the Forest and IMTs.
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Umpqua National Forest, March 2014

Team 1 (Williams) uses the Key Decision Log (KDL) to record key fire decisions,
document the rational, cost, and who is responsible for the decision and those
whom they coordinate with (the AA, District Ranger, DFPA Official, Fire
Management Officer, etc.). Most IMTs have gotten away from using the KDL
(previously done in real time and everyone could view it with a password). The
review team feels the IMTs and FS should reinstate this extremely valuable tool in
conjunction with the WFDSS, to better document risk informed decisions. It’s an
excellent method of noting contact with other decision makers and capturing the
resultant decisions and subjects/topics.
2. Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

The relationships between the Forest and key stakeholders are considered by the
Forest to be important VAR that have to be considered when developing strategic
options and alternatives. Line Officers and fire management personnel work all
year long, developing and maintaining these very important relationships.

The social and political issues on the fire were not controversial for the Forest,
partners, cooperators or the IMTs. Although the social and political issues are
potentially large on a fire threatening multiple ownerships/jurisdictions with
differing suppression philosophies, land management mandates and economic
stakes in the outcome, aggressive communication and early involvement of partners
kept these issues in check. Community involvement and relationships were well in
place prior to the fire season. Protection of private property and structures were
clearly identified as a priority in the objectives for the incident. Most of the
personnel we talked with felt they understood the VAR for the different
stakeholders. Values such as private property, structures, infrastructure, recreation
(hunting/fishing), plantations, fisheries, and commercial timber were easily
identified and those stakeholders were included in the process earlier in the year
and during the Incident. Specifically, important key stakeholders are:
o The DFPA, which has forest protection on over 1.6 million acres on three
associations in Oregon and two in Idaho. When fire goes through private
land (stand replacement), or through a young stand, it’s taken out of
production and there is minimal salvage. Timber is the life blood of the DFPA
and landowners and if timber is lost, it affects jobs in the short and longterm. The private timber companies extensively manage their timber. DFPA
has agreements with the ODF and local fire departments; they work back and
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Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
forth with the departments sharing training, equipment and personnel. They
strive for “strong” representation on IMTs deployed on or near lands they
protect.
o The ODF has protection responsibility (state land and by agreements) for 16
million acres. On the protection side, the landowners fund 50% and the rest
comes from the State General Fund for fire suppression. Any uncontrolled
fire is considered a nuisance and they have a mandate to aggressively attack
all fires to limit damage to timber resources and other values. ODF is a
willing partner for fire management activities with their federal partners.
o The protection of Native American Tribe Heritage sites is critical in
maintaining the relationship(s) with the local tribes and culture.
3. Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

There is a difference of opinion within fire management personnel as to the value of
the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS). The WFDSS process was
considered cumbersome with questionable value for the firefighting or decision
making effort. Some felt it was a valuable tool in the beginning, but lost value as the
incident increased in size, intensity and complexity. Some felt it had little value as a
decision-making tool, but had more use as a diary for fire management activities and
decisions.
o Specialist input by trained non-fire personnel can be valuable when fire
personnel are assigned to IA fires and WFDSS can be a vector for
communicating this input, along with important information from the Land
and Resource Management Plan (LRMP), fire plan and other guidance,
provided there is a basic understanding of the system, its use and
capabilities.
o Often, particularly on complex and rapidly changing incidents, teams and
units find themselves behind and playing catch-up; the publication of WFDSS
decisions can be a day or more behind the actual time the decision was made.
For this incident, a key point of discussion regarding timely WFDSS
publication revolved around the level of detail and analysis to include in the
Strategic Risk Analysis process.

The WFDSS process was also viewed as a valuable tool for developing alternatives,
decision rationale, developing Management Action Points (MAPS), and selecting a
course of action based on VAR and firefighter exposure provided it is kept current
with the complexity of fast moving fires with high complexity.
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Umpqua National Forest, March 2014

The Forest found that prioritizing strategic planning, particularly the extensive use
of MAPs (i.e. trigger points) developed in WFDSS, was an efficient and very effective
way to communicate intent to partners and other stakeholders. For example,
several MAPs were developed to trigger, based on fire spread past a certain point,
notifications, specific responses aimed at VAR threatened in a particular area, and
even consideration of a return to unified command. Partners and stakeholders felt
confident that their interests were being considered and comfortable that they
would be notified appropriately because of these MAPs, which meant they could
focus on other priorities rather than continually track fire progression.

Because the Whiskey Complex was considered a long duration incident, a Long
Term Analyst (LTAN) and supporting team were ordered to develop a Long Term
Implementation Plan (LTIP) in order to answer key questions the Forest wanted to
answer to optimize their long term strategic plan(s). Information from this
document was useful for communicating risk tradeoffs to partners and portions
were included in subsequent WFDSS decisions as rationale.

