Distributive justice, seminar exercise for Tuesday May 3
By Martin Flatø
In egalitarian theories, various concepts of what should be equal are put forward: welfare,
social primary goods, resources and capabilities. Please explain these concepts, and give a
critical discussion of them.
Egalitarian theories derive the premise of justice from the concept of equality. They thus
have in common that only societies where all people are (in some sense) treated equally are
just. The theories diverge from notions of justice which value individuals by divine
assignment, but also from theories that consider justice as bringing about valuable states of
affairs (teleological utilitarianism) or that derive justice from liberty as some libertarians do.
Most forms of welfarism and Rawls’, Sen’s and Nozick’s theories of justice are all egalitarian
theories according to Kymlicka. Hilde Bojer suggests reserving the term egalitarian for
proponents of economic equality in some sense, which would make the term more useful as
the group of theories covered would be smaller.
On the face of it, all egalitarian theories thus seem to have quite a lot in common. There is
agreement on the equal distribution of moral value, understood as that the only just
distribution is one in which each person matters as much as the next one. However, the issue
of dispute is on what redistributive measures need to be taken, if any, to achieve moral
equality. Utilitarians argue for equal consideration of interests, whereas egalitarian welfarists
argue for equality of welfare. Rawls calls for equal distribution of social primary goods and
Dworkin for envy-free distribution of resources, whereas Sen takes a capabilities approach to
equality. The equality libertarian stance seems to be quite different from other egalitarian
theories in arguing against just patterns of distribution based on moral equality. The concepts
of equal distribution of welfare, social primary goods, resources and capabilities will be
considered in this paper.
Equality of welfare
Welfare (which is more or less synonymous to happiness, well-being and utility) is an
emotional state, subjectively experienced by the person herself. Distributing welfare equally
raises a problem in that welfare cannot be redistributed. It is furthermore influenced by a
number of factors of which many are non-divisible and non-transferable such as love and
health. However, a number of empirical studies show a positive (though declining)
relationship between happiness and wealth. It should thus be possible in most cases to make
someone happier by increasing their income. Welfarist egalitarians believe that every person
is entitled to the same level of welfare, and that income should be distributed from a person
with welfare above average to a person below average until full equality is reached. This is
not the same as maximising total welfare, which would allocate income to the most efficient
utility machine.
A problem with the welfarist approach is the impossibility of interpersonal comparability.
Whereas each person is able to determine whether acquiring certain goods will make her
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better off or not, it is difficult to determine whether one person is happier than the next one.
In lack of better information, perhaps the best guess is that all persons have identical utility
functions, which would imply that an equal distribution of income and wealth would be just.
Yet if such simplifications are needed, the purpose of welfare egalitarianism would fall apart,
as we might as well have a theory of equality of wealth. Although the criticism is wellfounded, there are quite obvious situations where special needs can be identified. Following
welfare egalitarianism, such special needs should be compensated. If we assume that a
person who is disabled accrues the same pleasure from mobility as a non-disabled person,
the impaired person would need more income than the other to reach the same level of
welfare in order to cover the cost of a wheelchair. It seems quite easy to agree with welfarist
egalitarians that such redistribution is just.
A different scenario arises if the excessive need is a result of unethical preferences, such as
envy. Welfarist egalitarians would distribute income from an altruist to an envious person in
order to make them equally satisfied with their income. This last example points out that
welfare is not necessarily a good concept for equalisation. It could be that someone being
happier than others is not necessarily unjust. Furthermore, both Rawls and Nozick argue
rather convincingly that people have other pursuits in life than happiness; people strive to
live complete lives where happiness is not the only or even primary aim.
Equality of social primary goods
Rawls’ starting point for his theory of justice is exactly such a criticism of welfarism. He states
that ‘justice must be compatible with a society that allows for a plurality of different and
even incommensurable conceptions of the good’. He then defines primary goods as those
goods that all adults need in order to pursue what they consider the ideal life. Some of the
primary goods are natural, such as good health, intelligence and natural talents. What he
considers the social primary goods are the primary goods directly distributed by social
institutions, and these are the goods that he proposes should be subject to equal
distribution. Regarding income and wealth, which he considers a social primary good, this is
a good that may be unequally distributed only if such an inequality benefits the least well off
(the difference principle).
