THE BATTLES OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT
Designer's Notes
by Mark Herman
Introduction
The Macedonian war machine was arguably the premier army of antiquity. It was created by
Philip II and wielded by his son with such effect that it never lost a battle or a siege. What
was the secret of its power? This question has intrigued me since my youth and this game
was the opportunity to figure it out. It is interesting to note that the seeds of the
Macedonian military doctrine can probably be traced to Epaminondas the Theban who
defeated the Spartan army at Leuctra and Mantinea. It seems that Philip II while a youth
was a quest (hostage) in Thebes and knew the great man. It was from the knowledge gained
as a youth that Philip built the instrument which Alexander would use to conquer the
Persian empire.
Hoplite Warfare
Greek warfare had become formalized into a clash of heavy hoplite infantry on an open
plain, usually the prime farmland of one of the antagonists. The battle would be decided in a
mighty rush (Ephodos) of the opposing battlelines with victory going to the stouter of heart.
Generalship is what occurred prior to the Hoplite battle. A General's main responsibility was
to get his army to the battle, line them up, and lead them forward. The concept of reserves
had not yet become an accepted part of Hoplite warfare. Therefore, once the forces were
lined up the General's place was at the head of his troops. Retirement on half pay was not a
normal occurrence for a Greek general. Most of whom, like Epaminondas, died in battle.
Light troops and cavalry were, with few exceptions, not well developed in Greek warfare.
This was a function of economics and terrain. Effective light troops require training. Training
costs money and a standing force was hard for the typical Greek city state to maintain.
Cavalry suffered for many of the same reasons besides the fact that the dominant terrain
(mountains) and lack of modern livery (saddle, horseshoes, stirrups) prevented mounted
forces from becoming an effective combat arm in Hoplite battles.
For the most part these auxiliary forces sniped at each other on the sidelines while the main
Hoplite clash decided the battle. There were important exceptions to this rule. Thessaly and
Macedon possessed areas of open terrain which allowed for the development of competent
cavalry forces. The famous Macedonian Companion cavalry units rose from these humble
beginnings. During the Peloponnesian War, at the battle of Delium, the unexpected arrival
of a small Theban cavalry unit on the flank of the Athenian battleline caused a panic that
was decisive. Meanwhile, in Thrace and Aetolia where the terrain was heavily forested,
capable light troops developed whose missile volleys could defeat Hoplites in closed terrain.
Although there are many more exceptions, auxiliary forces tended to cancel each other out
when neither side had a significant numerical advantage in cavalry or light troops.
In summation the Greek combat system developed around shock combat almost to the
exclusion of all other combat arms. It survived for as long as it did due to the unique nature
of the terrain and the polis (city state) from which it arose. One of the continuing problems
of Greek economics was its inability to support a growing population on poor farmland. This
lead to significant migrations of colonists around the periphery of the egean sea and much
of the Mediterranean. These migrations brought Greek culture in contact with the Persians.
Marathon: A Clash of Systems
The Persian combat system emphasized missile combat almost to the exclusion of all other
arms. The Persian army was formed around foot archers and mounted javelin armed cavalry
with the odd chariot available on occasion. The Persian successes in battle were more a
function of the incompetence of their early opponents than the brilliance of their combat
system. Athenian meddling in Asia Minor eventually angered the Persians, who sent out a
punitive expedition to punish the upstarts. The resulting battle of Marathon highlighted the
Persian inability to deal with a shock oriented combat system. By all rights the missile
volleys of the Persian archers should have defeated the Greek Hoplites. But, the Athenian
charge covered the effective bow range too quickly for the Persians to loose many volleys,
and the Hoplite panoply was resistant enough to arrows to keep the battleline cohesive.
Once the forces were in contact the narrow beach did not allow for the typical Persian tactic
of rapid withdrawal and the resulting slaughter ended the raid.
