MASS
EVACUATION
FRAMEWORK
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 1
Colophon
A publication of the Ministry of Security and Justice, The Hague, September 2014
2 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
Table of Contents
Introduction: why this Framework?
5
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
6
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
What is the starting point?
Scaling up and possible roles of regional authorities and national government
Information preparation
Aspects for decision-making
Scenarios and evacuation strategies
II. ACTION PLANS
6
6
10
10
12
13
1. Action plan for COLD phase
2. Action plan for WARM phase
13
17
III. ANNEXES
I
ANNEXE 1: terms, key figures and rules of thumb
ANNEXE 2: legal framework
ANNEXE 3: basis for division between CoPI, ROT and RBT
ANNEXE 4: Indicative overview of information sources
ANNEXE 5: sources of communication and evacuation
ANNEXE 6: roadmap for Department of Waterways and Public Works
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 3
II
V
IX
XI
XII
XVI
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INTRODUCTION: why this Framework?
This Framework has been developed to actualize a unité de doctrine for preparations for and administrative
decision-making about a possible mass evacuation. The goal is two-fold: Firstly, to ensure that the national
government and security regions apply the same basic principles in (preparations for) mass evacuation. To
this end, basic principles have been described in part I of this Framework. Secondly, to ensure that the
planning and decision-making process of both the security regions and the national government are
harmonised to avoid the situation that the parties involved are not sufficiently informed of each other's plans
and roles. The action plans for the cold and warm phases that seek to ensure that harmonisation are
described in part II. An important element for these action plans are the meetings between the national
government and the regions; making cooperation agreements in both the cold and the warm phase is vitally
important for formulating an effective response to a threat or incident. It should be kept in mind that factors
such as time constraints and uncertainty in the warm phase could seriously complicate the conceptualisation
and decision-making process. An adequate preparation in the cold phase is, therefore, indispensable.
This Framework is intended for evacuations which exceed the boundaries of a security region, which have
an international component or which could result in a role for the national government. However, the
Framework can also be applied to evacuations of a smaller scale.
The Framework is intended for all hazards which could entail evacuations, such as floods, nuclear incidents,
wildfires and chemical incidents.
This document has been drawn up in cooperation with the National Consultative Committee on Mass
Evacuation (LOGE), in which the security regions and other bodies are represented.
What is evacuation?
Evacuation is the movement of people, animals and goods to a safer area until a stable situation has been
reached. An evacuation can be carried out preventively or during an incident.
A safe place is situated within or outside the threatened area:
• within the threatened area:
- on a higher floor in a house (hiding1) provided it offers sufficient protection from the impending threat
and provided that there are sufficient basic needs (food, drinks, medicine, shelter, etc.);
- another higher hiding place that offers sufficient protection and has sufficient basic needs (food,
drinks, medicine, shelter, etc.);
• outside the threatened area (could be both within or outside the source region).
Mass evacuation is a multi-disciplinary process
Mass evacuation also includes all supporting processes, such as alerting, risk and crisis communication,
registration, transport and transport assistance, reception and care for basic needs, care for the evacuated
area.
1
In this Framework, the term 'hiding' is used to denote finding a safe place in the home, for which the term 'vertical evacuation' is
used in the water domain.
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I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
1.
What is the starting point?
Self-reliance of citizens has priority and the government should facilitate this as much as possible in order to
be able to make use of that self-reliance. Citizens and businesses therefore have to be able to make an
informed choice while they also have an overview of the consequences of their choice, such as that they would
be responsible for their own safety if they do not follow the advice for evacuation. Active risk and crisis
communication enables citizens and businesses to be self-reliant and responsible. The government therefore
has to communicate about its own (preparatory) measures and about what people can do themselves. It is
important for the government to announce its plans even in the phase in which there is no concrete threat. It
should be borne in mind that the population has several information sources, of which reporting by the
government is only one.
It is important for the government to reach the target groups through as many channels as possible, including
social networks and organisations. It should be considered who would be the best party to communicate a
particular message to the media; communication about political interpretation is best left to administrators,
while factual information is best left to experts.
It is of vital importance to harmonise the messages of the various parties for the sake of
credibility and effectiveness of crisis management.
2.
Scaling up and possible roles of regional authorities and national government
In case of a supraregional incident, all security regions are scaled up to GRIP 4 (see Annexe 3).
This may mean that the regions in the organisation area will also scale up transit and reception to GRIP 4.
The security region in which the source area is located takes on the role of coordinating security region (GRIP
5). If it is unclear what or where the source is, the chairpersons of the security regions concerned decide in mutual
consultation which security region will take on the coordinating role.
If a source area is yet to be defined (in case of an impending flood, for instance), it is recommended to appoint
a coordinating security region, as well as one coordinating water manager in this example. It is therefore
reasonable that the designated security region also takes coordinating action in the acute phase, unless
another region is better equipped, but this depends on the nature of the incident and the situation. This is
coordinated in consultation: the coordinating region consults the 'designated' source region about the
transfer of coordinating roles.
The coordinating region is the primary contact point for the national government in the general governing
column . If desired, a liaison of the Ministry of Security and Justice participates in the regional consultations of
the coordinating security region. The National Crisis Centre (NCC) is the national government's 'front office'
for the coordinating region.
2
The areas in which the government can take action in case of an (impending) evacuation, and which
influences the actions of other government authorities, citizens and businesses, can be divided into seven
categories. These categories are:
1. Coordination between crisis organisations and formulating policy basic principles and tolerance levels;
2. Communicating with the media and public;
3. Reducing evacuation problems. Measures such as making use of emergency spillways and cancelling (large)
events;
4. Influencing environmental factors, such as regulating the transport flows and organising reception and
security of the area to be evacuated. Experience has taught us that maintaining public order and safety,
including guarding property and belongings in an area, increases the willingness to evacuate and could
therefore have a positive influence on the evacuation;
3
2 In case of a water-related threat, the coordinating water manager also acts as the primary point of contact in the functional
governing column. If desired, a liaison of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment participates in the regional consultations
of the coordinating water manager.
3 See also Annexe 6 with an overview of possible measures to be taken by the Department of Waterways and Public Works and
other road administrators in each phase of a large-scale incident.
6 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
5. Rendering assistance; Coordination of assistance on a regional level is carried out by the Regional
Operational Team (ROT) and on a national level by the National Operational Coordination Centre (LOCC) or,
after scaling up, by the National Operational Staff (LOS). Assistance from abroad may also be called for, such
as from our neighbouring countries, the EU, NATO or the UN. There are several arrangements in place for
international assistance4;
6. Exercising powers for exceptional circumstances;
7. Offering compensation or compensating costs and damage. This may stimulate desired behaviour.
The national government is generally reluctant to make ad hoc financial arrangements to compensate
victims. This particularly applies if the costs and damage were avoidable or insurable, or if damage can be
recovered from a perpetrator or person responsible.
The extent to which a government body implements a category of measures determines the role of the
government body in question, but it has to be borne in mind that the role definition of one actor influences
the role definition of other actors. Each of the categories of measures listed can be implemented
independent of each other and to various degrees of intensity. For instance, it is conceivable that GRIP 3
applies to a region, but that the national government provides guidance for particular aspects.
The leading authority is usually also responsible for and coordinates the harmonisation of communication.
If national government takes on a directive role, crisis communication is managed by the National Core Team
for Crisis Communication (NKC). The NKC acts as the national government's information hub in the area of
press and public relations.
Scaling up from a communication point of view can also be independent of scaling up for operational or policy
measures.
In choosing its role, the national government can choose between facilitation, guidance and direction. The
transition between the roles is highly situationally determined and therefore cannot be sharply defined
beforehand. Facilitation means the national government provides assistance when another party holds
responsibility. Guidance means that another party's decision-making process is influenced without the exercise
of formal powers. Direction means exercising formal powers. The term GRIP-national government (GRIP GOV)
has been introduced for the concept of direction5.
The national government is reluctant in taking on a directive role. If the national government directs a
situation, this occurs on the basis of formal powers and in to be defined concrete areas of crisis management.
Direction does not mean that the national government 'takes over'. The implementation of incident control
always remains the responsibility of the national and regional (implementing) organisations that usually are
responsible for this.
The national government lets the situation determine which role it takes. Reasons for the national
government to choose a particular role can be (in random order):
• in case of an intersectoral crisis ,
• there is a need to distribute scarce means,
• the situation is so complex that, for instance:
- more than collegial cooperation is desirable;
- the situation is about to escalate;
- the coordinating capability of the regions concerned is insufficient (for instance, as a result of the size of the area to
be evacuated, the organisation area or the reception area);
• the regions concerned have a preference for a particular role;
6
4 The arrangements and application procedures are discussed in the LOCC's Assistance Manual (version of December 2010),
part 2 (international assistance) and part 3 (incoming foreign assistance). See http://www.nctv.nl/
onderwerpen/crisisbeheersing/operationele-coordinatie/bijstand/
5 Examples of GRIP-national government are: a category A nuclear incident, infectious diseases (A diseases), large-scale cyber
crisis and long-term scarcity (National Manual on Decision-Making in Crisis Situations (Nationaal Handboek
Crisisbesluitvorming, NHC).
6 The NHC describes an intersectoral crisis as follows: an incident in which the national security is at stake because one or more
vital interests are affected, and in which the regular structures and/or means are not sufficient to maintain stability. In these
situations, the structures of the NHC enter into effect.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 7
• communication intervention is needed to achieve that 1) the idea of a reliable government is
created/maintained and/or that 2) a clear and univocal message is disseminated;
• in case of presence or absence of legal powers for a directive intervention;
• there is attention (pressure) from the (international) media;
• there is a possible international risk of disturbance;
• there are (other) considerations of a political, administrative or communicative nature, in light of the
(inter)national impact of the evacuation.
The table below lists several examples of possible role definitions of national government.
Table: possible role definitions of national government
Daily work
Facilitate
Guide*
Direct
Local and regional authorities
decide and implement,
national government
facilitates
Local and regional authorities
decide and implement,
national government gives
urgent opinion
The national government
decides certain aspects,
local and regional
authorities implement
1. Coordination
The regions and
national government
draw up their own
plans, after
coordination (if
applicable), and
inform each other
NCC and/or LOCC
facilitate coordination
among regions and/or
departments and
between departments
and regions (e.g., by
activating AT, ICCb,
MCCb)
National government
gives regions urgent
opinion to arrive at joint
approach.