By his contribution, Rawls is a founding figure of liberal egalitarianism. It is liberal in the
sense that there is no one definition of the good life, and that equal rights to extensive basic
liberties take lexical priority over the distribution of economic resources. Another contrast is
the Kantian imperative, which stipulates that one should treat people as ends in themselves,
and not as a means to achieve the ends of others. Recall that in the welfarist egalitarian
example, some people had to become less happy to compensate the misery of others. Rawls
disagrees with such compensations, and his principle of equality in income and wealth is not
based on redistributing deserts from the well off to the less privileged. Instead, he does not
conform to the view that one is entitled to one’s own production, as production processes
and market value depend on the collective effort of society. However, he recognises that
inequalities may be needed as an incentive to increase effort, thereby increasing production.
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If such an inequality is of benefit to all (including those less well off), it may be legitimised as
just, as long as it does not infringe on anyone’s basic liberties.
Three main criticisms of Rawls’ theory of justice will be discussed here: Rawls’ disregard for
the distribution of natural primary goods, the inability of ranking different unequal
distributions according to his principles, and the dubious character of his concept of income
and wealth. To start with the natural primary goods, Rawls agrees that no one ‘merits a more
favourable starting place in society’. Yet according to Rawls, ‘it does not follow that one
should eliminate these distinctions’. Rawls way of handling differences in talents and health
is first and foremost by awarding disadvantaged basic liberties, including freedom of
movement and occupational choice, political power and the social bases of self-respect.
Man-made discrimination of physically or mentally disabled persons should by that be ruled
out. His difference principle can then be applied, from which talented people should expect
to profit disproportionately as long as the least advantaged also benefit from the wellendowed applying her talent. Many argue that such a distribution is indeed unfair. If an
intelligent person has not deserved her intelligence, why should she benefit from her
intelligence when Rawls strongly argues against benefits arising from being born into a
particular class or ethnic group? Compensating natural endowments of this kind has been
the concern of later writers, most notably Dworkin.
Another inherent problem in Rawls’ theory is the inability to rank different inequalities.
Rawls measures all unequal distributions against full equality, yet several unequal
distributions may all benefit the least well off. This aspect vastly limits the policy implications
of his theory as one cannot determine whether Norway’s or Brazil’s income distribution is
closer to his ideal, only that each of them is either just or unjust. To some extent, his theory
thereby diverges from intuition and empirical findings on the importance of relative poverty.
It seems to matter to people whether some are tremendously richer than the majority or
only marginally so, even if both distributions are more favourable than an equal distribution
for the poor. One Rawlsian solution to this issue is the lexical priority given to the other social
primary goods. It may be that the injustice experienced by the poor in Brazil is related to the
exclusion, pity and lack of respect they receive from the better off and the lack of
occupational opportunity and political influence. Such results from economic inequalities will
not be considered just by Rawls, even if economic inequalities are beneficial to the
impoverished in the material sense.
Lastly, there is the question of what income and wealth entails. One could distribute cash
income equally, yet such a distribution would not allow for differences in purchasing power,
compensating for instance differences in housing prices between Oslo and Finnmark.
Perhaps a more just distribution would consider full income, defined as the earning power
(determined by the real wage rate) plus unearned income (capital income and transfers),
which is difficult to estimate. It is furthermore not clear whether income is considered as
income per hour or total income. One would assume that following different pursuits would
allow people to choose between leisure and consumption. Yet in such a scenario, it would be
difficult to determine whether a person chooses to work less or works less because of
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responsibilities imposed on her. A part of problem related to housework could be solved by
distributing household income, and leaving the distribution of housework to the private
sphere. However, such a solution would imply that women's economic independence is of no
importance to economic justice. A final problem is with Rawls desire to both distribute
income and wealth equally. If wealth is distributed equally only at offset, the distribution
would not infringe on the right of each individual to follow her own pursuits. Yet if repeated,
it would limit the freedom of some to save their income and others to borrow, as the savings
would be distributed equally in the next round. Such dictation of consumption levels would
seem to be problematic. And even with the one-time distribution of wealth, some might
want to leave part of their income to the next generation rather than spending it themselves.
