Growth Sustainability
Economy = Sustainable
Frontline
Economic growth is sustainable and key
Delong, Goldin, and Katz, July 2002 (J. Bradford Delong—a professor of Economics and chair of the Political Economy major at
the University of California, Berkeley; Claudia Goldin—an American economist and Henry Lee Professor of Economics at Harvard University; Lawrence F.
Katz-- Elisabeth Allison Professor of Economics at Harvard University; “Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth”; pg. 2, 3; http://www.j-bradforddelong.net/Econ_Articles/GKD_final3.pdf)
With rapid economic
growth, social and economic problems become far less of a burden. A fast¶
rich economy is one in which people have more options¶ and
better choices: the people can—through their individual private and collective public¶
decisions—decide to consume more, lower tax rates, increase the scope of public education,
take¶ better care of the environment, strengthen national defense or accomplish any other
goals they¶ might choose. For an economist these are sufficient reasons to consider growth a good thing. A¶ fast-growing
growing economy is a rich economy. A
economy is one in which people will have greater wealth, higher incomes, and¶ more of the necessities, conveniences, and luxuries
of life.¶ Moreover, in America at least, slow
economic growth appears to heighten political gridlock, and¶
thus reduce the quality of political decisions. The era of slow economic growth that began in¶ 1973 produced,
according to Paul Krugman (1994), an Age of Diminished Expectations. Slower¶ growth in private incomes led to a political backlash
that greatly reduced the ability of the U.S.¶ government to undertake large-scale projects. From a small-government perspective,
skepticism¶ toward government expansion may be a good thing. But it was the relatively conservative¶ President George H.W. Bush
(1989) who lamented at his inauguration that the American¶ government “had more will than wallet.” And it was his administration
that found itself—largely¶ due to political choices made as a result of the slow-growth age of diminished expectations—a large drain
through its borrowing on America’s ability to invest in its future, unable to respond in¶ a constructive large-scale way to the end of
the Cold War and the fall of communism in eastern¶ Europe, and unable to even think about whether and how increases or shifts in
the direction of¶ government spending could improve opportunity in America. Although faster economic growth is a good thing, it is
not the only good thing. The future¶ benefits of more rapid economic growth come at a cost. Resources
have to be
diverted from¶ consumption, and devoted to physical capital deepening, education and
training, and research¶ and development. Faster economic growth empowers the future: it
increases options, capabilities,¶ and choices. But the decisions required to accelerate growth foreclose other
options in the¶ present. There is, of course, a trade-off. It is the purpose of this chapter to sketch out what this¶ trade-off is: what
kinds of policies might sustain
and enhance economic growth, and how one¶ should go about
assessing whether their benefits are worth the costs they impose. ¶ Before we begin, it is important to
admit up front that economists know less about the effects of¶ policies and the causes of change in the rate of economic growth
than we would like. For¶ example, in the early 1970s, U.S. productivity growth fell off a cliff. Measured output per¶ person-hour
worked in nonfarm business had averaged a growth rate of 2.8 percent per year from¶ 1947 to 1973. It averaged a growth rate of
only 1.3 percent per year from 1973 to 1995. This¶ productivity slowdown meant that, according to official statistics, Americans in
1995 were only¶ 70 percent as productive as their predecessors back in the early 1970s would have expected them¶ to be. Yet the
causes of this productivity slowdown remain, even today, the subject of active¶ debate, and largely a mystery.1 Then, in the second
half of the 1990s, American productivity growth reversed itself and resumed its pre-1973 pace. Between the beginning of 1995 and
the¶ semi-official NBER business cycle peak in March 2001, U.S. measured nonfarm-business output¶ per person-hour worked
Economists today are confident that the
cause of this productivity speed-up was the attainment of¶ critical mass by the ongoing
technological revolutions in data processing and data¶ communications,3¶ yet few if any had forecast
appeared once again to grow at an annual rate of 2.8 percent per year.2¶
such a speed-up in advance.
Growth is sustainable, innovation allows better quality of life and leads to
environmental sustainability
Everett et. al., Marc 2010
(Tim Everett—Senior Policy Advisor at HM Treasury; Mallika Ishwaran—senior economist at the
Cabinet Office and member of UK Government Economic Service; Gian Paolo Ansaloni—Department for Environmental, Food &
Rural Affairs, United Kingdom; Alex Rubin—contributor New Eastern Europe, quarterly news journal which focuses on
Central/Eastern European affairs; “Economic Growth and the Environment”; DEFRA, pg. 27-28;
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69195/pb13390-economic-growth-100305.pdf)
Economic growth
remains essential to support continued improvements in factors that affect
people’s well-being, from health and employment to education and quality of life, and to help the government
deliver on a range of policy objectives – economic, social, and environmental . It is vital for supporting
continued improvements in material living standards, for example, by creating employment
opportunities and by creating an attractive environment for private investment. Through the tax
system, economic growth also supports other factors affecting wellbeing, for example, through continued improvements
in the provision of public services and in support for lower income households that reduce
poverty, improve health outcomes, and lead to greater educational attainment. The shift to a
low carbon and more resource-efficient economy will require fundamental changes in the
structure of the economy. It will require investment in new technologies and innovation,¶ and
investments to replace aging infrastructure and reduce future risks from environmental
change. Economic growth allows these demands to be met without necessarily reducing
investments in other areas that matter to the wellbeing of individuals and society.¶ Looking beyond
the UK, growth provides developing economies with the opportunity to improve the quality of
life of their citizens, developing institutions and industries, raising incomes and providing the
means by which they can meet the environmental challenges they face. Through trade, investment, aid
and remittance flows, continued growth in advanced economies has an important role to play
in reducing poverty and raising standards of living across the world.
Continued growth can be sustained
Rees, June 1st, 2001 (William E. Rees—PhD, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Colombia;
“Economics and Sustainability: Conflict or Convergence? (An Ecological Economics Perspective)”; StatsCan Economic Conference,
Ottawa, Canada; pg. 3; http://www.environomics.org/environomics/econSustain.pdf)
Prevailing economic
rationality relies heavily on the assumed simple mechanics of free and open
markets to ¶ ensure sustainability. This naturally leads to great emphasis on “internalizing the externalities” (waste
disposal costs) ¶ and “getting the prices right” (privatizing and pricing nature’s ‘goods and services’) as an essential first step. Many
¶ conventional
economists place great confidence in price as an indicator of scarcity and on
the mechanics of the ¶ marketplace to relieve it – rising prices for scarce resources automatically lead to
conservation of the affected ¶ resources and stimulate the search for substitutes. And as Nobel Laureate Robert Solow has
observed: “If it is very ¶ easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then... The world can, in effect, get along without
natural ¶ resources...” (Solow 1974, 11). (Solow’s is actually a fairly conservative statement of what has become the near ¶ doctrine
of ‘near-perfect substitution’. Julian Simon’s ebullient optimism tosses Solow’s cautionary ‘if’ to the winds: ¶ “Technology exists now
to produce in virtually inexhaustible quantities just about all the products made by ¶ nature…,” and “We have in our hands now…
the technology to feed, clothe, and supply energy to an ever-growing ¶ population for the next seven billion years…” [Simon, cited in
Bartlett 1996]). In contemporary mythology, the ¶ cornucopia of human ingenuity has clearly displaced nature as the great provider.
¶ In fact, market forces and substitution seem to be working, at least for commonly traded non-renewable ¶ resources. With the
exception of timber, the real prices of all resources examined—including rural land—show a ¶ significant drop over a century-long
period implying increasing economic availability (Barnett and Morse 1963), ¶ although a leveling of this trend may have occurred
around 1970 (Nordhaus 1992). Since real prices for appropriable ¶ resources show
no major turn toward scarcity,
economists generally “tend to be at the relaxed end of the spectrum” ¶ of those concerned about
environmental constraints on growth (Nordhaus 1992, 5). ¶ It follows that sustainability is a fairly simple
business from the expansionist perspective. If there are no general ¶ environmental constraints on
the economy and we can find technological substitutes for particular resources, then the ¶
shortest route to sustainability is to stay our present course. If we continue freeing up markets,
privatizing resources ¶ and government services, and eliminating barriers to trade, a new
round of growth in both rich and poor countries ¶ will provide the wealth needed both to
redress poverty and inequity and to generate the economic surpluses needed, ¶ particularly in the
developing world, better to husband the natural environment (see Beckerman 1974 for a full ¶ exposition). In short, mainstream
thinking holds that “ ...the surest way to improve your environment is to become ¶ rich” (Beckerman 1992, 491 as cited in Ekins
1993, 267).
Ext—Generic
Innovation ensures growth is sustainable
Tainter 9 (Joseph - a Professor in the Department of Environment and Society at Utah State
University, September 9th, “Human Resource Use: Timing and Implications for Sustainability,”
The Oil Drum, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/5745)
In conclusion, sustainability is not the achievement of stasis. It is not a passive consequence of having fewer humans who consume
more limited resources. One must work at being sustainable. The
challenges that any society (or other
institution) might confront are, for practical purposes, endless in number and infinite in
variety. This being so, sustainability is a matter of solving problems. In the conventional view, complexity
follows energy. If so, then we should be able to forego complexity voluntarily and reduce our consumption of the resources that it
requires. This approach to sustainability implicitly sees the future as a condition of stasis with no challenges. In actuality, major
infusions of surplus energy are rare in human history. More commonly, complexity
increases in response to
problems. Complexity emerging through problem solving typically precedes the availability of
energy, and compels increases in its production. Complexity is not something that we can ordinarily choose to
forego. Applying this understanding leads to two conclusions. The first is that the solutions commonly recommended
to promote sustainability–conservation, simplification, pricing, and innovation–can do so only
in the short term. Secondly, long-term sustainability depends on solving major societal problems
that will converge in coming decades, and this will require increasing complexity and energy production.
