Nuclear Proliferation in Asia:
India, Pakistan, China and the Threat to Global Security
Judy Wang
December 3, 2004
Engr 297a: Professor Bruce Lusignan
A Setback for Nonproliferation: Introduction
The United States pioneered the development of the nuclear bomb and ushered in
a new age of sophisticated and deadly weaponry. China soon followed and along with the
United States, France, Britain, and Russia, it became part of the five countries in the
world recognized to possess nuclear weapons. The most recent countries to join the
nuclear club, though the international regime tried to halt membership with the Non
Proliferation Treaty, are Pakistan and India. In 1998, both countries publicly tested their
own nuclear weapons, causing a whirlwind of problems for the world today. My paper
will outline the modern day arsenals of nuclear weapons in China, India, and Pakistan
and describe their strategic doctrine for the use of these weapons today. I will also
analyze the various international security fears stemming from the existence of these
weapons. Dr. Khan’s nuclear black market, the vulnerability of weapons, tensions in
South Asia, and the terrorist threat all create problems that extend beyond just a regional
concern; they are, indeed, global issues. Though these difficulties seem insurmountable, I
will recommend policies that can be taken to prevent these dangers and discuss what is
currently being done.
The Chinese Nuclear Arsenal and Strategic Doctrine:
“If China does not have atomic and hydrogen bombs and has not launched
satellites since the 1960s, it is not worthy of being called a big and influential country
and will not have its present international prestige.” –Deng Xiaoping1.
In the 1980s, China began to modernize its nuclear weapons, and it has continued
to this day. Though specific information on China’s arsenals and plans to advance its
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technology are unknown, there is reliable evidence on both. China relies mainly on its
ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads, of which there are five main types: the DF-3,
DF-4, DF-5, DF-21, and DF-31. Currently, the DF-3 is being retired as China moves to
longer range missiles2. To replace the outdated DF-3 missiles, China built the DF-21,
some of which are conventionally armed. The most modern of these missiles are the DF31s, which can travel 8,000 kilometers and are aimed primarily at Russia and American
bases in Asia. Future modernization plans include revamping the DF-31 to extend its
range to approximately 12,000 kilometers, so that it can be targeted at the United States3.
This new DF-31 missile is sometimes known as the DF-41, though its proper name is the
DF-31A4. Though deployment of this missile is unknown, it is projected to occur
between 2006 and 20105. While exact numbers of ballistic missiles are unknown, it is
believed China has 20 liquid-fueled intermediate range DF-4s, 48 medium range solidfuel DF-21s, and 20 silo-based intercontinental DF-5s, which can reach the United
States6.
China’s sea-based and air-based weapons capabilities are not as advanced as their
missiles. China’s sea-based strategic nuclear force consists of one Xia-class submarine,
named the Xia, which carries 12 warheads with a range of approximately 1,700
kilometers. China also has around 100 Hong-6 medium range bombers to carry nuclear
warheads7.
U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that China has 20 nuclear warheads, but this
number is expected to rise. By 2015, the U.S. predicts China will have 75-100 warheads,
mostly targeted at the United States8. Though the accuracy of these numbers is obscure, it
is known that China has the capability to produce far more than its current stockpile
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holds. Based on their strategic doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons, China has chosen
not to manufacture more warheads than it feels necessary.
Immediately after conducting its first nuclear explosion in 1964, China announced
its intention to abide by a “no-first use” policy9. This coincides with Chinese thinking
that nuclear weapons are largely a political symbol used to deter adversaries rather than
attack them. A “no-first use” policy is China’s guarantee that it will never be the first to
start a nuclear war and engage in mutually assured destruction. To further illustrate
China’s no-first use policy, it is believed that China keeps its nuclear weapons under tight
command and control with the missiles unfueled and the warheads stored separately10.
China has also never participated in an arms race as the United States and Soviet Union
did during the Cold War. Instead, China relies on a “limited deterrence” 11. To the
Chinese, limited deterrence is the intermediary between “minimum deterrence” and
“maximum deterrence”. It is the ability to survive a first strike and respond
proportionally12. China’s intention is to dissuade other countries from intervening in local
wars or directly attacking China. With this type of doctrine, China is able to establish the
legitimacy of its nuclear weapons program while exercising restraint in their use.
India’s Nuclear Force and Deterrent Capabilities
Exact information of the size, complexity, and readiness of India’s nuclear arsenal
is unknown, but the Center for Defense Information suggests that India currently has 60
nuclear warheads with enough plutonium to manufacture 30-50 more13. India relies on
two main missiles the Prithvi and the Agni. The Prithvi missiles are short range, with the
ability to travel less than 500 kilometers. The Agni missiles, tested in January 2002, have
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a range of 700 kilometers. Currently, India is developing longer range Agni missiles that
can travel a distance of up to 5,000 kilometers14.