National government
gives urgent advice about
approach to take
Ministry of Security &
Justice have King's
Commissioner(s) (KC) give
indication about uniform
approach
2. Communication
Region communicates
to the population
about:
- threat assessment,
- decision to not
activate crisis
organisations (yet)
NKC (if requested)
makes an
environmental
analysis, advises
and/or supports
regions;
- Region
communicates to
population about
threat assessment,
for instance
NKC steers towards
univocal communication
of all parties involved;
Region communicates to
population with due
regard for NKC's advice
NKC determine
communication strategy and
message, if possible after
consulting all parties
involved; Region
communicates messages
determined by NKC
3. Reducing
evacuation
problems
Mayors cancel
events
Minister(s) expresses
explicit support for
mayor’s decision to
cancel events
National government
gives urgent advice to
mayors to cancel events
Minister of Security &
Justice has KC issue a
direction to mayors to
cancel events
Water manager
decides to use
emergency spillway(s)
National government
decides, as requested by
region, to use
emergency spillway(s)
-
National government
decides, against wishes of
region, to use
emergency spillway(s)
Regions draw up
water assessment
(incl. threat
assessment) with
water authorities
-
National flood threat
coordination commission
draws up national water
assessment (incl. threat
assessment)
-
Example: threat
assessment of high
tide
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Daily work
Facilitate
Guide*
Direct
Local and regional authorities
decide and implement,
national government
facilitates
Local and regional authorities
decide and implement,
national government gives
urgent advice
The national government
decides certain aspects,
local and regional
authorities implement
4. Influencing
environmental
factors/specific
evacuation
measures
Regular
operational
management
(of
regional and national
organisations)
-
-
-
Example: traffic
management (see
also Annexe 6)
Regular operational
management aimed
at daily traffic
management
Infrastructure &
Environment adjusts
use of main road
network at request of
police
Infrastructure &
Environment submits
proposals to regions for
optimal use of main
road network
Infrastructure &
Environment decides to
adjust use of main road
network
Example: reception
Municipality organises
reception in own
region
Security &
Justice/LOCC
clarifies national
supply and
demand in
reception
Security & Justice/LOCC
advises regions and
AT/Minister about
optimal distribution of
required reception in
relation to possibilities
in traffic
MCCb/Security & Justice
has KC issue a direction to
the regions about reception
policy or decision based on
Population Evacuation Act
Example: evacuating
healthcare
institutions
No special role for
emergency services
Assistance coordination
(major incident hospital
and transport)
Advice of
MCCb/Infrastructure &
Environment about
evacuation, partly in
relation to population
evacuation
-
Example: evacuating
livestock
No special role for
emergency services
Assistance coordination
(for instance, in
cooperation with LTO)
Advice of
MCCb/Economic Affairs
about evacuation of
livestock
in relation to population
evacuation and
(healthcare) institutions
MCCb/Security & Justice has
KC issue a direction to the
regions about evacuation of
livestock in relation to
population evacuation
Surveillance of
evacuated areas
Role of police
Assistance coordination
Advice of MCCb/Security
& Justice to regions
about basic principles of
surveillance of area and
tolerance levels re.
people staying behind
MCCb/Security & Justice has
KC issue a direction to
regions about the policy
regarding surveillance of
evacuated area (incl.
deployment of defence
units for instance)
5. Rendering assistance
Region requests
assistance and LOCC
coordinates and
Minister of Security &
Justice decides, unless
compelling reasons
dictate otherwise
See daily work. LOCC
can be scaled up to
LOS
LOCC/LOS gives urgent
opinion for reviewing a
request for assistance, in
light of the potential lack
of capacities.
MCCb (Minister of Security
& Justice) decides, advised
by LOCC/LOS, about
distribution of assistance
in case of scarcity
6. Exercising
exceptional
powers
-
Exercising or making
available exceptional
powers in the general or
functional column, at the
request of the region
-
National government
decides to exercise
exceptional powers
Example: Nuclear
Energy Act (please
note: no exceptional
power, but direction
from national
government)
Region decides on
evacuation in case of
(impending) nuclear
incident
-
-
National government
takes measures to respond
to a nuclear incident
involving
an A object
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7. Financial
compensation for
population and
businesses (as an
incentive to
evacuate)
Citizens and
businesses bear own
costs; region may
(partly) compensate
costs
-
National government
advises regions about
conditions for
compensation by region
National government
decides on conditions for
compensating costs by
national government
(voluntary compensation)
* Where in this column mention is made of MCCb, this can also mean one of the two gateways ICCb or AT.
10 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
3. Information preparation
An adequate conceptualisation, decision making process and corresponding risk and crisis communication to
citizens, businesses and institutions is very difficult, if not impossible, without good information.
The term ‘information preparation’7 expresses the idea that decision-makers need to have, share, combine,
interpret and use the right information. It is impossible to construe a sound and coherent conceptualisation
without a multidisciplinary picture of the threat, exposure, vulnerabilities and capabilities.
Most of the required information can be assembled and prepared in the cold phase, which serves to increase
insight into the specific risks and vulnerabilities in a particular area. Having a clear picture of own areas is
paramount. The central question that needs to be answered is whether not an area remains liveable. The
answer to this question mainly depends on the continuity of the vital infrastructure. This means that not only
should the direct consequences of a flood, for instance, be taken into account, but also the chain reactions
(domino effects).
4. Aspects for decision-making
There is no legal basis for an evacuation order issued by the mayor or chairs of the security region. In
practice, the emergency power from Section 176 of the Municipalities Act is applied as a basis for the
evacuation order issued by the mayor. There is one limitation associated with such an order: people cannot
be obliged to leave their homes (right of inviolability of the home) as the limitation system in the Constitution
does not allow this. However, a call for evacuation is generally expected to be sufficiently effective.
See Annexe 2 for the legal framework.
The decision-making process regarding evacuation is strongly influenced by the context within which the
evacuation will take place. It is a drastic decision to make about an – often – uncertain threat. There will likely
be limited information available. Dealing with uncertainties is, therefore, the starting point. Key figures and
rules of thumb could be used to fill the information gap about the required reception, road capacity, etc. See
Annexe 1 for an overview of key figures and rules of thumb.
The following aspects should at least be included in the decision-making process and, if possible, prepared in
the cold phase:
• the expected scope and probability of the threat. Take account of uncertainties in incident development,
such as piping as a result of which the (impending) incident could take on a completely different
dimension, both in terms of scope and threat level, from one moment to the next;
• the (expected) available time until the incident occurs; take account of uncertainties in the required and
available time;
• the expected direct consequences and chain reactions following the threat (information preparation):
- victim and damage assessment: people, animals, cultural heritage, vital sectors, infrastructure, buildings, the environment....;
- special objects: objects which need human supervision or which require measures to prevent escalation (such
as companies to which the Major Accidents (Risks) Decree 1999 applies (BRZO companies), nuclear plants, water
companies, hospitals, etc.);
• which social and economic processes are affected by evacuation? This may result in costs, particularly if it is
later found that the incident did not occur;
• which (crisis) network partners are relevant? (see Annexe 1 for a design for a network card).
• which evacuation strategies are relevant?
• take account of limited options for coordination during execution. The situation is expected to develop so
quickly that problems in the field have already been solved or accepted before an administrative decisionmaking process has been initiated. If possible: position Incident Scene Commands (CoPIs), emergency
workers and means in such a way that they are not hindered or threatened for as long as possible in
implementing the measures.
7
See also “Information preparation in flood risks and domino effects; a study” by Hollands-Midden, the Netherlands Organisation
for Applied Scientific Research and Rijnland Water Authority
https://www.tno.nl/downloads/BOEKRAP_OVERSTROMINGSRISICOS_DEF.pdf)
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 11
• feasibility test:
- how much time is available for the decision-making process, for issuing warnings to the population, for preparing
the population and for taking measures?
- how much time is available for carrying out the evacuation (depending on the evacuation strategies)?
- is there a spontaneous evacuation and/or shadow evacuation, and what does this means for the organised evacuation?
- how long are the evacuation and reception expected to take?
- is it desirable and possible to reallocate means in the threatened area during an evacuation?
- what is the expected behaviour of citizens and businesses and can that be influenced at all? Citizens and businesses
take their own decisions, based on their own assessments of the severity of the situation and of possibilities for
taking action and will therefore not always follows the government's advice. This self-reliant behaviour could result in
spontaneous evacuation and shadow evacuation; it is therefore important to take timely decisions about measures to
steer a spontaneous evacuation in the right direction;
- which of the not self-reliant citizens at and outside institutions have to be evacuated and who is responsible for that
and what does this mean for the application for assistance? Correctional institutions are responsible for evacuating
their detainees. However, good contact with the security region/municipality is paramount. The earlier the custodial
institution is informed about a possible calamity which requires evacuation, the better it is able to carry out the
evacuation of its detainees. The risk associated with late information provision to a custodial institution is that it is not
capable of preparing for an evacuation in time.
- do animals have to be evacuated? Pets are evacuated along with their caregivers. The owner or keeper of commercially
kept farm animals8 is responsible for their evacuation.
Experience has taught us that these people are not inclined to evacuate as long as there is no safe place for their
animals. An organisation such as the Dutch Federation of Agricultural and Horticultural Organisations (LTO) could
coordinate the evacuation of these animals (transport, reception, etc.).
- is the evacuation capacity adequate? Reception and care are the responsibility of a municipality, more specifically, the
population care team (Article 2.1.3 of the Security Regions Decree).
In the context of civil-military cooperation, the Ministry of Defence has designated a Defence complex in each province
where large numbers of people can be temporarily received (see Annexe 1 for usage guidelines).
- does account has to be taken of the rescue capability? If yes, what does this mean for the decision to let people take
shelter in their own homes?
- does security need to be provided in the evacuated area? And is it feasible?
- are there sufficient capabilities (people and means)? In case of scarcity, the priority sequence comes into play: the
first priority is to save people's lives, including taking less self-reliant people to safety. The second priority is
ensuring the continuity of the vital infrastructure, as failure of the vital infrastructure not only has consequences
for the affected area, but possibly also for the rest of the Netherlands, thus further hindering the deployment of
assistance. The prioritisation of the other aspects – irreversible industrial processes, irreversible damage to nature,
animals, cultural heritage, material damage – has to be determined in the situation at hand;
- what are the operational consequences for emergency workers (perspective for action): an emergency worker has to
be capable of performing his or her duties during his or her deployment. An important precondition for this is that the
emergency worker's relatives are taken to safety. Moreover, it is of paramount importance that an emergency worker
can do his or work in an as safe as possible manner; therefore, protection related to the (impending) incident needs to
be provided.
