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The threat of stratospheric ozone depletion to human and environmental health provide an interesting insight into economic and administrative rationalist responses to environmental issues. This paper considers administrative and economic rationalist responses to anthropogenic depletion of the ozone layer, examines the limits of both approaches and considers some reasons why the administrative mechanisms implemented under the umbrella of the Montreal Protocol were chosen in preference to economic rationalist measures.
My contention is that industry responses to stratospheric ozone depletion and global warming provide good examples of the limits of economic rationalism as independent means of avoiding environmental harm. I conclude that despite the shortcomings of administrative and economic rationalist approaches in dealing with environmental harm, the examples of stratospheric ozone depletion and global climate change suggest the interaction of State sponsored action and economic criteria can nevertheless produce effective responses.
T HE L IMITS O F R ATIONALITY I N G LOBAL E NVIRONMENTAL I SSUES
Global environmental risks belong to a class of issues that lead to decision making that is made outside the bounds traditionally considered as rational.
1 This has arisen because rational decision making is customarily based on degrees of certainty and proof that often elude assessment of environmental risk.
2
Consequently, as Doyle and Kellow identify, the uncertainties inherent in environmental issues and difficulty in translating policy between bureaucracies can be used to justify the status quo.
3 We might therefore expect that the Earth’s atmosphere would be an obvious arena to witness Garrett Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the
Commons’. Self-interested exploitation of the atmospheres’ utility would appear probable, and given inherent complexity and jurisdictional problems, State-sponsored administrative responses concomitantly unlikely.
Nevertheless, as this paper illustrates, while the distinction between economic and administrative rationales is less precise than experience suggests, administrative action stimulated by public support can provide effective responses to environmental harm.
S TRATOSPHERIC O ZONE D EPLETION
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer was a landmark change in societal responses to environmental threat. The political and economic rationales between 1974 and 1987 provide an
1 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, The ‘successful’ ozone-layer negotiations: Are there any lessons to be learned? Global
Environmental Change: Human and Policy Dimensions, Vol 2 No. 4, 249.
2 Cameron, J 1993, The Precautionary Principle - Core Meaning, Constitutional Framework and Procedures for
Implementation. Proceedings of the Precautionary Principle Conference, 1.
3 Doyle, T. and Kellow, A. 1995, Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia, 144.

interesting window into the merits of administrative and economic rationalist perspectives on the amelioration of human-induced environmental degradation.
The Montreal Protocol is extremely significant as it represents the first international agreement designed to cope with a truly ecological problem.
4 Its significance also lies in the fact that the Montreal Protocol imposed substantial short-term economic costs to protect the environment against predicted dangers that rested on scientific theories rather than on proven facts. Unlike environmental agreements of the past, it was not a response to observed harmful events, but rather preventive action on a global scale.
5
T HE C AUSES A ND E FFECTS O F S TRATOSPHERIC O ZONE D EPLETION
Human-induced depletion of stratospheric ozone beyond climactic norms is considered a proven phenomenon.
6 Furthermore, the changes induced by stratospheric ozone layer depletion and resultant increase in ultraviolet radiation have potentially deleterious consequences for all living things, with the anticipated effects on animal and human health include increased incidences of skin cancer 7 , eye diseases, exposure to infectious diseases, and UV -induced immunosuppression.
8 Significantly, while damage occurs instantly, it may take decades before it results in illness.
9
While it is now accepted that stratospheric ozone depletion stems from the increased chlorine loading of anthropogenic organochlorine and bromine chemicals such as CFC s and halons 10 , no one had suspected such a possibility when General Motors developed CFC s in 1931.
11 Unaware of their propensity to migrate to the stratosphere and to catalyse the disassociation of ozone 12 , the inert nature of CFC s and halons led people to think they were both safe and environmentally neutral for over 40 years.
13 Significantly, however, while evidence established a link between the release of these substances with stratospheric ozone layer depletion as early as 1974, industry response ensured that sufficient remedial action was delayed for 13 years.
14
Consequently, rather than demonstrating the claims of free market environmentalists that the potential for bureaucratic regulation is characterised by inefficiency, regulatory capture and corruption 15 , as the following account details, the distortion of the free valuing of environmental goods inherent in their economic rationalist approaches provides a stark illustration of their limited approach to environmental issues.