Other possible missiles for sea-based strength include a short-range Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile and a Submarine Launched Cruise Missile15. India also has a
sufficient arsenal for air-based nuclear warheads. Among the plans that could readily
carry nuclear weapons are India’s 147 MiG-27s and 88 Jaguars. Additionally, India has
150 MiG-21 fighters, 64 MiG-29s, and 36 Mirage 2000s available to upgrade for the task
of carrying nuclear warheads16.
India’s nuclear doctrine focuses on four main ideas: no first use, deterrence,
civilian command and control, and eventual global disarmament17. The no first use policy
signifies India’s commitment to never initiate a nuclear war. Like China’s doctrine, India
relies on its retaliatory strike capability to serve as a deterrent. India believes that as long
as it has a survivable force of nuclear weapons, a country will be deterred from attacking
for fear of a reprisal, which fulfills its credible minimum deterrence policy18. India’s
National Security Advisory Board released an official Indian doctrine outlining the
requirements for their deterrence in 1999. In it, the Indian government states that their
weapons need to be credible, effective, and survivable, meaning that India is able to
threaten and carry out a devastating attack if attacked first19. This is the minimum
deterrence policy that India pursues. Another aspect of India’s nuclear doctrine is to
ensure civilian leaders keep a firm grip on the nuclear arsenal20. Indian authorities assert
that only the highest of political leaders will have access and control of India’s nuclear
arsenal21. This minimizes the risk of an unauthorized launch or accidental war because of
both India’s no first use policy and its civilian command of the weapons. Though India
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does have nuclear weapons, it is still interested in world disarmament. If other countries
were to also pledge to rid themselves of their nuclear weapons, India would reciprocate
or so the doctrine claims22. The Indian doctrine as described on paper shows considerable
restraint in the use of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons and the Balance of Power
Intelligence experts estimate that Pakistan possesses anywhere from 30-50
nuclear weapons. Their delivery methods consist of missiles and fighter planes, all of
which originated from foreign technology. The Ghauri I and II are the Pakistani version
of the North Korean Nodong. These missiles have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers.
Pakistan also possesses the Shaheen I, derived from Chinese technology, and is
developing the Shaheen II. These missiles have a range of approximately 2,500
kilometers. Pakistan’s fighter planes capable of carrying nuclear warheads are Chinese
A5 fighter planes, French Mirage fighters, and 32 American-made F16s23.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Mian Khursid Mahmud Kasuri says that their nuclear
doctrine is aimed only to deter India; the rest of the world should not view Pakistani
nuclear weapons as a threat24. The Pakistani nuclear weapons program is viewed to be an
intrinsic part of Pakistan’s deterrence. Pakistan believes that their nuclear power is
crucial to preventing India from engaging in a limited war or a large-scale military
operation25. Pakistan has not agreed upon a no first use policy because it fears that
without the option of using nuclear weapons first, India could escalate any conflict into
conventional warfare. India has a far superior conventional army, which would put
Pakistan at a severe disadvantage in any conflict if it could not credibly threaten the use
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of nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels the only way to deter an Indian attack is to leave open
the option of using nuclear weapons during any type of conflict.
An International Nightmare Realized: A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is a national hero in Pakistan. He is known as the father
of Pakistan’s bomb, and indeed, Pakistan owes a lot of its success to him. Despite his
confessions of violating Pakistan’s export control regulations by selling nuclear
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea26, his status and prestige earned him a pardon
from Musharraf instead of criminal charges.
Though Pakistan passed laws prohibiting the export of nuclear materials, these
laws had loopholes and no authority to monitor compliance27. Khan operated mostly
through intermediaries and sold the technology through a black market. Pakistan strongly
denies ties with Khan’s illicit trade, claiming that they did not know about it, but this still
remains controversial today. It is hard to believe that Khan could have acted without a
higher authority, but officials in the Pakistani government say that Khan was able sell
technology without the government’s knowledge because he had virtually no authority
overseeing his actions28. There is evidence that the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency
(ISI) not only knew of A.Q. Khan’s transfer of technology, but assisted in smuggling the
material out of Pakistan29. Whether the Pakistani government simply failed to enforce its
own laws, ignored Khan’s proliferation, or complied with it remains to be seen.