Sustainability is not a condition of stasis. It is, rather, a process of continuous adaptation, of
perpetually addressing new or ongoing problems and securing the resources to do so. It is useful
to think of sustainability in the metaphor of an athletic game: It is possible to “lose”–that is, to become unsustainable, as happened
to the Western Roman Empire. But the converse does not hold. Because we continually confront challenges, there is no point at
which a society has “won”–become sustainable in perpetuity, or at least for a very long time. Success,
staying in the game.
rather, consists of
Ext—Resource Wars
Only economic growth solves for resource scarcity
Taylor 2 (Jerry - senior fellow at the Cato Institute, environmental policy, August 26th,
Sustainable Development A Dubious Solution in Search of a Problem, Cato,
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa449.pdf)
If sustainable development is the answer, what is the question? Society has managed to “sustain” development now for
approximate ly 3,000 years without the guidance of “green” state planners. The result is not only a society that is both healthier and
wealthier than any other in history but also a society with more natural resources at its disposal than ever before. The
overwhelmingly positive trends in environmental quality and resource availabil ity in the
developed and developing worlds suggest that the best way to sustain develop ment—or to
maximize human welfare—is to • ensure that productivity continues to improve in both the
agriculture and resource extraction industries, • facilitate continuing improvements in the
efficiency of resource use, and • promote wealth creation and gains in per capita income. It’s
important to remember that condi tions in the developing world are similar to those in the West a century ago. As the World
Resources Institute observes: Just a century ago, health conditions in Europe, North America, and Japan were similar to those of the
least developed countries today, as was environmental quality. Conditions in London and other major centers were squalid;
sewagefilled rivers, garbage-strewn streets, and overcrowded and dank housing were the norm. Much of the popula tion lacked
access to fresh water or adequate sanitation. Epidemics of typhus, cholera, tuberculosis, and measles swept these cities. Indeed, in
the world’s most prosperous cities at the time, the infant mortality rate— the number of children who die before their first
birthday—was more than 100 per 1,000 live births, and in some places it exceeded 200. Diarrheal and respiratory diseases and other
infections were the main cause of death. 276 The environmental plight of cities such as London might not have been indefinitely
“sustainable,” but industrialization was accompanied by an increase in life expectancy and an improved standard of living.
Incomes rose so that people were able to afford more environmental amenities, better health
care, modern sanitary investments, and an improved diet. Economic growth spawned new
manufacturing technologies that were more efficient, less resource intensive, and hence less
polluting. Moreover, these gains in human welfare accelerated over time. Indeed, it is the lack
of economic growth— not the pollution spawned by growth—that is the root cause of most
health-related prob lems in the less-developed world today. Again, as the World Resources Institute notes:
Of all the factors that combine to degrade health, poverty stands out for its overwhelming role. Indeed, WHO [the World Health
Organization] has called poverty the world’s biggest killer [ The World Health Report 1995: Bridging the Gaps (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 1995), p. 1]. Statistically, poverty affects health in its own right: just being poor increases one’s risk of ill health.
Poverty also contributes to disease and death through its second-order effects; poor people, for instance, are 31 Society has man
aged to “sustain” development now for approximate ly 3,000 years. The
result is not only a society that is both
healthier and wealthier than any other in history but also a society with more natural
resources at its disposal than ever before. more likely to live in an unhealthy environment. 277
Indeed, the most serious environmental problems today are manifestly the conse qunce of
poverty and lack of development. Approximately 2 million people in develop ing countries die every year from
exposure to high concentrations of particulate matter in indoor environments in rural areas, a direct result of burning primitive
biomass fuels. 278 Electrification
would save far more lives than any conceivable set of
environmental regula tory initiatives, but electrification cannot occur without further
economic develop ment. Another 3 million people die every year in Africa due to poor water quality, another problem that
could be easily remedied by investment in water treatment facilities. 279 But those investments will not come
without economic growth. Improvements in productivity, efficiency, and per capita income, however, are not pre
ordained. Economists largely agree that they are manifestations of political systems that protect economic liberty and proscribe the
boundaries of state authority to protecting life, liberty, and property.
Disease
Growth solves disease— innovation of vaccines
McCullers and Dunn, January 2008 (Jonathan A. McCullers—MD, Chair, Department of
Pediatrics, University of Tennessee Health Science Center; Jefferey Dunn—PharmD, MBA is
Formulary and Contract Manager with SelectHealth Plans in Salt Lake City, UT, a plan
responsible for over 500,000 lives, where he manages multiple aspects of the Formulary review
process; “Advances in Vaccine Technology And Their Impact on Managed Care: FUTURE
TRENDS”; US National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health; pg.
http://reason.org/files/how_ipcc_misleads_on_climate_change_impacts.pdf )
As more costly vaccines enter the market, the financial implications for health plans and
physicians will become more pronounced. The debate over who will pay and how much will be paid will only
intensify. Vaccines remain the single best investment in health care,33 but the costs associated
with the increasing options are beginning to strain both public and private systems. Most health
plans have liberal coverage and reimbursement policies for vaccines, and this approach is
considered to offer a good return on investment. As we mentioned earlier, this traditional approach may be reexamined in some areas, with many alternative options to be explored. With most of these alternatives, one goal remains:
making sure that the best vaccines reach the right patients with few impediments.¶ For physicians,
the introduction of newer vaccines has led to a greater number of nontraditional vaccinators, such as pharmacies and businesses
traditionally outside the health care system that are now becoming acquainted with, and challenged by, the financial implications.
Expectations about
reimbursement levels and profitability may need to be addressed to
ensure that all parties involved—health plans, physicians, employers, and patients—feel their
contribution is significant.¶ In 2007, the immunization schedule for children was already crowded; 15 different vaccines
were recommended for children from birth to six years of age, and 14 were recommended for older children, seven to 18 years of
age. Many of these vaccines are administered multiple times, and adults may need additional boosters. The development
and
approval of new vaccines against infectious diseases, as well as other potential uses for them,
are likely to exacerbate this problem.¶ A desire to simplify the regimen is fueling a trend toward combination
vaccines. Although many combined vaccines have been used historically (e.g., diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus), new
combinations are being approved for children (e.g., pentavalent vaccines such as GSK’s Pediarix [diphtheria, acellular
pertussis, tetanus, hepatitis B, and inactivated polio vaccine]) and for adults (e.g., GSK’s Twinrix for hepatitis A and B). ¶ The main
challenge will be to balance immunogenicity in the newer formulations while maintaining
their benefits of easier administration and lower costs. In this regard, adherence is likely to be a key issue in
the future. If it can be shown that a product improves compliance and clinical outcomes while reducing costs, that vaccine may
benefit from preferential positioning by health plans.¶ For instance, Happe et al., using data from SelectHealth, retrospectively
compared children receiving the HEDIS Combination 2 vaccine series with those receiving each vaccine series individually.34 By two
years of age, children in the combination cohort were more likely to have been fully vaccinated, and vaccinated within the
recommended age ranges, than children receiving each series individually (86.9% vs. 74.1%, P < 0.001; 45.2% vs. 37.5%, P = 0.001
respectively). Additional studies with data indicating improved compliance rates and outcomes support the value of this
technological advancement.
Economy = Unsustainable
Frontline
Economic decline results in global nuclear war / power vacuum
Howarth, September 2012 (Richard B. Howarth, an environmental and ecological economist who studies the interface
between economic theory and the ecological, moral, and social dimensions of environmental issues, Dartmouth University;
“Sustainability, Well-Being, and Economic Growth”; Center for Humans & Nature; pg. ;
http://www.humansandnature.org/sustainability--well-being--and-economic-growth-article-116.php)
The notion that stabilizing
climate might require reductions in the levels of material production
and consumption is one facet of the rapidly evolving “degrowth” movement.[12] This perspective
notes (rightly) that greenhouse gas emissions tend to increase with the level of economic activity
because higher income and consumption levels translate into increased demand for carbonintensive goods. An analogous argument, however, is offered by analysts who favor free-market energy policies over the
interventionist policies needed to put the economy on course towards the achievement of a sustainable energy system. The
argument is that the
production of goods and services requires energy and that cutting energy
use—or shifting toward higher-cost forms of energy—necessarily threatens to reduce the level
and growth of economic output.[13] As one example of this line of reasoning, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (USEIA) predicted that implementing the Kyoto Protocol would reduce U.S. economic output by up to 4.3 percent in
the year 2010.[14] That estimate played powerfully into the anti-Kyoto rhetoric that was already prevalent inWashington political
circles. In 2002 speech, for example, President George W. Bush argued that:¶ The approach taken under the Kyoto Protocol would
have required the United States to make deep and immediate cuts in our economy to meet an arbitrary target. It would have cost
our economy up to $400 billion and we would have lost 4.9 million jobs.[15]¶ Because claims of this sort have major policy
implications, it is fair to ask whether they hold up under scrutiny. On this point, the research literature depicts a more complex and
subtle set of relationships.[16] For one thing, the USEIA study found that well-designed policies could achieve the goals of theKyoto
agreement at a substantially lower cost. The 4.3
percent output loss occurred in a single year based on the
assumption that emissions cuts were implemented precipitously in a way that failed to limit
costs through measures designed to achieve a smooth and efficient transition.¶ A more
representative assessment is provided by the Stern Review on climate change,[17] which found that stabilizing atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentrations at 500–550 parts per million—a level sufficient to limit the future increase in mean global temperature to
roughly 2 degrees Celsius—would impose costs equivalent to a permanent 1 percent reduction in the level of present and future
economic output. This is a number that needs to be viewed in perspective. One
key point is that achieving Stern’s
stabilization target would require a gradual but also nearly complete transition away from
today’s high-carbon energy economy to a mainly post-carbon energy system over the course
of the next four decades. This is in line with the goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by the year
2050, which Barack Obama embraced during the 2008 presidential campaign. It also consistent with Daly’s concept of “scale,” which
calls for limiting material throughput (i.e., the use of natural resources and the discharge of waste) to levels that are ecologically
sustainable given the dynamics of biophysical systems.[18]¶ A second point is that a 1
percent reduction in economic
output would involve an annual cost of roughly $150 billion per year in the context of the
current U.S. economy. That is a substantial impact that should not be borne without good
reason. On the other hand, Stern’s analysis implies that climate change policies would have almost
no impact on the rate of economic growth. Because climate change policies would be phased in gradually over
time, an economy that might have grown at a rate of 3.00 percent per year would instead grow at the lower rate of 2.95 percent per
year if one assumed that climate policies had costs in the middle of the range described by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change in its systematic literature review.[19] This effect is so
small that it would be difficult to distinguish
from the year-to-year variability in growth that is driven by fluctuating trends in technology,
human behavior, and other fundamental drivers. As the Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling once
framed this point:¶ If someone could wave a wand and phase in, over a few years, a climate mitigation program that depressed
[U.S.] GNP by two percent in perpetuity, no one would notice the difference.[20]¶ Why
are the impacts of climate
policies on the rate of economic growth predicted to be small? One reason is that engineering
studies have shown that a wide variety of low-cost emissions abatement technologies are
currently available or projected to become available given appropriate investments in
research, development, and technology diffusion. A recent study by McKinsey and Company, for example,
identified a set of specific technologies sufficient to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2030 by up to 46 percent at a
maximum cost of $50 per tonne of CO2 equivalent, or 44 cents per gallon of gasoline.[21] This cost
is greater than zero
but far too small to have major impacts on the overall level of economic activity. A carbon
dioxide tax of $50 per tonne would favor lower-emission technologies and a shift towards
low-carbon goods and services. The problem, then, is not a lack of technical potential but a lack of policies and price
signals that promote the transition to a green energy system.¶
Economic collapse is unavoidable—growth cannot be sustained—causes
extinction
Friedberg and Schoenfeld, October 21st, 2008 (Aaron Friedberg—professor of politics and international
relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School; Gabriel Schoenfeld—senior editor of Commentary, is a
visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J.; “The Dangers of a Diminished America: In the 1930s,
isolationism and protectionism spurred the rise of fascism.”; WSJ; pg.;
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html)
One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world
is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will
face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that
it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be
calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs.¶ [Commentary]¶ David Gothard¶ In the face of this
onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic
wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction --
foreign aid. This would be one
of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we
may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era
of financially-induced isolationism.¶ Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost
of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the
surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of
the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with
annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions.¶ Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs
disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather
support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow.¶
Then there
are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial
architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of
that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other
things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by
buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future?¶ Meanwhile, traditional
foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been
extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly
down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern.¶ If
America
now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The
stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our
position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be
placed at risk.¶ In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground
nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by
the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their
divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our
moment of maximum vulnerability.¶ The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our
principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian
stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by
the global slowdown. China
is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on
foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting
economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests
on progress in the long march to prosperity.¶ None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these
countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.¶ As for our democratic friends, the
present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of
anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past
dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical
power.¶ What does this all mean? There
is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we
have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff
price tag of continued American leadership.¶ Are we up for the task? The American economy has
historically demonstrated remarkable resilience. Our market-oriented ideology, entrepreneurial culture, flexible institutions and
favorable demographic profile should serve us well in whatever trials lie ahead.¶ The American people, too, have shown reserves of
experience after the Cold War era -- poorly articulated and executed
policies, divisive domestic debates and rising anti-Americanism in at least some parts of the
world -- appear to have left these reserves diminished.¶ A recent survey by the Chicago Council on World
resolve when properly led. But
Affairs found that 36% of respondents agreed that the U.S. should "stay out of world affairs," the highest number recorded since this
question was first asked in 1947. The economic
crisis could be the straw that breaks the camel's back.¶
US collapse inevitable
McCoy, December 6th, 2010 (Alfred W. McCoy, a historian of Southeast Asia. He is the J.R.W.
Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison; “How America will collapse
(by 2025): Economic Decline: Present Situation”; Salon; pg.
http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/)
Today, three
main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of
economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade, the decline of American
technological innovation, and the end of the dollar’s privileged status as the global reserve
currency.¶ By 2008, the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports, with just 11 percent of
them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union. There is no reason to believe that
this trend will reverse itself.¶ Similarly, American leadership in technological innovation is on the
wane. In 2008, the U.S. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232,000, but China was closing
fast at 195,000, thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the
U.S. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology
& Innovation Foundation when it came to “change” in “global innovation-based
competitiveness” during the previous decade. Adding substance to these statistics, in October China’s Defense
Ministry unveiled the world’s fastest supercomputer, the Tianhe-1A, so powerful, said one U.S. expert, that it “blows away the
existing No. 1 machine” in America.¶ Add
to this clear evidence that the U.S. education system, that
source of future scientists and innovators, has been falling behind its competitors. After leading the
world for decades in 25- to 34-year-olds with university degrees, the country sank to 12th place in 2010. The World Economic Forum
ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010.
Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U.S. are now foreigners, most of whom will be heading home, not staying
here as once would have happened. By
2025, in other words, the United States is likely to face a critical
shortage of talented scientists.¶ Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp
criticism of the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. “Other countries are no longer
willing to buy into the idea that the U.S. knows best on economic policy,” observed Kenneth S. Rogoff,
a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. In mid-2009, with the world’s central banks holding an astronomical
$4 trillion in U.S. Treasury notes, Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it
was time to end “the artificially
maintained unipolar system” based on “one formerly strong reserve currency.”¶ Simultaneously,
China’s central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve
currency “disconnected from individual nations” (that is, the U.S. dollar). Take these as signposts of a world to
come, and of a possible attempt, as economist Michael Hudson has argued, “to hasten the bankruptcy of the U.S. financial-military
world order.”
Ext—Generic
Economic growth is unnatural and not sustainable—hurts the environment
Daily Kos, January 25th, 2010 (Daily Kos—online think tank, news organization, and activist hub, patrickz—
member; “The Impossible Hamster: Global Economic Growth Unsustainable”; Daily Kos; pg.1;
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/01/25/830037/-The-Impossible-Hamster-Global-Economic-Growth-Unsustainable)
Our planet cannot sustain unlimited growth. ¶ I know, it should be obvious. Sadly, though, some economists still
seem to miss this incredibly important point:¶ "It is precisely this economic growth which will lift the poor out of poverty and
improve the environmental standards that really matter to people - like clean air and water - in the process, as it has done
throughout human history."¶ That is Tom Clougherty from the Adam Smith Institute, which apparently operates "Europe's favourite
(denialist) think tank website," responding to the NEF study in a BBC article.¶ The NEF goes beyond making a simple point with a very
cute monster hamster in the meat of their study:¶
Even at a growth rate of 3 per cent (low for many
developing countries), the global economy would need to reduce its carbon intensity by 71
per cent by 2050 (compared to 2002) or 2.7 per cent per year. This would mean achieving more than double
the yearly average improvement between 1965 and 2002. But even this would result in a level of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the
atmosphere of 500 parts per million (ppm). Whereas the latest climate science shows that such a level would push temperature rises
far passed the 2 °C threshold.¶ The point being that
if global economic growth continues, it will take much
more dramatic reductions in CO2 emissions than we are currently considering, or may even be
possible, to prevent disastrous climate change. And climate change is only one of many reasons
that we can not continue growing the global economy indefinitely. Earth's ecosystems as they
exist today will not last forever if we continue on this unsustainable path.¶ As I am not an expert, I
cannot vouch for the numbers in this study. However, it is difficult to argue against the main point:¶ Andrew Simms, co-author of the
report and nef policy director said, "We
tend to think of growth as natural for economies, forgetting that
in nature things grow only until maturity and then develop in other ways. A world in which
everything grew indefinitely would be strange indeed. A young hamster, for example, doubles
its weight each week between birth and puberty. But if it grew at the same rate until its first
birthday, we’d be looking at a nine billion tonne hamster , which ate more than a year’s worth of world
maize production every day. There are good reasons why things don’t grow indefinitely. As things are in
nature, so sooner or later, they must be in the economy.¶ "The economic priorities of the rich world are as
ridiculous as the impossible hamster. Endless growth is pushing the planet’s biosphere beyond
its safe limits. The price is seen in compromised world food security, climatic upheaval, economic instability and threats to
social welfare. We urgently need to change our economy to live within its environmental budget. There is no global,
environmental central bank to bail us out if we become ecologically bankrupt."
Economic growth is unsustainable
Ruttan, 5/18/08 (Vernon W. Ruttan—well-known development economist at the University of Minnesota, where
he was Regents Professor Emeritus in the Departments of Economics and Applied Economics; “Can Economic Growth
Be Sustained? A Post-Malthusian Perspective”; pg. 1-3; http://www.gobernanzamedioambiental.org/brugger_new/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/Can-Economic-Growth-Be-Sustained.pdf)
CAN ECONOMIC GROWTH be sustained? Is technical change the engine of economic growth? These issues have
generated intense controversy since at ¶ least the early years of the industrial revolution. They emerged with even ¶ greater
intensity during the last half of the twentieth century. During the ¶ late 1990s, a spurt of growth in output and productivity led the
business ¶ press, and some economists, to proclaim that the economy had entered a ¶ new era in which the old rules that had
governed cyclical and secular growth ¶ no longer obtained (Stiroh 1999). During the twenty-first century the United ¶ States and the
other advanced industrial countries will be confronted by a ¶ new challenge: to make the service sector the driver of economic
growth. ¶ In the classical model of Malthus and Ricardo, growth
is constrained ¶ by an inelastic supply of
natural resources.' In the neoclassical model, economic growth is constrained by the rate of growth of
the labor force (Solow ¶ 1956; Prescott 1988). In both models the constraints on growth were re- ¶ leased by
exogenous technical change. In the new growth economics, the ¶ constraints are released by
endogenous technical change driven by the accumulation of knowledge and human capital
(Romer 1986, 1990, 1994; ¶ Lucas 1988, 1993).2 In this article I argue that future economic growth in ¶ economically
advanced countries such as the United States will be con- ¶ strained by low service-sector
productivity. Economists and technologists have typically taken an optimistic view of the ¶ ¶
possibilities of sustainable growth. Ecologists and many natural scientists ¶ ¶ have often taken
a less sanguine view.3 Environmentalists have replaced ¶ ¶ economists as the dismal scientists.