However, the allowance of inheritance would leave large differences in wealth. The issue of
inheritance remains unresolved, both by Rawls and by Dworkin.
Envy-free distribution of resources
These three criticisms are to a large extent responded to by Ronald Dworkin. He makes a
clear distinction between income generated through individual effort which he considers
just, and income accruing from brute luck. Such a distinction seems quite intuitive: a person
who has worked hard for his income has entitlement to the fruits of her labour, whereas a
person who simply happens to be born with fortunate endowments does not. Furthermore,
the natural environment has not been produced by anyone and it therefore hard to argue for
justice in the arbitrary way in which natural resources are divided today. Ideally, natural
resources should be distributed equally according to Dworkin. However, a problem arises in
that plots of land differ in many ways, and as everyone cannot own the same plot, it cannot
be equally divided. For the proper pricing of natural resources, Dworkin proposes an auction
in which each person starts with 100 clamshells and uses her clamshells to bid on different
resources. If all leave the auction without wanting to substitute their bundle of resources for
someone else’s, the distribution can be called envy-free and is therefore just.
A second theorem is needed in order to respond to the problem of differences in personal
endowments, which Rawls might have taken too lightly. Ideally, differences in talents should
be completely compensated for, so that a person with a handicap is envy-free of a person
with many talents. However, such an ideal is difficult to achieve, as it is quite possible that all
the resources would have to be owned by a severely disabled person for her to even come
close to not wanting to swap bundles. Dworkin's solution is a second-best option. He
considers the same original position with the clamshells, yet under a veil of ignorance where
the persons do not know what their handicaps or talents might be. The parties can then use
their clamshells for insurance against all types of disadvantages before the auction starts. The
amount of insurance payments would provide a basis for a social planner to redistribute
clamshells from the more advantaged to the disadvantaged, who may use them in the
auction.
A key attraction of his theory of justice is that it is endowment-insensitive and ambitionsensitive. It is endowment-insensitive in that a person's internal and external endowments
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do not determine the person's opportunities in life. It is ambition-sensitive in that all are free
to make use of their resources as they see fit, thereby pursuing their purpose in life. There
are a few criticisms, however, that challenge this fundamental quality of his theory. One is
the returning question of inheritance, which Dworkin does not give a clear answer to.
Allowing inheritance would be endowment-sensitive, as some are born with more
inheritance than others. The dilemma is quite clearly that people tend to have ambitions on
behalf of their children, and therefore would want them to inherit. What is endowmentsensitive for the inheritor is ambition-sensitive for the parents. A second dilemma to be
raised is the insurance scheme, which Dworkin points out is a second-best option. His theory
is still endowment-sensitive, as those less talented or able are not fully compensated for
their disadvantages. Can we settle for a second-best theory of justice, one which is unjust but
as endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive as practically possible? If yes, one may just
as well return to Rawls who regards talents and handicaps as beyond the realm of
redistribution, for the exact reason that a fair distribution of natural primary goods is
impossible.
The capabilities approach
In common with Rawls and Dworkin, Amartya Sen is attracted by the liberal notion of equal
right to follow one's ideal life prospect. People may want to do different things, such as
studying or eating chocolate. These are functionings, simply things we wish do in life. His
idea of justice is one where everyone has the same capability of carrying out valuable
functionings. The list of functionings is infinitely long, and there is therefore a need to
narrow down the list to those functionings that society finds valuable. Eating chocolate may
not be such an example, whereas studying might be a better fit. What is to be distributed is
not these valuable functionings, e.g. all receiving the same amount of education. What
should be distributed equally is the capability of carrying out a valuable functioning, the right
to choose whether to exercise a valuable functioning or not.