In addition to pre-season training and identifying WFDSS teams, the Forest normally
conducts an AAR, which includes a focus on the WFDSS process. The following
comments are from that AAR and should be considered locally as well as nationally:
o Ensure that the forest’s fire personnel are proficient with WFDSS use and
have current access;
o Consider more hands-on advanced training beyond the basic button pushing;
o The course of action should change with time, these are dynamic, annotate
the need for these changes (time stamp comments);
o Reference Fire Management Plan (FMP) or Land Resource Management Plan
(LRMP) where appropriate;
o Paint a better picture of the incident, this means less questions from the
Regional Office; and
o Decide the role the Forest would like the IMT to play regarding WFDSS.
Clarify their role in the Delegation of Authority (DOA) letter.
The following are additional topics/subjects that could be enhanced and/or expanded.

The National Contract for Type 1 chippers needs to be modified. Currently, the
contract says that only the operator and/or helper can feed large woody debris into
the chipper and fire suppression hand crews cannot assist in turning the wood into
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Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
chips. The current process is costly and ineffective. In contrast, the Crambo 5000 is
a drum mounted chipper that utilizes an excavator (large backhoe) with
bucket/thumb for picking up woody debris and depositing it into the chipper. The
Crambo is 75% more efficient than utilizing chippers with 20-person hand crews
feeding it.

Transition time should be tailored between IMTs based on purpose, need, objectives
and leader’s intent. A day and a half might be too long between two T2 IMTs and
might not be enough time between a T2 IMT and an incoming T3 IMO that has mopup, back-haul of supplies, demobilizing equipment/personnel, still has fire to
suppress and then must begin/finish rehabilitation plans. It is also important that
rehabilitation plans be site and objective specific, be timely in preparation and have
an agreed upon end-state. Resource Advisors (READ) and technical specialists
(timber specialists, biologists, hydrologists, etc.) have to be available daily to
inspect, describe, and coach rehabilitation standards.

The last IMT on the Whiskey Complex was the organized Southern Cascades IMO.
They have been established for eight years and have been active during those years.
As mentioned in previous fire reviews, an established, dedicated personnel IMO has
team cohesion, knows each other’s strengths and weaknesses and does as well as a
T2 IMT in most cases. The establishment of organized and dedicated T3 IMO’s is
critical in building capacity and capability for fire management.

As mentioned earlier, there were two alternate Operations Section Chief(s) and one
OSC2 (trainee) on the Whiskey Complex. The span of control was adequate. The
use of alternatives in place of regular team members was due to team personnel
(FMO’s) committed to fire activities on their home forests. It is to the credit of the
Operations section and the Division Group Supervisors skill, knowledge, and
experience that the strategy and tactics on the Whiskey Complex were successful.

Utilizing fire management personnel as team members can be a risk to IMTs
deployed when a large area is affected by cold fronts and dry lightning. There is an
issue locally and nationally when you use fire personnel who have reduced staff, less
depth, and less commitment from employees and supervisors on the forest for IMT
support.
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
Standing up the mini-MAC (local Multi-Agency Coordination Group) early assisted in
prioritizing fires, and aided in the timely deployment of supplies, equipment and
personnel.

Programmatic fire reviews in the present context of “Lessons Learned” for AAs,
IMTs and Fire Managers was viewed as a good tool. This effort is aimed at providing
an atmosphere of learning in a very dynamic environment.
4. Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations
It is the expectation of the Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry (S&PF), and the
Director of FAM that we emphasize the importance of communicating our intent to all of
our partners, including AAs and ICs. They expect each region and forest to become actively
engaged with their stakeholders and prepare them to participate in risk-informed decisionmaking meetings to prepare them for the upcoming fire season.
 Leader’s Intent was stressed very often on the Whiskey Complex. Firefighter,
aviation, and public safety were stressed as the primary objective.

The District/Forest implements pre-season planning to ensure that all cooperators
understand their roles and responsibilities for not only evacuations but fire
management activities.

IMTs are assigned a specific number of trainees (8-10). Most IMTs will accept
additional trainees if they have sufficient trainers, evaluators, and correct fire
complexity to give each trainee a quality assignment. There were sixty (60) trainees
on the Whiskey Complex, a number that stretched the capacity of the team. The
IMTs are certainly commended for building capability and capacity with the fire
management organization, but should strive to find that optimal balance to provide
both structure and quality assignments.
5. Identify Actions Taken by The IMT and Forest to Meet the Intent/Direction of the
Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol.

The Umpqua NF, Rogue River-Siskiyou NF, DFPA and ODF meet regularly preseason and during the season to discuss fire management. They host pre-season
workshops and scenarios, inviting personnel from the ODF, Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and other cooperators/partners (rural fire departments).
Forest personnel have attended the Regional Aviation and Fire Management
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meeting and regularly meet, formally and informally with their partners and
cooperators. The meetings/workshops and training ensures that equipment and
cost-share agreements are in place, and that risk analysis of firefighter exposure and
VAR is understood. The Forest has also requested that the NIMO come to the forest
to facilitate risk based scenarios and sand-table exercises. It is apparent that these
meetings have contributed to an excellent working relationship and understanding
between fire managers from the different entities.

Forest personnel, fire personnel and other functional personnel conduct AARs after
each incident and at the end of the fire season. The intent is to discuss what
happened on the incident and how they can improve the next time. In most cases,
cooperators (rural fire departments) and partners (BLM and ODF) are invited to
participate.