The trauma of the Great Depression and ¶ ¶ the fear of post-World War II economic instability directed economists to explore the
conditions and economic policies that could lead to "steady- ¶ ¶ state" sustainable economic growth (Harrod 1939; Domar 1946;
Solow ¶ ¶ 1956). Productivity
growth, resulting from technical change, was identified ¶ ¶ as a
fundamental source of economic growth. Concerns about the constraints ¶ ¶ imposed by natural
resource scarcity receded. ¶ ¶ Beginning in the 1970s, economists' optimism about economic growth ¶ ¶ was challenged by
the coincidence of a global energy crisis and the slowing ¶ ¶ of economic growth in the
developed industrial economies. The Ricardo- ¶ ¶ Malthus concern with the adequacy of the natural resource base to
sustain ¶ ¶ economic growth was supplemented by the emergence of intense concern ¶ ¶ about
environmental degradation. These concerns were highlighted for the ¶ ¶ general public by the press coverage given to
the book Limits to Growth sponsored by the Club of Rome.4 ¶ ¶ The three main elements in these new concerns were: ¶ ¶ -an
anticipated scarcity of food, raw materials, and energy under conditions of burgeoning population growth; ¶ ¶ -rising demand for
environmental assimilation of residuals-the ¶ ¶ spillovers into the environment of pollutants arising as byproducts from commodity
production, energy production, and transportation; and ¶ ¶ -growth in consumer demand for environmental amenities-for the ¶ ¶
direct consumption of environmental services associated with rapid growth ¶ ¶ in per capita
income and high income elasticity of demand for environmental services such as freedom
from pollution and congestion. ¶ ¶ During the 1980s fears about the adequacy of material and energy re- ¶ ¶ sources
abated. But concern about the implications of environmental changes ¶ ¶ that were occurring at
the global level intensified. These included the possibility that increases in the concentration of
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other ¶ ¶ "greenhouse" gases in the atmosphere were leading to
deleterious climate ¶ ¶ change and that human encroachment on the environment was leading
to ¶ ¶ irreparable loss of biodiversity (Turner et al. 1990; Stern, Young, and ¶ ¶ Druckman 1992). ¶ ¶ There has also
emerged since the 1970s a renewed concern about the ¶ ¶ "social limits to growth." In the 1920s the German historian Oswald
Spengler ¶ ¶ (1926, 1928) argued that Western
"culture" had lost its dynamism and was ¶ ¶ becoming a
static "civilization." More recently Yale historian Paul Kennedy ¶ ¶ (1988) theorized that strategic "overreach"-an
imbalance between strategic commitment and economic capacity-had been the major source
of the ¶ ¶ decline of empires in the past and had become a source of excessive burden ¶ ¶ on
economic growth in the United States and the Soviet Union since the ¶ ¶ middle of the twentieth century. It would have
been considered highly audacious, however, even in 1986, to predict the imminent collapse of
the ¶ ¶ Soviet empire. ¶ ¶ Among its critics technical change came to be regarded as part of the ¶ ¶
problem confronting both the modern world and the countries that are still poor. The view became
pervasive in both popular and elite culture that modern technology-reflected in the cataclysm of war, the degradation of the ¶ ¶
environment, and the psychological cost of rapid social change-was dangerous to the modern
world and the future of humankind (Lawless 1977; ¶ ¶ Wagar 1982). In a much more sophisticated
exploration of the social limits ¶ ¶ to growth, Fred Hirsch (1976) has argued that the good things of life are
¶ ¶ restricted not only by the physical limits imposed by natural and human ¶ ¶ resources but
also by the inherent scarcity of positional goods that limit the ¶ ¶ capacity to expand
consumption without deterioration in quality.
Ext—Resource Depletion
Economic collapse is inevitable—resource depletion
Boyle, 4/5/12 (Rebecca Boyle—Freelance Science Writer at Freelance Past: Contributor at Popular Science, Reporter at
Northern Colorado Communications Group, Reporter at Greeley Tribune, Reporter at Keene Sentinel; “MIT Predicts That World
Economy Will Collapse By 2030”; Popular Science; pg.;
http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2012-04/new-research-tracks-40-year-old-prediction-world-economy-will-collapse-2030)
Forty years after its initial publication, a study
called The Limits to Growth is looking depressingly
prescient. Commissioned by an international think tank called the Club of Rome, the 1972 report found that if civilization
continued on its path toward increasing consumption, the global economy would collapse by
2030. Population losses would ensue, and things would generally fall apart.¶ RELATED ARTICLES¶ Dear
President Obama: Congratulations! But We Need To Talk.¶ A Tightly Knit Network of Companies Runs the World Economy, Says
Network Analysis¶ Robots Are Stealing American Jobs, According
to MIT Economist¶ study was — and remains
— nothing if not controversial, with economists doubting its predictions and decrying the
notion of imposing limits on economic growth. Australian researcher Graham Turner has examined its
assumptions in great detail during the past several years, and apparently his latest research falls in line with the report’s predictions,
according to Smithsonian Magazine. The world
is on track for disaster, the magazine says.¶ The study, initially completed
computer models of economic trends and estimated that if things didn’t
change much, and humans continued to consume natural resources apace, the world would
run out at some point. Oil will peak (some argue it has) before dropping down the other side
of the bell curve, yet demand for food and services would only continue to rise. Turner says realworld data from 1970 to 2000 tracks with the study’s draconian predictions: “There is a very clear warning bell being rung here. We
are not on a sustainable trajectory,” he tells Smithsonian
at MIT, relied on several
Ext—Overpopulation
Growth is finite and is not sustainable—overpopulation
Heinberg, March 4th, 2010 (Richard Heinberg- American journalist and educator who has written extensively on energy,
economic, and ecological issues, including oil depletion; Life After Growth: limits to growth; Countercurrents.org; pg.;
http://www.countercurrents.org/heinberg040310.htm)
The journey that led to my formulating these propositions began in 1972, when a book called Limits to Growth was making
headlines. This relatively compact volume, which went on to become the best-selling environmental book of all time, provoked the
first Great Wake-up Call of my adult life, changing the course of everything I have thought and done ever since.¶ Let me explain why
Limits to Growth impacted me so deeply.¶ That book, which reported on the first attempts to use computers to model the likely
interactions between trends in resources, consumption, and population, was also the first major scientific study to question the
assumption that economic growth can and will continue more or less uninterrupted into the foreseeable future. ¶ The idea was
heretical at the time—and still is: during
the past few decades, growth has become virtually the sole
index of national economic well-being. When the economy grows, jobs appear, investments
yield high returns, and everyone is happy. When the economy stops growing, financial
bloodletting ensues. And so predictably a book saying that growth cannot and will not continue beyond a certain point
proved profoundly upsetting in some quarters, and soon Limits to Growth was prominently "debunked" by public relations efforts
organized by pro-growth business interests. In reality, this "debunking" merely amounted to taking a few numbers in the book
completely out of context, citing them as "predictions" (which they explicitly were not), and then claiming that these predictions had
failed. The ruse was quickly exposed, but rebuttals often don't gain nearly as much publicity as accusations, and so today millions of
people mistakenly believe that the book was long ago discredited. In fact, the original Limits to Growth scenarios have held up quite
well*.¶ In principle, the argument for eventual limits to growth is a slam-dunk.
If any quantity grows steadily by a
certain fixed percentage per year, this implies that it will double in size every so-many years;
the higher the percentage growth rate, the quicker the doubling. A rough method of figuring doubling
times is known as the rule of 70: dividing the percentage growth rate into 70 gives the approximate
time required for the initial quantity to double. If a quantity is growing at 1 percent per year, it
will double in 70 years; at 2 percent per year growth, it will double in 35 years; at 5 percent
growth, it will double in only 14 years, and so on. If you want to be more precise, you can use the Y^x button on
your calculator, but the rule of 70 works fine for most purposes.¶ Here's a real-world example: Over the past two centuries,
human population has grown at rates ranging from less than one percent to more than two
percent per year. In 1800, world population stood at about one billion; by 1930 it had doubled to two billion. Only 30
years later (in 1960) it had doubled again to four billion; currently we are on track to achieve a third doubling, to
eight billion humans, around 2025. No one seriously expects human population to continue growing for
centuries into the future. But imagine if it did—at just 1.3 percent per year (its growth rate in the year 2000). By the
year 2780 there would be 148 trillion humans on Earth—one person for each square meter of
land on the planet's surface.
Growth Good
Environmental
General
Growth is key to sustaining the environment
Economides and Philippopoulos, May 29th, 2009 (George Economides—Associate Professor at Athens
University of Economics and Business; Apostolis Philippopoulos—Economics Professor Athens University of Economics and Business ·
Department of Economics; “Growth enhancing policy is the means to sustain the environment”; Science Direct; pg. 207-208;
http://www.theamericanmind.com/2007/04/23/the-environments-best-friend-economic-growth/)
Stokey (1998) has studied whether long-term growth is feasible and, in turn, optimal when pollution occurs as a¶ by-product
of output. Stokey has studied a social planner’s problem (where the planner makes all choices including ¶ pollution), as well as
the possibility of implementation of the first-best allocation resulting from the social planner’s¶ problem. But
what
happens when, for some reason, the first-best allocation is unattainable? In this case, the
government has to design a second-best optimal policy. What is the best policy? Should the government
give priority to¶ environmental policies over growth-enhancing policies? Should a green government choose its
policies so as to put a¶ limit to growth?¶ We study Ramsey second-best optimal policy in a general
equilibrium model of growth augmented with renewable natural resources. The setup, although
stylized, is relatively realistic. Natural resources are depleted by private¶ economic activity, but they
can also be maintained by public policy. The government uses the collected tax revenue¶ to
finance infrastructure services and cleanup policy.1¶ The former (infrastructure services) provides
production externalities to firms and is the engine of long-term growth. The latter (cleanup policy) improves
environmental quality¶ and produces external welfare benefits for households. Policy
instruments (the tax rate on polluting activities and the¶ allocation of tax revenue between
infrastructure and cleanup policy) are chosen optimally. To the extent that there are¶ externalities at market
level and indirect policy control at government level, this is not a social planner’s problem.¶ We work in four steps. We first
solve for a competitive decentralized equilibrium (CDE), which is for any feasible ¶ policy. Second, we endogenize policy by
assuming that the
paths of policy instruments are chosen by a benevolent¶ government that takes
into account the CDE, where the latter includes the optimal behavior of private agents. In other¶
words, we solve for a typical Ramsey second-best allocation (RSBA). Third, to have a benchmark, we also solve for¶ a first-best
allocation (FBA). Fourth, we compare the properties of RSBA and FBA. In all cases, we study nontrivial ¶ economies where
effective cleanup policy is inferior to pollution technology. ¶ Focusing on the long run, our results are as follows. First, the
Ramsey government can lead the economy to sustainable balanced growth (namely, a situation in which the economy is
capable of long-term growth without damaging the¶ environment). Thus, long-term growth is socially optimal. Second, and
more interestingly, the
more the representative¶ citizen cares about the environment, the more
growth-enhancing policies the Ramsey government finds it optimal to¶ choose. Specifically, the
more the citizen cares about the environment, the higher should be the share of tax revenue¶
allocated to infrastructure vis-à-vis cleanup, the lower the income tax rate, and the higher the
sustainable balanced¶ growth rate. Third, contrary to the RSBA, in the FBA, the more the citizen cares about the
environment, the more¶ environmental friendly allocation of resources the social planner finds it optimal to choose. ¶ The
intuition behind these results is as follows. In a second-best situation where private agents ignore externalities ¶ and
policymakers lack lump-sum policy instruments, when
private agents care about the environment, this
requires¶ extra revenue for cleanup policy and this can only be achieved by large tax bases and
high growth . Ramsey-type¶ policymakers realize all this and choose their policy instruments accordingly, in the sense
that they give priority to¶ growth. By contrast, in a first-best situation, the social planner first hits a relatively high growth rate,
and in turn¶ allocates some of the available social resources to the environment, where the degree of allocation increases with
how¶ much we value the environment relative to consumption or other goods. ¶ Therefore,
not only there is no
tradeoff between economic growth and environmental quality in the long run, but¶ also only
growing economies can afford to improve environmental quality . This is consistent with the
general belief¶ that to fund the governments’ policy goals on health, redistribution, the
environment and the rest, we need tax receipts¶ and this can be achieved by growthenhancing policies.220
Warming
Growth solves warming
Baumol, Litan, and Schramm, May 16th, 2007 (William J. Baumol-- Professor of Economics, Leonard N. Stern
School of Business - Department of Economics; Robert E. Litan—Director AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies; Carl J.
