Kant Society in Ukraine
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Humanities, NaUKMA
The Antonovychi Library, NaUKMA
philosophical discussion
War and Peace.
Kantian co-Meditations.
Peter McCormic (Paris, France)
Mykhailo Minakov (Kyiv, Ukraine)
Auditorium at NaUKMA Museum
14:00, 23 April 2015
Mykhailo Minakov
Peace and Applied Enlightenment
Theses for a Dispute with Prof. McCormick at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
April 23, 2015
1. Peace is unnatural for humans, however peace as lasting peace between nations is possible.
 Kantian paradox:


 Why peace should be established? Why to ruin the “noble case” of war?
 Peace is absence of war between humans. War is a natural state, a bottom-line of human
history.
o Peace makes life to be a practiced value. War refers to dignified life but destroys
it. Peace makes dignity to serve to the case of life.
o Dignity is a civil virtue. War destroys civil condition. War and dignity cannot be
combined.
o Kantian thesis: peace is a pre-requisite and a result of global civil situation.
o Civility – and those political institutions that we can create – is the key answer.
 Politics as ‘communication for the common good’ (Aristotle, Politics I) provides humans
with a possibility to cease the permanent war and establish permanent peace. Possible
solutions:
o Monarchy (Augustine, Dante) or Leviathan (Hobbes): end of civil war by the
price
2. Peace can be established as a result of human conduct with the use of moral reasoning and
political engineering.
 How can peace be established?

Are there dangers of ‘idealization of peace’ just like with the ‘idealization of war’?
3. It is time to review results of the Enlightenment in the Eastern Europe, and make the region to
be peaceful.
Positive sublime of Peace:
 In the beginning of the Treatise, Kant defines a paradox:
o He repeats the joke of Leibnitz (Codex diplomaticus, 1693) that stipulates doubt
if the eternal peace is possible: “We can leave open the question whether this
satirical caption to the picture of a graveyard, which was painted on the sign of a
Dutch innkeeper, applies to human beings in general, or specifically to the heads
of state, who can never get enough of war, or even just to philosophers who
dream the sweet dream of perpetual peace.” (IK, 2004, p. 67)
o The pathos of the Treatise is on the contrary – practicality of the peace project.
Entire structure and argumentation of the Treatise is directed at ‘the practical
politicians’. The Treatise concludes that peace can be established. And in the Idea
of Universal History Kant sais it is being established in the human history.
o This paradox constitutes the positive sublime that as a notion describes the idea of
perpetual peace in terms of its super-sensual aesthetic proof, its practical (moral
and political) significance, and historical possibility
 The paradox is based on what I call – following Peter McCormic's expression ‘negative
sublime of war’ – positive sublime of peace
o By using term ‘positive sublime’ I risk to be correct in using Kantian dictionary:
since in the Critique of Judgment, Kant associates sublime mainly with negativity
(to contrast positive taste of beauty)
 For example: “As a matter of fact, a feeling for the sublime in nature is
hardly thinkable unless in association with a disposition of mind
resembling the moral… And though, like that feeling, the immediate
pleasure in the beautiful in nature presupposes and cultivates a certain
liberality of thought, i.e. makes our delight independent of any mere
enjoyment of sense, still it represents freedom rather as in play than as
exercising a law-governed activity, which is the genuine characteristic of
human morality, where reason has to impose its dominion upon
sensibility. There is, however, this qualification, that in the aesthetic
judgement upon the sublime this dominion is represented as exercised
through the imagination itself as an instrument of reason. Thus, too,
delight in the sublime in nature is only negative (whereas that in the
beautiful is positive): that is to say it is a feeling of imagination by its own
act depriving itself of its freedom by receiving a purposive determination
in accordance with a law other than that of its empirical employment.”
(CoJ 99)
o Nonetheless, I argue that positive sublime is possible in Kantian terms; and that
notion of positive sublime helps understand the possibility and practicality of
peace
 The sublimity of peace corresponds with Kant’s idea of sublime as mind
super-ceding the senses of natural affects: “Sublimity, therefore, does not
reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our own mind, in so far as
we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus
also over nature without us (as exerting influence upon us).” (CoJ 94)
 The positive sublime of peace is directly connected with sublimity of
enthusiasm: “The idea of the good connected with affect is enthusiasm.
This state of mind appears to be sublime: so much so that there is a
common saying that nothing great can be achieved without it. But now
every affect is blind either as to the choice of its end, or, supposing this
has been furnished by reason, in the way it is effected—for it is that
movement of the mind whereby the exercise of free deliberation upon
fundamental principles, with a view to determining oneself accordingly, is
rendered impossible. On this account it cannot merit any delight on the
part of reason. Yet, from an aesthetic point of view, enthusiasm is
sublime, because it is an effort of one’s powers called forth by ideas which
give to the mind an impetus of far stronger and more enduring efficacy
than the stimulus afforded by sensible representations.” (CoJ 102)
 Later, Kant connects enthusiastic sublime with peace: “So, for example, a
certain poet says* in his description of a beautiful morning: ‘The sun
arose, as out of virtue rises peace.’ The consciousness of virtue, even
where we put ourselves only in thought in the position of a virtuous man,
diffuses in the mind a multitude of sublime and comforting feelings, and
gives a boundless outlook into a happy future, such as no expression
within the compass of a definite concept completely attains.” (CoJ 145)
 This enthusiasm is based upon immensity of history’s un-graspable
wisdom: even the worst of human feelings can serve to the best of it. One
of the greatest Kant’s ideas here is the ‘unsociable sociability’
(ungesellige Geselligkeit)
 Positive sublime of peace corresponds with Kant’s idea of human progress
towards peace as ‘guiding end in history’
 This historical vision is parallel to the metaphor of starry skies: “So, if we
call the sight of the starry heaven sublime, we must not found our
judgement of it upon any concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings,
with the bright spots, which we see filling the space above us, as their suns
moving in orbits prescribed for them with the wisest regard to ends. But
we must take it, just as it strikes the eye, as a broad and all-embracing
canopy: and it is merely under such a representation that we may posit the
sublimity which the pure aesthetic judgement attributes to this object.”
(CoJ 101)
o In the Treatise, the paradox of positive sublime is defined as the following: “To be
sure, it does this with a certainty that is not sufficient to foretell the future of this peace (theoretically),
but which is adequate from a practical perspective and makes it a duty to work toward this (not simply
chimerical) goal.” (Treatise, 92)