The Persians never quite figured out how to deal with these vicious Westerners who insisted
on fighting toe to toe. Eastern culture was familiar with the concept of mercenaries and
ultimately settled on hiring Hoplite units to augment their missile armed forces. These hiring
practices were not augmented by a significant change in doctrine so the Persian forces still
did not act as a combined arms force.
Chaeronea: A Clash of Systems
Over a century later, Philip II leaves Thebes and creates a new system of warfare. His
concept is for a fully coordinated and balanced force which combines the best features of
missile, shock, and maneuver tactics. Most perceptions of the Macedonian army revolve
around the Phalanx and the Companion cavalry, both of which are shock combat systems. In
fact the Macedonians matched their opponents’ missile for missile while employing all arms
as complementary parts of a single lethal whole.
Philip unleashed his forces on the Hoplite system at Chaeronea and carried the day. The
significant factor besides the brilliant doctrine and leadership was the fact that the
Macedonians were professionals. Philip, who was the architect of Alexander's rise to
greatness, had early in his career gained control of significant gold deposits in Thrace which
he used to raise a professional army.
The Macedonian System
The purpose of the historical commentary was to highlight a critical design concept; the
interaction of differing tactical systems. Most wargames treat all combat units as a singular
entity while only varying speed and strength to show unit distinctions. I believe this
approach is fundamentally wrong and removes most of what is important about tactical
interactions in combat. While it is true that in most of Alexander's battles he was never as
outnumbered as his official press proclaimed, the success of his army was based on its
intricate interplay of differing tactical systems.
The base and backbone of the Macedonian army during its conquest of the Persian empire
was its 12,000 Phalangites organized into 6 Phalanxes. These phalanxes were the base upon
which the wings maneuvered. A key misperception concerning Phalanxes is that they were
superior Hoplites. This is incorrect. Whereas in a Hoplite battle the clash of the battlelines
was the decisive moment, in the Macedonian system the Phalanx did not close until after
the wings had been engaged. The power of the Phalanx was based on its defensive
dominance over cavalry due to the good sense possessed by horses and its offensive
dominance over Hoplite
s due to its superior reach. It was vulnerable to missile volleys due to its reduced armor and
flank attacks due to the disadvantages of a pike in close combat. It is interesting to note that
the famous Swiss pikemen would overcome this latter vulnerability by employing
Halberdiers within their formation for close combat situations.
Although it is true that no Phalanx ever broke in battle it was found in some playtests that
they were more fragile than expected. A close examination of the playtests and history
revealed the cause. Wargames force the static narratives of history to become dynamic
systems. What can occur is often startling since the wargame can read between the lines
and reveal what was too obvious for the ancient author to write about. It also served as an
example of the tactical interplay within the Macedonian army.
No phalanx was ever engaged for more than 2 hours in a battle and usually less than 1 hour.
The Phalanxes were brought into play later in a battle after the enemy skirmishers had been
run off or suppressed and the enemy wings were engaged. This allowed a Phalanx to move
forward without being subjected to missile volleys and flank attack. Alexander employed
very capable skirmishers (Agrianian and Thracian Javelinmen, Cretan and Macedonian
Archers, and Peltasts). These skirmishers neutralized the enemy skirmishers but like all
skirmishers were vulnerable to cavalry. The playtesters violated these concepts and the
resulting loss of cohesion due to missile volleys and overuse of the rapid advance
capabilities burned out the Phalanx prior to its shock combat. In these circumstances, fresh
Greek Hoplite units were often able to outlast the Phalanx with disastrous effect. Once the
correct tactics were employed and a rules change prevented Persian archers from
committing suicide all worked as was intended.
The offensive power of the Macedonian army was their shock cavalry: the Companions. This
arm was usually on the right flank and often lead by Alexander personally. The cavalry
would often be directly supported by missile troops for fire support and light cavalry for
flank protection in a crushing oblige attack. Alexander's Companions were armored and
possessed a lance which outreached their opponents’ javelins. Darius at Arbela (Gau
Gamela) attempts to neutralize this weapon by arming his heavy cavalry in a similar manner.