Schramm—University Economics Professor, Syracuse University; “Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth
and Prosperity”; Social Science Research Network; Pg. 18-19; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985843)
The same process of technological advance that undermined Malthus’s dire predictions may be able to quiet the concerns of the
modern-day Malthusians who worry about disappearing energy, although more active involvement by governments may be
necessary to address concerns about global warming. As some
sources of energy are depleted—fossil fuels, in
particular—their prices will rise, setting in motion several developments that will keep economies from stagnating. For
one thing, consumers will cut back on their demand for fossil fuels directly (taking fewer trips, car- pooling,
or even moving closer to work) or indirectly by buying things (cars, houses, and appliances) that are more energy-efficient. This
occurred after the first postwar “energy crisis” of 1973. Energy
use as a percent- age of GDP in the United
States has been cut in half largely as a result of higher prices, and it will continue to drop if
fossil fuel prices (adjusted for inflation) rise in the future. Equally important, if prices of fossil fuels increase, the
backers of substitute forms of energy (nuclear power, fusion, geothermal, biomass, solar, and possibly other sources) will have
stronger incentives to perfect their technologies so that they can be readily used instead.4¶ As
for global warming, there is a consensus among scientists that the problem is real and growing.
Indeed, some scientists attribute the intense hurricane activity that devastated the Gulf states and parts of Florida during the 2005
season to warmer waters due to global warming. At the same time, there
is an emerging consensus among
economists and policy makers around the world that the best way to curb the carbon
emissions that are contributing to global warming is to employ a mixture of rules and marketlike incentives, perhaps the most promising being the establishment of ceil- ings on pollution by
allocating suitably restricted limits on unavoidable emissions by producers and allowing these
rights to be traded in markets. Thus pollution can be capped and growth can nevertheless continue. The “cap and trade”
approach, applied globally, was the linchpin of the Kyoto agreement reached in the late 1990s but not yet implemented (due in large
part to opposition by the United States). Although
political and practical problems may inhibit the
adoption of cap and trade on a global scale, it may be feasible on both grounds to implement
the idea on a national basis.5¶ Those who doubt whether economic growth can continue if resources are devoted to
reducing pollution need only look to the U.S. experience— where both the air and water are far cleaner today than thirty years ago,
even with a substantially higher production of goods.6 If
the same political energy that has so far fueled the
“no growth” or “limits to growth” move- ments were channeled instead to persuading
governments around the world to accept less socially damaging approaches, including a
tradable emissions permit system, there is good reason to believe global warming concerns
would be much attenuated.¶ Growth and Globalization¶ A second line of attack on growth, though not
directly labeled as such, stems from the antiglobalization movement. Some of those who object to the
increasing economic integration among nations around the world—and who have mounted protests in various places around the
globe to make their point—have done so out of the belief that even if this process of “globalization” enhances overall growth, it also
contributes to rising economic inequality and even to poverty. Some
critics of globaliza- tion have followed this
reasoning to its logical conclusion, advocating higher barriers to trade, capital flows, and
immigration as a way of revers- ing economic integration and thus ostensibly reducing
inequality and poverty in the process, regardless of what it does to growth.
Economic growth solves warming
Anderson, April 29th, 2004 (Terry Anderson—president of PERC and the John and Jean De Nault
Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; “WHY ECONOMIC GROWTH IS
GOOD FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: Cooling the Global Warming Debate”; PERC; pg.;
http://www.perc.org/articles/article446.php)
Hansen's essay concludes on an optimistic note, saying "the
main elements [new technologies] required to
halt climate change have come into being with remarkable rapidity." This statement would not have
surprised economist Julian Simon. He saw the "ultimate resource" to be the human mind and believed it
to be best motivated by market forces. Because of a combination of market forces and technological innovations, we
are not running out of natural resources. As a resource becomes more scarce, prices increase, thus
encouraging development of cheaper alternatives and technological innovations. Just as fossil fuel
replaced scarce whale oil, its use will be reduced by new technology and alternative fuel sources. Market forces also cause
economic growth, which in turn leads to environmental improvements. Put simply, poor
people are willing to sacrifice clean water and air, healthy forests, and wildlife habitat for
economic growth. But as their incomes rise above subsistence, "economic growth helps to undo the damage done in earlier
years," says economist Bruce Yandle. "If economic growth is good for the environment, policies that
stimulate growth ought to be good for the environment." The link between greenhouse gas emissions and
economic prosperity is no different. Using data from the United States, Professor Robert McCormick finds that "higher GDP reduces
total net [greenhouse gas] emissions." He
goes a step further by performing the complex task of
estimating net U.S. carbon emissions. This requires subtracting carbon sequestration (long-term storage of carbon in
soil and water) from carbon emissions. Think of it this way: When you build a house, the wood in it stores carbon. In a poor country
that wood would have been burned to cook supper or to provide heat, thus releasing carbon into the atmosphere. McCormick
shows that economic growth in the United States has increased carbon sequestration in many ways, including improved methods of
storing waste, increased forest coverage, and greater agricultural productivity that reduces the acreage of cultivated land. Because
rich economies sequester more carbon than poor ones, stored carbon must be subtracted
from emissions to determine an economy's net addition to greenhouse gas emissions.
McCormick's data show that "rich countries take more carbon out of the air than poorer ones" and
that "the growth rate of net carbon emission per person will soon be negative in the United
States." Put differently—richer may well be cooler. Global-warming policy analysts agree that greenhouse gas regulations such as
those proposed at Kyoto would have negative impacts on the economy. Therefore, as McCormick warns, we should take great care
that regulations in the name of global warming "not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs."
War
Resource Wars
Interdependence solves wars
Tan Yan Yee, July 18th, 2005 (Tan Yan Yee—Royal Military College in Duntroon, Australia from
1987-1988. He graduated from the London School of Economics and Political Science with a B.Sc.
(Econs) degree in 1992; “Democratisation, Interdependence, and the Prospects for Future War:
THE THEORY OF INTERDEPENDENCE, The Liberal vs The Realist View”; Journal of Singapore
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/7.htm)
Four other subsidiary propositions supporting the liberal view are worth mentioning here.17 Firstly, the increased
economic
activity that accompanies higher trade levels tends to promote domestic prosperity, and in
doing so lessens the internal problems that push leaders to war. Secondly, trade may alter the domestic
structure of a particular state, giving more influence to groups with a vested interest in the continuation of peaceful trade. Thirdly, a
higher level of interdependence inevitably leads to increased interaction between
governments and peoples. This enhances understanding and an appreciation of each other's views and perspectives,
reducing the misunderstandings and miscalculations that sometimes lead to war. The final argument asserts that trade
has the spillover effect of enhancing political ties between trading partners, thus improving
the prospects for long-term co-operation.¶ Going by the liberal arguments, there is cause for optimism as long as a
high level of interdependence can be maintained among all states. Rosecrance sums up the view rather neatly
that high interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading.18�
Some liberals explain the continuing occurrence of war as a result of the misconception of political leaders caught up in the
outmoded belief that war still pays.19 Yet
others saw it as the misguided attempts by political leaders to
gamble for an outright victory in war, in which case the benefits would be even greater. The
contention is that inspite of the pacifist tendencies that interdependence brings about, it may sometimes not be enough to prevent
war from happening.�¶
Peace
Economic interdependence promotes peace
Krustev, April 27th, 2006 (Valentin Krustev—Department of political science, Rice University; “Interdependence
and Duration of Militarized Conflict”; Sage; pg. 244-245; http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/43/3/243.full.pdf+html)
Multiple causal mechanisms explaining how economic interdependence inhibits inter- national conflict have been put forward in the
literature. Examples include the argu- ments that trade and military conquest are alternate means of acquiring scarce resources,
more efficient trade thus making conflict less attractive, and that economic cooperation
between private actors eventually spills over into the political domain (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001).2 A
frequently recurring claim has been that commerce enriches domestic and foreign private agents, whose welfare¶ constrains
government action, as conflict might disrupt trade (Polachek, 1980; Mans- field & Pollins, 2001).3¶ According to Polachek, Robst &
Chang (1999: 405), the simple logic behind the pacifying effect of trade is that if
conflict disturbs trade, ‘then
countries with the greatest gains from trade face the highest costs of potentially lost trade
and hence engage in the least conflict and most cooper- ation’. However, while the cited argument
exemplifies the ‘opportunity cost’ hypothesis for the link between trade and conflict (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001; Gartzke, 2003b),
there are also signaling arguments that view trade as an informational medium allowing states to signal their resolve (e.g. Gartzke, Li
& Boehmer, 2001; Gartzke, 2003a,b).¶ Both
opportunity-cost and signaling arguments lead to the
expectation that trade and conflict would be inversely related, and, indeed, the empirical
literature has been quite supportive of that claim (Polachek, 1980; Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982; Oneal et al.,
1996; Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999; Russett & Oneal, 2001). A number of scholars have also provided qualified
support for the statistical relationship between trade and conflict. For instance, Gasiorowski
(1986) has argued that trade interdepen- dence has both conflict-promoting and cooperationpromoting aspects. Mansfield & Pevehouse (2000), in turn, report that the pacifying effect of interdependence is contingent upon states’ membership in the same preferential trading agreement, while Hegre (2000) argues that the effect of
interdepen- dence is interactive with the level of economic development. Finally, Crescenzi (2003) shows that trade decreases highlevel but increases low-level conflict.4¶ These
positive empirical findings have been challenged on several
fronts. First, Barbieri (1996, 2002) has questioned their validity by showing that interdependence increases the likelihood of a MID
onset in a given dyadic year. Oneal & Russett (1997), nevertheless, have raised as an objection the fact that Barbieri’s studies include
all possible dyads, an arrangement which might produce a spurious correlation between trade and conflict, as contiguous states
both trade more and fight more often. In addition, Gartzke & Li (2003) have shown that Barbieri’s
measure of trade
share is negatively correlated with trade openness, which captures the import- ance of
international trade to a state’s economy. Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998), in turn, have argued that Oneal & Russett’s
(1997) strong results in support of the com- mercial peace arise only because of their failure to
control for temporal dependence. Still, Oneal & Russett (1999) change their model specification in accordance with
Beck, Katz & Tucker’s (1998) recommendations and again find statistical evidence for the pacifying effects of trade.