- to what extent can the infrastructure be used as optimally as possible? Which capabilities are available? Are the
evacuation routes safe in relation to the threat, also if the evacuation takes longer than planned?
- is an international evacuation needed and feasible? Timely coordination is necessary. To this end, the NCC will
contact the counterparts of the neighbouring countries, namely the CGCCR in Belgium and the Lageszentrum in
Germany.
- crisis communication: can the proposed decisions be explained? This concerns government communication about its
plans and about what it expected from citizens and businesses, and about the consequences of not following the
government's advice. Can it be explained to the population why one area is evacuated and others are not?
• correlation with other measures: an evacuation decision must always be viewed in correlation with
other decision to manage an incident, such as dyke strengthening in case of an impending flood.
• taking political and administrative aspects into account.
8 For the evacuation of commercially kept farm animals, the then Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality issued the socalled "Livestock evacuation guidelines" (The Hague, 2008).
10 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
5. Scenarios and evacuation strategies
It is expected that there will not be one possible scenario, but various possible scenarios. Thinking in
terms of - combinations of - scenarios is of major importance for an effective decision-making process
about evacuation.
In order to create a feasible perspective for action for all parties involved, the government needs to have
evacuation strategies for the most important scenarios. A strategy may comprise one strategy for the entire
area, or a combination of strategies, for instance in part preventive and in part local reception in the area. A
combination of strategies will only work if it is seen as logical by citizens and businesses.
The basic evacuation strategies are:
a. no evacuation,
b. taking shelter in own home in threatened area,
c. reception elsewhere in the threatened area,
d. preventive evacuation to a safe area.
In case of a large-scale incident, preventive evacuation from the area does not necessarily have to be the
first option. People are very vulnerable during an evacuation. On the other hand, saving people who have
stayed behind requires substantial capability, which will have to be available. Therefore, the pros and cons of
preventive evacuation has to be weighed against the pros and cons of local reception in the own area and/or
own building.
Not (directly) choosing to evacuate is another strategy and requires a decision and possibly public
communication. However, the consequences of possible delay need to be charted and it has to be considered
what is and is not possible in terms of evacuation at a later time. This calls for an assessment of the combined
effect of time and behaviour of citizens and businesses as well as other government bodies on the feasibility of an
evacuation.
The ultimate choice to evacuate or not is a choice between several evils: each strategy will result in costs and
possibly victims. In order to be able to make a decision, the probability of the most important scenarios (most
realistic scenario, worst case scenario, the incident does not occur) has to be calculated (in percentages or
qualitatively speaking (high/low). Furthermore, the positive and negative consequences of the various
evacuation strategies for each threat scenario (evacuate, shelter, not evacuate). The costs and benefits can be
expressed in terms of money, human life, risk of disruption, etc.
A decision to evacuate is an uncertain decision. Particularly because a decision has to be made about an
evacuation when it is not certain that people will not actually be threatened. A numerical assessment can
help in making this decision. It boils down to the following: if chances are slim that an evacuation is required,
the expected yield of that evacuation will have to be bigger. The yields have to outweigh the big chance that in
hindsight the evacuation turned out to be unnecessary. Annexe 1 lists a formula which can serve as a rule of
thumb.
Naturally, a decision to evacuate is more than arithmetic. For instance, it may also be decided to evacuate even
though the numerical analysis indicates that an evacuation would be disadvantageous.
12 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
II. ACTION PLANS
1.
Action plan for COLD phase
This action plan helps with preparations in the cold phase for making choices between evacuation strategies
based on the pros and cons of those strategies. A unified planning process prevents plans and measures of the
various actors from interfering with each other in the acute phase.
Actually going over this action plan for the cold phase is an important precondition to being capable of taking
swift and adequate action in the warm phase. It is important to exchange information, paint a clear picture
and involve the network in all steps of the plan.
Step 1 Choosing scenarios and strategies
1a) Scan the risks in the Regional Risk Profile for relevance to large-scale evacuation
1b) Has large-scale evacuation associated with those risks been detailed in the plans?
1c) List the existing threat scenarios, add missing scenarios and, if needed, complement them with the
missing variations (worst case, realistic)
1d) For each threat scenario, formulate possible basic strategies with all partners (business
community, vital sectors, cattle farmers, healthcare and custodial institutions), exclude strategies
that are bound to fail, detail strategies likely to succeed, with a timeline and pros and cons and
place them in a weighting matrix (see below) for strategies.
Step 2 Role of other regions and/or national government in case of strategies likely to succeed
2a) Determine for which of these scenarios/strategies you need other regions/the national government
for evacuation?
2b) For which subjects is this the case?
the execution of the evacuation affects other regions (organisation area)
there is too little capability (people and capacities) available in the region
size of the threatened area is larger than the own region (with consequences for the execution of the
evacuation, communication, etc.)
2c) About what subjects do you expect an (administrative) discussion with other regions and/or the
national government in case of a threat? Examples: communication, probability of the threat
scenario, evacuation strategy to be chosen, distribution of scarce capacities
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 13
Step 3 Coordination of likely to succeed strategies with other regions and/or national
government
3a) Discuss the likely to succeed evacuation strategies (1d) which require the assistance of other
regions and/or the national government (2a) or about which a discussion might arise with them
(2c).
3b)
Identify possible bottlenecks and solve them.
3c)
Document bottlenecks that cannot be solved [in the description of the strategies]
Step 4 Coordination about division of roles with other regions and/or national government
4a)
Make agreements about the division of roles and document them. For instance:
- for which subjects is direction by the national government needed
- if a coordinating region is chosen, which duties will it have
4b) Agree on how the unsolvable bottlenecks (3c) will be dealt with during a threat (for instance,
consultation between the regions, decision by the coordinating region or direction by the
national government).
Step 5 Documentation in plans
Bundle the threat scenarios and the associated evacuation strategies likely to succeed with the
associated pros and cons, bottlenecks and the role of the various partners. Use the weighting
matrix for this. See next page
14 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
Weighting matrix for evacuation strategies
Threat:
Step 1c) Fill in the type of threat (e.g., nuclear incident Doel or nuclear incident Borsele or flood Lekdijk West or flood Lekdijk East) or .....
Scenario characteristics
Severity
realistic
Most
important
characteristics
of threat and
consequences
Step 1c) describe
Preferred
strategy
Strategies likely to succeed
Probability
(only fill in
for threat)
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Strategy 3
Strategy ...
e.g. 20%
Describe the
strategy, fill in
costs and
benefits** and
state the
required time
for execution
Describe the
strategy, fill in
costs and
benefits** and
state the
required time
for execution
Describe the
strategy, fill in
costs and
benefits** and
state the
required time
for execution
Describe the
strategy, fill in
costs and
benefits** and
state the
required time
for execution
e.g. Strategy 5
the most
important
characteristics of
the realistic threat
and possible
consequences
etc.
worst case
Step 1c) describe
the most
important
characteristics of
the worst case
scenario and
possible
consequences
e.g. 10%
Describe the
strategy, fill in
costs and
benefits** and
state the
required time
for execution
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
e.g. Strategy 1
incident
does not
occur
Step 1c) describe
the most
important
characteristics if
the incident does
not occur
e.g. 70%
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
e.g. Strategy 3
**The consequences of the various evacuation strategies likely to succeed are listed for each scenario. The costs and benefits can be expressed in
terms of money, human life, risk of disruption, etc. However, sometimes there will be so little information available that the following indications
will have to suffice: ++, +, 0
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 15
Description of strategy + timeline per scenario
Scenario ....
Evacuation strategy
• size of evacuation area
- area of shadow evacuation
• evacuation statement
- people: self-reliant, not self-reliant
- animals
• number of people staying behind
• request for assistance + consequences of
Costs
Benefits
• Economic damage, victims of the evacuation • Prevention of fatalities and injuries,
itself, social damage, image,
prevention of damage to vital interests,
prevention of damage to goods,
• ...............
• international aspects,
• ...............
assistance cannot be provided
• other risks
Draw up a timeline for each strategy and make a distinction between:
1. Decision-making time
2. Preparation time
3. Execution time
Timeline of expected moment of incident occurring
Decision-making
Postponement
preparation
decision-making
execution of preventive evacuation
preparation
One meeting later
16 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
execution of preventive evacuation
acute evacuation
2.
Action plan for WARM phase
This action plan enables policy, operational and communication advisers in the various regions and in national
government to optimally fulfil their roles in the decision-making process, and perform their duties if required. The
system ensures a uniform information exchange and attuned decision-making between various regions and the
national government and thus contributes to a unité de doctrine.
Where relevant, this has to be coordinated during each step with the relevant public and private crisis partners in
and outside the region; if the action plan for the cold phase has been properly executed, a network analysis will
already have been carried out, the crisis partners are already identified and involved and agreements have been
made about cooperation.
Step 1 What is going on and how serious is it?
1a) In case of a supraregional threat, designate a coordinating security region, establish an ROT and RBT,
formulate the assignment and inform the partners;
1b) Based on the existent threat, draw up a regional or national image ((un)certainties, scope, current
behaviour of the population, consequences (including for livestock, vital sectors, healthcare and
custodial institutions), available time, probability) of the possible scenarios in consultation with the
partners (such as regions, national government and vital sectors); in case of a water-related incident:
flood does not occur, worst case (dyke fails in short term), realistic (dyke breaks in the medium term);
1c) Compare the national common operational picture with the threat scenarios defined in the cold
phase and complement the scenarios, if required;
1d) Decide (on an administrative level) with the partners (including other regions) on which scenario(s)
(does not occur, realistic, worst case) further preparations are based and which intraregional and
interregional framework for action will be used;
1e) Decide (on an administrative level) whether preparations have to be made for an evacuation, given
(the probability of) the scenario chosen and time-space factors. If not go back to step 1b);
1f) Decide (on an administrative level) if and whether public communication is called for.
Step 2 What can we do?
Detailing strategies likely to succeed
- Based on the evacuation strategies detailed in the
cold phase, detail several strategies likely to
succeed, with a timeline and pros and cons and
place them in a weighting matrix (see page 15).
- Take account of unforeseen incidents such as
accidents, people choosing another route. Seek
to prevent strategies from becoming
deadlocked due to any disruption.
Measures for minimising
evacuation problems
- Identify measures (such as cancelling events or
parts of the measure categories on page 6) which
may minimise evacuation problems and which
are sensible, even if an evacuation decision has
not yet been made;
- Make a decision about this (on an
administrative level), in consultation with
partners (such as ROT/RBT), if required.
