Beautiful Truths and Beautiful Theories: A Short Reply to Philip Ball
(By Lucas P. Halpin)
Experimental testing has always been the gold standard in science. According to Ball, beauty in a theory
does not, and should not, trump experimental testing. Truth is one thing, beauty another.
Still, what is truth, and what is beauty? We might ask another related question. Where is truth, and
where is beauty? The beauty relevant to “Truth ≠ Beauty” is presumably theoretical beauty. So then,
the salient swash of beauty would presumably be “in the theory.” We all know what a theory is, of
course. But, one might wonder, where is a theory?
Ball notes that many beautiful theories have failed to be true, and many ugly theories have turned out
to be true. So, a theory may be beautiful, but not true, and true but not beautiful. So, truth ≠
theoretical beauty. Granted.
Let’s take a brief detour through truth-theory. The most common contemporary theories of truth entail
all instances of the following Schema: ‘S’ is true if and only if S. This, we are told, is the data against
which they are “tested.” ‘S’ is a sentence, or a thought, and S is a fact (or some such thing). So, for
example, ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white, and ‘E = MC2’ is true if and only if E = MC2.
These theories of truth, supposing they are true, tell us something about the location of truth. Truth is a
relation between ‘S’, a sentence or a thought perhaps, and S, a fact or some bit of the objective, external
reality. The instances of beauty Philip Ball has in mind are located elsewhere. They are located only in
‘S’. As such, these little swashes of beauty were never really plausible candidates to be identified with,
nor to replace, the theoretical notion “truth” in the first place.
But, beauty can be found in many places. So, perhaps beauty can be found in the relationship between
‘S’ and S? Between ‘E = MC2’ and E = MC2? If so, we have a more plausible candidate for the beauty in
“truth = beauty.” Let’s return briefly to the entailments of the standard theories of truth: ‘Snow is
white’ is true if and only if snow is white, and ‘E = MC2’ is true if and only if E = MC2.
The green semanticist has a law like response to these: “Uh?” They seem, we might say, deeply shallow.
Attempts have been made to say something more substantive about the nature of truth, the
relationship between ‘S’ and S, between the conceptual/linguistic item, ‘E = MC2’, and reality itself, E =
MC2. One suggestion is that theories (as sets of related sentences or thoughts) can literally mirror
portions of reality. In which case, perhaps truth = mirroring, or truth = symmetry. Another suggestion is
that the relationship between the theories and reality can be beautiful (or ugly), where beauty is
something other mirroring. In which case, perhaps truth = beauty. A theory, ‘S’, might not be a
beautiful theory. But, a truth, the relationship between ‘S’ and S, must be a beautiful truth.
Imagine an ugly person in a beautiful relationship. This, I hope, clarifies the issue somewhat.
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