IMTs habitually conduct AARs within their functional area sections (Logistics,
Operations, Command, etc.) and with the Command and General Staff (Team
Leaders) to discuss lessons learned and how to improve on the next incident. IMTs
historically communicate before the season by attending the annual Regional IMT
meeting and by conference phone calls.

The Region, Forest and District(s) have been cooperative, open and frank in their
discussions with the Programmatic/Cost Review Team, to discuss ways to improve
fire management activities and review lessons learned on the Whiskey Complex.
Their commitment to a learning culture is commendable.
6. Identify Practical Application of Risk Management Concepts that Generate
Positive Outcomes (Public Safety, Firefighter, and Cost).
The Umpqua NF, in conjunction with the Rogue River-Siskiyou NF, BLM, DFPA and ODF
prepare for the fire season all year long. In addition, specifically on the Whiskey Complex,
the Umpqua National Forest and the IMTs:

Worked to prepare Leader’s Intent and fire objectives: that firefighter exposure and
public safety were the number one priority; that private structures, private
property, sold federal timber sale(s) and forest infrastructure/improvements were
second; and that natural landscape features were third. The Five Rights were
discussed and reiterated daily: Right Plan; Right Place; Right Time; and Right Assets
for the Right Duration.
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
The Forest prepared an initial Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA) during the IA of the
Whiskey Complex and developed more detailed assessments in subsequent
decisions. The VAR (What is important? Why is it important? How important is it?),
firefighter exposure, probability of success, and the incident objectives were an
integral part of the SRA. In addition, the Forest requested that the Portland NIMO
come to the forest and assist with the long-term strategy, risk assessment and
firefighter exposure.

The decision was made to utilize a mix of direct and indirect attack, and point
protection strategies to balance protection of critical VAR with firefighter exposure
and cost containment. This decision was based on the lack of containment feature,
safety zones, steep inaccessible terrain, challenging fuel and fire weather
characteristics, and the value of relationship(s) with partners and cooperators. This
mix of strategies best balanced achieving reasonable objectives with minimizing
firefighter exposure and keeping cost commensurate with VAR. Forest leadership
directed that the Whiskey Complex be managed under Unified Command (FS, DFPA
and ODF).

The Forest initiated and maintained two-way risk communication with the IMTs, the
community of Tiller, landowners, local law enforcement, the adjacent NF, the BLM
and other partners and cooperators.

Tiller Ranger District personnel have worked extensively to assist landowners and
communities in preparing for wildfire within the wildland urban interface. Upper
Cow Creek and Tiller are now FIREWISE communities due to the hard work of the
District and Forest personnel.

Doug Johnson’s T2 IMT in conjunction with the Umpqua NF hosted the Line Officers
Strike Team (LOST), enabling AAs to learn about large complex wildfires. The
Forest and Deputy Forest Supervisor mentored and worked with District Rangers to
increase their skill, knowledge and experience with fire management activities. The
Forest and Region believe in increasing the capacity and capability of fire
management decision-makers locally and nationally.

The IMTs and IMO utilized the modified Risk/Hazard 215A that identifies hazards,
exposure frequency, consequences, initial risk level, mitigations and the residual
risk level. The risks from the hazards, mitigations were discussed daily with
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responders and the Forest. Receiving feedback from the suppression personnel can
be an issue; Team 1 requested that some line personnel stay in camp daily for an
hour debrief session. That helped the IMT accurately identify and describe hazards,
exposure, and risk levels.

The Dutch Creek Protocols: mission locations; medical support and assessment; and
distance and time for medical extraction (ground and aerial) were discussed, and
the Region 6 Nine Line was attached to the ICS-206 Medical Plan. Though not
bulleted within Block 8 (Special Instructions) of the Medical Plan for this fire, all fire
personnel understood the process in case of serious accident/injury. The IMTs will
modify their Medical Plans prior to the 2014 Fire Season.

The safety record on the Whiskey Complex was excellent: there were three IMTs;
four fires; 17,891 acres burned; 22,224 personnel on the complex; who worked over
333,360 hours for 52 days and had four reportable injuries.
Attachments