4 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 294.
5 Benedick, R. 1991, ‘Building on the Vienna Convention’ in Greenhouse Warming: Negotiating a Global Regime, 9.
6 Tsamenyi, M. and Bedding, J. 1990, ‘The Australian Legislative Framework For The Protection Of The Ozone Layer’ in Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol 7, 3.
7 National Health And Medical Research Council 1989, Health Effects of Ozone Layer Depletion, v.
8 Longstreth et al, 1991, ‘Human Health’ in Environmental Effects Of Ozone Depletion: 1991 Update Panel Report Pursuant
To Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol On Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer, 16.
9 Cagin, S. and Dray, P. 1993, Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs Changed Our World And Endangered The Ozone Layer, 324.
10 Fraser, P. J. 1988, Environmental, Health And Economic Implications Of The Use Of Chlorofluorocarbons As Aerosol
Propellants And Possible Substitutes, 10.
11 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 295.
12 Ibid.
13 Parson, E. A. 1993, ‘Protecting the Ozone Layer’ in Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International
Environment Protection, 29.
14 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. 1992, International Law and the Environment, 388.
15 Eckersley, R. 1995, Markets, the State and the Environment: Towards Integration, 15.
The Politics Of Ecology: Essay One/ David Risstrom / Page 2

M AKING T HE L INKS B ETWEEN C ONCERN A BOUT O ZONE D EPLETION
The implications of ozone depletion first surfaced in an international arena at the 1972 U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment preparatory meeting, where research was presented that proved that supersonic transport ( SST ) exhaust was a much greater threat to stratospheric ozone than earlier assumed.
16 Aggravating
SST proponents, the USA National Cancer Institute calculated that SST flights might result in up to 103,000 additional adult cases of skin cancer annually, stating that ‘skin cancer might well prove to be only one of the health effects of having tampered with the ozone layer, and not necessarily the worst.’ 17 Nevertheless, lack of certainty led the conference to only recommend monitoring and increased research.
18
Research published in 1973 indicated that rocket exhaust could catalyse the destruction of ozone for several decades.
19 In the same year, Molina and Rowland published their discovery that chlorofluorocarbons are neither chemically broken down nor easily rained out.
20 While neither research group anticipated finding a link between CFC release and stratospheric ozone depletion, their findings came as an environmental and economic bombshell, as millions of tonnes of CFCs were already migrating towards the stratosphere.
21 The
USA scientific community, which controlled about 80-90% of the world’s atmospheric science skills 22 responded by mounting a major research campaign.
23 Although studies confirmed the chlorine-ozone depletion linkage, natural fluxes in ozone density compounded uncertainty as to whether these studies were able to conclusively prove that stratospheric ozone depletion was occurring.
24
I NDUSTRY R ESPONSE
The economic significance of the CFC industry and the shortcomings of the Coase theorem soon emerged. The transnational chemical industry responded with research and public relations vigorously denying any connection between ozone layer depletion and the increasing sales of CFCs.
25 A Du Pont executive presented the industry position at a 1974 US Congressional hearing claiming, ‘The chlorine-ozone hypothesis is, at this time, purely speculative with no concrete evidence … to support it.’.
26 Arguing that the science was too speculative to justify regulation 27 , Du Pont claimed that restrictions on CFCs “would cause tremendous economic dislocation”.
28 Therefore, without sufficient certainty to counter economic rationalist imperatives, industry supporters forestalled precautionary action by creating the impression that a scientific battle was
16 Feldman, D. L. 1990, Global Climate Change Through International Cooperation, 37.
17 Cagin, S. and Dray, P. 1993, Op cit, 164.
18 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. 1992, Op cit, 392.
19 Stolarski, R. S. and Cicerone, R. J. 1974, ‘Stratospheric Chlorine: A Possible Sink for Ozone’ in Canadian Journal of
Chemistry, No. 52, 1610.
20 Molina, M. J. and Sherwood, S. 1974, ‘Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atomic Catalysed
Destruction of Ozone’ in Nature, Vol 249, 812.
21 Benedick, R. 1991, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet, 11.
22 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 300.
23 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 11.
24 Ibid.
25 Dotto, L. and Schiff, H. 1978, The Ozone War, 150.
26 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 12.
27 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 34-5.