A.Q. Khan is believed to have helped several countries in their quest for nuclear
weapons, but none more so than Iran. As early as 1987, under General Mohammed Zia
ul-Haq, Pakistan and Iran established a relationship for nuclear exchange30. Khan set up
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and maintained secret bank accounts for the money he received from Iran in exchange for
nuclear secrets and material. He used a middle man, Noman Shah, who was also his sonin-law until 1994, to broker deals with Iran31. Khan allegedly sold outmoded centrifuges
to Iran and the technical specifications and possibly components for modern models until
199532. The lax reinforcement of Pakistani laws and the lack of authority over A.Q. Khan
allowed him to smuggle material to other countries relatively easily. The case of covert
aid to Libya illustrates the disturbing ease at which countries wishing to acquire nuclear
weapons could do so. Libya is estimated to have purchased equipment worth $100
million that was intended to be used as a centrifuge plant 33. Khan also provided Libya
with at least 20 assembled centrifuges (outdated models) and 1.87 tons of enriched
uranium34, which is enough to fuel a plant. Even worse, it is believed that Khan sold
Libya the design for a workable nuclear weapon35.
Since the A.Q. Khan scandal, Pakistan has made efforts to reform its nuclear
export regulations. In late September 2004, the Pakistani government passed a bill known
as the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to
Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act. Any violation would
result in a maximum of fourteen years in prison, revocation of property and personal
belongings, and a fine of 5 million rupees. This law also extends to accomplices, who
would receive the same punishment36. The consequences of A.Q. Khan’s transgressions
threaten the world today. Pakistan is an example of how other countries or individuals
seeking financial gain could invalidate the international regime against nuclear
nonproliferation.
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Securing Our Future: Threat Reduction
Avoiding Nuclear Terror:
For the international community, the Khan scandal was a worst fear realized. The
thought of terrorists ever possessing these weapons is of main concern today. While
deterrence may work to prevent wars between states, the new emerging threat to the
world today is terrorism. Asia today is responsible for three quarters of terrorism
worldwide, and most of this comes from South Asia37. The growing power and
extremism of Islamic militants only serves to further destabilize South Asia and poses a
serious risk for the world, especially given the nuclear status of both India and Pakistan38.
Exploiting the vulnerability of weapons and political instability in Pakistan would be one
of the easiest ways for terrorists to get their hands on these weapons. As the head of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, asserts, “The danger is so
imminent... not only with regard to countries acquiring nuclear weapons but also
terrorists getting their hands on some of these nuclear materials, uranium or plutonium”39.
Pakistan is viewed as the most likely source of proliferation, either knowingly or
inadvertently.
The new relationship between Pakistan and the United States as well as Pakistan’s
hardened stance against Islamic extremists and terrorists make it unlikely that Pakistan
would knowingly provide terrorists with weapons. The main risk, as the A.Q. Khan
scandal demonstrated, is proliferation by Pakistani officials without government
authorization. The U.S. has also voiced its concerns over retired scientists in the Pakistani
nuclear agency that may have gone abroad to work for North Korea and share their
nuclear know-how40. Still, no one is ruling out the possibility of Pakistan selling nuclear
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material or information for financial gain. With a foreign debt of around $40 billion
dollars, the temptation to sell technology or knowledge might be too much for the
Pakistani government41.
As the Congressional Research Service notes, the main fear stemming from the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal is “that some members of the armed forces might covertly give
a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic
fundamentalist government or a state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to
obtain a weapon” 42. In recent years, however, the U.S. and Pakistan have worked
together to change Pakistan’s image in the international eye. As an ally in the war on
terror, Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to cracking down on Islamic extremism
to the delight of the international community and most importantly, to the appreciation of
India and the United States. Since 9/11, Musharraf has recanted on Islamabad’s earlier
claims that it provided “moral support” for the insurgency in Kashmir. The Pakistani
government now makes it clear that it opposes such attacks; Musharraf demonstrated this
with his ban of radical Islamic organizations43
.
Critics of Musharraf claim that he is not doing enough. They point out that these
organizations continue to exist under new names and that Musharraf can still do more to
improve on his current policies to suppress radicalism44. These accusations, however,
ignore the real progress Pakistan is making. Musharraf’s actions against fundamentalist
groups are more decisive steps than any other Pakistani leader has ever attempted45.
President Musharraf has continued to aggressively hunt terror suspects despite several
assassination attempts on his life and officials in his government, purported to be the
work of Al-Qaeda in response to Musharraf’s intolerance of militants46. Since 9/11,
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Pakistan has significantly aided the war on terror not only in Afghanistan, but also by
arresting more than 500 terrorism suspects and maintaining an army of 100,000
specifically for anti-terror efforts47. This has significantly improved Pakistan’s relations
with the international community because it is proving that it can be a country held
responsible for its people and actions. The effects of Pakistan’s new stance against terror
on its relationship with India will be discussed in a later portion of this paper.
The Chance of Accidental War and the Vulnerability of Weapons
While there has been no nuclear war between India and Pakistan since both
obtained nuclear weapons, this does not mean that there is no chance of a future one.