The Companions were superbly trained and could carry a charge home. Since the stirrup had
not yet been invented, the rider thrust with his lance at his enemy, as opposed to the
medieval knight who bore the brunt of the lances impact. The history of Alexander’s battles
shows that the Companion cavalry had no equals in combat.
Now once the Companion cavalry had moved out to engage the enemy the right flank of the
Phalanxes should become uncovered except for the presence of the Hypaspists. The role of
the Hypaspists (shieldbearer) was to maintain the linear connection between Alexanders
advancing right wing and the right flank of the Phalanx. Since this force was designed to
spread out, it was organized into smaller tactical units than a Phalanx. The exact armaments
of a Hypaspist are unknown but they appear to be Hoplite armed heavy infantry with lighter
body armor for increased mobility.
Now while the right wing advanced off of its Phalanx base the left wing had a different
function. The Thessalian cavalry who were highly trained and lance armed were primarily
defensive in character. Their main function was to ward off enemy flank attacks and guard
the left flank of the Phalanx. They would have missile troops in support and were lead by
Parmenion, a brilliant tactician and one of Philip's closest friends. The left wing's role was to
tie up the opposing enemy wing to prevent it from harming the Phalanx or reinforcing the
other wing.
When all of the above was brought into play on the battlefield under the control of a
military genius, it quickly becomes clear why the size of the respective armies was
unimportant in the battle outcomes. Darius was a better general than his two losses would
indicate, although he did lack conviction. At Issus it was a tactical error that threw away a
battlefield whose characteristics could have neutralized much of the Macedonian maneuver
capability. At Arbela (Gau Gamela) Darius picked an open battlefield with an army whose
size and composition began to neutralize some of the Macedonian tactical advantages. In
both cases it was Alexander's ability to adapt his army to the circumstances of the moment
that ensured his place in history.
The Game Design: Leadership
My analysis of the Macedonian army, which I have summarized in this narrative, made me
focus on two critical elements: combined arms tactics and leadership. Up to this point I have
emphasized the different tactical systems in use during the period and have spoken little
about Generalship. Much of my recent work has been in the area of modern Command
Control and its impact on combat. A key dynamic of leadership is its asymmetrical impact on
the maneuver of forces. The usual sequence of one player moving then the other misses the
interplay of maneuver on both the ancient and modern battlefield. Leadership became the
mechanism through which the players interacted on the battlefield. Leaders are rated for
their initiative and their command range. Once a leader begins giving orders, the quantity of
which is a function of his initiative, he sets forces in motion. Alexander has the highest
initiative and can move the largest force in one orders phase.
Another factor that I wanted to capture was the ability of good leaders to exceed the
expected performance of an average leader. This was captured in three ways. First, a good
leader can move more of his forces farther than an average leader. This was captured by
having Momentum. Momentum allows a leader to have up to two additional orders phases.
Since this is based on the leader's initiative rating, Alexander often has three orders phases
to a poor leaders one per game turn.
Second, I wanted to capture the ability of a good leader to seize the moment. This was
captured with the Trumping option. When a poor leader gets a second orders phase it
creates an opportunity for the opposing player to interrupt the enemy player with an
immediate counter move. The danger is that a failed trump cancels a leaders abilities for the
remainder of the turn. This factor in the game system has the additional impact that poor
leaders usually do not attempt Momentum opportunities to avoid potential enemy
counterplays.
Third, leaders can move units outside of their basic movement parameters. I have always
liked having an element of gamble within a game system, much as those faced by Alexander
himself. There must however be a downside. Otherwise, where's the gamble? A player can
move a combat unit a second time during the same game turn but the units formation
becomes less cohesive. Early playtests saw the players abuse this option because of the
perception that one cohesion hit was not a big deal. The reality is that it is hard to find the
opportunities for cohesion removal and units tend to build up cohesion and become fragile
when called upon for shock combat. The intention and the proper use of this capability is at
critical moments to decisively maneuver a unit into the flank of an opponent.
