2013.4.26
•
•
(Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, 1787)
•
(Critique of Practical Reason, 1788)
•
(Critique of the Power of Judgment, 1790)
Sensibility
Understanding
Reason
(1)
• “The Germans are the only ones who now employ the
word ‘aesthetics’ to designate that which others call the
critique of taste. The ground for this is a failed hope,
held by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing
the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles
of reason, and elevating its rule to a science. But this
effort is futile.” (
, A21/B35)
(2)
•
(imagination)
• “[I]magination is the faculty for representing an
object even without its presence…the imagination is
to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility
a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance
with the categories…which is an effect of the
understanding on sensibility…” (B152)
(3)
•
• “[T]he freedom of the imagination consists precisely
in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the
judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of
the reciprocally animating imagination in its freedom
and the understanding with its lawfulness…” (5:287)
(4)
•
• “The power of judgment in general is the faculty for
thinking of the particular as contained under the
universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the
law) is given, then the power of judgment, which
subsumes the particular under it…is determining. If,
however, only the particular is given, for which the
universal is to be found, then the power of judgment
is merely reflecting.” (5:179)
(5)
•
• “Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed
between the domain of the concept of nature, as the
sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom,
as the supersensible, so that from the former to the
latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of
reason) no transition is possible…”(5:175-6)
(Analytic of the Beautiful)
(Analytic of the Sublime)
:
• First moment (quality): “Taste is the faculty for
judging an object or a kind of representation
through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without
any interest(
). The object of such
a satisfaction is called beautiful.” (5: 211)
:
• Second Moment (quantity): “That is beautiful
which pleases universally without a concept(
).” (5:
219)
• Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of a
object, insofar as it is perceived in it without
representation of an end. (5:235)
•
•
(modality)
• “That is beautiful which is cognized without a
concept as the object of a necessary
satisfaction.”(5:240)
(MARCEL DUCHAMP, 1887-1968)
SUBJECTIVE UNIVERSALITY (1)
• “Now an objectively universally valid judgment is also
always subjectively so, i.e., if the judgment is valid for
everything that is contained under a given concept then it
is also valid for everyone who represents an object
through this concept. But from a subjectively universal
validity(
), i.e., from aesthetic
universal validity, which does not rest on any concept,
there can not be any inference at all to logical universal
validity; because the first kind of judgment does not
pertain to the object at all.” (5: 215)
SUBJECTIVE UNIVERSALITY (2)
• “For that very reason, however, the aesthetic
universality that is ascribed to a judgment must
also be of a special kind, since the predicate of
beauty is not connected with the concept of the
object considered in its entire logical sphere, and
yet it extends it over the whole sphere of those
who judge(
).” (5: 215)
UNIVERSAL VOICE(
)
• “Now here it can be seen that in the judgment of
taste nothing is postulated except such a
universal voice with regard to satisfaction without
the mediation of concepts, hence the possibility
of an aesthetic judgment that could at the same
time be considered valid for everyone….The
universal voice is thus only an idea(
).” (5: 216)
PLEASURE AND JUDGING: A PUZZLE
• “Whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of
pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the
latter precedes the former?” (5: 216)
•
STATE OF MIND(
)
• “Thus it is the universal capacity for the
communication of the state of mind in the given
representation which, as the subjective condition
of the judgment of taste, must serve as its ground
and have the pleasure in the object as a
consequence. Nothing, however, can be
universally communicated except cognition and
representation so far as it belongs to cognition.” (5:
217)
FREE PLAY (1)
•
/
• “The powers of cognition that are set into play by
this representation are hereby in a free play, since
no determinate concept restricts them to a
particular rule of cognition.” (5: 217)
FREE PLAY (2)
• “Now there belongs to a representation by which
an object is given, in order for there to be
cognition of it in general, imagination(
/
) for the composition of the manifold of
intuition(
) and understanding (
)for the unity of the concept that unifies the
representations. This state of a free play of the
faculties of cognition….is the only kind of
representation that is valid for everyone.” (5: 217)
(1)
• The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the
object, which consists in limitation; the sublime, by
contrast, is to be found in a formless object
insofar as limitlessness is represented in
it…[deleted]…so that the beautiful seems to be
taken as the presentation of an indeterminate
concept of the understanding, but the sublime as
that of a similar concept of reason. (5:244)
(2)
• [I]n the former (the beautiful) directly brings with it a
feeling of the promotion of life, and hence is
compatible with charms and an imagination at play,
while the latter (the feeling of the sublime) is a
pleasure that arises only indirectly, being generated,
namely, by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of
the vital power…[deleted]…the satisfaction in the
sublime does not so much contain positive pleasure
as it does admiration or respect, i.e., it deserves to
be called negative pleasure. (5:245)
(3)
• [T]he feeling of the sublime, may to be sure
appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our
power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of
presentation, and as it were doing violence to our
imagination, but is nevertheless judged all the
more sublime for that. (5:245)
• For as a judgment of the aesthetic reflecting
power of judgment, the satisfaction in the sublime,
just like that in the beautiful, must be represented
as universally valid in its quantity, as without
interest in its quality, as subjective purposiveness
in its relation, and the latter, as far as its modality
is concerned, as necessary. (5:247)
:
• But one division is necessary in the analysis of
the sublime which that of the beautiful did not
require, namely that into the mathematically and
the dynamically sublime. (5:247)
(
)
• We call sublime that which is absolutely great.