Though neither Pakistan nor India has used nuclear weapons, there is still a chance of
accidental war due to the vulnerability of their arsenals. The political instability and
economic failure in Pakistan further exacerbates this international concerns Pakistan
outwardly assures the international community of the security of their nuclear weapons,
but people within the Pakistani government often doubt the command and control of their
own weapons. A former Pakistani foreign minister, Agha Shahi, has described the high
risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch as neither Pakistan nor India have effective
early warning systems to detect missiles that have been fired48.
Some experts, like Stanford Political Science Professor Scott Sagan, argue that
the Pakistani nuclear weapons are vulnerable to unauthorized launch and possibly even
theft49. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal lacks several key safeguards. Pakistan does not place
Permissive Action Links (PALs) on their nuclear weapons. PALs work to prevent theft
and an accidental launch by preventing anyone without a specific code to detonate the
weapons50. Pakistan has also alerted its weapons during crises, like Kargil and in
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September and December of 2001, when they feared attacks from possibly Indian and the
United States because of terrorist attacks in both countries51. By alerting their weapons in
moments of crisis, the Pakistani government shortens the amount of time necessary
before a nuclear launch, thereby increasing the likelihood of an accidental launch. The
lack of safeguards coupled with the tensions between Pakistan and India increase the risk
of nuclear war.
The easiest way to alleviate the danger posed by the vulnerability of Pakistan’s
weapons is to ease tensions between Pakistan and India. This would ensure that Pakistan
would not need to alert its nuclear weapons and neither would have to fear an attack.
Recently, the two countries agreed to setup a nuclear hotline between top officials in both
foreign ministries. This hotline helps solve part of the problem: both countries can use it
to warn each other of accidents that could be mistaken for attacks52. The nuclear hotline
is a significant step in encouraging communication between the two countries. Other
actions both countries have initiated toward an Indian-Pakistani peace are discussed later
in my paper.
Pakistan has also reached out to the international community for assistance.
Recently, Pakistan has been working with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to safeguard their nuclear reactors and protect civilian facilities53. Pakistan’s
cooperation with the IAEA is one way to reduce the risks coming from its nuclear
arsenal, and further cooperation with the international community should be encouraged.
This is in the interest of international security. The United States’ role in reducing this
threat is also discussed later in this paper.
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An Optimistic Outlook on Future Policy:
The problems posed by nuclear proliferation are not unmanageable. There are
policies the U.S. and other countries can take to reduce these threats, but they will require
a genuine commitment to diplomacy and a concerted effort to implement solutions.
The Non Proliferation Treaty: Can it Find Success?
Though China is one of the main signatories on the NPT, the probability of India
and Pakistan signing the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is close to zero. The NPT would
not recognize either country as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), and neither country
would join as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS)54. The NPT is the closest statement
the world has on an international norm against the development of nuclear weapons. In
the past few years, however, the world has stood by and watched as the loopholes in this
treaty were exposed and the nonproliferation regime eroded. While India and Pakistan
chose to ignore the existence of the NPT, other countries, like North Korea, simply pulled
out of the NPT in response to international pressure for verification. India’s main
complaint against the NPT is that it seeks to allow the NWS to keep their nuclear
weapons while preventing every other country from obtaining them55. India views the
NPT as hypocritical because it does not allow any state to acquire nuclear weapons, yet
none of the five NWS are seriously making an effort toward disarmament. For Pakistan,
joining the NPT is also out of the question. The Pakistanis refuse to consider the treaty
unless India signs it. Since India refuses to, the chance of Pakistan ever signing it is also
close to zero56.
In order for the NPT to really succeed, the five NWS states must be committed to
eventual disarmament57. Dialogue must focus on both keeping the possession of nuclear
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weapons limited and finding a way to remove them from the international picture all
together. There also needs to be a stronger verification regime in place. Countries like
Iran expose loopholes by declaring their intent to develop nuclear technology for peaceful
uses. There is strong evidence to suggest Iran is using this technology to then move
forward with production of the bomb all under the guise of peaceful nuclear power58. The
NPT remains the central document cementing the international regime against
proliferation, but it must be strengthened before it can genuinely prevent countries bent
on acquiring nuclear weapons from doing so.