Whiskey Complex Fire History - Key Fire Events; see page 23.
WFDSS Summary (July 27, 2013); see page 24.
WFDSS Summary (August 7, 2013 - Description of Alternatives); see page 28.
Medical 9 Line Information; see page 37.
Operational Map (August 16, 2013); see page 38.
Public Information Map (August 14, 2013); see page 39.
Progression Map (August 12, 2013); see page 40.
Personnel Interview List (Phone and Forest); see page 41.
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Umpqua National Forest, March 2014
Key Fire Events
The four fires (Whiskey, Big Brother, Smith Ridge and Buckeye), eventually designated the
Whiskey (Complex (OR-UPF-130132) were ignited by lightning on Thursday, July 25, 2013.
The complex was declared 100% contained on September 15, 2013, after burning 17,891
total acres in Oregon on the Umpqua National Forest and lands under private land
ownership.
The lightning fires were detected and initial attacked on July 26, and eight strikes started
four additional fires within the area. The four fires designated as the Whiskey Complex
were assigned to Ross Williams Type 2 (Oregon Team 1) IMT. The growth of the Complex
in acres and duration led to multiple transitions of IMTs. The changes in complexity, size,
and the presence of intermingled communities, threatened and endangered species (TES),
critical habitats, private ranches, and timberlands in front of the fire resulted in ordering
two additional IMTs (Doug Johnson Type 2 and John Poet Type 3), as the preceding IMT
timed out (14 day tour); both of these additional teams extended their tours on the 52 day
incident.
The fires (excluding Smith Ridge) made numerous runs between July 29 and August 20.
The combination of fuel type (mixed conifer), dry, windy conditions, inaccessible access
and spotting made fire management difficult on the Whiskey Complex (see fire chronology
for specific growth dates). Ross Williams Type 2 IMT (Oregon Team 1) was assigned to the
Complex for 15 days; Doug Johnson Type 2 IMT (Oregon Team 3) was on the fire for the
next 15 days; and John Poet’s Type 3 Incident Management Organization (Southern
Cascades T3) was on the fire for 22 days.
The last 20+ days of the incident (August 25 thru September 15) were spent holding the
fires in place (Whiskey was still burning actively in the interior), mopping up, locating
excess equipment (hoses, pumps, porta-tanks, etc.), hauling equipment back to supply and
returning them to the respective cache(s).
It is also important to mention that the fuel type (mixed conifer), fog, as well as sporadic
precipitation and smoke hindered burn-out operations, suppression activities and the
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effectiveness of aviation assets. The fog, precipitation, etc. extended the containment of the
fires within the Whiskey Complex.
The Smith Ridge (23 acres) and Buckeye (1,683 acres) fires were aggressively managed to
limit size and duration until they were 100% contained on August 3 and 13 respectively.
The Big Brother (700 acres) and the Whiskey Fires grew together on August 4. Together
they were contained at 16,185 acres on August 24, 2013. The Complex was returned to the
Forest and District on September 16, 2013.
WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Rationale)
July 27, 2013 - Day 2 of Fire, Williams T2 IMT Assigned
Weather
 Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (42-55, 75-85)
Course of Action
 Consider preemptive point protection actions around structures and other VAR
within the planning area.
 Use a combination of direct and indirect suppression strategies to reduce fire extent
and duration. Whenever possible from the standpoint of firefighter safety, use
aggressive suppression strategies fire spread and impact onto private lands.
 Assist the forest with identifying current fire perimeters and developing and
negotiating strategies and reasonable VAR protection objectives.
 Minimize the fire spread using existing roads, prioritizing protection of private
lands and private and public structures.
 Because the threat to private lands under DFPA protection, establish a DFPA/ODF
Unified Command structure.
Rationale
1. Risk Assessment – Develop an assessment of what is at risk, probabilities of harm
and possible mitigation.
There are a large number and variety of values at risk within the Whiskey Complex fire
planning area, including private property, Forest Service infrastructure, and public safety.
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A. Public safety: The planning area is bounded by and contains roads and river sites that
attract a large number recreational user. The same roads are used by incident personnel to
reach their assignments. Coincidentally, the annual Powwow of the Cow Creek Band of the
Umpqua Tribe is being held at South Umpqua Falls, increasing the number of people in the
South Umpqua Corridor. There is a high probability that an incident within an incident
could occur, or that members of the public will be in the fire area. The Buckeye Fire is very
near Ash Flat Campground. Consequences could be severe.
B. Private lands: There are many residential parcels in the planning area. The Fitts
property is within a mile of the Whiskey fire. Other properties are not adjacent to the fires,
but access and egress could be limited with continued fire behavior. Highest density of
residences is off the 1610 road; there is low probability of impact there. There are a
number of sections of industrial timber land within the fire planning area, with three
parcels within a mile of the Whiskey Fire. There is a high probability of those parcels being
negatively impacted by continued fire behavior. Economic consequences could be
substantial for both residential and industrial lands.
C. South Umpqua Experimental Forest: The experimental forest contains four gauging
stations with data collection electronics, as well as the legacy of treatments that could be
lost if fire were to reach the boundaries of the Experimental Forest. Fire is currently
approximately 2-miles from the Experimental Forest.
D. Recreational Facilities, Lookouts: There is one lookout, one shelter and one cabin in
the Fire Planning area. The Pickett Butte lookout is manned, and some distance from the
fires; it has a low probability of being harmed. The shelter at Bunchgrass Meadows is
adjacent/within the fire perimeter and has a high probability of being negatively impacted.
There are numerous campgrounds along the South Umpqua River and Jackson Creek that
