Distributive Justice: seminar discussion
As this is meant as material for discussion I will give a shortened and unsatisfactory answer to the questions.
However, some elements of elaboration will be shown. There will be more explanation and definition, rather than
elaborate discussion.
1. In egalitarian theories, various concepts of what would be equal are put forward: welfare, social
primary goods, resources, capabilities. Please explain these concepts, and give a critical
discussion of them.
There are several egalitarian theories, each with their own interpretation of what the term ‘equality’ should denote. We can for
example think of equality of happiness (even in two different senses), equality of the abilities to achieve happiness etc.
Welfare:
As I interpret the question, ‘welfare’ here should be understood as ‘welfare’ in Welfarism. Within Welfarism, there are two main
directions called ‘utilitarianism’ and ‘economic welfare theory’. Both emphasizes the result of procedures (e.g. policies), which
means they emphasize the consequential side of justice (recall the term consequential ethics). However, they have two different
ways to stress and evaluate ‘utility’ (the consequential aspect). The utility people derive from certain conditions are measured in
terms of their level of happiness.
Generally speaking, utilitarianism emphasizes welfare for people insofar as they are efficient utility machines, whereas economic
welfare theory emphasizes welfare for all (whether they are effective utility machines or not). Typical examples showing the
difference are the examples of handicapped persons or elderly and dependent people. These need relatively more services to
function on a certain level and be able to derive utility as opposed to ‘healthy’ people who are assumed to need less service to
derive certain utilities. There is no absolute human right aspect in respect to welfare provisions in this utilitarian example, because
people can be discriminated against on the grounds of their varying ability to derive utility. However, the theory of utilitarianism
will not necessarily increase the difference of income too much if we assume that due to higher expectations to services and goods
among the ‘spoiled’ rich, operating with high expectations and expensive preferences, their money need to be distributed to
poorer and more efficient utility machines, with lower expectations and a more efficient derivation of utility per dollar (a higher
marginal utility). However, important to note, both utilitarians and economic Welfarists will probably support equal liberties,
political rights and to consider human beings as ‘equal’ in different terms. However, they will differ in their consideration of
social and economic rights (especially extensive ones as in Norway; calling for considerable redistributions – which economic
welfare theoreticians will favor).
A typical term regarding individual utility is ‘preference utilitarianism’. Here, individual preferences are considered, and their
subjective perception is what matters. If we had a paternalistic way of determining individuals’ utility functions, then we could
speak of a very strong state (to enforce people to accept the government’s evaluation of what yields utility for different persons
(which would certainly not be preferable for persons as Martha Nussbaum emphasizing the effect of freedom on people’s wellbeing).
Economic welfare theory operates with the simple term ‘utility’ in measurement. Here, equality and the proper state of affairs are
evaluated based on the actual equality of utility. Equal utility means that we can give more the less efficient utility machine, and
less to the more efficient utility machine. Hence, the theory is egalitarian in the sense of equal utility (happiness). The egalitarian
attribute of utilitarianism is equality of marginal utility (if all utility functions are equal, utilitarians will give the same amount of
money to each – and we treat certain marginal utilities equally).
Seen in a broader sense, however, as I choose not to do in an elaborate way, ‘welfare’ can also be interpreted in terms of other
approaches to distributive justice. Both the capability approach and the approaches of Rawls and Dworkin touch the sphere of
welfare, albeit not stressing the term directly.
Rawls’s account of the primary goods is interesting, as it theoretically distances itself from Welfarism. Rawls believes that
people have different conceptions of the good, yielding different ‘rational life plans’. The social primary goods are there to ensure
that people can reach their desired ends, which means that they need rights, liberties, powers and opportunities, income and
wealth. In a sense Rawls’s theory resembles the concept of the capability approach. The point is that these stressed ‘resources’ are
there to ensure desired functions (whatever the individual want). In this respect he wants us to imagine a ‘veil of ignorance’
resulting in people choosing policies from the ‘original position’. Here he assumes that people know which goods they will be
interested to possess, but they do not know how much they will get of these (social primary) goods, their position in society,
gender, race, talent and conceptions of the good. He assumes that people are capable of knowing the means to obtain ‘whatever
they want’, but not which ends these means are to serve (prior to the establishment of the social contract distributing the social
primary goods), and people do not know about whether they enjoy taking risks or not. His equal distribution of social primary
goods is a Kantian inspired principle; it both ensures that no people are used as means for other people’s ends (Welfarism), and he
wants to ensure arrangements everyone would agree on based on rational choice in enlightenment.