- Implement the measures and communicate
about the choices made.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 17
Step 4 Execute the evacuation strategy
Step 5 Monitor the situation and execution
Together with the other regions and partners, monitor the situation and execution and go
back to step 1 when circumstances change
18 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
III. ANNEXES
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | I
ANNEXE 1:
terms, key figures9 and rules of thumb
Evacuation area and organisation area
The evacuation area. This area consists of three parts:
a. threatened area: the area where an incident is about to occur and which needs to be evacuated;
b. area with chain reactions: the area where an incident is not about to occur but where the chain reactions
of the incident will arise, such as the failure of utilities. These effects may also lead to a full or partial
evacuation of this area;
c. shadow area: the area that is not under threat, but where people take the initiative to evacuate, based on
an apparent threat (shadow evacuation). The government will have to take measures for this area as well
or anticipate the consequences of a shadow evacuation for the organised evacuation from the threatened
area.
The organisation area: the area outside the threatened area where measures have to be taken in order to
have the evacuation run smoothly (e.g., traffic measures for traffic flow) or where measures have to be taken
in order to provide reception (this so-called reception area may be located in and outside the threatened
area).
Design for network card
Target groups (for who measures are required)
• citizens
• first responders (and their relatives)
• businesses
• schools/crèches/after-school care/nursing homes/old people's homes
• hospitals/institutions for the handicapped/domestic care
• utility companies
• ICT
• prisons (Ministry of Justice is responsible for evacuation)
• cattle farmers (in consultation with LTO)
• .........................
Crisis partners (who can help us?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
road administrators (national, regional and local)
LOCC (National operational Crisis Centre)
NCC (National Crisis Centre)
temporary reception and reception municipalities and/or regions
ministerial representatives on a local/regional level
transport companies, taxi companies
Ministry of Defence
media
experts (such as water authorities, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), Royal
Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI), research institutes)
• .........................
9
Taken from, among other things, the “Scenario card for evacuations: execution”, a publication of the Province of North Holland,
April 2012 (kab@noord- holland.nl). The key figures and rules of thumb can be adjusted according to local or regional information.
20 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
Composition of the population
Self-reliant people 89%
Not self-reliant people: 11%
- hospitals
- nursing homes
- mentally disabled
- psychologically disabled
- visually disabled
- prisoners
- domestic care
- sick people
0.32%
8.0%
0.37%
0.02%
0.01%
0.15%
2.5%
A further subdivision can be made:
- depending on instruments and continuous care
- depending on (semi) continuous care
Children fall under the responsibility of parents/caregivers or schools/after-school facilities.
Human behaviour
Research shows that about 20% of the population does not follow the government's evacuation advice.
Therefore, the government has to take into account that citizens and businesses will act contrary to its advice.
This logically also has consequences for the expected scope of the evacuation.
Prisoners
In case of an evacuation, each prison is obliged to take in 25 individuals.
The Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI) has its own transport organisation, the Transport and Support
Department (DV&O), which could support the evacuation process with sufficient response time.
Reception
Take account of the fact that no more than 10% of the population needs government-organised reception for
the first couple of days up to a week10. The use of government-organised reception will likely increase in case
of longer periods. All evacuees are entitled to facilities provided in the reception area.
In order to give the municipalities a guideline they have to take into account when they are responsible for
reception and care, the Bruinooge Committee compiled the following report: Population care in order - beyond
a lack of commitment
Civil-military cooperation
In the context of civil-military cooperation, the Ministry of Defence has designated a Defence complex in each
province where large numbers of people can be temporarily received. The following guidelines apply to the
use of such facilities:
Initially, use will be made of civil reception capabilities. Should these capabilities be insufficient, use could be
made of the reception capabilities provided by the Ministry of Defence.
The required reception capabilities are not described in every detail and depend on the situation at hand.
In case of an actual (threat of) disaster or serious accident, assistance is requested according to the formal
procedure. This procedure could be accelerated by an early deployment of security region officers of the
Regional Notification and Coordination Centre (RMC).
Depending on the situation at that very moment, reception can be executed in three different variations
(improvised to lesser or higher degree).
10
Report “Population care in order 2.0”, Security Consultative Body (Veiligheidsberaad), April 2014. See www.veiligheidsberaad.nl
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | III
Key traffic figures
The average number of people in a car is 2.25
Motorway
Bad weather
Extra traffic
2,200 cars per hour per lane (optimal conditions) N-roads
1,800 cars per hour per lane
capacity decreased by 1% to 5%
an increase of 3% in rush hour results in 30% more travel time
Transport
About 80% of self-reliant people make use of their own transportation; 20% would need collective transport.
Formula for numerical analysis: is evacuation sensible?
11
The formula states that if it is highly improbable that the incident (a flood, for instance) occurs, the costs of
the evacuation will have to outweigh the possible (but uncertain) benefits.
Pw * O > Pv * K
for which
Pw: the probability that the threat becomes reality and an evacuation is
needed;
Pv: the probability that evacuation is not needed (because the threat does not
occur); Pw + Pv = 1;
O: the net yield of the evacuation;
K: the costs of the evacuation.
An estimate of the probability that the flood will actually occur or that the toxic plume will spread to a
residential area is part of the threat assessment. From this probability (Pw) it logically follows that Pv (=1-Pw).
A rough estimate of the costs associated with the evacuation (loss of human lives (key figure), operational
costs for extra care and reception, economic damage) gives K. A rough estimate of the yields of the
evacuation if the incident actually occurs (saved lives, prevention of damage to health, prevention of material
and economic damage) minus the costs of the evacuation (K) gives O.
If Pw*O is greater than Pv*K, the evacuation is recommended from a numerical point of view.
11
Comparable to roulette. A bet on red or black results in only a minor pay-out because the success ratio is 1/2; 50%. A bet on a single
number usually results in a higher pay-out (36 times the stake) because the success ratio is much smaller (1/36; less than 3%). Nobody
would take part in a lottery or play roulette solely based on arithmetic. Other considerations also come into play to participate in such
games. For instance, the hope or trust that the few bets placed will beat statistics. After all, people can be lucky.
22 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
ANNEXE 2:
legal framework
This Annexe explains:
A. who is authorised to make the decision to evacuate
B. who pays for the reception costs
C. the liability of the government
A. Who is authorised to make the decision to evacuate?
Mayor / chair of the security region
The mayor has the highest command in disaster response and in taking measures in the event of a serious
fear of an incident occurring.12 In the event of a supralocal disaster or crisis, or a serious fear of the
occurrence of such a disaster or crisis, that responsibility is assigned to the chair of the security region. 13
In practice, the emergency power from Section 176 of the Municipalities Act is applied as a basis for the
evacuation order issued by the mayor. There is one limitation associated with such an order:
people cannot be obliged to leave their homes (right of inviolability of the home) as the limitation system
in the Constitution does not allow this. There is therefore no legal basis for an evacuation order issued by
the mayor or chairs of the security region.
King's Commissioner (KC)
A KC also does not have a specific evacuation power. A KC may issue a direction to the chair of the security
region about the policy to be pursued by the chair concerned regarding disaster response or crisis
management.14
Minister of Security and Justice (VenJ)
The Minister of VenJ also does not have a specific evacuation power.
Furthermore, he does not have the power to give instructions, except in two cases:
• under Article 5c of the King's Official Instructions, the Minister may request the KC, in his capacity as
Deputy Minister, to issue directions (within the meaning of Section 42 of the Security Regions Act) to the
chair of the security region regarding the policy to be pursued for disaster response or crisis management.
The KC must comply with the Minister's request forthwith;
• in case of exceptional circumstances15, the Minister can order the KC to issue specific directions to the
mayors regarding disaster response in concrete cases (such as the need for evacuation). The Minister could
even, if the general interest so requires, provide for the exercise of the KC's powers and the mayor's powers
under the Security Regions Act, by assuming that exercise of powers fully or partially, or by assigning those
powers to another authority.
The powers for exceptional circumstances may be initialised without a state of emergency being declared;
however, the initialisation of these powers requires a Royal Decree.
In the event of an (impending) disaster which also is so severe that powers to give instructions do not suffice,
the Minister of VenJ16 may order the evacuation of the population17 under the
12 Section 5, subsection 1 of the Security Regions Act.
13 Section 39 of the Security Regions Act.
14 Section 42, subsection 1 of the Security Regions Act.
15 For these circumstances, chapter 12 contains a description of the emergency powers under Sections 52 to 54 of the Security
Regions Act.
16 Based on Section 2d, viewed in conjunction with Section 2a of the Population Evacuation Act.
17 The Act defines evacuation of the population as follows: the full or partial evacuation of an area and the resulting removal and
housing of and care for the population with the associated registration, as well as preparations for this.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 5
Population Evacuation Act. This Act is based on the fact that the broad outlines of the evacuation policy, such
as determining the time at which the evacuation should commence, who have to be moved and where to, are
determined by the national government. Local authorities have to operate within the scope of the framework
set by the Minister.
Incidentally, this Act only provides for the evacuation of the population, not of livestock or goods. The power to
order an evacuation is put into effect by Royal Decree, as proposed by the
Prime Minister.18
Based on the Population Evacuation Act, the Minister can grant a general or special authority, in the event of
an (impending) disaster, based on which the mayor or KC can order evacuation of the population in the
interest of the population or for the sake of maintaining social life.19 This authority can only be granted if
Section 2b of the Population Evacuation Decree has been put into effect through Royal Decree. It can also be
determined which area will be designated as reception area for the evacuated population.20
For the benefit of evacuated people and people to be evacuated, the mayor can order homes, buildings and
other shelter to be made available for use, with the associated inventory if needed, to be made ready for
reception, with or without maintenance services.21
Sector specific authorities for the evacuation of livestock
The Minister of Economic Affairs is responsible, on a policy level, for the agricultural sector and
for the commercially kept farm animals (livestock).22 They are not only business assets but living beings for which a
duty to care is in place under the Health and Welfare of Animals Act. The duty to care is primarily placed with the
animals' owner (cattle farmer). The cattle farmer is responsible for the evacuation of his livestock, supported by
the local/regional authorities. Municipal contingency plans must contain procedures for the evacuation and
reception of and care for livestock.