More evidence
Blomberg and Hess, February 1st, 2002 (Brock Blomberg— Economics PhD Department of Economics
Wellesley College; Gregory D. Hess—Economics PhD Department of Economics Oberlin College; “The Temporal Links between
Conflict and Economic Activity”; Sage; pg. 76-77; http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/46/1/74.full.pdf+html)
To begin this temporal “causal” investigation, we first need to develop a statistical framework to estimate the joint, dynamic
determination of the occurrence of internal conflict, external conflict, and growth. Because conflict is
measured as a
discrete vari- able, researchers typically estimate the occurrence as a probability, or if we
consider both internal and external conflict, we can always estimate the joint probability
distri- bution. But are there similar interpretations of economic activity as a discrete state? Indeed, a broad literature considers
the evolution of states in the economy as the natu- ral progression of phases. In fact, one of the key historical studies of U.S. and
interna- tional business cycles, undertaken by Burns and Mitchell (1944), treated the
state of the economy as either
an expansion or contraction, on which the National Bureau of Economic Research’s dating
procedure for recessions was founded.4 The relevance for our study is that breakpoints in the state of the
economy, either expansion or recession, are analogous to break points in peace—internal or
external conflicts.5 Using an unbal- anced panel of data covering 152 countries from 1950 to 1992, we therefore
consider the joint determination of internal conflict, external conflict, and the state of the
econ- omy as measured by the aforementioned discrete variables. We find that the relation- ship between
the variables is not a simple one. Conflict does appear to be highly related to the economy for the entire
sample. However, it seems to be most highly related when considering certain nation-groups.
For nondemocracies or in regions highly populated by nondemocracies, there seems to be an intimate link
between a poor economy and the decision to go to war—both internally and externally. These
results confirm much of the original hypotheses put forth in Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2001)—namely, that there is compelling
evidence of a conditional poverty-conflict trap.
Terrorism
Economic growth solves terrorism
Gries, Krieger, and Meierrieks, February 2009 (Thomas Gries—Corresponding Author, University of
Paderborn, Department of Economics; Tim Krieger—University of Paderborn, Department of Economics; “Causal Linkages Between
Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth: Possible Effects of Economic Performance on Terrorism”; Center for International
Economies, Business Administration & Economics, University of Paderborn; Pg. 4-5; http://groups.unipaderborn.de/fiwi/RePEc/pdf/wpaper/WP20.pdf )
Economic theory argues that terrorists
are rational individuals which choose¶ their levels of violent
activity according to the costs and benefits arising from¶ their actions (cf., e.g., Sandler and Enders,
2004). Because of terrorists’ presumed rationality, the opportunity costs of terror also matter.
Intuitively, low¶ opportunity costs of violence – that is, few prospects of economic activity –lead¶
to elevated terrorist activity, whereas high opportunity costs result in the opposite (cf., e.g.,
Freytag et al., 2008). Times of economic success mean, inter¶ alia, more individual economic opportunities and economic
participation. Higher¶
levels of overall growth should coincide with higher opportunity costs of
terror¶ and thus less violence. Conversely, in periods of economic downturn should be¶
accompanied by fewer economic opportunities and participation and thus by¶ more economic dissatisfaction. In
times of economic crisis, dissidents are more¶ likely to resort to violence as the opportunity costs of terror are low, while the¶
potential long-run payoffs from violence ñ a redistribution of scarce economic¶ resources
which is to be enforced by means of terrorism are comparatively¶ high (cf. Blomberg, Hess and
Weerapana, 2004).¶ To some extent, empirical evidence suggests that economic performance and¶ 428282828282828terrorism are
linked along the lines discussed before. The findings of Collier and¶ Hoe- er (1998) indicate that higher
levels of economic
development coincide with¶ lower likelihoods of civil war, providing initial evidence that
economic success¶ and conflicts are diametrically opposed. Considering economic
development and¶ terrorism, several studies find that higher levels of development are
obstacles to¶ the production of transnational terrorism (cf., e.g., Santos Bravo and Mendes¶ Dias, 2006; Lai,
2007; Freytag et al., 2008). Blomberg and Hess (2008) also find¶ that higher incomes are a strong deterrence to
the genesis of domestic terrorism.¶ Furthermore, there is evidence connecting solid short-run economic conditions¶
with less political violence (cf. Muller and Weede, 1990; Freytag et al., 2008).6¶ In¶ general, the evidence indicates that
terrorism and economic conditions are linked.¶ Here, economic success seems to impede the
genesis of terrorism, presumably¶ due to higher opportunity costs of conflict. In other words, in times
of stronger¶ economic performance individuals simply have more to lose.
Growth Bad
Environmental
General
Growth results in an unsustainable environment and resource wars
Trainer, July 2002 (Ted Trainer—Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales; “If you
want affluence, prepare for war”; pg.; ssis.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/D62IfYouWantAffluence.html)
As is the case with the other major problems confronting the planet, such as environmental destruction, it is
essential to understand the problem of global peace and conflict from the "limits to growth" perspective. This analysis focuses on
the fact that the
present living standards of the rich countries involve levels of production and
consumption that are grossly unsustainable . Just to note two of the lines of argument documented in the large
literature from the limits perspective, if all 9 billion people likely to live on earth by 2070 were to have the present rich world
lifestyle and "footprint" we would need about 12 times the area of productive land that exists on the entire planet. Secondly if
we
were to cut greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to prevent the carbon content of the
atmosphere from increasing any more world per capita energy consumption would have to be
cut to about one-eighteenth of its present amount If all 9 billion people likely by 2070 were to have the present rich
world per capita resource consumption, resource production would have to be about 8 times the present
rate.¶ These multiples underline the magnitude of the overshoot. Sustainability will require
enormous reductions in the volume of rich world production and consumption. Yet its supreme goal
is economic growth, i.e., to increase the levels of production and consumption and GDP, constantly, rapidly and without any limit.
That the absurdity of this is never recognised in conventional economic and political circles defies understanding. If we in rich
countries average 3% economic growth to 2070 and by then all the world’s people had risen to the "living standards’ we would have
by then, the total world economic output would be 60 times as great as the present grossly unsustainable level.¶ If this limits
to
growth analysis is at all valid the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and
security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our
level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent
living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we the rich are determined to get richer without any limit,
then nothing
is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and
violence.¶ To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed.¶ Increased conflict in at
least the following categories can be expected. Firstly the present conflict over resources between the rich
elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example as "development"
under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Secondly there are
conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the
war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by
much high-sounding rhetoric, (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel's invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of
East Timor.) As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world's leading exporter of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful
whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing the US is at war in Central Asia over
"terrorism". Few would doubt that a "collateral" outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the
oil wealth of Central Asia.¶
Following are some references to the connection many have recognised
between rich world affluence and conflict.¶ General M.D. Taylor, U.S. Army retired argued "...U.S. military priorities
just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World." Taylor referred to "...fierce competition
among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States"
and "... growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent
counterparts."62¶ "Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world
product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets".63¶ "That more than half of the
people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically
unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict."64¶
The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in
order to secure supplies. "President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf
would lead to war." It would "…be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States."65¶ "The US is ready to take
military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr. Brown, said
yesterday."66¶ Klare's recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a
source of international conflict. "Global
demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable
rate." "…the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow." "The wars of the future
will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods." "…resource
wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security
environment."67¶ Much of the rich world's participation in the conflicts taking place through out the world is driven by the
determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, "The rich prize that is
Shaba", Breeze begins, "Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies
behind the joint Franco-Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire." "These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain
the West’s extended diplomatic courtship,..."68¶ Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones
most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. "The
resource and energy intensive modes of
production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and
competition to secure raw materials."69¶ "Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor
nations over their share of he world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets…"70¶
Growth, competition, expansion…and war.¶ Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in
the literature on the causes of war. "...warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world
economy." "...world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion."71 "War is an inevitable result of the struggle
between economies for expansion."72¶ Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong
determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73.¶ World Wars I and II can be
seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. But
Britain already held much of the world within its empire…which it had previously fought 72 wars to take!¶ "Finite resources in a
world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence."74¶ Ashley
focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. "War
is mainly explicable in terms of differential
growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources…" "…expansion is a prime
source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term
processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war."75¶ Security¶ The point being made can be put in terms of security.
One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations
this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However
there is a much better strategy; i.e., to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do
not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut this is not possible unless there is global economic justice.
If a few insist on
levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to
achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global
resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to
use their arms to defend their unjust privileges.¶ In other words if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If
we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get
access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes,
without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not
possible unless rich countries move to "The Simpler Way."
Economic growth causes environmental problems
Klare, October 17th, 2008 (Michael T. Klare—Author and Professor of Peace and WorldSecurity Studies at Hampshire College;“The Economic Crisis and the Environment: The
Downside”; Huff Post; pg.; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-t-klare/the-economiccrisis-and-t_b_135631.html)
But there is a downside to all this as well. Most serious is the risk that venture capitalists will refrain from pouring big bucks into
innovative energy projects. At an energy forum organized by professional services firm Ernst & Young on October 9, experts warned
of a sharp drop-off in alternative energy funding. "The concept
of alternative energy has a lot of momentum,"
says Dan Pickering, head of research for Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co. Securities in Houston. "But lower oil prices make it
harder to justify investment. At $50 a barrel, a lot of that investment will die."¶ Governments could also have
a hard time coming up with the funds to finance alternative energy projects. Moderators at the
presidential debates repeatedly asked both John McCain and Barack Obama what programs they would cut in order to finance the
massive financial-rescue packages the Bush administration has engineered in order to avert further economic distress. Both insisted
that their respective energy initiatives would be spared any such belt-tightening. It is
highly likely, however, that
costly endeavors of this sort will be scaled back or postponed once the magnitude of the
financial rescue effort becomes apparent. The same is true for Europe and Japan, who have also pledged to
undertake ambitious energy initiatives in their drive to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.¶ Indeed, leaders of some
European Union countries are calling for a slowdown in efforts to curb emissions of
greenhouse gases due to the burgeoning economic crisis. Under a plan adopted by the EU in 2007, member
countries pledged to reduce such emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, which is far more ambitious than the Kyoto Protocol.