could be negatively impacted. Of particular concern is Ash Flat Campground which is near
the Buckeye Fire. Facilities include toilets.
E. There are a number of stockpiles of large logs for in stream work in the Fire Planning
Area. These have value for the logs as well as value added by the contract work to place
the stockpiles. Stockpiles are at 68-200, 2980-010, 2921 and 2925 roads. Probability of
fire reaching stockpiles is low, consequences if fire reached stockpiles is not substantial.
F. Forest Service Lands: Forest Service lands serve multiple purposes including
recreation, economic potential and ecological function. Some forest land will be negatively
impacted by fire activity, depending on fire severity. From an economic perspective, there
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will be negative impacts from lost timber. Probability is very high. Of particular concern
are the three timber sales of the Beaver Timber Sale project area south of Beaver Creek to
the 1610 road, which have been sold. Value includes the cost of planning. Ecological
function could be negatively or beneficially impacted, depending on fire severity and site
specific characteristics. Consequences could be substantial if fire severity is high.
G. Cultural Resources: There are a number of culturally significant sites within the Fire
Planning Area. The cabin at Whiskey Camp and a gravesite on the trail between Coffin
Butte and Whiskey Camp. The cabin has been discussed above. Probability of negative
impact is high; consequences could be substantial if fire reaches the cabin. The grave site
may be negatively impacted. Additionally, the Beaver Creek Watershed was an important
route to the high country for Native Americans and early settlers, with a high probability of
numerous archaeological sites potentially impacted by fire.
H. Tiller Ranger District is a focal point for the local rural communities in the Tiller area.
Tiller Ranger District has had great recent success developing collaborative relationships
with local residents and organizations. Open and transparent communication is essential
to maintaining these relationships. Lack of communication could reverse the positive
results of the collaboration.
2. Risk Analysis – Compare at least two prospects (alternatives) for successful
completion of the incident starting with a “point protection only prospect” (if
property is at risk) or the “monitoring prospect” if no property is at risk.
The minimum approach would be to protect the public along the recreation corridors
(South Umpqua River, Jackson Creek and Buckeye Creek), residential private lands, and
point protection of Forest Service infrastructure including the cabin at Whiskey Camp,
Bunchgrass Shelter, the 4 gauge stations at South Umpqua Experimental Forest and the
campground at Ash Flat. This would result in minimal exposure to firefighters and reduced
costs in the short term, but increase potential loss of natural resources, both Forest Service
and private. In the long term, there could be increased danger to the public, exposure to
firefighters and costs, depending on duration and spread of fires.
An alternate approach is to protect all above, as well as to execute both direct and indirect
attack on the fire(s). This would require substantially more resources in the short term, as
well as increase firefighter exposure and costs in the short term. However, considering the
seasonal fire severity, expected weather, and time until a season ending event, it is most
likely that limiting fire size and duration will result in lower overall exposure to firefighters
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as well as minimize threats to public safety and VAR. Given the risks to public safety,
values at risk, and the importance of our relationships with neighbors and partners, I
believe it would be irresponsible to employ a monitoring strategy and this was not
considered a viable option in this context.
3. Risk Communication – Engage community leaders, local government officials,
partners and other key stakeholders of the incident in order to share the risk
picture.
There are a number of stakeholders that will be consulted with or considered prior to
making the risk decision. The private property concerns require notification of landowners
in the vicinity of the fires, both residential and industrial. Decision making should include
consultation with Douglas Fire Protection Association. Local community leaders, including
the Cow Creek tribe will be kept apprised of the situation and potential risks to the public.
4. Risk Sharing
Engage appropriate authorities (appropriate line officers and political appointees as
necessary) of the potential decision in a dialogue aimed at obtaining understanding,
acceptance and support for the range of potential prospects and likely decision.
Information will be shared frequently up and down the chain of command.
5. Risk Decision – Document the Strategic Risk Decision.
Risk Decision
My decision is to employ a mix of direct (as opportunities arise (i.e. changes in fire
weather)) and indirect strategies that best minimize fire extent using all reasonable
resources at our disposal. My priority is to protect public safety and private lands by
focusing our resources on these priorities. Our goal is to minimize burned acres and
incident duration. I make this decision in the context of the considerable Values at Risk as
well as the current and expected fire weather and the wildfire situation in the region and in
recognition of the important relationships we share with our partners and neighbors. This
course of action minimizes firefighter exposure to what is necessary to meet reasonable
objectives. Given the time of year, this decision will be a relatively low level firefighter
exposure and less public safety concerns compared to managing much larger incidents
over a long duration.
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5. Risk Monitoring
Decision will be reviewed and amended as new information is received or conditions on
the ground change. A new WFDSS decision will be made if current courses of action are
inadequate to meet stated objectives, or if additional objectives are identified requiring
additional courses of action.
August 7, 2013 - Day 13 of Fire, Day 12 of Williams T2 IMT
Weather
 Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (44-57, 71-90).
 Outlook - September 12-18, above normal temperatures and below normal
precipitation.
Intent


