Kuhn and his Revolution
Paper 2, Essay #1
Monet Montehermoso
James Woodbridge
Philosophy 430
Due: 06 December 2013
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The scientific method is debatable in the communities of scientists and philosophers
because of the knowledge science that uncovers and the “truth” that it creates. They question the
validity of truth in theory-making on whether it can be called truth and whether it can progress
into mirroring reality. The traditional view is that science continually reaches closer
approximations of the truth and limits our empirical observations of the world from our theoryladen beliefs; this is known as scientific empiricism. Kuhn argues that science is discontinuous
and cyclical in nature and that it should be seen as a way to develop our knowledge of the world,
blurring the line between observations and beliefs. For this reason, Kuhn approaches historicism
in order to understand why science changes and why it should not be understood as being a
continuous, linear method of acquiring truth. Another view that tries to incorporate traditional
logical empiricist and anti-realist thought is Boyd’s take on scientific realism, in which he
approaches each by examining the strengths and weaknesses of arguments for and against
scientific realism. Each makes a compelling argument, but I believe that Kuhn’s revolution
should be accepted in guiding science for reasons discussed later. In this essay, I will briefly
explain the traditional view of science and its methods and delve into Kuhn’s radical ideas, then
examine Boyd’s realist argument, and lastly explain why Kuhn’s ideas should be scientifically
accepted.
Traditional science is recognized under Popper’s logical empirical realism. This method
of science inquiry is linear and cumulative, always aiming for truth and the creation of theories
that are based only on empirical observations (lecture). It explains the changes to, or revisions of,
theories that scientists make because Popper suggests that the testing of theories is never
confirmed and is always falsified. What this means is that if a hypothesis should be regarded as a
“truth,” it should have a certain degree of inherent falsifiability; it should be accepted as
potentially being proven wrong after thorough examination and dispute. When a theory survives
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under such scrutiny, it is known as corroborated theory. This is normal science in that theories
continually adopt changes and becomes more “approximate” truth to how the observable world
actually is, allowing us to better predict how the world works and why it works (Kuhn,
postscript). In observing logical empiricism, the operations of science should be objective in
nature, independent of theory-laden beliefs towards the world. If it is not, then it would not be
science as understood from this perspective. However, examples like how we have knowledge of
astronomy, or electricity, produce discrepancies as to how an objective mind explains
unobservable phenomena and the laws they follow. Phenomena like gravity, astronomy, and
faster-than-light travel are understood today because we are aware of only concurrent
phenomena predicting their behaviors, and not the actual facts for why such behaviors exist. We
now turn to Kuhn’s descending theory of the methods of science.
Kuhn’s revolutionary interpretation of science is historically based from an anti-realist
perspective, also called constructivism. His view takes the assumption that the reason why our
theories change is not because we prove previous theories false but because we cannot answer
immediate problems within that theory’s paradigm of standards. Before we were able to explain
foundational sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology, science was at an immature level, in
that, at the time, different competing theories existed trying to understand the world. There was a
lack of uniformity, and once the best theory was accepted, we become immersed in those
theories respective paradigms by which we conduct normal science and knowledge develops.
Within mature science, paradigm shifts arise once we reach an unanswerable problem, or an
anomaly. We are able to shift into another paradigm where new rules are to be followed from
within that paradigm in order to answer that anomaly and other questions it poses to solve. When
the current paradigm cannot explain the solution the best theories are to be abandoned and new
ones develop and “replac[es] the first,” showing that normal science circles but never repeats in a
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cyclical nature (Ch. 9). Additionally, Kuhn points out that new paradigms do “not correct [the
previous]”, which pushes him to conclude that science is developmental and cyclical in that it
becomes “incommensurable;” meaning, the paradigms should be thought of as different worlds
with its own standards, never crossing worlds trying to compete against each other to solve the
anomaly (Ch. 10). With the examples of astronomy and electricity, subjectivity in creating
hypotheses allows scientists to hypothesize the unobservable aspects of the world such as the
metaphysical properties for knowledge. Once we conclude that there are particles in electricity,
we change our view of the concept as if we shifted into another paradigm (Ch. 10). The radical
consequence of Kuhn’s view is just this: we should accept our observations of the observable
and unobservable with theory-ladeness. In accepting theory-laden beliefs, he suggests that
science does not focus on approximating truth and mirroring the observable world but to come
closer to understanding the world and solving the puzzles which it creates. In other words, it
makes resolution from crises as the main focus of science.
Boyd describes scientific realism in four fundamental theses: (i) theoretical terms in
scientific theories are putatively referring expression and typically refer; (ii) scientific theories
interpreted realistically are confirmable and often confirmed as approximately true by ordinary
scientific evidence and method; (iii) scientific progress is cumulative and a matter of increasing
verisimilitude; and, (iv) the reality that scientific theories describe is largely independent of our
thoughts or theories (lecture).
Boyd first analyzes several different arguments that refute certain components of logical
realism and looks towards weaknesses in logical empiricism in order to improve scientific
realism. He remembers that logical empiricism denies theoretical knowledge, so by changing (iv)
he should reinterpret (iii) in order to allow theory-laden beliefs in explaining the unobservable.