Why would everybody find an equal distribution of social primary goods (equally) appealing based on the conditions outlined
above? According to Rawls, they will do because they are afraid of being affected negatively by an unequal distribution of
income, which means, for example, that they are afraid to be a poor man without rights and liberties. Rawls believe that people
will be risk averse provided these circumstances. This means that they will choose a ‘maximin’ strategy, meaning that they will
maximize the social primary goods of the least well off. On that account, people behind the veil or ignorance will choose equality
of social primary goods. This will be a choice made on rational self-interest, but preventing an ignorant ‘subjective choice’ based
on consideration of own situation. The choice will be rather ‘objective’ since “all people will choose Rawls’s concept if the
circumstances outlined are present. However, Rawls believes that people will accept inequalities (for example of income) if it is to
the advantage for the least well off. Then it will be rational to hope to take the risk of being the richest, because the inequality will
advantageous for you even if you end up ‘least well off’. Rawls do not allow for differences in liberties – whose equality is
fundamental. Social and economic inequalities, on the other hand, are to be arranged so that are both reasonably expected to be to
everyone’s advantage, and attached to positions and offices open to all. The priority follows from the fact that parties are ignorant
of which lifeplans they will prefer (and which they need these liberties to determine). The ensuing economic and social goods
depend on the decision made about lifeplan.
People do not know their ‘natural primary goods’ either, which stimulates them to choose equality of ‘social primary goods’ since
institutions are able to affect the endowment of the latter goods. In practice, however, Rawls does not find endowments of ‘natural
goods’ a matter of distributive justice, which is a less appealing feature of his theory. Different endowments of natural character
implies different needs and, hence, different social primary goods to facilitate for the realization of those differing needs. Rawls’s
theory only allows for people receiving the exact same amounts of social primary goods (unless the difference principle is valid),
which are not compatible with different needs for social primary goods. This has been scrutinized and criticized by Dworkin.
Dworkin’s conception of ‘resources’ is aimed to solve a perceived weakness with Rawls’s theory. Dworkin distinguishes his
theory from that of Rawls through his distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ resources. External resources are resources one
can acquire in society, for example natural assets. I find Kymlicka’s example useful here. Think of two people getting the same
amount of clamshells. They can exchange it for the social goods they need to pursue their desired ends. They know which goods
they want to realize the needs. As people are different, with different conceptions of the good, they should have the right to decide
for themselves which goods they want to acquire spending their clamshells. However, as Dworkin stresses, people have different
endowments of ‘internal resources’. This can be abilities, physical characteristics, talents and so forth. The important thing is that
these differences in internal resources require different amounts and kinds of social primary goods. If people shall be equally
happy with what they acquired with the clamshells, and hence achieve a state without envy, they may thus need different amounts
of clamshells to obtain the level of social primary goods to ensure equal welfare (taking into account people’s different conception
of the good through the stress on the distribution of social primary goods to thereafter produce welfare).