o Consequently, positive sublime of peace responds to the noble case of life,
splendid idea of future, and terrifying doubt if it is reachable in history.
Positive sublime of peace makes the hope for peace even in the worst times of war terror
reasonable and aesthetically-proven. The enthusiasm that arises from the hope to peace
o But it not the peace as absence of war that has the chance for moral ground and
durable time-span:
 “War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for
the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations
that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime
the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they
are able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace
favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a
debasing self-interest, cowardice, and weakness, and tends to degrade the
character of the people. So far as sublimity is predicated of might, this
solution of the concept of it appears at variance with the fact that we tend
to represent God in the tempest, the storm, the earthquake, and the like, as
presenting himself in his wrath, but at the same time also in his sublimity,
and yet here it would be alike folly and presumption to imagine a preeminence of our minds over the operations and, as it appears, even over
the direction of such might. Here, instead of a feeling of the sublimity of
our own nature, submission, prostration, and a feeling of utter helplessness
seem more to constitute the attitude of mind befitting the manifestation of
such an object, and to be that also more customarily associated with the
idea of it on the occasion of a natural phenomenon of this kind.” (CoJ, 93)
o The peace has positive sublime, practical significance and historical meaning only
if it has been established by applying reason.
 “1. ‘‘No peace settlement which secretly reserves issues for a future war shall be considered



valid.’’ For such a treaty would represent a mere cease-fire, a postponement of hostilities, and
not peace. For peace signifies the end to all hostilities, and even merely adding the adjective
perpetual to the term renders it a suspicious-looking pleonasm… But if, on the basis of
‘‘enlightened’’ concepts of political prudence, the true honor of the state is thought to lie in
the continual expansion of its power by any means whatsoever, then such a judgment will
surely seem academic and pedantic.” (Treatise, 68)
War is natural to humans, while peace is a product of culture: “The state of nature (status
naturalis) is not a state of peace among human beings who live next to one another but a state
of war, that is, if not always an outbreak of hostilities, then at least the constant threat of such
hostilities. Hence the state of peace must be established.” (Treatise, 72)
It is up to political creativity of human to construct such a social – economic and political –
order where moral and lasting peace was possible.
In the Treatise stipulates three pre-conditions of world-wide eternal peace: citizen at
individual level; constitutional republic at collective level; federation of nations at global
level.

Citizen as a citizen of universal moral state: “The validity of these innate
rights, which necessarily belong to humankind and are inalienable, is confirmed and elevated
by the principle of the juridical relations that a human being can have to higher beings (when
he conceives of such beings), by imagining himself, in accordance with precisely the same
principles, as a citizen of a supersensible world. For, as concerns my freedom, I have no
obligation even with regard to the divine laws, which are known to me by means of mere
reason, other than the laws I have myself been able to agree to (for I conceive of the divine
will only by means of the law of freedom of my own reason in the first place). ”