Conflicting Desires: China, Non Proliferation, and the Relation to U.S. Ambitions
China’s modernization of its nuclear forces has also proved to be of concern to the
international community. China asserts that the only reason it continues to modernize and
may even bulk up its nuclear weapons stockpile is because of a growing threat coming
from the United States59. In January 1999, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen
announced U.S. intentions to pursue missile defense, seeking to spend $6.6 billion for the
deployment of a national missile defense whereas previous funding had been limited to
research and development60. Both China and Russia are strong opponents of a U.S.
missile defense because U.S. efforts to increase its own security detract from their
deterrence. Putin announced in November 2004 that Russia was going to continue
building advanced nuclear weapons, which many experts warn is the latest sign that a
U.S. missile defense will not go unchallenged and could lead to a new arms race61. As the
United States continues its plans for missile defense, China must also find new ways to
defend itself, lest its nuclear forces lose their deterrence credibility. China also opposes
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U.S. missile defense for fear that it undermines the nonproliferation regime and will lead
to a general deterioration of attempts at global disarmament62.
Indeed, the nonproliferation regime has experienced a setback because important
treaties, such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) have remained deadlocked
due to conflicting Chinese and U.S. interests63. This further demonstrates the claims of
hypocrisy India makes against the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states. While the U.S.
works hard to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons, it does not make
nearly the same effort to disarm its own arsenal. Programs like the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) prevent proliferation by making it illegal to transport any WMD-related
material64. A UN Security Council Resolution that criminalizes proliferation was also
heavily supported by the U.S. 65. Global treaties like the FMCT, which cuts of the
production of fissile material, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which calls
for a nuclear test ban, also work to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but with one
important exception: it not only prevents the spread of weapons, but also forces current
nuclear weapons states from continuing to develop their weapons. The U.S. opposition to
these treaties and its decision to continue developing national missile defense
demonstrates a flagrant noncommittal attitude toward disarmament.
The Chinese strongly oppose U.S. missile defense and as a result, refuse to
negotiate the FMCT. From the Chinese perspective, its security concerns over U.S.
missile defense prohibit them from signing the FMCT. If the U.S. can build a reliable
missile defense, then the Chinese will need to upgrade its arsenal so that it can still
maintain a credible deterrence66. China was willing to sign the CTBT because it believed
that further nuclear testing would not change the deterrence balance67. China refuses the
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FMCT for this same reason: a successful U.S. missile defense would alter the strategic
balance and the Chinese would no longer be able to produce fissile material.
India, Pakistan, and Kashmir
The Kashmir issue has existed since the creation of both India and Pakistan. They
have fought wars and engaged in many other clashes in an attempt to control Kashmir.
Neither India nor Pakistan is willing to cede Kashmir to the other side, but diplomacy on
the issue has been slow. The past few years have brought about a great change in the
dialogue between the two countries as both India and Pakistan have met and discussed
Kashmir and their commitment to ending violence in the region. For the first time, peace
in the region is a possibility as long as both countries stay committed to dialogue and
diplomacy.
Pakistan wishes to speed up the negotiation process and has recently criticized
India for delaying discussions on the issue of Kashmir. India counters that Kashmir is not
the only issue it has on its plate and thus, should not prioritized above all else. Despite
these setbacks, the two countries remain committed to resolving their dispute and to their
cease-fire that was first announced in November of 200368. While there is still violence in
Kashmir, the cease-fire did end conflicts between troops deployed at the line of control.
Additionally, India is redeploying 40,000 troops out of Kashmir in a gesture of goodwill
to Pakistan69. This is an encouraging sign that both countries are serious about ending the
violence in Kashmir and making progress toward a solution. Other confidence-building
measures that have improved relations between India and Pakistan include a bus service
between Indian-held Kashmir and Pakistan-held Kashmir, meetings between the Indian
15
Border Security Force and the Pakistani rangers, a nuclear hotline to reduce the chance of
an accidental war70, and a proposed gas pipeline to India through Pakistan71.
It seems that for now Kashmir will remain disputed territory. Every meeting
between the two countries is viewed as progress in the hopes of one day reaching a
peaceful settlement. Peace between these bitter rivals will greatly increase global security
as well. Any reduction in tensions will further remove the need of nuclear weapons,
thereby decreasing the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch as well as theft
of the weapons by terrorists.
The United States’ Role in Stabilizing South Asia:
The U.S. and the Emerging Chinese Power:
It is estimated that over the next 15 years, China could increase the number of
warheads aimed at the U.S. from 20 to anywhere from 75-10072. Growing tensions over
missile defense could further erode the nonproliferation regime, something the world can
not afford. A simple solution would be to say that the United States should simply halt
efforts to deploy a national missile defense. This, however, does not seem politically
feasible given the current $9 billion appropriations passed for funding missile defense for
fiscal year 200573.
The danger in deteriorating Sino-American relations is not readily apparent. A
nuclear war between these two countries will almost certainly not happen; rather, the U.S.
needs Chinese cooperation in persuading North Korea to give up its alleged nuclear
arsenal. As the country with the most influence over North Korea, China has a unique
role in negotiations. It can credibly exert pressure on North Korea by threatening to cut
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off aid to the region74. Resentment toward the perceived U.S. anti-China “containment
policy” has led China to nearly stop wielding its influence over North Korea75. The
“containment policy” is a reference to Chinese beliefs that U.S-Japan-Taiwan
cooperation over missile defense is a method to breakdown China’s nuclear deterrent.