Nuclear disaster response
Section 46 of the Nuclear Energy Act23: the Minister in question may set rules or take measures, if needed with
the help of the strong arm of the law, to limit or remedy the consequences of the disaster. These rules and
measures may relate to:
a. access of people, animals, plants or goods to the contaminated area,
b. people and animals staying indoors,
c. bringing people, animals, plants or goods from the contaminated area to other locations in or outside the
contaminated area,
No rules are set and no measures are taken until after consulting the chair of the security region and the KC,
who are particularly involved, unless urgency dictates otherwise.
18 Section 2b of the Population Evacuation Act may also apply if a (limited) state of emergency is declared based on the Exceptional
Situations (Coordination) Act, if the crisis calls for the exercise of powers in a wide range, or for the exercise of far-reaching powers.
19 Section 2b of the Population Evacuation Act.
20 Section 3, subsection 2 of the Population Evacuation Act.
21 Section 7 of the Population Evacuation Act. In the context of this Act, providing temporary housing comprises making available
beds, furniture, as well as heating and lighting or a place in a heated and lighted room, at the option of the occupant.
Maintenance in the sense of this Act comprises providing food and drinks.
22 See the "Livestock evacuation guidelines" of the then Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (The Hague,
2008).
23 See Section 46, subsection 1, opening words and under c (regarding evacuation).
6 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
Section 49b of the Nuclear Energy Act24: Following an accident involving a category-A object, the chair of the
security region may adopt regulations by means of a by-law or, if necessary with the strong arm of the law, may
take measures to limit or remedy the consequences of that accident. The regulations and measures may relate
to the subjects stated above under a to c.
Environmental management
Section 17.19 of the Environmental Management Act grants the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment
the power to take all measures he or she deems in the interest of the protection of human health and the
environment, with the strong arm of the law, if needed. The measures may comprise "the removal of persons,
animals, plants or goods from certain areas".
The condition for application of this power is the situation that "substances, preparations or genetically
modified organisms, or acts with these items, result in intolerable danger to the health of people or the
environment, in the opinion of our Minister".
The Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment takes the measure in accordance with the Ministers who
are also involved, unless urgency dictates otherwise, in the opinion of the Minister of Infrastructure and the
Environment.
B. Reception costs
The municipality which incurs costs (reception municipality/effect municipality) bears the costs, unless agreed
on otherwise. The starting point of the Security Regions Act is to realise reception in local municipalities, while
in the event of a large-scale evacuation reception will probably take place outside the municipality/region. In
this case, the source municipality will approach another municipality with the question whether people can
make use of reception facilities there. It stands to reason that the source municipality is responsible for the
costs.
Municipalities can take the following actions with the costs:
• recover them from the party who caused the disaster;
• submit for compensation under Section 55 of the Security Regions Act: contribution towards disaster
response costs. There has to be a disaster in the sense of Article 1 of the Security Regions Act, and they have
to be costs that were not budgeted. Municipalities which provided reception facilities, but which are located
outside the disaster area, can claim their (not-budgeted) costs from the source municipality, which
subsequently includes these costs in the application for disaster response costs submitted by the source
municipality. This was also done following the high tide in 1995. Incidentally: municipalities never receive
100% compensation for costs incurred, under Section 55 of the Security Regions Act. In implementing
Section 55 of the Security Regions Act, it is assessed whether the costs can be related to the disaster
response during the period in which the disaster occurred. It is also assessed whether the claimed costs are
reasonable. Furthermore, the concept of disaster is limited in time. This means that the costs ensuing from a
disaster may usually only be related to initial emergency reception in the context of an evacuation. The
(temporary) reception during rehabilitation of the area/houses does not fall within the scope of this Section.
• depending on the nature and extent of the disaster, a specific agreement may be reached for certain types of
damage and costs, but this cannot be defined beforehand.
• private individuals have been known to have received a lump sum for evacuation (move/transport, storage
of household effects, etc.). Hotel costs etc. were not reimbursed because the government provided free
reception (to private individuals).
24 Section 49b, subsection 1.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 7
C. Liability of the government
Unlawful decision
Liability of the government may arise from an unlawful decision it has made. If an authority acts within the
framework of one of its tasks (disaster response and the prevention of injury and damage) and within the
confines of the powers provided by law (see above), there is no unlawful act.
Lawful decision
Even if an, in itself, lawful decision is made - such as a decision to take certain security measures - the interests
of all parties involved has to be included in the assessment under Section 3:4 of the General Administrative
Law Act.
Damage caused by lawful government decisions in principle remain at the expense of the aggrieved party.
There is one exception to that starting point, namely if a limited group of citizens or businesses are
disproportionally harshly affected by a government decision. The basis for this form of government liability can
be derived from the principle of equality of the public burdens (“égalité devant les charges publiques”). This is
therefore also known as the principle of equality of public burdens. Liability under the principle of equality of
public burdens requires that the damage is disproportionate in two ways. Firstly, the costs must burden
(special burden) a limited group of persons with legal rights (natural persons and legal entities) and secondly,
the burden has to be abnormal (not 'normal social risk'). Contributory negligence or risk of the aggrieved party
is the corrective factor; the doctrine of active and passive risk acceptance plays an important role. Moreover,
there has to be a causal connection between the damage and the lawful government decision which has been
identified as the cause of the damage. Only disproportionate damage is eligible for compensation.
Under certain circumstances, the financial loss of citizens or businesses may be of such a nature that the
decision does not stand up to judicial scrutiny without an adequate agreement for compensation. Whether or
not this is the case depends on various factors. If this is the case, the obligation to compensate losses arising
from the damage lies with the administrative body which decided to take the measure that caused damage.
In view of the plurality of factors, it cannot be accurately predicted what the chances are of an administrative
body being forced to offer compensation in individual cases. It can be asserted that an administrative body
(mayor/Minister) is not obliged to compensate damages if:
• he/she acts within the confines of his legal powers;
• he/she acts based on expert advice;
• the application of the evacuation power is necessary, proportional and subsidiary. This means, among other
things, that the time and scope of the decision has to be such that any damage is limited.
Under these circumstances, it can be asserted that an administrative body acts "in the lawful exercise of
public-law power".
8 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
ANNEXE 325: basis for task division between CoPI, ROT and RBT
Step 1 Determining the assignment or question to ROT
Action: formulate a question/assignment of the Regional Policy Team (RBT) to the evacuation team and/or
Regional Operational Team (ROT)
Step 2 Identify tasks and responsibilities
Actions:
1) appoint responsible person(s) for the elaboration of the evacuation strategy (evacuation leaders,
operational leader)
2) appoint the planning staff with:
a. support for operational elaboration
b. support for assessing other consequences (costs and benefits)
The planning staff draws up alternatives for decision-making. These are not operationally detailed
plans. A proposal for composition of the planning staff is:
- evacuation leader
- threat expert
- representatives of operational services, such as emergency services, traffic control centres and LTO
(evacuation of livestock)
- population care/municipality
- communication expert
- control room (for information provision)
Step 3 Draw up advice to RBT
Based on the elaboration of the strategies, draw up advice for (GBT and) RBT
25 Taken from the Evacuation Scenario Card: Implementation. A publication of the
Province of North Holland, April 2012.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | IX
CoPI
ROT
Task
Coordination point for controlling local affairs (traffic
management, reception and care)
Liaisons
Multidisciplinary planning staff for evacuation including OVR and
external crisis partners such as road administrators and threat
experts.
Combating
- take the available people and means as the starting point
- act on the basis of priorities
- position the capabilities at strategic locations
Combating
- detail prioritisation
- analyse relations with surrounding regions and traffic networks
- analyse required travel time when means are deployed
- detail logistics aspects:
- rotation of emergency services
- exhaustion of means (fuel, material, food)
- primary necessities of emergency workers and evacuees
Coordination
- Appoint local evacuation leader
Coordination
- appoint evacuation leader for planning and execution
- make agreements about logistics facilities, such as:
- who takes care of wheelchair transport and seated transport
and lying down transport, and who
- who is the point of contact for crisis partners who (will) take
own measures
- make an overview of decision that need to be made by the RBT
Safety of emergency workers
- take account of overburdening of assistance capabilities
- formulate a plan B (on site) for own safety
Safety of emergency workers
- make sure that there is a plan B to go with the evacuation plan
- take account of the rotation of emergency workers and material
Information provision
- accept incomplete information
Information provision
- Accept and identify incomplete information and uncertainties
- appoint owners of processes and the provision of information:
- threat (threat experts)
- traffic (traffic experts)
- reception (ROT)
- assistance (ROT)
- autonomous behaviour of surrounding regions (ROT)
- autonomous behaviour of population (communication)
- media (communication)
Population care
- map out reception areas and communicate about them
- distinguish between short term (days) and long term (weeks)
- set requirements for reception and share expectations with
population
Communication and information
- describe information structure and communication strategy,
including possible messages
- identify uncertainties
- provide a perspective for action
Other processes
- give immediate attention to damage handling
- initiate project organisation for recovery and after-care
- make the after-phase concrete
- start planning the rescue operation at the start of the evacuation
RBT
AMK
- harmonise communication strategy on the basis of
operational plan (continuous process based on new
information)
- provide a legal basis for the measures chosen
- maintain contact with the back office
- maintain information position
- forward notification to Netherlands Police Agency
- take account of safety of emergency services (and material)
10 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
GRIP
Incident characteristics
Authority
Consultation
GRIP
0
Daily activities operational
services and first responders
in one municipality
Mayor
Informal consultation
GRIP
1
Multi-disciplinary response to
Mayor
source in one municipality
Formal consultation at
incident scene
command (CoPI)
GRIP
2
Multi-disciplinary response to
source and effect at one spot Mayor
in one municipality
Operational Team
(OT)
Multi-disciplinary response to
source and effect in one part
of the municipality Mayor
Administrative control by
Mayor in one municipality
Municipal Policy Team
(GBT)
GRIP
4
Incident has effect on
several municipalities
A role for chair Security
Region
Chairperson
Security
Region
(mayor)
Regional Operational
Team (ROT)
Regional Policy Team
(RBT)
GRIP
5
Incident has effect on
several Security Regions
One coordinating chair
(usually incident region)
Chairperson
Security
Region
(mayor)
One coordinating
Regional Operational
Team (ROT)
(in principle: incident
region)
GRIP
3
GRIP GOV (national government – National Crisis Centre)
National interest to manage certain aspects at national level
Scaling up/down scheme for Coordinated Intervention Procedure - GRIP
25 Taken from the Evacuation Scenario Card: Implementation. A publication of the
Province of North Holland, April 2012.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | IX
12 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
ANNEXE 426: indicative overview of information sources
Information
Source
1. probability of
- the realistic scenario
- the worst case scenario
- scenario that the incident does not occur
Threat experts, depending on the (impending) incident:
- water: water authority and other parties in the water column
- hazardous substances
- Nuclear
- terrorism: NCTV
- extreme weather: KNMI
- ...........