European leaders are scheduled to implement a detailed plan to achieve this goal by December of this year. But at a rancorous
summit meeting of the EU heads of state in mid-October, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy and the leaders of some Eastern
European countries indicated that due to the current crisis, they were no longer able to finance the high costs of attaining the 2020
goal and so weren’t prepared to adopt a detailed plan. "We don't think this is the moment to push forward on our own like Don
Quixote," Berlusconi declared at the summit. "We have time."¶ At some point, the price of gasoline will fall so low that many drivers
will once again engage in the wasteful driving habits they may have given up when the price of gas soared over $3 per gallon. This
may not occur right away. But with crude oil at $70 per barrel, half of what it was in August, a corresponding drop in the price of
refined products will eventually follow. And
that could lead people to see cheap gasoline as the one
bright spot on an otherwise dismal horizon.¶ It’s unclear at this point whether the crisis will do more good or more
harm for the environment. In the short term, it will certainly slow the increase in carbon dioxide emissions. It will also cause a delay
in developing environmentally hazardous projects like Canadian tar sands. But
if the crisis also sets back the
development of energy alternatives for any significant length of time, it will cancel out any of
these positive developments. Many people are waiting and watching what happens in the global financial markets.
Likewise, the verdict is still out on the ultimate impact of the crisis on the environment.
Warming
Continuing consumption and growth kills the warming
Djordjevic, March 1998 (Johnny Djordjevic—BA Global Economics, Paper in Global
Sustainability at UC, Irvine; “Sustainability”; pg.;
www.dbc.uci.edu/sustain/global/sensem/djordj98.html)
People's way of life seems to be a glaring example of values leading to high rates of personal
consumption of resources and the waste of these same materials. In addition to overconsumption, the
services used to supply our society with goods, (examples of these goods would be food,
water, energy, and sewage services.) tends to be wasteful and expensive. Production is organized in such a way,
(usually highly centralized) that travel becomes an enormous burden. Another consideration is that our population is
expected to increase to rise to eleven billion within the next half century. Considering the mineral and
energy resources needed in the future, these estimates must also include the consumption of a population almost doubled from its
current status and these same figures must include an expected increase in the affluence of developed countries. "If we
are
willing to endorse an already affluent society in which there is continued growth on this
scale,(american resource use increasing 2% each year), then we are assuming that after 2050 something like
40 times as many resources can be provided each year as were provided in the 1970's, and
that it is in order for people in a few rich countries to live in this superaffluent way while the
other 9.5 billion in the world do not"(Trainer, 1985).¶ The environment is in danger from our pursuit
of affluence. Serious worries come from predictions about the atmosphere. The burning of fossil fuels will raise temperatures
and result in climatic effects. Rising temperatures could have horrific effects. First of all, food
production could seriously be imperiled even by increases of only one degree celcius. If the
temperature should increase by five degrees scientists predict the coastal island nations would be submerged and possibly trigger
the next ice age. Another environmental concern deals with the soil. Our agricultural practices disregard the value of recycling food
waste. Also, the use of pesticides and chemicals in agriculture lead to the poisoning of the soil and topsoil loss through erosion.
Yields per acre for grain are falling and "we do not produce food in ways that can be
continued for centuries"(Trainer, 1985). Even more disturbing is the deforestation of
rainforests. This results in the extinction of many species, concentration of carbon dioxide, the
loss of many potential medical breakthroughs, and possibly the disruption of rainfall. Opponents
of the deforestation fail to realize that our expensive way of life and greedy economic system are the driving forces. "Nothing can be
achieved by fighting to save this forest or that species if in the long term we do not change the economic system which demands
ever-increasing production and consumption of non-necessities"(Trainer, 1985).
Bio D
Continuing growth destroys biodiversity—causes irreparable damage
Sarkar, 6/17/11 (Christian Sarkar—Co-Founder at The $300 House Project CEO at Ecosystem Intelligence CEO and Founder
¶
¶
at Double Loop Marketing LLC; “Global Warning: Ecosystem Changes Worsen, Putting Development Goals At Risk”; Harvest
H2o.com; pg.; http://www.harvesth2o.com/ecowarning.shtml)
“Any progress
achieved in addressing the goals of poverty and hunger eradication, improved
health, and environmental protection is unlikely to be sustained if most of the ecosystem
services on which humanity relies continue to be degraded,” said the study, Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (MA) Synthesis Report, conducted by 1,300 experts from 95 countries. It specifically states that the
ongoing degradation of ecosystem services is a road block to the Millennium Development Goals agreed to
by the world leaders at the United Nations in 2000.¶ Although evidence remains incomplete, there is enough for the experts to warn
that the ongoing
degradation of 15 of the 24 ecosystem services examined is increasing the
likelihood of potentially abrupt changes that will seriously affect human well-being.¶ This
includes the emergence of new diseases, sudden changes in water quality, creation of “dead
zones” along the coasts, the collapse of fisheries, and shifts in regional climate.¶ The MA Synthesis
Report highlights four main findings:¶ Humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively
in the last 50 years than in any other period. This was done largely to meet rapidly growing
demands for food, fresh water, timber, fiber and fuel. More land was converted to agriculture since 1945 than in the 18th and
19th centuries combined. More than half of all the synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, first made in 1913, ever used on the planet has
been used since 1985. Experts say that this resulted
in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in diversity
of life on Earth, with some 10 to 30 percent of the mammal, bird and amphibian species currently threatened with extinction.¶
Ecosystem changes that have contributed substantial net gains in human well-being and
economic development have been achieved at growing costs in the form of degradation of other services.
Only four ecosystem services have been enhanced in the last 50 years: increases in crop, livestock and aquaculture
production, and increased carbon sequestration for global climate regulation. Two services – capture
fisheries and fresh water – are now well beyond levels that can sustain current, much less future, demands. Experts say that these
problems will substantially diminish the benefits for future generations. ¶ The
could grow significantly worse
degradation of ecosystem services
during the first half of this century and is a barrier to achieving the UN Millennium
Development Goals. In all the four plausible futures explored by the scientists, they project progress in eliminating hunger, but at far
slower rates than needed to halve number of people suffering from hunger by 2015. Experts warn that changes
in
ecosystems such as deforestation influence the abundance of human pathogens such as
malaria and cholera, as well as the risk of emergence of new diseases. Malaria, for example, accounts for 11 percent of the
disease burden in Africa and had it been eliminated 35 years ago, the continent’s gross domestic product would have increased by
$100 billion. ¶ The challenge
of reversing the degradation of ecosystems while meeting increasing
demands can be met under some scenarios involving significant policy and institutional
changes. However, these changes will be large and are not currently under way. The report mentions
options that exist to conserve or enhance ecosystem services that reduce negative trade-offs or that will positively impact other
services. Protection
of natural forests, for example, not only conserves wildlife but also supplies
fresh water and reduces carbon emissions.¶ “The over-riding conclusion of this assessment is that it lies within the
power of human societies to ease the strains we are putting on the nature services of the planet, while continuing to use them to
bring better living standards to all,” said the MA board of directors in a statement, “Living beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and
Human Well-being.” “Achieving
this, however, will require radical changes in the way nature is
treated at every level of decision-making and new ways of cooperation between government,
business and civil society. The warning signs are there for all of us to see. The future now lies in our
hands.”¶ The MA Synthesis Report also reveals that it is the world’s poorest people who suffer most from ecosystem changes. The
regions facing significant problems of ecosystem degradation – sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, some regions in Latin America, and
parts of South and Southeast Asia – are also facing
the greatest challenges in achieving the United Nations’
Millennium Development Goals. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the number of poor people is forecast to rise from
315 million in 1999 to 404 million by 2015.
War
Resource Wars
Interdependence creates momentum resulting in wars
Tan Yan Yee, July 18th, 2005 (Tan Yan Yee—Royal Military College in Duntroon, Australia from
1987-1988. He graduated from the London School of Economics and Political Science with a B.Sc.
(Econs) degree in 1992; “Democratisation, Interdependence, and the Prospects for Future War:
THE THEORY OF INTERDEPENDENCE, The Liberal vs The Realist View”; Journal of Singapore
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/7.htm)
Conversely, the realist view is that ceteris paribus, highly interdependent states are more likely to go to war
with each other. Ironically, like liberals, realists also accept that economic interdependence is
generally mutually beneficial to both parties. However, they argue that the security perspective
of a state is rarely if ever defined solely in economic terms. In fact, states concerned with their security will
want to avoid becoming too dependent in the first place, as it could mean imported goods being cut off in a crisis.20�This is
particularly so for crucial imports like oil or raw materials, without which most modern
economies would collapse. Consequently, it is argued that the more militarily powerful states have an increased incentive
to go to war in order to assure themselves of continued access to vital goods. Such a course of action pre-supposes
that there are no alternative supplies of the particular good from other sources or that the
adjustment costs of doing so will be too high; otherwise, war may not be the most viable option.¶ Kenneth Waltz
puts across the point succinctly: whilst in theory states have little reason to fear the dependence that goes
with specialisation and international trade, the anarchic structure of international politics
engenders in states a heightened sense of vulnerability. This fosters the desire in states to constantly seek to
increase the span of control and lessen the extent of their dependency.21 In fact, one can trace the roots of the modern realist's
understanding of economic interdependence and war to the advent of imperialism in the 18th century. Imperialistic
expansion and the acquisition of colonies by major colonial powers can be traced to the
states' desire to secure ever-greater control over sources of supply and markets for its goods.