The measure suggested is to create a redistributive scheme, properly exemplified with an insurance arrangement. Dworkin
operates with an idea similar of that of Rawls. We are to imagine people behind a modified veil of ignorance. The people do not
know their place in the distribution of natural talents (internal resources), and are to assume that they are equally susceptible to the
various natural disadvantages that might arise. We give people the 100 clamshells, and ask them to spend what they want on
insurance against being ‘internally’ disadvantaged. The people needing more clamshells to derive equal amounts of social primary
goods which then enable us to pursue as good and desired ends as others, will receive those clamshells through a distribution
grounded on the insurance market. Then, people will get the same foundation for actual freedom to pursue their ends, and it is this
equal foundation of resources->social primary goods that makes Dworkin’s theory egalitarian. But people are responsible for their
actions. The distribution of welfare is ambition sensitive since people themselves have the responsibilities to convert the sufficient
grounds for converting their conceptions of the good into the good, whereas it is not in their hands (and thus responsibility) that
they have received some natural disadvantages. They should receive support if the latter is the case.
Capabilities are used in the ‘capability approach’. Capabilities are what one needs to achieve valuable functionings. This theory
was coined by Amartya Sen, who criticized Rawl’s emphasis on resources. It is inadequate to focus on resources while people
have different needs, not just in terms of naturally induced ones, but also ‘needs’ shaped by adaptive preferences which may be
‘false’. A conversion factor is used to convert resources into capabilities. For example time, as in the amount of hours you need to
become capable of communicating, or for example obtain a higher education. Which capabilities should then be viewed as
important/more important/stressed? Should one make a list, or should it be subject for democratic deliberation? Sen and
Nussbaum seem to differ somewhat here, in that Sen refuses to make a list. The capability approach stresses resources in order to
achieve a capability. A capability of ‘adequate nourishment’, which hopefully the most of us will stress as an essential capability,
requires different amounts of resources because people have different conversion factors. If one is to achieve equality, then,
people need to receive equal amounts of capabilities assumed important. Democratic deliberation and philosophical reasoning can
both be methods of determining which capabilities that should be subject to demands for equality.
In a sense, both lists may be arbitrary since some individual preferences probably will be neglected in a list worked out by an
‘expert’ or democratic decision-making. Capabilities are difficult to measure, because the degree to which you have them vary.
You can for example have ‘decent’, ‘good’ or ‘poor’ health. The capability approach have a certainly consequential aspect, in
that, the goal is to achieve certain functionings (by means of vital capabilities). The capabilities to do certain things are there to
ensure freedom. You should just have them; you should not be forced to use them. This consideration implies a liberal society in
which the members are responsible to achieve whatever functionings they want based on ‘essential’ capabilities. One could argue
that actually establishing which capabilities are essential is a difficult task. One way of doing it could be to employ Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs, where capabilities and resources based on different conversions factors should be directed towards fulfilling
those needs (expressed as functions).
2. Which are the libertarian arguments against economic equality?
The libertarian arguments against economic equality are many (although they can be problematized and argued
against.
We can spot a similarity between libertarianism and utilitarianism in the sense that adherents of both tend to
favour a capitalist system. However, whereas utilitarianism does that in order to achieve the best ends (maximal
utility), libertarianism feels that capitalism is right because of the inherent wrongdoing of taking other people’s
property. As long as property is acquired acceptably, and (if applicable) transferred in a voluntary transaction, then
people have an absolute right to do whatever they want with their own property. Thus, the libertarian rejection of
violating property rights, for example through unnecessary redisitributive means, are grounded on historical and
procedural considerations. The ‘entitlement perspective’ of Nozick points exactly at this. Libertarian arguments are
often used, thus, to stress the efficiency of the free market, but differ from utilitarianism in the principal and ethical
foundations.
Nozick also points at the intuitive preference for self-ownership. People own their own talents and thus,
accordingly, shall be entitled to the product of their own powers. Their talents and hence the product of these are
the individuals’ own property, and should not be taken away from them insofar as what is taken away is spent by
governmental control over the upholding of property rights and the necessary ‘law and order’.
A libertarian argument is that one should freely dispose of what one has him/herself acquired, which means
freedom for the individual. Intuitively one can question the value of enjoying provisions from the government or
indeed the fruits of one’s own labour if one is not allowed to spend one’s assets on what one wants.
There are more arguments to, and I am sorry that I was not able to write more (lack of time). I will probably bring
some more arguments which can be written very shortly on the blackboard.