The Whiskey Complex Fire is currently approximately 7,368 acres and encompasses
lands on the Tiller Ranger District of the Umpqua National Forest and private lands
under the protection of Douglas Forest Protection Association (DFPA). The fuel type
is heavy timber, with steep dissected drainages, and some meadows, most closely
associated with fire behavior fuel models 8 and 10. The forest is a mixed conifer
forest primarily composed of Douglas-fir with western hemlock, white fir, incense
cedar, ponderosa pine, and some sugar pine mixed in. The Bunch Grass Meadows
are dry bunch grasses with scattered white and black oak and mountain mahogany.
Hardwood species in the riparian areas include a mixture of red alder and big leaf
maple. Upland hardwoods include Pacific madrone, golden chinquapin, white and
black oak, and big leaf maple. Shrubs include ocean spray, California hazel, vine
maple, several types of manzanita and poison oak. At higher elevations
rhododendron can become more dominant in the shrub layer.
Approximately 8 fires were ignited on the Tiller Ranger District by a lightning storm
in the early morning hours of July 26, 2013. The four fires in the Whiskey Complex
escaped initial attack and are currently being managed by a Type 2 Incident
Management Team in Unified Command with Douglas Forest Protection Association.
On August 1, 2013, the Whiskey Fire spotted over Beaver Creek and currently
threatens the sold unlogged timber sales in the Beaver Project which is estimated at
168,000 cf and $6.6 mm. Logging equipment was removed out of the area on August
2, 2013 and an area closure was put into place on August 3rd for the south side of
Jackson Creek to Forest Road 1610, east from Forest Road 31 junction at Jackson
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
Creek to Forest Road 2925. Approximately 50 acres of private land were burned by
the Whiskey Fire, but the threat to private land is largely diminished because of
favorable winds and prioritizing the area for focused fire suppression efforts. The
Smith Ridge Fire was contained on August 2, 2013 at approximately 30 acres. The
Buckeye Fire spans across the South Umpqua River adjacent to the small community
of Ash Valley and it is approximately 1,300 acres.
There are 5 fires of national significance burning in Southwest Oregon on National
Forest, Bureau of Land Management, and lands protected by the State of Oregon and
DFPA. These fires total over 55,000 acres. Southwest Oregon is experiencing very
hot and dry conditions for this time of year. Southwest Oregon is roughly mid-fire
season with approximately 10 weeks remaining of active fire behavior potential
before a season ending event can be expected.
Risk Assessment
Critical Values at Risk