It should be noted that maneuvering a leader into a shock combat situation removes his
ability to issue orders until the shock combat is concluded. This simulates the disadvantages
of the traditional role expected of leaders in combat. Let's face it, its hard to give orders
while you are fighting for your life. Leadership of the traditional type ends with Alexander.
The new Macedonian combined arms system had increased the requirements for battlefield
decision making to the point that the overall commander could no longer lead from the
front. Using Alexander in his traditional role will have great impact on whatever shock
combat he participates in, but you temporarily lose his ability to control the battle. Players
tend to use Alexander for his leadership abilities and avoid his shock combat advantages. I
did not want to foist an Alexander elan rule on the players but give them the option on how
to employ the greatest general in antiquity.
The Game Design: Combined Arms Tactics
The heart of the tactical interplay is captured in the shock combat system. The key elements
of shock combat are Troop Quality and Shock Superiority. Troop quality is a measure of how
many cohesion hits a unit may receive before it routs. The higher the troop quality rating
the more sustainable the unit. In the actual battles, good units could usually engage in no
more than two shock combats with a short breather in between. A unit gains cohesion hits
when it moves beyond its normal rate, enters broken terrain (rivers and woods), receives
missile volleys, and engages in shock combat. Cohesion hits can be removed with an order
but only if the unit is out of harms way, which is often inconvenient during the heat of
battle.
Shock Superiority determines which tactical systems are superior when they oppose each
other in shock combat. The impact of a unit being attacked by a unit type which is superior
to it doubles the cohesion hits received in shock combat. Unless a unit is of unusually high
quality this impact will usually decide the encounter. Another critical application of this
concept is that all units are superior to the unit which they are delivering a flank or rear
attack. Moving parts of an army aggressively will open flanks which an opponent probably
will exploit. The entire Macedonian war machine was designed to prevent an enemy from
exploiting vulnerabilities or open flanks. Failure to employ these tactics is done at the
player’s risk.
Shock combat is handled in an elaborate fashion to show the dynamics of ancient shock
combat and the interplay between different unit types within the same tactical system.
Phalanxes and Hoplites are both heavy infantry and therefore neither is attack superior to
the other, but the Phalanx has other advantages which the Clash of Spears Chart captures.
An individual Shock combat is usually decided in one game turn but can last over a period of
several game turns to reflect the push and shove characteristic of ancient combat. The
result of shock combat is one or the other side routing.
The Game Design: Army Rout
The objective for each side is to have the opponents army rout from the field. As units rout
they make a dash for safety. A leader may attempt to rally his routing units, but only once. A
failed rally attempt results in the elimination of the unit. This is simulating the fact that a
routing unit in antiquity would throw away its weapons and armor to speed up its
withdrawal. The old adage of returning with your shield or upon it reflected the knowledge
that the first thing a fleeing man discards is his heavy shield, hence the loss of one's shield
was a sign of cowardice. If the leader fails in a rally attempt the assumption is made that
thereafter the unit is unarmed and therefore useless for further combat. Once an army has
taken losses equal to its rout level the game is over. I passed on the opportunity to have an
elaborate army withdrawal procedure since once an army routed in antiquity the battle was
over. Why should the player waste time with no payback?
Conclusion
The game system was designed to put the player in Alexander's sandals. Besides being
enjoyable to play it is hoped that some of the critical aspects of ancient warfare will be
experienced and learned. It has been heartening to discover that the game system is flexible
enough to be easily modified to reflect the historical evolution of ancient warfare. By adding
two rules: Pre-shock missile fire and the ability to give group commands we have been able
to capture the critical aspects of the Roman tactical system which will be released in an
upcoming S.P.Q.R. game. An additional insight was that by placing a missile volley rule into
the game system we were able to capture the arrow storm of Agincourt. The rule has been
removed for future use since it turned a poor General like Darius into an effective leader. I
hope you enjoy playing this game as much as I enjoyed designing it. Good hunting.