However, to be great and to be a magnitude are
quite different concepts. Likewise, simply to say
that something is great is also something entirely
different from saying that it is absolutely great.
The latter is that which is great beyond all
comparison. (5:248)
• If…we say of an object absolutely that it is great,
this is not a mathematically determining judgment
but a mere judgment of reflection about its
representation, which is subjectively purposive for
a certain use of our cognitive powers in the
estimation of magnitude, and in that case we
always combine a kind of respect with the
representation, just as we combine contempt with
that which we call absolutely small. (5:249)
• That is sublime in comparison with which
everything else is small. (5:250)
• Thus we can also add this to the foregoing
formulation of the explanation of the sublime: That
is sublime which even to be able to think of
demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses
every measure of the senses. (5:250)
• The feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity for
the attainment of an idea that is a law for us is
respect. (5:257)
• The feeling of the sublime is thus a feeling of
displeasure from the inadequacy of the
imagination in the aesthetic estimation of
magnitude for the estimation by means of reason,
and a pleasure that is thereby aroused at the
same time from the correspondence of this very
judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest
sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of
reason, insofar as striving for them is
nevertheless a law for us. (5:257)
:
• The mind feels itself moved in the representation
of the sublime in nature, while in the aesthetic
judgment on the beautiful in nature it is in calm
contemplation. (5:258)
• For just as imagination and understanding
produce subjective purposiveness of the powers
of the mind in the judging of the beautiful through
their unison, so do imagination and reason
produce subjective purposiveness through their
conflict…(5:258)
(
)
• Power is a capacity that is superior to great
obstacles. The same thing is called dominion if it
is also superior to the resistance of something
that itself possesses power. Nature considered in
aesthetic judgment as a power that has no
dominion over us is dynamically sublime. (5:260)
• However, that which we strive o resist is an evil,
and, if we find our capacity to be of no match for it,
an object of fear. Thus, for the aesthetic power of
judgment nature can count as a power, thus as
dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is
considered an object of fear. (5:260)
• We can, however, consider an object as fearful
without being afraid of it. (5:260)
• Someone who is afraid can no more judge about
the sublime in nature than someone who is in the
grip of inclination and appetite can judge about
the beautiful. (5:261)
• In this way, in our aesthetic judgment nature is
judged as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear,
but rather because it calls forth our power (which
is not part of nature) to regard those things about
which we are concerned (goods, health and life)
as trivial…[deleted]…in which the mind can make
palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation
even over nature. (5:262)
• In fact, without the development of moral ideas,
that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime
will appear merely repellent to the unrefined
person. (5:265)
• For just as we reproach someone who is
indifferent in judging an object in nature that we
find beautiful with lack of taste, so we say of
someone who remains unmoved by that which we
judge to be sublime that he has no feeling. (5:265)
AESTHETICS AND MORALITY(1)
• [T]he both, united in the same subject, are
purposive in relation to the moral feeling. The
beautiful prepares us to love something, even
nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it,
even contrary to our (sensible) interest. (5:267)
AESTHETICS AND MORALITY(2)
• The pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a
pleasure of contemplation involving subtle
reasoning, also lays claim to universal
participation, yet already presupposes another
feeling, namely that of its supersensible vocation,
which, not matter how obscure it might be, has a
moral foundation. (5:292)
AESTHETICS AND MORALITY(3)
• No I say that the beautiful is the symbol of the
morally good, and also that only in this
respect…does it please with a claim to the assent of
everyone else, in which the mind is at the same
time aware of a certain ennoblement and elevation
above the mere receptivity for a pleasure from
sensible impressions, and also esteems the value
of others in accordance with a similar maxim of their
power of judgment. (5:292)
SUBLIME AND NAZI
KANT’S THIRD CRITIQUE AND POLITICS
Hannah Arendt
SENSUS COMMUNIS ( 40)
• The maxims of common human understanding
• To think for oneself.
• To think in the position of everyone else.
• Always to think in accordance with oneself.
SUBLIME AND POSTMODERNISM
Jean-François Lyotard
!!