28 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 31
The Politics Of Ecology: Essay One/ David Risstrom / Page 3

raging over ozone depletion.
29 Nevertheless, despite an inability to surmount industry resistance, administrative action began. UNEP began sensitising governments and public opinion about the potential danger, and by making research a priority, was able to provide the first official statement of international concern about CFCs.
30
O FFICIAL S CEPTICISM A ND E CONOMIC I NTERESTS
Nevertheless, export earnings from the sale of one third of its CFC production allowed companies such as ICI to influence UK government policy during this period.
31 Scepticism marked the official UK position from
1975 to 1988.
32 The official statement that ‘it is difficult to establish a direct quantitative relationship between decreases in the ozone column and the incidence of skin cancer’ allowed the UK Department of Environment to conclude that ‘there appears to be no need for precipitate action on this issue’.
33
Significantly, the competitiveness between ICI in the UK and Du Pont in the USA led UNEP’s Secretary
General, Mostafa Tolba to subsequently remark that the difficulties encountered in Montreal in 1987 had nothing to do with whether the environment was damaged or not, ‘It was all who was going to gain an edge over whom. Whether Du Pont would have an advantage over the European companies or not.’ 34
Recognising the difficulties inherent in translating information about complex environmental issues, UNEP established the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer in 1977, thereby forming an important information bridge between governments, scientists, industry, universities and international agencies.
35 In the same year, the USA banned the use of CFC s as aerosol propellants in non-essential applications 36 , though an industry lobby group known as the ‘Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy’ responded with a strong antiregulatory campaign in 1980.
37
C ONTINUING D EBATE
Understanding stratospheric ozone depletion became increasingly challenging. The complex interactions meant researchers had to examine the biosphere as a system of interrelated physical and chemical processes, which were in turn influenced by economic, political and social forces.
38 This was in contrast to established principles of reductionist science, which seeks greater certainty by isolating variables from their environment.
Following massive international co-operation, the UNEP publication Stratospheric Ozone 1985 concluded that evidence ‘strongly indicates that man-made chlorine compounds are primarily responsible for the decrease in
29 Cagin, S. and Dray, P. 1993, Op cit, 200-1.
30 World Meteorological Organisation, 1975, Statement on Modification of the Ozone Layer Due to Human Activities and Some
Possible Geophysical Consequences, Appendix.
31 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 39.
32 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 32.
33 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 39.
34 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 298.
35 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 41.
36 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 295.
37 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 36.
38 World Meteorological Organisation, 1986, Atmospheric Ozone 1985: Assessment of Our Understanding of the Processes
Controlling its Present Distribution and Change, 2.
The Politics Of Ecology: Essay One/ David Risstrom / Page 4

ozone.’ 39 Soon after, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was implemented with an emphasis on information exchange and further systematic research and monitoring.
40 The science since 1985 consistently moved towards greater concern 41 , allowing scientists to move beyond their agendasetting role to substantially influence negotiated decisions.
42 This increased political pressure on industry, with Du Pont announcing that CFC alternatives could be available within 5 years.
43
I NDUSTRY R EDUCES O PPOSITION
By 1986, in light of increasing public pressure and new administrative measures, industry resistance diminished greatly. Du Pont’s alternatives research spending increased from $5 million in 1986 to $30 million in 1988.
44 Within four months of the Montreal negotiations, several hundred industry representatives met to exchange information and to stimulate research on CFC alternatives.
45 Within one year, it was generally accepted that a 50% reduction of CFC s and halons was achievable relatively quickly and inexpensively.
46
In the same year, a US EPA report estimated that the benefits from controlling CFC s outweighed the anticipated costs of a business as usual approach by a factor over 150 47 , largely attributable to an estimated
$6.4 trillion saving from avoided early cancer deaths in the US population born before 2075.
48 Similar reports concluded that “…the monetary value of the benefits is undoubtedly much greater than the costs of CFC and halon reduction”.
49 Administrative action had thereby made the search for alternatives economically viable.
The Montreal Protocol set firm targets of up to 50% reductions for CFC s and halons by 1995 50 , though these were found wanting. Industrial research, testing, and innovation considerably increased the options for replacing and conserving CFC s 51 , allowing parties to declare at their first Protocol meeting in 1989 that they intended to phase out CFC s by the year 2000 52 , and halons as soon as possible.