o

(Treatise,
74)
Constitutional republic:
o “a supersensible world” for citizens
o “The republican constitution is a constitution that is established, first,
according to principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as
human beings), second, according to principles of the dependence of all on
a single, common legislation (as subjects), and third, according to the law
of the equality of the latter (as citizens of the state).” (Treatise, 74)
o republic should be constructed in way that even devils would abbey to its
rules; (Treatise, 90)
 Federation:
o “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of
another state” (Treatise, 70)
o “Peoples, as states, can be judged as individual human beings who, when
in the state of nature (that is, when they are independent from external
laws), bring harm to each other already through their proximity to one
another, and each of whom, for the sake of his own security, can and ought
to demand of others that they enter with him into a constitution, similar to
that of a civil one, under which each is guaranteed his rights. This would
constitute a federation of peoples, which would not, however, necessarily
be a state of peoples.” (Treatise, 78)
o “…the idea of federalism, which should gradually encompass all states
and thereby lead to perpetual peace, is practicable …”(Treatise, 80)
Once again: “To be sure, it does this with a certainty that is not sufficient to foretell the future of
this peace (theoretically), but which is adequate from a practical perspective and makes it a duty to
work toward this (not simply chimerical) goal.” (Treatise, 92) It is human duty to build
political and economic pre-conditions of peace.
It is human reasonable practice that makes peace possible. Fatalism, decadence and
laziness ruin preconditions for establishing peace.
o It the lesson of Enlightenment that we in Eastern Europe did not learn timely. We
perceived that other agents of security can establish and support peace for us. We
were wrong.
o It is the task of living generations in the nations of Eastern Europe to start the era
of the second Enlightenment: return to citizen education, creation of
constitutional republics with the rule of law, and establish rights-based
mechanisms for the peaceful development of our region. We should return to
active creativity in public sphere at national and international levels.
“The mechanical course of nature visibly reveals a purposive plan to create harmony through discord among people, even
against their own will.” (Treatise, 85)
“To be sure, it does this with a certainty that is not sufficient to foretell the future of this peace (theoretically), but which is
adequate from a practical perspective and makes it a duty to work toward this (not simply chimerical) goal.” (Treatise,
92)
unsociable sociability
reaches a limit at the point where human conflict disrupts the stable
life of civilization that is needed for the preservation and further development
of human faculties. If life and property become insecure, then people
have no opportunity to perfect themselves and no incentive to accumulate
products of labor, which may be taken from them before they can be enjoyed.
At a certain point, therefore, nature’s end of endlessly developing the
predispositions of the human species requires a stable and ordered society, a
condition of peace with justice. When civilization reaches this point, natural
purposiveness requires another device alongside unsociable sociability
to balance its counterpurposive effects. This device, which Kant introduces
in the Fifth and Sixth Propositions of ‘‘Idea for a Universal History,’’ is the
establishment of ‘‘a civil society which administers right universally’’ (IUH
8:22). This civil society, characterized by a coercive power protecting rights
and property, is the political state. It is a voluntary creation of human beings
themselves and is subject to ideal rational principles (of right or justice) that
people are capable of recognizing and obeying; but in promoting the full
development of our species predispositions, the establishment of a political
state also accords with natural teleology.
Allen Wood 252-253
that nature is seen to employ unsociable sociability
as the device for unfolding the predispositions of the human species,
and the fact that beyond a certain point this device can continue to operate
toward nature’s end only if it is counterbalanced by a humanly created order
of peace with justice within the political state and between states
Wood 254
The natural end of endlessly developing humanity’s species-predispositions
leads, for instance, to the specification of unsociable sociability (the human
traits of discontent and competitiveness) as the basic mechanism for this
development; the historical need, at a certain stage of history, for nations to
remain at peace in order to perfect their civil constitutions and continue the
development of new human capacities, leads us to recognize the importance
of commerce and economic prosperity in making nations powerful, and the
reluctance of commercially oriented citizens to turn their lives and property
over to warlike heads of state to pursue their greedy and barbaric fantasies of
military conquest
Wood 259
Idea for a Universal History
fourth proposition
The means that nature employs in order to bring about the development of
all of the predispositions of humans is their antagonism in society, insofar
as this antagonism ultimately becomes the cause of a law-governed organization
of society. Here I take antagonism to mean the unsociable sociability
of human beings, that is, their tendency to enter into society, a tendency
connected, however, with a constant resistance that continually threatens to
break up this society. This unsociable sociability is obviously part of human
nature. Human beings have an inclination to associate with one another because in such a
condition they feel themselves to be more human, that is
to say, more in a position to develop their natural predispositions. But they 8:21
also have a strong tendency to isolate themselves, because they encounter
in themselves the unsociable trait that predisposes them to want to direct
everything only to their own ends and hence to expect to encounter resistance
everywhere, just as they know that they themselves tend to resist
others. It is this resistance that awakens all human powers and causes
human beings to overcome their tendency to idleness and, driven by lust for
honor, power, or property, to establish a position for themselves among
their fellows, whom they can neither endure nor do without. Here the first
true steps are taken from brutishness to culture, which consists, actually, in
the social worth of human beings.
IUH 6-7
Literature:
CoJ stands for: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement (tr. by. J. C. Meredith; rev. & ed. by
N. Walker; NY, Oxford University Press, 2007).
IUH stands for: Immanuel Kant, Idea of Universal History, in: Toward perpetual peace and other
writings on politics, peace, and history / Immanuel Kant ; ed. by P. Kleingeld; tr. by
D. L. Colclasure/ (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006) 3-16.
Treatise stands for: Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in: Toward perpetual
peace and other writings on politics, peace, and history / Immanuel Kant ; ed. by P. Kleingeld; tr.
by D. L. Colclasure/ (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006) 67-109.