There are a large number and variety of values at risk within the Whiskey Complex
fire planning area. The most critical values at risk were determined from preseason efforts with DFPA and other key stakeholders and supplemented with
additional information when the incident was discovered and as the incident
expanded. Fire fighter and public safety is the highest priority concern.
Suppression activities will continue only if strategies and tactics can be
implemented safely. After consideration for safety of the public and all incident
responders, the critical values at risk include private forested lands and structures,
historic and prehistoric sites including sites of high sensitivity to the Cow Creek
Band of the Umpqua Tribe of Indians (hereafter the “Tribe”) such as South Umpqua
Falls and the surrounding areas, Forest Service historic structures, recreation
facilities and other infrastructure, in-stream restoration structures on Beaver Creek,
the Beaver project timber sales, habitat for T&E fish species, and spotted owl critical
habit.
An inventory of all of the critical values at risk is displayed within the WFDSS
Document.
Risk Analysis
Alternatives Considered
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
Alternative 1- Full Perimeter Control (Direct and Indirect Attack). Alternative 1 is
an aggressive suppression strategy to contain the Whiskey/Big Brother Fires
(hereafter Whiskey Fire) as quickly as possible, minimizing acres burned and fire
size to the smallest extent. This alternative manages the fire north of Forest Road
600, south of Forest Road 29, west of Forest Road 2925 and east of Bear Creek. This
strategy will use direct attack using existing control lines and roads where current
fire containment has been obtained. Indirect strategy will be used on the north, east
and south portions of the fire. Indirect strategy will encompass approximately 20
miles of road and dozer prep followed by burnout operations when weather
conditions are favorable. Alternative 1 maintains the existing containment through
mop-up and patrol activities on the Buckeye and Smith Ridge Fires including
aggressive attack on any spot fires or slop-overs. This alternative assumes the
availability of ground and aerial resources will remain constant in order to
implement this strategy and meet the goal of this alternative. This alternative also
assumes acceptable weather conditions and fire behavior characteristics (low to
moderate fire intensity) will exist in order to achieve this goal.

Alternative 2 - Full Perimeter Control (Direct and Indirect Attack), Option 2.

Alternative 2 continues to use a fairly aggressive suppression strategy as
conditions allow to confine and contain the Whiskey Fire. Alternative 2 will
primarily use Forest Roads 2950 and 1610 to confine and contain the fire. This
strategy uses direct attack using existing control lines and roads where fire is
currently held in check.
Indirect strategy would be used on the north, east and south portions of the fire.
This strategy uses somewhat more favorable terrain for containment lines working
off roads near ridgelines at higher elevations and continues using existing road
systems and potential sections of dozer line as the operations continued downslope
towards Forest Road 29. Approximately 34 miles of road prep and potential dozer
line would need to be completed. Extensive burnout operations would continue
until the fire has been contained. Burnout operations could be delayed due to
greener fuels with higher fuel moisture in the upper elevations that would not be
available to burn until the mid-later portion of the fire season. Options exist with
this alternative that allows flexibility to the incident management organization that
could range from a Type1, Type 2, Type 2 short team or a Type 3 team as the
incident ramps up and down with planning, operations and logistical support needs.
If alternative 1 is not successful, alternative 2 would more than likely be the fall back
option with some variation to what has been described above. Alternative 2