53 1990 and 1992 amendments dramatically accelerated the phase-out schedules, with the timetable for eliminating some prescribed substances being brought forward 54 , and adding other substances to the list.
55
Although not all participants in the subsequent negotiations accepted that the full phase-outs were justified, those who did not were isolated and unable to block agreement.
56 Furthermore, as the industrialised
39 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 295.
40 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 294.
41 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 61.
42 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 62.
43 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 296.
44 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 41.
45 Benedick, R. 1991, Op cit, 104.
46 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 296.
47 Markandya, A. 1991, Economics and the Ozone Layer in Blueprint 2: Greening the World Economy, 64.
48 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 69.
49 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 297.
50 Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, 1992, 1992 The IPCC Supplement, 38.
51 Benedick, R. 1991 Op cit, 133.
52 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 294.
53 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 47.
54 Benedick, R. 1991 Op cit, 139.
55 Benedick, R. 1991 Op cit, 190.
56 Parson, E. A. 1993 Op cit, 62.
The Politics Of Ecology: Essay One/ David Risstrom / Page 5

countries consumed about 88% of all CFC s while having only 25% of the world’s population, some less developed countries felt that foregoing the benefits of CFC s, while paying the human and environmental price for ozone depletion was unfair.
57 Cognisant of the uneven economic impact, the amendments permitted developing countries to delay compliance 58 , and established a fund to facilitate conversion to alternatives through co-operation and technology transfer.
59
In summary, because the understanding of ozone depletion was insufficient to provide definitive portrayals of cause and effect 60 , controversy was generated as to how uncertainty should be reflected in policy.
61 This enabled corporations to resist the regulation of ozone depleting substances by lobbying decision makers to defer regulation, which in light of the assessment of environmental risk were objectively considered rational.
62
Nevertheless, as the Montreal Protocol and subsequent amendments demonstrated, the diffusion of information across different bureaucracies, increased certainty and public responses to the potential impact of ozone depletion eventually led to an unprecedented level of response.
T HE P ARALLELS T O C LIMATE W ARMING
While the response to the threat to the ozone layer demonstrated that administrative action could overcome industry use of economic rationalist arguments in the light of uncertainty, a similar pattern became apparent in industry response to global warming.
Reviewing a period of ‘global warming bashing’ 63 , Mark Diesendorf examined the power that business interests, especially the producers and consumers of large quantities of energy from fossil fuels, can wield in encouraging a ‘business as usual’ approach to environmental issues.
64 While the ESD process had sought to encourage precautionary measures according to the principle that ‘the shortcomings of our knowledge need not inhibit the … initiation of ‘no regrets’ and limited ‘insurance measures’ 65 , according to Diesendorf, ‘This was clearly too threatening to industry interests, both within the government and in the private sector.’ 66
Despite potential for ‘no regrets’ actions to reduce Australian greenhouse gas emissions, fossil fuel based industries mounted a massive media campaign founded on the claim that an interim target of reducing CO
2 emissions to 20% below the 1988 level by 2005 would only be achieved ‘at great expense.’ 67 This was despite the ESD Energy Use Working Group’s conclusion that stabilisation of Australia’s CO
2
emissions by energy
57 Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 298 .
58 Tsamenyi, M. and Bedding J. 1990, Op cit, 5.
59 Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. 1992, Op cit, 407.
60 Godard, O. 1992, ‘Social decision making in the context of scientific discoveries: The interplay of environmental issues, technological conventions and economic stakes’ in Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy Dimensions,
No. 23, 240.
61
62
Wynne, B. and Maher, S. 1993, ‘How science fails the environment’ in New Scientist, No. 1876, 33.
Skjærseth, J. B. 1992, Op cit, 249.
63 Cohen, S. J. 1993, ‘Climate change and climate impacts: Please don’t confuse the two!’ in Global Environmental Change:
Human and Policy Dimensions, Vol 3 No. 1, 4.
64 Diesendorf, M. 1993, ‘Can Science Protect The Earth’s Climate?’ in Proceedings of the Precautionary Principle Conference,
1.
65 Ecologically Sustainable Development Intersectoral Working Group 1992, Ecologically Sustainable Development
Intersectoral Issues Working Group Report, 39.