2. size of the evacuation area, consisting of threatened area, area
with chain effects and shadow area
(see Annexe 1)
Threat experts for actual threat
3. evacuation statement
- people in the evacuation area: self-reliant people and
not self-reliant people
- animals
- goods
Security regions, municipalities, domestic care and
institutions, LTO, animals' owners
e.g. Chamber of Commerce
4. (evacuation) strategies
- preventive evacuation, horizontal or otherwise
- vertical evacuation (shelter)
- save
- flee
- spontaneous evacuation
- shadow evacuation
- doing nothing
For the assessment of autonomous behaviour of people: environmental
analysis
ROT, evacuation team
5. assistance
Which type of assistance from outside the region is required to
implement an evacuation strategy within the time frame set
ROT
6. network analysis
Identify the relationships with the other stakeholders and ensure
that they inform you and, if needed, harmonise the measures (or
arrange for that to happen via LOCC and/or NCC). Remember:
operational dilemmas with other stakeholders may lead to
administrative dilemmas
ROT
7. assessment of benefits, such as
- prevention of fatalities and injuries
- prevention of damage to vital interests
- prevention of damage to goods
Threat experts, ROT
8. assessment of costs, such as
- economic damage
- victims as a result of the evacuation
- social damage
- damaged image
- international aspects
This is mapped out by other advisers who, in principle, are on the
RBT. Some things can be prepared in the ROT provided that all
parties involved are on board.
9. amount of time needed and available
- total available time until occurrence of the incident
- reduction of execution time in connection with extreme weather
- time required for evacuation in accordance with strategy chosen
and evacuation statement
- time needed for planning/decision-making
- Threat expert
- threat expert/KNMI
- VCNL, regional traffic control centres
- ROT/RBT/evacuation team
26 Taken from the Evacuation Scenario Card: Advice about Strategy Choice
A
publication of the Province of North Holland, April 2012.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | XI
ANNEXE 5:
sources of communication and evacuation
Communication is one of the most important means of the government to implement an evacuation. Plenty of
literature about evacuation is available. A (non-exhaustive) overview of this literature is displayed below, with a
short description of the contents.
Floods
• Guidelines for information provision about evacuation in high tide situations and floods, TMO and Leven
met Water, 2008 (www.infopuntveiligheid.nl)
These guidelines consist of two parts: I: Experiences with high tide 1993/1995 and Hurricane Katrina; II: Information about
high tide situations and floods manual. The first part delves deeper into the general (crisis) lessons learned during
evacuations in high tide situations. Parts of the lessons zoom in on the communication that is required at times of (largescale) floods. Part II provides a number of various concrete check lists, which are based on various communication
strategies, a Communications Team could use in crisis situations. These check lists can be used in all sorts of evacuations
(not just floods).
• Evacuation can be learnt, HKV, 2009 (www.evacuerenkunjeleren.nl
This website gives information about the (completed) project "From impending high tide to evacuation". A lot of
information is to be found here about evacuation in the widest sense of the word, including the above-mentioned
Guidelines for information provision about evacuation in high tide situations and floods.
• Risk perception in the event of floods in relation to evacuation willingness, NIPO, ordered by Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006 (http://www.nifv.nl/web/show/id=175521)
In this study, it was researched to what extent the experience of 'false alarm' (when people have the idea that it was not
necessary for them to be evacuated) influences the public's willingness to evacuate in the future, and how a support base
can be created for future evacuations. Moreover, it was investigated which communications means are necessary and what
the public expects from the government.
• Risk perception and risk communication in the event of floods; Report of data collection in the context of the
exercise week 'Water-proof' of the Flood Management Task Force (TMO) of the University of Twente,
December 2008.
(http://www.levenmetwater.nl/static/media/files/Rapportage_TMO_Risicoperceptie_en_Risicocommunicatie_bij_
Overstromingen.pdf)
This report gives a description of research into risk communication and risk perception of flood risks, executed as a result of
the TMO week 'Water-proof'. In order to attune risk communication to the needs of citizens, it is important to have insight
into their risk perception. This way, communications can be attuned to the public's risk perception. The goal of this research
is to map out to what extent communication activities reached citizens, which were carried out in the context of the
exercise week 'Water-proof'. Moreover, it is assessed whether there is a correlation between communication about 'Waterproof' and the activities carried out in that context, and the public's risk perception of floods.
• Flood preparedness, thoughts, feelings and intentions of the Dutch public, Teun Terpstra 2009 (www.hkv.nl)
This thesis is intended to increase knowledge about citizens' intentions to prepare for a flood. Crisis communication is not
specifically targeted, but the results of the thesis do form a basis to take into account in risk and crisis communication in the
event of evacuations.
• Twitter in crisis management. Instruments for decision-makers. Work package 2: Social Media, Teun Terpstra
and others by order of the Flood Control Foundation, 2011 (www.hkv.nl)
14 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
This research is focused on communication which takes place on social media during crises. The relevance of Twitter in crisis
management is specifically targeted. The main question is: How can the authorities start using Twitter during impending
floods and extreme weather, so that crisis communication (between government and society) and crisis management can be
improved?
• National Crisis Plan for High Tide and Floods. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, August 2008
(http://www.nifv.nl/web/show/id=169196)
This crisis plan consists of three parts: Policy plan; National operational strategy; National communication strategy. The
national communication strategy contains basic principles for crisis communication and deals with the appropriate
communication strategy based on scenarios and phases.
• Dyke ring 14 coordination plan (http://www.zuid-holland.nl/01_cooerdinatieplan_dijkring_14.pdf)
This document deals with the various scenarios that could play out in dyke ring 14, the associated harmonisation and
coordination and the perspectives for action per scenario. Risk and crisis communication is also dealt with under
perspectives for action.
• Regional crisis communication strategy and plan for high tide and floods, Security Region Utrecht, 2009.
The strategy consists of a short environmental analysis, in which the national, regional and communicative aspects are
involved. A communication plan for the relevant target groups and relevant actors follows from this analysis. The strategy
is concluded with the organisation of communication.
• Manual for risk communication about high tide and floods, Security Region Utrecht, 2009
This manual comprises points of reference for setting up risk communication in case of high tide and floods. It contains
developments on a national government level, theoretical backgrounds and regional policy basic principles.
• http://www.maastricht.nl/web/Home/Home/M_e_d_i_a_i_t_e_m-tonenop/Hoogwater-alle-informatie-op-een-rij.htm
Website of the municipality of Maastricht in which citizens are given ample advice on what to do in the event of high
tide/evacuation.
• Hello?! About crisis communication and citizen preparedness. TNO, November 2012
This document deals with (crisis) communication in relation to self-reliance, human behaviour and the effect of
communication.
• Manual on communication about water security risks outside the dykes. Delta programme – New
construction and Restructuring.
(http://www.vnrgemeenten.nl/uploads/media/20130322_Bijlage_2_Handreiking_risicocommunicatie_buitendijks.pdf)
This manual is intended for policy staff of municipalities, water authorities and security regions which deal with areas
outside the dykes. Municipalities are responsible for properly informing the public and businesses about flood risks in areas
outside the dykes. This manual supports the municipalities. The document explains the various characteristics of the area
outside the dykes and the associated flood risks. Moreover, the various responsibilities for the areas outside the dykes are
explained, and it is described what needs to be communicated to whom. It also refers to places where extra information can
be found about risks and possible preventive measures. It also gives examples of risk communication.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | XIII
• Social media during crises. Case study of floods in Queensland (January 2011), Kim Anema and Daniëlle
Jansen (2013)
(http://www.infopuntveiligheid.nl/Publicatie/DossierItem/6/4482/sociale-netwerken-onder-druk.html)
The research question was: 'How would community resilience (which can be loosely translated as 'joint self-reliance') can
be documented in institutions and which roles are taken by social media?' This was primarily studied based on
conversations and interviews with a large part of the range of organisations and individuals involved in the response and
recovery operation following the flood in Queensland in January 2011. Joint self-reliance not only turned out to be subject
to change by the introduction of new media; it also appeared to be easier to manage than assumed.
The document contains many lessons learned and insights into the use of social media during calamities.
Nuclear incident
• Response Plan for National Nuclear Incidents Plan, VROM Inspectorate 2011 (www.rijksoverheid.nl)
The document contains a description of a number of scenarios related to nuclear incidents, a description of the NPK response
organisation and a description of the response processes on a national level. Several brief paragraphs about
evacuation/shelter and crisis communication can be found in this document.
• The Strategic Communication Plan for Radiological Incidents
• National protocol for shelter or evacuation in the event of incidents involving hazardous substances,
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2006 (www.infopuntveiligheid.nl)
This protocol is intended to make the measure to be taken about shelter or evacuation in the operational team (OT) run
more smoothly and clearly. The document consists of an action plan and a separate chapter on communication.
• Website of Security Region Zeeland: (www.zeelandveilig.nl)
Website which describes the four risks (water threat, weather threat, failure of utilities and nuclear safety) for the security
region of Zeeland. The site states the current threat level and has a description of the perspectives for action at all possible
threat levels. Evacuation is one the possible perspectives for action.
• Emergency response plan for nuclear plants, security region Zeeland 2011 (www.vrzeeland.nl)
This document contains a separate chapter on crisis communication, which includes: a check list for crisis communication
during radiological incidents / crisis communication in relation to the four threat scenarios / general background to crisis
communication in the event of radiological incidents.
Moreover, the document has a timeline of an impending nuclear incident; an administrative part that deals with the roles and
powers; a general operational part; a description of preconditional processes; and a description of processes per column. It also
deals with the subject of evacuation.
• Standard messages for crisis situations involving hazardous substances and/or asbestos:
(https://www.pitregio.nl)
Website (much of it in demo mode) with a public information tool, developed to standardise public communication in the
event of fires involving hazardous substances and incidents involving hazardous substances and asbestos. The goal is to inform
the public, with the tool, in a swift and transparent manner and with the right tone of voice about an incident involving
hazardous substances. It only concerns first swift notification during the golden hour.