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maintains the existing containment through mop-up and patrol activities on the
Buckeye and Smith Ridge Fires including aggressive attack on any spot fires or slopovers. This alternative has flexibility to allow management to engage the fire when
weather and fire conditions are favorable. However, there is an increase to incident
responder exposure compared to alternative 1 and increased probability of a low
probability/high consequence event to occur. This alternative would have a longer
impact to the local Forest which would have an effect to the Agency Administrators,
Fire Staff, District and S.O. personnel. Furthermore, it would affect a larger area of
Forest resources (timber, fisheries, recreation etc.). Smoke impacts to surrounding
areas and air quality would be affected for a longer duration as well. The majority
of the sold timber sales south of Forest Road 600 would be compromised in this
alternative. This alternative assumes ground and aerial resources will be available
as needed in order to implement this strategy and meet the goal of this alternative.
This alternative also assumes acceptable weather conditions and fire behavior
characteristics (low to moderate fire intensity) will exist in order to achieve the
goal.

Alternative 3 – Confine/Contain, Point Protection and Monitor Strategy to manage
the Whiskey Fire. Alternative 3 uses a combination of strategies to manage the
incident for a long duration. Alternative 3 uses existing fire lines as well as indirect
lines that would need to be prepped, natural barriers, moisture of extinction and
point protection strategies; Management Action Points (MAPs) would need to be
developed to manage the fire and protect values at risk. Furthermore, alternative 3
may employ checking actions to slow fire spread until a season slowing or season
ending event. Monitoring the fire by ground or aerial resources would be a
management action that would remain constant for the duration of the incident
which would result in a long term commitment of resources. Alternative 3 would
more than likely affect the Rogue National Forest to the south and east of the
Umpqua National Forest. Alternative 3 may increase the risk to private lands to the
north and west as well as the Elk Creek community. Incident responder exposure
and risk would vary during the incident as the situation changes over time
depending largely on weather patterns over the next 10 weeks. Options exist with
this alternative that allows flexibility to the incident management organization that
could range from a Type 1, Type 2, Type 2 short or Type 3 team as the incident
ramps up and down with operations, planning and logistical support needs. In
consideration of this alternative the 2013 Southwest Oregon Fires – Long Term
Assessment should be reviewed to have an overview of weather outlooks for the
next month and fire projections. Based upon the 2013 Southwest Oregon Fires -
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Long Term Assessment during the months of August and September, there is an
average of four days where large fire growth greater than 1,000 acres and runs
extending 2-3 miles can be expected. Due to managing the incident for a long
duration, there is a relatively high risk of a low probability/high consequence event
occurring (i.e. extreme fire weather) that could pose threats to nearby communities,
private property and resource values. Based on local knowledge and past Long
Term Assessments there is a 50% chance of a season ending event by mid-October
and increasing to 90% by the end of October. A Long Term Assessment should be
updated as the situation changes with new fire projections as well as determining
the probabilities of season slowing and season ending events and the associated
dates. This alternative has flexibility to allow management to engage the fire when
weather and fire conditions may be favorable. This alternative would impact the
local Forest for the longest duration. Furthermore, it would affect a much larger
area of Forest resources (timber, fisheries, recreation etc.). Relationships with
community members, adjacent land owners, and DFPA may be compromised with
the selection of this alternative. Smoke impacts to surrounding areas and air quality
would be affected for a much longer duration as well.
Alternative Comparison
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This assessment develops a rough estimate for potential fire size; number of hours worked
by incident responders and associated costs under each alternative. The comparison also
shows the probability of success for each alternative considered. The assessment assumes
that each person is exposed for 14 hours/day for ground resources (hand crews, engines,
and equipment). For each aviation resource, exposure is based on 6 hours/day.
Estimated Fire
Size(acres)
Estimated
Containment Line
(miles)
Estimated
Contingency Line
(Miles)
Estimated Incident
Responder Exposure
(Person Hours)
Estimated Cost
Probability of
Success
Alternative 1
Alternative 2
Alternative 3
Full Perimeter
Control
Direct/Indirect
Attack Strategy
Full Perimeter
Control
Direct/Indirect
Attack Strategy Option 2
Confine/Contain,
Point Protection and
Monitoring
Strategies.
16,623
30,863
45,000-60,000
20
34
70
34
70
Unknown
94,994
$5.2 mil
65%
Low
High
108,990
406,260
$5.9 mil - $21.4 mil
70%
Low
High
224,700
812,520
$11.8 mil - $42.6 mil
50%
Risk Communication
Stakeholders consulted prior to making a decision:
Stakeholders consulted prior to making this decision included DFPA, adjacent private
landowners, community members, the Tribe, and industrial timber land representatives.
The incident is being managed under a unified command structure with DFPA to best
represent the interests of those under their protection and reflect our shared commitment
to protecting private property. Internal consultation also took place with relevant
biologists, Contract Administrators (timber sale), recreation planners, archeologists, etc.
Leader’s intent during the in-brief prioritized the importance of relationships with our
partners and emphasized the goal of the team leaving these relationships at least as good
as they were found when they arrived. The incident management team will continue to
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host frequent stakeholder meetings where concerned community members and land
owners can ask questions and voice their concerns. Press releases will continue being sent
to concerned members of the public, interest groups, neighboring agencies, partners, and
media. These groups will continue to receive relevant information and public comment
will be considered in the management of the incident.
The Regional Office will be consulted with and informed of progress, and issues and will
continue to be a part of the decision process.
Risk Dialogue and Risk Sharing
Umpqua National Forest Line Officers and Staff are working closely with each other and the
key stakeholders (listed in the previous section) and Incident Management Team so there
is a shared understanding of the tradeoffs, ownership of the risk, and agreement on the
courses of action. The Forest Supervisor has been in contact with regional staff and will
continue to engage the Regional Office and the key stakeholders in further decisions.
Opportunities to manage the fires to meet land management plan objectives:
Due to proximity to Values at Risk, desires of community members and key stakeholders,
seasonal severity, and the amount of time left before a season ending event, there is no
opportunity to manage this incident specifically for meeting land management plan
objectives. However, an incident objective is included to emphasize all ignitions operations
should be planned to achieve mixed or low severity fire effects whenever feasible.
Additionally, all burned acres will be evaluated to determine if fire caused conditions to
move toward desirable future conditions for the impacted management areas.
Possible low probability/high consequence events:
The major concerns on this incident include a frontal passage bringing high winds, a
continued warming and drying trend and other fire weather causing plume dominated fire
behavior, an east wind event, or thunder cell development in the area causing high and
erratic winds. In the remainder of the fire season, this area experiences an average of 4
days of weather parameters that have, based on past experience, caused rapid and
uncontrollable fire spread and/or plume dominated fire behavior. On these days, fire runs
of 2 or 3 miles per day and medium to long range spotting can be expected. These
conditions could result in a high consequence event in the community of Elk Creek located
along Hwy 1 about 3 miles southwest of the incident, the adjacent and impacted privately
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owned land and structures, and the important cultural and recreational infrastructure
throughout the area. The probability of a high consequence event increases with time until
containment. The selected alternative minimizes time until containment, reducing (but not
eliminating) the probability of a high consequence event relative to the other alternatives.
Risk Decision
Decision based upon the best balance between the desired outcome and responder
exposure:
Alternative 1 is the selected alternative that will drive the strategy. This decision is based
on the context of the considerable Values at Risk as well as the current and expected fire
weather and the wildfire situation in the region and in recognition of the important
relationships we share with our partners and neighbors.
Findings:
This course of action minimizes firefighter exposure to what is necessary to meet
reasonable objectives and is the lowest firefighter exposure among the viable options
considered. Given the time of year, this decision will minimize the potential for a high
consequence event, reduce potential damage to private property, strengthen our
relationships in the community, and reduce public safety concerns compared to managing
much larger incidents over a long duration. Because of the relatively short duration of the
incident, this alternative has the lowest costs compared to the other alternatives
considered.
Documentation
This document is included in WFDSS and will be incorporated in the published WFDSS
decision so that the risks assessed and identified can be shared vertically and horizontally
throughout the organization and become part of the incident record.
Monitoring
Critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed alternative.
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As this incident develops, the Agency Administrators will monitor the effectiveness of the
course of action with the Incident Management Team. The critical thresholds that will
trigger reconsideration of the selected alternative include any significant changes in the fire
environment, including fuels, topography, weather and/or the fire exceeding the
boundaries identified in the course of action.
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Medical- 9 Line Information
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Operational Map (August 16, 2013)
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Public Information Map (August 14, 2013)
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Progression Map (August 12, 2013)
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Umpqua National Forest Interview Schedule
Whiskey Complex
OR-UPF-130132
Phone Interviews (February 3- March 20, 2014)
Ross Williams
Incident Commander (IC), Team 1
Carl West
Deputy Incident Commander (DIC), Team 1
Carol Fieder
Finance Section Chief (FSC)
Shawn Sheldon
Operations Section Chief (OSC)
Doug Johnson
Incident Commander (IC), Team 3
Tim Keith
Deputy Incident Commander (DIC)
John Poet
Incident Commander (IC), Southern Cascades T3 IMO
Person Interviews (March 12-13, 2014)
0900 Alice Carlton
Gina Owens
Dennis Darling
Forest Supervisor
Deputy Forester
Forest FMO
(541) 957-3203
(541) 957-3281
(541) 957-3305
1200 Mike Harris
Timber Planner
(541) 957-3414
1300 Carla Schamber
IBA
(541) 750-7088
1500 Donna Owens
District Ranger (Tiller RD)
(541) 825-3107
1600 Terri Brown
DFMO
(541) 825-3122
1730 Gabe Dumm
Fire Planner
(541) 957-3205
0900 Melvin Thornton
Pat Strit
Arron Whitely
(Douglas Forest Protection Assoc.) (541) 580-2437
(DFPA)
(DFPA)
1100 Cheryl Caplan
Public Affairs
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(541) 957-3270