While China most likely would not approve reckless proliferation in North Korea, it will
not hesitate to deadlock the current 6-party negotiations over North Korean nuclear
devices76. The United States’ need for China to continue to facilitate discussions with
North Korea is evident. In October of 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell paid a visit
to Beijing in an effort to seek continued Chinese support of negotiations with North
Korea77. The U.S. is well aware that without Chinese assistance, it can not persuade
North Korea to end its proliferation efforts.
The North Korean nuclear arsenal poses a grave threat to the nonproliferation
regime, considering that North Korea pulled out of the NPT in order to continue
developing nuclear weapons78. International concern is focused on a potentially
destabilizing new arms race and an increasing threat of terror. If North Korea continues
to develop and advance its nuclear weapons program, this could lead Japan to develop
some form of nuclear device because it may feel threatened due to its close proximity
with North Korea79. A Japanese decision to go nuclear might provide an incentive for the
Chinese to increase and upgrade its own arsenal, which sets off an alarming Asian arms
race80. Both India and Pakistan could also reexamine their own arsenals and doctrines if it
sees countries within its region doing the same. An increase in nuclear weapons in Asia
could motivate South Korea and Taiwan to once again pursue their own ambitions of
attaining nuclear power81. The North Korean nuclear weapons program could be the
17
match that ignites a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation that shatters the
nonproliferation regime and increases tensions exponentially in Asia.
The more immediate and pressing concern is the increased risk of global terror.
North Korea is in an impoverished nation and may consider selling its plutonium, highly
enriched uranium, or even weapons for financial gain. North Korean missile sales to
Pakistan and Iran are already a concern, and there is no certainty that North Korea would
not consider selling its material to other potential buyers82. These issues are all ones that
need to be addressed, and the U.S. can certainly use this opportunity to demonstrate its
commitment to nonproliferation.
China’s concerns over the credibility of its nuclear deterrence are easily alleviated
if the U.S. can give China security assurances over non-aggression. Ideally, the U.S.
would not engage in missile defense, but since this does not seem realistic, the U.S.
should at least try to open dialogue with China addressing Chinese concerns. A stronger
Sino-American relationship would also reduce the threat of North Korean nuclear
proliferation because China would once again exert pressure on North Korea to agree to
new negotiations. If the Chinese do not feel threatened by U.S. missile defense and if the
North Koreans agree to stop building its arsenal, the international community could
breathe easier knowing the chances of nuclear terror and an Asian arms race have
significantly diminished.
Pakistan and the United States: A New Alliance
Since September 11, the United States has considerably improved its relations
with Pakistan. Pakistan’s assistance in the war against the Taliban was critical to rooting
18
the Taliban out of Afghanistan, but the threat of Islamic militants still remains. The
United States is actively engaged in aiding Pakistan with money and military technology.
President Bush has declared Pakistan an ally and approved a package to give Pakistan
three billion dollars over five years to meet economic and security needs83.
One of the international community’s greatest concerns still remains the
vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the instability of the country itself. If a
radical Islamic group were to overthrow the government, they would have control of
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as well. The United States recognizes this dilemma and has
opened up greater communication with Pakistan, specifically through funding for the
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program. To prevent any
covert smuggling operations, this program provides funds for training and equipment for
border control personnel. In addition, the U.S. agreed to help Pakistan on enforcement of
export laws. Plans to include Pakistan in upcoming summits concerning non-proliferation
are also being made, though their status is unsure84.
U.S. and India Relations:
The United States’ is not as close with India as with Pakistan. There is not as
much fear or security concerns over the status of India’s nuclear weapons as there is with
Pakistan’s. Their main focus with India is to ensure that India acts responsibly and does
not engage in any illicit proliferation. The United States, along with the rest of the
international community, expects India to act as any of the acknowledged five nuclear
weapons states would85. India has also reaffirmed its commitment to being a responsible
nuclear power86. The United States and India have held discussions and conducted
training for Indian customs officials in an effort to prevent India from becoming the next
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proliferation hotspot. The United States hopes that this cooperation will expand and lead
to more open dialogue with India in the future87.
Ensuring Future Peace
As the world’s sole superpower, the U.S. has an undeniable role to push
nonproliferation as a priority on the international agenda. It is then up to the international
community to do its part in reinforcing the norm against the spread of nuclear weapons.
Engaging China, India, and Pakistan in talks on arms control and non proliferation will be
crucial to global security.