In other words, the colonial empires were striving to reduce their fears and dependence on external specialization by increasing
internal specialization within a now larger political realm.22�
Economic interdependence leads to more conflict
Krustev, April 27th, 2006 (Valentin Krustev—Department of political science, Rice University; “Interdependence
and Duration of Militarized Conflict”; Sage; pg. 244-245; http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/43/3/243.full.pdf+html)
Multiple causal mechanisms explaining how economic interdependence inhibits inter- national conflict have been put forward in the
literature. Examples include the argu- ments that trade and military conquest are alternate means of acquiring scarce resources,
more efficient trade thus making conflict less attractive, and that economic cooperation
between private actors eventually spills over into the political domain (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001).2 A
frequently recurring claim has been that commerce enriches domestic and foreign private agents, whose welfare¶ constrains
government action, as conflict might disrupt trade (Polachek, 1980; Mans- field & Pollins, 2001).3¶ According to Polachek, Robst &
Chang (1999: 405), the simple logic behind the pacifying effect of trade is that if
conflict disturbs trade, ‘then
countries with the greatest gains from trade face the highest costs of potentially lost trade
and hence engage in the least conflict and most cooper- ation’. However, while the cited argument
exemplifies the ‘opportunity cost’ hypothesis for the link between trade and conflict (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001; Gartzke, 2003b),
there are also signaling arguments that view trade as an informational medium allowing states to signal their resolve (e.g. Gartzke, Li
& Boehmer, 2001; Gartzke, 2003a,b).¶ Both
opportunity-cost and signaling arguments lead to the
expectation that trade and conflict would be inversely related, and, indeed, the empirical
literature has been quite supportive of that claim (Polachek, 1980; Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982; Oneal et al.,
1996; Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999; Russett & Oneal, 2001). A number of scholars have also provided qualified
support for the statistical relationship between trade and conflict. For instance, Gasiorowski
(1986) has argued that trade interdepen- dence has both conflict-promoting and cooperationpromoting aspects. Mansfield & Pevehouse (2000), in turn, report that the pacifying effect of interdependence is contingent upon states’ membership in the same preferential trading agreement, while Hegre (2000) argues that the effect of
interdepen- dence is interactive with the level of economic development. Finally, Crescenzi (2003) shows that trade decreases highlevel but increases low-level conflict.4¶ These
positive empirical findings have been challenged on several
fronts. First, Barbieri (1996, 2002) has questioned their validity by showing that interdependence increases the likelihood of a MID
onset in a given dyadic year. Oneal & Russett (1997), nevertheless, have raised as an objection the fact that Barbieri’s studies include
all possible dyads, an arrangement which might produce a spurious correlation between trade and conflict, as contiguous states
both trade more and fight more often. In addition, Gartzke & Li (2003) have shown that Barbieri’s
measure of trade
share is negatively correlated with trade openness, which captures the import- ance of
international trade to a state’s economy. Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998), in turn, have argued that Oneal & Russett’s
(1997) strong results in support of the com- mercial peace arise only because of their failure to
control for temporal dependence. Still, Oneal & Russett (1999) change their model specification in accordance with
Beck, Katz & Tucker’s (1998) recommendations and again find statistical evidence for the pacifying effects of trade.
AT Innovation Solves
Tech doesn’t solve
Westley et. al. October 6th, 2011 (Frances Westley-- Frances Westley joined the University of Waterloo as the
JW McConnell Chair in Social Innovation in July 2007; Per Olsson-- holds a Ph.D. in natural resource management
from Stockholm University and is a researcher and theme leader for Adaptive Governance at the
Stockholm Resilience Centre; Carl Folke—Professor Carl Folke is Science Director of the Stockholm
Resilience Centre and the Director of the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics of the Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences, one of the collaborating partners of the Stockholm Resilience Centre; Thomas
Homer-Dixon-- the Centre for International Governance Innovation Chair of Global Systems at the Balsillie School of
International Affairs in Waterloo, Ontario; Harrie Vredenburg—Professor of Strategy at the University of Calgary’s
Haskayne School of Business and is the Suncor Energy Chair in Competitive Strategy and Sustainable Development;
Derk Loorbach-- director of the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT) and associate professor at the Faculty of Social
Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam; “Tipping Toward Sustainability: Emerging Pathways of Transformation”; US National
Library of Medicine: National Institutes of Health; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3357751/)
First, the problems we are facing are so complex
that it is hard for us to grasp their dimensions—there is an “ingenuity gap” between the
demand for appropriate solutions and its supply. Second, the nature of technological innovation processes is in
This may prove difficult in practice, for a variety of reasons.
some ways inimical to the nature of a healthy environment; and further, the path dependent (vs. path breaking) character of
technological innovation means there may be a lag between what we see as an emerging crisis and the available technological
the sector most likely to produce innovative technical responses to
environmental threats, the private sector, is constituted as the engine of economic growth
and is unlikely to place that innovative capacity at the service of greater sustainability unless
broad institutional shifts occur to encourage such reorientation.
response. Finally,
Transition (Dedevelopment)
Decline  Good
De-developing to a system without growth can be achieved—only in purposely
collapsing growth can we achieve harmony—impact is global destruction
Heinberg, March 4th, 2010 (Richard Heinberg- American journalist and educator who has written extensively on energy,
economic, and ecological issues, including oil depletion; Life after growth: life in a non-growing economy can be fulfilling,
interesting, and secure; Countercurrents.org; pg.; http://www.countercurrents.org/heinberg040310.htm)
The absence
of growth does not imply a lack of change or improvement. Within a non-growing or
equilibrium economy there can still be a continuous development of practical skills, artistic
expression, and technology. In fact, some historians and social scientists argue that life in an equilibrium economy can be
superior to life in a fast-growing economy: while growth creates opportunities for some, it also typically
intensifies competition—there are big winners and big losers, and (as in most boom towns) the quality
of relations within the community can suffer as a result. Within a non-growing economy it is
possible to maximize benefits and reduce factors leading to decay, but doing so will require pursuing
appropriate goals: instead of more, we must strive for better; rather than promoting increased economic
activity for its own sake, we must emphasize whatever increases quality of life without
stoking consumption. One way to do this is to reinvent and redefine growth itself.¶ The transition to a nogrowth economy (or one in which growth is defined in a fundamentally different way) is
inevitable, but it will go much better if we plan for it rather than simply watching in dismay as
institutions we have come to rely upon fail, and then try to improvise a survival strategy in their absence.¶ In
effect, we have to create a desirable "new normal" that fits the constraints imposed by
depleting natural resources. Maintaining the "old normal" is not an option ; if we do not find
new goals for ourselves and plan our transition from a growth-based economy to a healthy equilibrium economy, we
will by default create a much less desirable "new normal" whose emergence we are already
beginning to see in the forms of persistent high unemployment, a widening gap between rich and
poor, and ever more frequent and worsening financial and environmental crises—all of which
translate to profound distress for individuals, families, and communities.
The transition is the only way to achieve peace
Trainer, July 2002 (Ted Trainer—Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales; “If you
want affluence, prepare for war”; pg.; ssis.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/D62IfYouWantAffluence.html)
The logically inescapable implications from the foregoing discussion is that global peace cannot be achieved before there has been a
vast and historically unprecedented transition to "The Simpler Way'. The accelerating
global predicament cannot be
remedied until social, economic, political and cultural systems based on competitive individualism,
acquisitiveness, affluence and growth are abandoned and replaced by ways of life based on production
to meet needs rather than profits, high levels of individual and local self-sufficiency,
cooperation, participation, mutual assistance and sharing, and above all on willing acceptance
of materially simple lifestyles within zero-growth national economies.76¶ This does not mean hardship
and deprivation; indeed it can be argued that high levels of simplicity, self sufficiency and
cooperation are the necessary conditions for a high quality of life, as well as for global justice
and ecological sustainability. Nor does it mean absence of sophisticated technology and research. It does mean a
landscape made up mostly of small towns and villages within comfortable distance of small cities by public transport, with relatively
little heavy industry, travel and transport, international trade or big firms. Most
"government" would have to be
carried out through small local participatory assemblies. Because large sectors of the present
economy would no longer be necessary, the overall amount of work for monetary income
would probably be reduced by two-thirds, enabling a much more relaxed pace of life. There would
be no need to reduce the sophistication and quality of research and technology within socially desirable fields.¶ Needless to say the
simpler Way would require the abandonment of an economy in which profit and the market are the major determinants of
production, consumption or development, and it would require a steady state or zero growth overall economy. Most difficult would
be the radical changes in values.¶ That
the prospects for such a transition are poor in the extreme is not
central to the present discussion. Any rational observer of the global situation must give little
chance of the present accelerating race to catastrophic breakdown being halted, given that
the fundamental cultural and systemic causes of the predicament are in general not even
recognised by publics or governments. However the source of what hope there is lies in the recent emergence of the
Global Alternative Society Movement. In the last two decades many small communities and regions have begun to establish
settlements and economies more or less based on the principles of The Simpler Way The argument in my What Should We Do? Is
that the
prospects for transition depend primarily on whether or not this minority can develop
rapidly in the next few decades, and that by far the most valuable global contribution one can
make is to work within this movement.
Decline  Bad
Dedevelopment theory is wrong and ignores that growth hasn’t reached limit
Ben-Ami, May 4th, 2006 (Daniel Ben-Ami, a London-based journalist and author specializing in economics and finance;
“Who's afraid of economic growth?: Growth hasn't gone nearly far enough”; Spiked-Online; pg.;
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/financial-crisis-and-war-by-harold-james)
Admittedly, the
more sophisticated growth sceptics will grudgingly concede that economic
growth is positive up to a certain point. However, they go on to argue that as economies become
more developed there are diminishing returns in relation to growth. In their view, once basic human
needs are met it becomes less important, or even counterproductive, to strive for material development.¶ Such an outlook
ignores how much there is still to be done to improve human living standards even in the
developed world. For example, there is a common refrain that the developed world is suffering
form a 'demographic time bomb' as a result of an ageing population. The advocates of such an approach
often argue it is necessary to curb consumption in the present to help provide a minimal standard of living for the elderly. But with
economic growth there should be no problem in providing a comfortable living for those who have retired (25).¶ There
is also a
considerable amount of unemployment, both overt and hidden, in the developed world. Even in
countries such as Britain, where the official unemployment rate is low compared with many other nations, there is a huge amount of
covert unemployment. As Phil Mullan has pointed out on spiked there are about nine million people between 16 and 65 who do not
work (26). No
doubt a large proportion of these people are willing and able to work. A stronger
more productive economy could in principle give them the ability to do so.¶ Although the growth
sceptics seem to have a point in relation to happiness it is weaker than first appears. It is probably true that as the
developed world has become substantially more affluent over the past 50 years, the
subjective feeling of wellbeing has not improved (27). But it is a huge logical leap to conclude from this that
economic growth is not worthwhile. Even leaving aside the objective benefits of growth, there are other
ways to explain the pervasive sense of foreboding about the future. As has been argued elsewhere on
spiked, this sense of pessimism has other roots, including the atomisation of contemporary society (28).¶ In any case it is
questionable that happiness should be an overriding social objective. On the contrary, the
most important social
changes have generally come about when people are discontent with their lot. The obsession with
happiness virtually lowers humans to the level of mere animals. From the perspective of happiness alone a cow munching grass in a
field can be better than a human being trying to grapple with his problems. To change the animal metaphor, John Stuart Mill, a
nineteenth-century British philosopher, was right when he argued: 'It
is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied.' (29)¶ The conclusions to be drawn from social inequality are also not what
they might first appear. A positive approach to inequality would be to argue that the mass of
society should have the benefits that are currently confined to the elite. A precondition for
such an approach is to have an even more developed and economically advanced society . But
of the growth sceptics, and sometimes the explicit argument, is that society
should consume less. For them, criticisms of inequality imply that there should be a levelling
down of living standards to more basic levels rather than (30). a rising up of affluence
the implication