66 Diesendorf, M. 1993, Op cit, 2.
67 Diesendorf, M. and Kinrade, P. 1992, Paper: Integrated greenhouse policies for energy and transport, 6.
The Politics Of Ecology: Essay One/ David Risstrom / Page 6

efficiency could produce benefits of $3.3 billion to the year 2005 68 , while the 20% reduction target may be achievable at no net cost.
69 Furthermore, some business interests invoked the precautionary principle by arguing that a radical change to our energy production, consumption and trading would require a significant decline in the sales of coal and oil, which they claim would risk damaging the national economy.
70
While the 1992 Convention UN Framework Convention on Climate Change commits its signatories, including
Australia, to establishing aggregate greenhouse emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, the now defeated carbon tax proposal, widespread acceptance that the 1990 targets are practically unattainable, and the fact that the total volume of emissions has continued to rise suggest 71 our responses to global warming will be less decisive than that for ozone depletion.
T HE M ERITS O F E CONOMIC A ND A DMINISTRATIVE R ATIONALISM F OR E NVIRONMENTAL M ANAGEMENT
As this paper illustrates, responses to ozone depletion and global warming provide mixed messages about the relative strengths of economic and administrative rationalist responses to environmental harm. One hypothesis which may explain this disparity is the increased potential economic impact of ameliorative action concerns greenhouse gases when compared to ozone depleting substances.
In my view, despite the current success of the Montreal Protocol in responding to stratospheric ozone depletion, the above observations provide strong anecdotal evidence of the limits of economic rationalism in responding to global environmental threats. As Doyle and Kellow identify, I suggest this is particularly evident where the complexity and uncertainty surrounding environmental issues such as stratospheric ozone depletion and global warming mean that uncertainty and the concomitant problems of establishing rational can mitigate against meeting the holistic demands of ecology.
72
This is not to underestimate the shortcomings of administrative rationalist approaches of traditional bureaucracies in dealing with the inherent complexity and uncertainty surrounding ecological issues 73 . While environmental regulation may theoretically satisfy the administrative need for specificity, prospectivity, predictability and stability, problems inherent with their administration often mean that they do not live up to these ideal in practice.
74 Furthermore, administrative approaches have limitations in that they do not adapt well to changes in population, technology and economic activity, are ill-suited to forms of non-end-of-pipe environmental harm, are typically costly 75 , and are susceptible to free-rider problems.
76
In conclusion, the examples of stratospheric ozone depletion and global climate change provide what might be the most obvious example of a potential tragedy of the commons. While a variety of factors mitigated against
68 Diesendorf, M. and Kinrade, P. 1992, Op cit, i.
69 Diesendorf, M. and Kinrade, P. 1992, Op cit, 8.
70 Diesendorf, M. 1993, Op cit, 3
71 Christoff, P. 1995, Market-based Instruments: The Australian Experience’ in Eckersley, R., Markets, the State and the
Environment: Towards Integration, 169.
72 Doyle, T. and Kellow, A. 1995, Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia, 137.
73 Dryzek, J. 1987, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy, 26.
74 Fisher, D. 1993, Environmental Law: Text and Materials, 605.
75
76
Alm, A. 1992, ‘A Need For New Approaches’ in EPA Journal, 18, May/June, 1992 6-7.
Gillroy, J. M. 1992, ‘Public Policy and Environmental Risk: Political Theory, Human Agency, and the Imprisoned
Rider’ in Environmental Ethics, Vol 143, 219.
The Politics Of Ecology: Essay One/ David Risstrom / Page 7

ameliorative economic and administrative rationalist measures in isolation, growing public pressure and the synergistic effect of the two rationales appears to have authorised remedial administrative action. I also believe it provides one bit of evidence that the political pursuit of private gain espoused by Mitchell and
Simmons as a means of environmental protection is far from reliable in such circumstances.
77
Therefore, while delays in responding to the potential threats of stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change illustrate the difficulties inherent in translating ecological concerns into administrative action and appropriate policy responses, I believe the history of the Montreal Protocol measures demonstrate that with public support and a recognition of the limits of both economic and administrative measures in isolation, these problems are surmountable.
77 Mitchell, W. C. and Simmons, R. T. 1994, Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare and the Failure of Bureaucracy, 155.
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