With China, the United States must continue to emphasize common interests and
assuage Chinese security concerns. The Chinese are only interested in maintaining a
limited deterrence, one that they feel will be nonexistent if the U.S. deploys missile
defense. As long as the U.S. allows China to maintain this deterrent, talks with North
Korea will continue and the chance of an Asian arms race is diminished. A U.S-China
relationship must be mutually beneficial to both countries88.The U.S. must seek Chinese
cooperation on the issue of North Korea while at the same time prove that a U.S. –JapanTaiwan relationship is not a threat to Chinese security. This can be done simply by
involving China in more multilateral talks and agreements.
Peace between India and Pakistan reduces the risk of an accidental launch or
unauthorized war, which makes the Kashmiri peace process important to the international
community. The U.S., as an ally of both countries, must continue to press for talks. The
aid to Pakistan is valuable in curbing the spread of Islamic militancy and securing
20
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. As long as terror remains a global security threat, the U.S.
must continue to aid Pakistan and maintain their current relationship.
To do its part, the international community must continue working toward global
disarmament and strengthen the NPT. Brokering and enforcing global treaties is the best
way for countries to reiterate their stance against proliferation. Success can only be
found, however, if there is an equally strong commitment to disarmament as there is to
nonproliferation.
Endnotes:
1. Federation of American Scientists. Chinese Nuclear Doctrine. April 2000.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/overview.htm
2. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nuclear Notebook. “Chinese Nuclear Forces,
2003”. November/December 2003. pp. 77
3. Lewis, Jeffrey. The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in
the Nuclear Age. 2004. pp. 36.
4. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, supra n.2 at 77.
5. Id, pp.77.
6. Nuclear Arsenals, Center for Defense Information. Washington DC, 2003
http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfm
7. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, supra n.2 at 78.
8. Id, pp. 79.
9. Federation of American Scientists, supra n.1.
10. Lewis, supra n.3 at 41.
11. Johnston, Alastair Iain. “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited
Deterrence”. International Security. Vol. 20, No.3, Winter 1995/96. pp. 5.
12. Id, pp. 19.
13. Nuclear Arsenals, supra n. 6.
14. Id.
21
15. Thomas, Raju G.C. “Whither Nuclear India?” Eds. D.R. SarDesai and Raju G.C.
Thomas. Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, New York: 2002. pp. 12.
16. Nuclear Arsenals, supra n. 6.
17. Subrahmanyam, K. “India and the International Nuclear Order”. Nuclear India in
the Twenty-First Century. Eds. D.R. SarDesai and Raju G.C. Thomas. PalgraveMacmillan, New York, New York: 2002. pp. 77.
18. Id, at 78.
19. Perkovich, George. “What Makes the Indian Bomb Tick?” Eds. D.R. SarDesai
and Raju G.C. Thomas. Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, New York: 2002. pp.
52.
20. Subrahmanyam, supra n. 17 at 80.
21. Perkovich, supra n.19 at 53.
22. Subrahmanyam, supra n.17 at 81.
23. Nuclear Arsenals, supra n.6.
24. Nartker, Mike. “Pakistan: Nuclear Arsenal is “India-Specific,” Foreign Minister
says” January, 30, 2003. Nuclear Threat Initiative: www.nti.org.
25. Lavoy, Peter R. and Clary, Christopher. “Strategic Stability in South Asia”.
Center for Contemporary Conflict, Conference Summary: June 29-July 1, 2004.
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/jul04southasia.pdf
26. Koch, Andrew. “The Nuclear Network—Khanfessions of a proliferator”. Jane’s
Defense Weekly, February 25, 2004. www.4janes.com
27. Lin, Shi-Chin. The A.Q. Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani
Export Controls. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 2004. Nuclear
Threat Initiative: www.nti.org.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. John, Wilson. “Iran, Pakistan, and Nukes”. The Washington Times, October 4,
2004. available through lexisnexis.
31. Id, at 1.
32. Sanger, David E. “Key Pakistani is Said to Admit to Atom Transfers”. New York
Times. February 2, 2004.
22
33. Braun, Chaim and Chyba, Christopher F. “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to
the Nonproliferation Regime”. International Security. Vol.29 No.2, 2004. pp.5-49
34. Kampani, Guarav. “Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Talks from Pakistan”.
Monterey Institute of International Studies. February 23, 2004.
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm
35. Braun and Chyba, supra n.33 at 16.
36. Lin, Shi-Chin, supra n. 27.
37. Chellaney, Brahma. “Lessons from Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia”. The
Use of Force, 6th ed. Eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 2004. pp. 458.
38. Laqueur, Walter. “The Changing Face of Terror”. The Use of Force, 6th ed. Eds.
Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 2004. pp. 454.