16 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
Wildfires
• Self-reliance pilot in the event of wildfires in North Veluwe, Final report, Province of Gelderland, Security
Region North and East Gelderland, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and others, 2010
(http://www.infopuntveiligheid.nl/Publicatie/DossierItem/1/2262/pilot-zelfredzaamheid-bij-natuurbranden-noord-veluwe-eindrapportage.html)
This document reports on the manner in which in the self-reliance pilot in the event of wildfires -Veluwe answers were
sought to questions about self-reliance citizens. How can citizens help themselves and other to safety in the event of a
wildfire? What is the meaning of self-reliance in actual practice? Which instrument could enhance this self-reliance? A
number of evacuation exercises on recreation grounds formed the basis for this pilot.
• Manual "National Wildfire Message 2013", Communication about risks of and self-reliance in case of
drought and wildfire. National Wildfire Core Group
(http://www.infopuntveiligheid.nl/Infopuntdocumenten/20121003%20LKN%20HR%20Landelijke%20
Natuurbrand%20Boodschap%202013.pdf)
This document is intended as a manual for risk communication about wildfires with the aim of increasing risk awareness and
self-reliance. The goals is for each security region to be able to draw up a regional implementation plan for crisis
communication in the most important risk areas, based on this manual. The document contains a communication matrix
which also lists the perspectives for action for the warm phase.
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 15
ANNEXE 6:
(RWS)
Roadmap for Department of Waterways and Public Works
The following pages contain an overview of possible measures the Department of Waterways and Public
Works and other road administrators may consider or take, depending on the nature, scope and complexity
of a threat or incident. These are measures that facilitate a large-scale and horizontal evacuation. The
roadmap, drawn up by order of the HID RWS Traffic and Water Management, will form part of the Evacuation
Module for Major Floods of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.
Explanation to the columns 'framework' and 'possible options per framework' (see diagram on
the following pages)
Circumstances
Circumstances mean, for instance, a nuclear incident or heavy storm which make it impossible to deploy
staff. But the psychological/human factor can also play a role in this. The question 'what do you have
available?' is also relevant. More concrete: is there or is there not an option to deploy staff? This is the social
component. Another question from the circumstances is the physical component: are there or are there not
limitations? These could include obstacles that could hinder the evacuation.
Preparation time
The standard time frame is 48 hours, with ample time for preventive evacuation prior to those 48 hours, and
with everything happening within the 48-hour being labelled as 'acute'.
Environmental characteristics
The environmental characteristics can be divided along the points of the compass: north, east, south, and
west. These can be used as the available evacuation directions for each location and situation. For instance,
North Holland really only has one evacuation direction when it comes to horizontal evacuation by road,
namely south.
But the city of Utrecht in theory could use all four points as evacuation direction.
Number of motorised vehicles
In this framework, the relationship between the number of evacuees and the actual number of vehicles
(occupancy rate) plays an important role. The average number of people per car is the norm: 2.5 persons per
motorised vehicle.
The minimum standard is the norm, scale and scope of a large concert or event: about
25,000 persons per 10,000 motorised vehicles.
(Network) availability
Availability of the (road) network / capacity, in which the simple fact that the bottlenecks during regular rush
hour will also be a bottleneck during evacuation has been taken into account. Extra capacity such as rush hour
lanes, but also the availability of bridges and tunnels is decisive. The extent to which ICT, electricity and
technology are available and function determined the operational possibilities.
16 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
ROADMAP FOR RWS
PHASE ZERO
PREPARATION
PHASE
ACTIONS
MAIN GOAL PER PHASE
FRAMEWORK
POSSIBLE OPTIONS PER FRAMEWORK
• General, broad
GOAL:
INFORM AND PREPARE
CIRCUMSTANCES
SOCIAL
communication of
the national
government: what
to do in the event of
a crisis?
• Preparation (including
adjustments of the road
network)
• Drawing up operational
scenarios by
security region
• realisation of number (no
regret) measures such
as linking VRIs to
escape routes
RWS measures:
• list routes and bottlenecks in these routes: what is
missing? Are there alternatives?
• determining preferred escape routes, based on the
possible escape directions
• drawing up and realising road sign plans
• adjusting road lining (if desirable/required)
• harmonisation with security regions icw network
approach (so major road network (HWN) and
subordinate road network (OWN) together!)
• purchase of mobile cameras
• If required and necessary: draw up wish list of
complementary measures (see toolkit)
• Adding preferences re routes to (current)
plan studies
staff available
no staff
PHYSICAL
limitation
no limitation
PREPARATION TIME
NO PREPARATION TIME
< 48 HOURS
> 48 HOURS
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
NORTH
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
< 10,000
> 10.000 AND < 50.000
> 50,000
Implement traffic
management measures:
THREAT PHASE
PREPARATION
•
•
•
•
increase flow-through
limit influx
distribution over network
erect temporary
road signs
• deployment of extra
manpower
in support of
measures
• check whether calamities
setting has been set in VRIs
Measures of other parties:
• Drawing up operational scenarios / manuals by
security regions
• Purchase of mobile cameras
• Linking / reprogramming VRIs (calamities setting)
• Appoint shelters and set them up, if desirable
(also remember to erect road signs or special logo
for recognition)
AVAILABILITY
GOAL:
EVACUATION OF POPULATION > PREPARATION
CIRCUMSTANCES
RWS measures:
• open rush hour lanes in time
• if needed: test whether calamities short-cuts
'work' and therefore are available if they are
needed
• erect mobile measures (e.g., cameras and
barriers)
• temporary lining, marking, road signs
• take measures for extra capability (e.g., multiple
lanes at hub and use of emergency lanes) as
included in the Traffic Concept Evaluation (VCE)
• if required: (partially) close off hubs
in accordance with VCE
• if not yet done: adjust VRIs HWN (connection of
motorways to OWN)
• apply measures to make use of
reversed laning
Measures of other parties:
• adjust VRIs OWN (if possible)
• prepare / set up shelters
• place additional road signs on OWN
• remove any bottlenecks on OWN (such as
temporarily adjusting roundabouts or removing
refuges but also: placing concrete blocks to close
off streets)
OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
NO OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
SOCIAL
staff available
no staff
PHYSICAL
limitation
no limitation
PREPARATION TIME
NO PREPARATION TIME
< 48 HOURS
> 48 HOURS
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
NORTH
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
< 10,000
> 10.000 AND < 50.000
> 50,000
AVAILABILITY
OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
NO OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | 17
PHASE
ACTIONS
MAIN GOAL PER PHASE
FRAMEWORK
POSSIBLE OPTIONS PER FRAMEWORK
Implement traffic
management measures:
GOAL:
EVACUATION OF POPULATION → PUT OUT ALL STOPS
CIRCUMSTANCES
SOCIAL
•
•
•
•
RWS measures:
• rush hour lanes are open
• adjust VRIs HWN (connection of motorways to
OWN)
• deploy extra capability (e.g., multiple lanes at hub
and use of emergency lanes) as included in the
VCE
• if required: (partially) close off hubs
in accordance with VCE
• extra manpower to guide evacuation from a
traffic point of view
• closing off certain approach road and exits (e.g. when
applying
reversed laning) to improve the traffic flow on the
escape route
• take physical measures to prevent
undesirable behaviour. E.g., placing barriers on
approach roads and exits
ALERT PHASE
PREPARATION
increase flow-through
limit influx
distribution over network
deployment of extra
manpower in support of
measures
• activating calamities
setting
of VRIs on escape
routes
staff available
no staff
PHYSICAL
limitation
no limitation
PREPARATION TIME
NO PREPARATION TIME
< 48 HOURS
> 48 HOURS
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
NORTH
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
< 10,000
> 10.000 AND < 50.000
> 50,000
AVAILABILITY
OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
NO OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
Measures of other parties:
• place additional road signs on OWN
• open shelters / facilitate their use
• remove any bottlenecks on OWN (such as
temporarily adjusting roundabouts or removing
refuges but also: placing concrete blocks to close
off streets)
• adjust VRIs (if possible)
IMPACT PHASE
INCIDENT
Uphold
traffic
management measures
if possible
GOAL:
DO NOTHING → SECURING / SHELTER
PLEASE NOTE: IN THIS PHASE, FRAMEWORKS DO NOT PLAY A ROLE. THE INCIDENT ITSELF DETERMINES THE EVERYTHING AND
CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY FRAMEWORKS OR OTHER MATTERS. HENCE THE LACK OF A FRAMEWORK AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS
PER FRAMEWORK IN THIS PHASE OF THE ROADMAP.
RWS measures:
• previously taken measures must be terminated or simplified (e.g. no manpower in too dangerous situations) such as: no help
and support anymore in use of emergency lanes
• bringing everyone to safety
Measures of other parties:
• previously taken measures must be terminated or simplified (e.g. no manpower in too dangerous situations) such as: no help
and support anymore in use of emergency lanes
• bringing everyone to safety
18 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
RECOVERY PHASE
AFTER-CARE
PHASE
ACTIONS
MAIN GOAL PER PHASE
FRAMEWORK
POSSIBLE OPTIONS PER FRAMEWORK
If possible: extra
capability in the area for
emergency services and
emergency workers.
GOAL:
ACCESSIBILITY TO THE AFFECTED
AREA/REGION FOR EMERGENCY
SERVICES AND EMERGENCY
WORKERS for ASSISTANCE
CIRCUMSTANCES
SOCIAL
So: possible adjustment of
traffic management
strategy from earlier
phases
RWS measures:
• If possible: extra capability in the area for
emergency services and emergency workers.
• So: possible adjustment of traffic management
strategy from previous phases.
• Such as initiating a variation on reversed laning in
which one direction of traffic flow is facilitated for
both incoming and outgoing emergency services.
• This depends on the location and
accessibility of the area (e.g., only accessible from
one direction -> then it is necessary; in case of
multiple directions, it remains to be seen whether
this works)
staff available
no staff
PHYSICAL
limitation
no limitation
PREPARATION TIME
NO LONGER APPLIES/NEEDED
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
NORTH
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
< 10,000
> 10.000 AND < 50.000
> 50,000
AVAILABILITY
OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
NO OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
Measures of other parties:
• making OWN available and keeping it available
for accessibility of emergency services.
If possible: extra
capability in the area for
emergency services and
emergency workers.
GOAL:
ACCESSIBILITY OF AFFECTED AREA/REGION
for EMERGENCY SERVICES, EMERGENCY WORKERS AND
EVACUEES.
CIRCUMSTANCES
SOCIAL
staff available
no staff
PHYSICAL
limitation
RESCUE PHASE
AFTER-CARE
no limitation
So: possible adjustment
of traffic management
strategy from earlier
phases
The focus of traffic management measures now
mainly lies on accessibility for the emergency
services and not so much on evacuation.