Empiricists sharply draw the line between the observable and unobservable, under-determining
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theories by data. Boyd’s contribution of scientific realism also shows that there is an additional
significant flaw in empiricism such as the Evidential Indistinguishability Thesis. Since they
demarcate the observable and the unobservable, they fail in explaining unobservable “miracles”
without becoming arbitrators. In explaining their observations they believe that their data should
be perceived raw, but it does not follow the epistemology of its truth. This No-Miracle Argument
then shows that there is something fundamentally wrong with Popper’s science without any
indication of what exactly is wrong with it (54). It proves that the observational and unobservational worlds should not be as “sharp” and as arbitrary as when empiricists attempt to
explain the unobservable.
The second argument that Boyd takes into consideration is empiricist tradition in which
they deny (i) and (ii) and accept (iii). He believes that Kuhn’s anti-realist conclusion regards the
efficacy of part (iv) of scientific realism while accepting (i and ii) and reinterpreting (iii). Boyd
states that scientific theories developed in order to describe our reality suffer from the fact that
the methods used to reach these conclusions are products of social and intellectual constructs
similar to Kuhn (46). While empiricists believe that testing for and acquiring knowledge of
unobservable phenomena is impossible, anti-realists are able to use a priori knowledge in
guiding their actions. This leads to the notion that empiricists should only use their empirical
data as predictors and are unreliable because they can be disputed. Under anti-realism, scientists
are able to shift paradigms when they are unable to solve anomalies in the previous paradigm.
They have the background knowledge of the previous and are able to formulate new rules and
regulations under incommensurability in how to solve the new paradigm centered on the
anomaly. It makes the need to understanding the unobservable through former theoretical
knowledge and new knowledge acceptable, as in allowing a kind of imagination into problemsolving.
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When we compare Kuhn and Boyd’s alternatives for empirical realism, we see that there
is still a gap in explaining why successful evidence does not explain the success of science in
Boyd’s. However, the value of his contribution must not be overlooked. The major flaw of the
logical empiricist realism is that doing science rests on approximating truth by disproving
theories one after another. It makes science essentially weak when the foundations on which we
rest our new theory is able to falsify the previous. Additionally, it follows that it cannot explain
how successful scientific evidence is able to explain why science is successful in the long run.
Following this understanding, scientific understanding continues as one continues stream of
“progress” that has the potential to tip over and shatter. Boyd reinterprets (iii) to incorporate (iv)
into scientific realism. However, he wants to claim that we should take (iv) in face value because
we cannot know whether our theories that describe reality are independent of our thoughts and
theories. When he proposes this, it is as though he suspends judgment in order to blur the two
opposing views of the way we do science and what we count as science. We do not know
whether the theories we make are true or false yet (lecture). He sadly opens science’s success as
the inference to best explanation (IBE).
From inference to the best explanation, the problem that Popper and Boyd face is similar
to the problem of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature (PUN). If we were to accept Boyd’s
scientific explanation, we are ultimately accepting the circularity that Hume points out in his
problem of induction. IBE and PUN is characterized in the same way because of the gap it
creates when it presupposes that we are correct on the basis of the evidence collected that had
made us correct. In forming hypotheses and gathering data in order to support it, we are put into
the position of assuming that future consequences will be the same as in the past. It is irrational
and clearly contradictory of realist claims of truth and is exactly what is wrong with Boyd’s
solution to “inference to the best explanation” (IBE). In other words, we cannot explain why
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science is successful on the basis of our success in science based on our evidence of it. Our
collected data should not conclude that the success in our theories would follow in the next case;
otherwise, it would beg the question.
Meanwhile, Kuhn opens science to possibilities of the imagination in a way that
empirical realism and scientific realism cannot, as there must be more than one way of
conducting scientific inquiry. When it comes to topics in science like astronomy, gravity, and
electricity, even the subatomic particles that we cannot see with the naked eye, we enter a new
paradigm that allows us to formulate in greater detail theories that can help explain unobservable
phenomena such as these. Scientific theories may or may not be taken at face value because we
go along with what we are taught. However, given these arguments we may allow science to
progress in different paradigms instead of contending with just one theory that is stuck on an
anomalyl. Exploring the metaphilosophical nature of science allows our imaginations to reach
conclusions outside of our traditional paradigm of thought.
Within this essay I have briefly explained the traditional view of science that Kuhn
criticizes and postulates different means of understanding. Kuhn’s understanding of historicism
radicalized the way in which science can be understood and formed a way for theoretical
knowledge to be expanded upon as a method of science. By accepting that there is theory-laden
belief in producing theories of the observational and non-observational, science can progress
cyclically in the sense that it can fully develop our range of knowledge about the world
compared to traditional views. If we demarcate observation from theoretical knowledge and
progress linearly, we are bound to tip over and break entire theories in science from which we
cannot recover from. If we were to accept Boyd’s scientific realism, we may come closer to an
approximate truth; however, epistemologically, we may forget and question the validity of those
truths if we encounter an anomaly. Thus, Kuhn’s alternative to empirical realism is a better
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account in explaining how and why we do science, how and why our theories of knowledge
changes and also allows more room for progress.