39. BBC News World Edition, “Nuclear Terror ‘Matter of Time’”. June 21, 2004.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3827589.stm
40. Bennett Jones, Owen. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. 2nd ed. Yale University Press,
2003. pp. 219.
41. Id.
42. Hasan, Khalid. “Pakistan feared as a source of nuclear terror”. The Daily Times.
July 10, 2004. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-102004_pg7_6
43. Bennet Jones, supra n.40 at 29-31.
44. Id, at 26.
45. Id, at 106.
46. Ahmad, Munir. “Al-Qaeda linked group claims assassination attempt in Pakistan,
threatens more attacks”. The Associated Press. July 31, 2004. available through
lexisnexis.
47. “Pakistan’s role in war against terror remains significant, and could not be
brushed off”. The Pakistan Newswire. August 9, 2004. available through
lexisnexis.
48. Bennet Jones, supra n. 40 at 208.
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49. Sagan, Scott D. and Waltz, Kenneth N. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A
Debate Renewed. 2nd ed. New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
2003. pp. 101.
50. Id, at 103.
51. Id.
52. Huggler, Justin. “India and Pakistan to have Nuclear Hotline”. The Independent,
June 21, 2004. available through lexisnexis.
53. Gottemoeller, Rose and Longsworth, Rebecca. Nuclear Security in the
Counterterrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002. available at www.ceip.org,
pp. 14.
54. Paul, T.V. “India, the International System, and Nuclear Weapons”. Nuclear India
in the Twenty-First Century. Eds. D.R. SarDesai and Raju G.C. Thomas.
Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, New York: 2002. pp. 99.
55. George, Nirmala. “India won't sign nonproliferation treaty in present form, prime
minister says”. The San Francisco Chronicle, October 7, 2004. www.sfgate.com.
56. Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, 2002.
www.fas.org.
57. The five countries recognized to have nuclear weapons by the NPT are the United
States, Russia, Britain, France, and China.
Elbaradei, Mohamed. Remarks to the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Conference on International Non-Proliferation. The Federal News Service,
June 21, 2004. available through lexisnexis.
58. “The Nuclear Route: Europe and Iran”. The Economist, November 13, 2004.
59. “China’s Opposition to U.S. Missile Defense Programs”. Center For
Nonproliferation Studies. http://www.nti.org/db/china/mdpos.htm
60. Lewis, supra n. 3 at 56.
61. Rosenberg, Eric. “Russia’s Move Could Signal Renewed Arms Race”. The
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. November, 21, 2004. available through lexisnexis.
62. “China’s Opposition to U.S Missile Defense Programs”, supra n.59.
63. Lewis, supra n.3 at 168.
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64. The text of the Proliferation Security Initiative can be found at the U.S.
Department of State website here: http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726.htm
65. Braun and Chyba, supra n. 33 at 35.
66. Lewis, supra n.3 at 168.
67. Id.
68. Watson, Paul. “Pakistan India Still Far Apart as Summit ends; Diplomats repeat
usual positions on Kashmir but renew commitment to a cease-fire there.” The Los
Angeles Times, September 7, 2004. available through lexisnexis.
69. “Singh on a sticky wicket; India’s prime minister visits Kashmir”. The
Economist.com November 17, 2004. available through lexisnexis.
70. Waldman, Amy. “India and Pakistan End 2 Days of Talks; Make Gains on Some
Issues but not on Kashmir”. The New York Times, September 7, 2004. available
through lexisnexis.
71. Kripalani, Manjeet. “Thirst Brings a Thaw”. Business Week. 3908 (2004) 62.
72. Nuclear Arsenals, supra n. 6.
73. Historical Funding for Missile Defense can be found at the Department of
Defense site: http://www.acq.osd.mil/mda/mdalink/pdf/histfunds.pdf
74. “Technology in National Security” Lecture. Professor William Perry, November
24, 2004.
75. Lam, Willy. “Beijing’s North Korean Gambit” October 28, 2004.
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=16260
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Du Preez, Jean and Potter, William. “North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT: A
Reality Check”. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Monterey Institute of
International Studies. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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83. Parmeswaran, P. “U.S. told to step up aid to Pakistan as part of global anti-terror
strategy” Agence France Presse, July 23, 2004. available through lexisnexis.
84. Lin, Shi-Chin, supra n. 27.
85. Professor David Holloway, Stanford University. Interview on November 17,
2004.
86. George, supra n.55
87. Rocca, Christina B. Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs. Remarks to
Confederation of Indian Industry. May 14, 2002. available at www.state.gov.
88. Carter, Ashton B. and Perry, William J. Preventive Defense: A New Security
Strategy for America. Brookings Institution Press. Washington D.C.: 1999. pp.
105.
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