A particularly attractive feature of Sen's theory of justice is his disapproval of paternalism.
Recall that welfarists decided on the importance of welfare for individuals, and many
welfarists disregard unethical preferences which someone must define. Rawls made a
complete list of social primary goods which seemed reasonable. Yet who is Rawls to decide
that his list of social primary goods and only these are justified as inevitably emerging from
his original position, and why can Dworkin decide that resources are the important entities
to be distributed? Sen does not make such a claim, but leaves the list of important
capabilities to be determined by an open and democratic debate.
One criticism will be noted. Who will decide the rules of the open and democratic debate,
and what are the proper guidelines? A majority system might not take proper into account
capabilities particularly important to native minorities (such as the capability of pursuing a
nomadic lifestyle). A debate which is more open and argumentative might give more weight
to those who are better able to express their point of view and make it heard. Sen's
disapproval of paternalism should be cherished, yet it seems incomplete without a clear
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account of the proceedings which would make an identification of important capabilities just.
The lack of attention all these four theories award to justice in procedures is an important
criticism of them.
Explain the concepts of procedural justice and consequential justice and give examples
Consequential justice is concerned with the outcome of a distributive measure. If the
outcome is just, it does not matter how it was achieved. The theories discussed above are all
examples of theories applying consequential justice. If evaluating the recent efforts to
protect civilians in Libya, the military efforts can be justified if they in fact lead to civilians
being protected. An example involving distributive justice would be to set a minimum income
for all which is believed to be just, and disregard claims that taxation in itself is unjust due to
its intrusive procedure.
Procedural justice starts in the other end. It does not stipulate any pattern of distribution
which is just, but procedures of earning income that are just. One such theory is that of
Nozick, who presents three procedural arguments. He holds that a person may legitimately
aquire unowned resources (justice in acquisition) or may legitimately hold what has been
voluntarily given to the person (justice in transfer). Justice only arises from repeated
applications of these two principles, according to Nozick. The result of such justice might be a
very unequal distribution of income and wealth, yet that is not a concern for Nozick.
Similarly, Marxists see injustice in the exploitation of the working class, a procedure through
which capitalists grab profits and rent which has been produced by the proletariat and
therefore belongs to them. The injustice does not rest on workers being poorer than
capitalists, but on them being subject to exploitation. Together with left-libertarianism, it is
clear that justice in procedure need not produce large income inequalities, yet whether it
does so or not is beyond the point. Using the example of the conflict in Libya, if the military
engagement was sanctioned by a legitimate body and is carried out in the spirit of the
resolution, it is just regardless of whether the outcome is favourable for the civilians.
Which approach to justice is the most intuitive is a difficult question to answer. An account of
libertarian justice would have to go back to the origins of mankind and ask whether the first
settler and all her successors accrued land through violence against other humans, or
through settling on unowned land or voluntary transfer. Most probably, current landholdings
are highly unjust judged by this rule, and a problem arises in the collective ownership most
probably practiced in gatherer and hunter societies. Left-libertarians would claim that in the
beginning, land resources were collectively owned rather than up for grabs, which would
significantly alter the just distribution. Even if proper accounts of history could be given, one
may ask whether what our ancestors did should matter at all for justice today. Would it be
just to punish people living now for the actions taken thousands of years ago?
However, a problem with disregarding the proposition of procedural justice is that all special
relationships that have been created through past actions must be disregarded. Consider the
relationship between an employer and an employee who has carried out her duties. Act
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utilitarians would not give any special entitlement for the employee to the salary paid by the
employer. The employer should reward the salary to the person who has the most use of it,
regardless of whether that person has worked for her or not. Rule utilitarians would solve
this dilemma by pointing out the usefulness for the total welfare in society of rewarding
effort. Yet this is a matter of practicalities rather than a just entitlement. If the consequential
justice does not support our intuitions about justice in the short run and procedural justice is
problematic in the long run, one would need a very good justification to identify a cut-off
point.
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