RWS measures:
If possible: extra capability in the area for emergency
services and emergency workers.
At the same time, attention to evacuees who
want to leave the area.
Measures of other parties:
Making OWN available and keeping it available for
accessibility of emergency services.
PREPARATION TIME
NO LONGER APPLIES/NEEDED
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
NORTH
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
< 10,000
> 10.000 AND < 50.000
> 50,000
AVAILABILITY
OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
NO OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | XIX
ROADMAP FOR RWS
PHASE
GENERAL ACTIONS
GOAL: INFORM
AND PREPARE
OPERATIONAL MEASURES FOR EACH ROAD ADMINISTRATOR, CATEGORISED PER
FRAMEWORK
MEASURES FOR THE HWN
MEASURES FOR THE OWN
namely to be taken by the RWS
to be taken by other road authorities in cooperation
with RWS
• Listing routes and bottlenecks in these routes
• Listing routes and bottlenecks in these routes
• If necessary and required: wish list
• If necessary and required: wish list
drawing up additional measures
FRAMEWORK
CIRCUMSTANCES
drawing up additional measures
PHASE ZERO
PREPARATION
• General, broad
communication of
the national
government: what
to do in the event of
a crisis?
• Preparation (including
adjustment to
road network)
• Drawing up operational
scenarios by
security region
• Realisation of number (no
regret) measures such
as linking VRIs to
escape routes
• Adding preferences re routes to (current) plan
studies
• Harmonisation with security regions icw network
approach
• Drawing up and realising road sign plans
• Adjusting road lining
• Drawing up operational scenarios / manuals by
•
•
•
•
PREPARATION TIME
security regions
Designate and/or set up shelters (also remember
to
erect road signs or special logo for
recognition)
Harmonisation with security regions icw network
approach
Drawing up and realising road sign plans
Adjusting road lining
Determining preferred escape routes, based on
the possible escape directions
Determining preferred escape routes, based on
the possible escape directions
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
Listing routes and bottlenecks in these routes
Listing routes and bottlenecks in these routes
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
• Listing routes and bottlenecks
• Purchase of mobile cameras
• Listing routes and bottlenecks
• Purchase of mobile cameras
• Linking / reprogramming VRIs (calamities
AVAILABILITY
setting)
20 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
PHASE
GENERAL ACTIONS
GOAL:
EVACUATION OF
POPULATION >
PREPARATION
OPERATIONAL MEASURES FOR EACH ROAD ADMINISTRATOR, CATEGORISED PER
FRAMEWORK
MEASURES FOR THE HWN
MEASURES FOR THE OWN
namely to be taken by the RWS
to be taken by other road authorities in cooperation
with RWS
• Erect mobile measures (e.g., cameras and
• Apply measures to make use of reversed laning
barriers)
• Apply measures to make use of
reversed laning
Implement traffic
management measures:
THREAT PHASE
PREPARATION
•
•
•
•
increase flow-through
limit influx
distribution over network
erect temporary
road signs
• deployment of extra
manpower
in support of
measures
• check whether calamities
setting has been set in VRIs
• If needed: test whether calamities short-cuts
•
•
•
•
•
'work' and therefore are available if they are
needed
Erect mobile measures (e.g., cameras and
barriers)
Temporary lining, marking, road signs
Take measures for extra capabilities (e.g.,
multiple lanes at hub and use of emergency
lanes) as included in the VCE
(Partially) close off hubs in accordance with VCE
Adjust VRIs connections of motorways
to OWN
FRAMEWORK
CIRCUMSTANCES
Remove any bottlenecks on OWN (such as
temporarily adjusting roundabouts or removing
refuges but also: placing concrete blocks to close
off streets)
• Place additional road signs on OWN
• Prepare / set up shelters
• Temporary lining, marking, road signs
• Take measures for extra capabilities
PREPARATION TIME
as included in the VCE
• (Partially) close off hubs in accordance with VCE
• Adjust VRIs connections of motorways to
OWN
• Apply measures to make use of
reversed laning
• Remove any bottlenecks on OWN (such as
temporarily adjusting roundabouts or
removing refuges)
• Prepare / set up shelters
Apply measures to make use of reversed laning
• Apply measures to make use of reversed laning
• Prepare / set up shelters
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
• Open rush hour lanes in time
• Take measures for extra capability as included in
• Take measures for extra capability as included in
the Traffic Concept Evaluation (VCE)
• Prepare / set up shelters
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
• Temporary lining, marking, road signs as back
AVAILABILITY
the Traffic Concept Evaluation (VCE)
• (Partially) close off hubs in accordance with VCE
• Apply measures to make use of reversed laning
• Open rush hour lanes in time
• Erect mobile measures (e.g., cameras and
barriers)
• Temporary lining, marking, road signs
Back up in case technology fails
up for failing technology
• Apply measures to make use of
reversed laning
• Place additional road signs on OWN
• Apply measures to make use of reversed laning
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | XXI
PHASE
GENERAL ACTIONS
GOAL:
EVACUATION OF
POPULATION
→
PUT OUT ALL STOPS
Implement traffic
management measures:
OPERATIONAL MEASURES FOR EACH ROAD ADMINISTRATOR, CATEGORISED PER
FRAMEWORK
MEASURES FOR THE HWN
MEASURES FOR THE OWN
namely to be taken by the RWS
to be taken by other road authorities in cooperation
with RWS
• Extra manpower to guide evacuation from a
• Extra manpower to guide evacuation from a
traffic point of view
• Take physical measures to prevent
undesirable behaviour.
• Close off certain approach roads and exits (e.g.,
in reversed laning) to improve the through-flow
of traffic
ALERT PHASE
•
•
•
•
•
•
PREPARATION
•
increase flow-through
limit influx
distribution over network
deployment of extra
manpower in support
of measures
• Activating calamities
• Take measures for extra capability (e.g.,
setting of VRIs on
multiple lanes at hub and use of emergency
lanes) as included in the Traffic Concept
escape routes
Evaluation (VCE)
• (Partially) close off hubs in accordance with VCE
• Take physical measures to prevent
undesirable behaviour
• Adjust VRIs connections of motorways to
OWN
•
•
•
•
•
•
• Rush hour lanes are open
• Take measures for extra capability (e.g.,
multiple lanes at hub and use of emergency
lanes) as included in the Traffic Concept
Evaluation (VCE)
• (Partially) close off hubs in accordance with VCE
• Rush hour lanes are open
• Extra manpower to guide evacuation from a
IMPACT PHASE
INCIDENT
traffic point of view
CIRCUMSTANCES
traffic point of view
Take physical measures to prevent
undesirable behaviour.
Close off certain approach roads and exits (e.g.,
in reversed laning) to improve the through-flow
of traffic
Remove any bottlenecks on OWN
(temporarily adjusting roundabouts or
removing refuges but also: placing concrete
blocks to close off streets)
Place additional road signs on OWN
Prepare / set up shelters
• Take physical measures to prevent undesirable
•
FRAMEWORK
PREPARATION TIME
behaviour E.g., placing barriers on approach
roads and exits
Closing off certain approach road and exits (e.g.
when applying
reversed laning) to improve the traffic flow on
the escape route
Adjust VRIs connections of motorways to
OWN
Remove any bottlenecks on OWN (such as
temporarily adjusting roundabouts or removing
refuges but also: placing concrete blocks to
close off streets)
Place additional road signs on OWN
Prepare / set up shelters
Remove any bottlenecks on OWN (such as
temporarily adjusting roundabouts or removing
refuges but also: placing concrete blocks to close
off streets)
• Extra manpower to guide evacuation from a
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
AVAILABILITY
traffic point of view
• Place additional road signs on OWN
GOAL:
DO NOTHING →
SECURING / SHELTER
PLEASE NOTE: IN THIS PHASE, FRAMEWORKS DO NOT PLAY A ROLE. THE INCIDENT ITSELF DETERMINES THE EVERYTHING AND
CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY FRAMEWORKS OR OTHER MATTERS. HENCE THE LACK OF A FRAMEWORK AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS
PER FRAMEWORK IN THIS PHASE OF THE ROADMAP.
• Uphold traffic
RWS measures:
previously taken measures must be terminated or simplified (e.g. no manpower in too dangerous situations) such as: no help
and support anymore in use of emergency lanes
bringing everyone to safety
management
measures if possible
Measures of other parties:
previously taken measures must be terminated or simplified (e.g. no manpower in too dangerous situations) such as: no help
and support anymore in use of emergency lanes
bringing everyone to safety
22 | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans
PHASE
GENERAL ACTIONS
OPERATIONAL MEASURES FOR EACH ROAD ADMINISTRATOR, CATEGORISED PER
FRAMEWORK
MEASURES FOR THE HWN
MEASURES FOR THE OWN
namely to be taken by the RWS
to be taken by other road authorities in cooperation
with RWS
FRAMEWORK
GOAL:
ACCESSIBILITY FOR
EMERGENCY SERVICES
AND EMERGENCY
WORKERS for
ASSISTANCE
Possible adjustment of traffic management
strategy from earlier phases. Such as initiating a
variation on reversed laning in which one
direction of traffic flow is facilitated for both
incoming and outgoing emergency services.
Making OWN available and keeping it available
for accessibility of emergency services.
CIRCUMSTANCES
If possible: extra capability in the area for
emergency services and emergency workers. So:
possible adjustment of traffic management
strategy from earlier phases
If possible: extra capability in the area for
emergency services and emergency workers. So:
possible adjustment of traffic management
strategy from earlier phases
PREPARATION TIME
This depends on the location and accessibility of
the area (for instance, can only be reached from
one direction -> then it is necessary)
Making OWN available and keeping it available
for accessibility of emergency services.
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHARACTERISTICS
Taking account of double traffic flows:
emergency services moving in, evacuees moving
out.
Making OWN available and keeping it available for
accessibility of emergency services. Evacuees still
moving away from the area during the rescue
phase.
Making OWN available and keeping it available
for accessibility of emergency services.
NUMBER OF
MOTORISED
VEHICLES
RESCUE AND RECOVERY PHASE
AFTER-CARE
If possible: extra
capability in the area for
emergency services and
emergency workers.
The focus of traffic
management
measures now
mainly lies on
accessibility for the
emergency services
and not so much on
evacuation.
If possible: extra capability in the area for
emergency services and emergency workers. So:
possible adjustment of traffic management
strategy from earlier phases
AVAILABILITY
MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans | XXIII
XXIV | MASS EVACUATION FRAMEWORK Joint basic principles and action plans