Theories of Judgment and Cognitive Attitudes
November 8-9, 2012 Santiago de Compostela (Spain)
Facultad de Filosofia – Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
*Organized by: Concha Martínez and Sofia Miguens*
**
Since January 2010 the Mind Language and Action Group (MLAG, University of Porto) and the
Group EPISTEME (University of Santiago de Compostela) have been working together in two
different but closely related researchprojects: *The Bounds of Judgment* and *Cognitive
Attitudes and the Justification of Knowledge*, funded respectively by the Portuguese research
agency Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia and the Spanish Ministery of Science. Several
researchers are members of both projects, including project leaders C. Martínez and S.
Miguens .
*The Bounds of Judgment* takes as the starting point Frege’s conception of judgement
(Urteil), side by side, and in contrast, with those of thought (Gedanke) and assertion (Aussage),
and uses it as a guide to consider what it is to be a thinker. Adopting a working definition of
judgment as a posture towards the world, fixing how the world would matter to its
correctness, and held rightly or wrongly solely in virtue of the world being as it is, Project *The
Bounds of Judgment* sets out to identify some bounds within which some people have
thought judgement must remain. In particular, the project considers the following possible
limits to the application of a concept of judgement proper: 1) Emptiness of demands on the
world (in a section of the project dealing with logic and philosophy of logic); 2) Objects not
sufficiently woven into the fabric of the world (in a section of the project dealing with
philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception and focusing in particular on judgements of
inner experience). 3) Usurpation (in the section of the project dealing with moral and aesthetic
judgements). In section *4) Articulation and Agency, the connection between judging, acting,
and the use of language is investigated.
*
These issues span a very wide swathe of philosophy, from philosophy of logics to moral
philosophy. One main aim of the project, which, is to focus on relations between them, trying
to understand how the fate of judgment with respect to one of these problems bears on its
fate with respect to others.
Project* The Bounds of Judgment* was to a large extent inspired by Charles Travis’ recent
work on the interpretation of Frege (cf. Perception – Essays after Frege, forthcoming 2013,
OUP), and has counted on his involvement in all its activities.
**
Project* Cognitive Attitudes and the Justification of Knowledge* tries to elucidate a series of
problems in epistemology (what is knowledge, what is given to us in perception, what is in a
proof, etc.) in the light of an onto-formal detailed analysis (i) of the psychological states, acts,
events, or processes (beliefs, thoughts, judgments, perceptions, predictions, knowledges,
wishes, and so forth), called cognitive/propositional/mental attitudes, involved in those
problems, and (ii) of the structural relations existing among them. The project is structured in
three units: Unit I: a) an analysis of the notion of cognitive attitude and of the elements
involved in it, especially those that have to do with their *intentional contents *(concepts and
propositions, or non-conceptual or non-propositional contents); b) the relevance of being
directed towards different objects to the categorization of different attitudes, and to see the
relations among them. Unit II: Given we intend to apply the results of our analysis of the
notion of cognitive attitude to problems in epistemology, we will characterize those attitudes
that are most relevant to epistemology: believing, knowing, judging, and perceiving. Unit III:
Study of different problems in epistemology in the light of the results obtained in the two
previous units (see below).
The final aim of the Project is to get a better understanding of the nature and structure of the
abovementioned cognitive attitudes to clarify classical epistemological problems such as
nature and structure of belief and knowledge, a priori versus a posteriori knowledge,
justification and evidence, etc. In more specific fields we will deal with issues such as
determining the status, knowability and justification of logical truths, inference rules or
mathematical axioms, on one side, or the problem of what is the character and the content of
perception, what kind of relationship is there between perception and beliefs about the
physical world, and problems related to the justification of scientific knowledge such as that of
the knowability and justifiability of highly idealized laws and principles (particularly the idea of
synthetic a priori to understand the role fundamental laws occupy in science), and the study of
the different cognitive attitudes a scientist may have towards a scientific theory and the
interrelations among them.
The purpose of this meeting is to present and discuss issues in the intersection of these
projects, and also to present and discuss results in some of the other areas dealt with in the
projects.
* * *PROGRAM** *
*DAY 1 November 8th*
10-10.40h Charles Travis, *Who knows what lurks in the minds of men? Frege versus Fodor*
10.40-11h Discussion
11-11.40 h João Alberto Pinto and Sofia Miguens, *Frege and the Twilight of Empiricism*
11.40-12h Discussion
* * 12-12.15 BREAK**
12.15-12.55h Susana Cadilha, *Judging Morally*
12.55-13.15 Discussion
13.15-13.55 Uxía Rivas Monroy, *A evolución da concepción do xuizo en Frege e Peirce: unha
aproximación comparativa*
13.55-14.15h Discussion
14.15h LUNCH
16-16.40K Mattia Riccardi*, Non-panoramic hallucination and the articulation of
disjunctivism*
16.40-17h Discussion
17-17.40 José Luis Falguera y Santiago Peleteiro, "Perceptual Experience and Epistemic
Support"
17.40-18h Discussion
18-18.15 BREAK
18.15-18.55h João Santos, *Experiencing the World, John McDowell and the role of
sensibility*
18.55-19.15 Discussion
*DAY 2 November the 9th*
10-10.40h Concha Martínez, *Basic logical knowledge*
10.40-11h Discussion
11-11.40 h Juan Vázquez, *La justificación empírica de los enunciados observacionales*
11.40-12h Discussion
* * 12-12.15 BREAK**
12.15-12.55h Javier Vilanova, *Percepción y Juicio en las Investigaciones Filosóficas.*
12.55-13.15 Discussion
13.15-13.55 Víctor Verdejo, *Looking for public and rational concepts*
13.55-14.15h Discussion
14.15h LUNCH
16-16.40K Antonio Blanco *¿Se puede ser a la vez griceano y whorfiano?*
16.40-17h Discussion
17-17.40 Sofia Miguens, *Judging on inner experience: blindspots, perspectives and the firstperson*
17.40-18h Discussion
CLOSURE