THE STATE
1. Society and State
A society is a group of systematically interacting beings (whether or not they have a state).
A state is (very roughly) a rule-of-law-based coercive organization that, for a given territory,
effectively rules all individuals in it, is not effectively ruled by any other person or organization (so
that is the ultimate or supreme ruler), and claims a monopoly on the use of force. It is coercive in
that it prohibits at least some activities, threatens to use force against individuals who do not comply
with its directives (either via prior restraint to prevent violations or via punishment/compensation
extraction for violations), and generally does so in such cases. It is rule-of-law-based in that
(roughly) coercion is applied only for violation of public and proactive directives (and not on the
whim of its officials). (This condition is quite controversial and many reject it entirely or replace it
with something much weaker.) It effectively rules the individuals of a given territory if and only if
(1) its directives are generally obeyed by these individuals (in the sense of choosing at least in part
because of the existence of the dictate), and (2) it is not effectively ruled by some other organization
(e.g., it’s not merely the local branch of some organization). It claims a monopoly on the use of
force if and only if it prohibits the use of force (or credible threat thereof) without its permission
(or at least most such uses).
Non-coercive social institutions—such as a chess club that simply revokes membership of those
who violate the club rules—are not states. Voluntary coercive social institutions—such as a chess
club for which members explicitly agree to physical punishment if they violate the club rules—are
not states. Non-territorial-based, non-voluntary coercive social institutions—such as a chess club
that physically punishes chess players (even if not members)—but not non-chess players—that
violate the club rules—are not states (although they share many of the same problematic features:
non-voluntary coercion).
A government is a collection of individuals occupying the official positions in a state institutional
structure (e.g., the Bush government in 2004).
Questions:
(1) Suppose a rich individual owns a piece of land and makes, interprets, and enforces rules of
conduct for anyone on her land. Does that mean that there is (monarchical) state?
(2) Suppose a group of chess players form a club and purchase some land for it. Suppose further
that the group makes, interprets, and enforces rules of conduct for anyone on this land. Does that
mean that there is a state?
2. Morally Assessing the State
The state can be assessed in the same kinds of ways that individuals and individual actions can
be: (1) How virtuous is it (or its actions morally desirable)? (2) Does it act in a morally
permissible manner? (3) Does it act justly (i.e., without violating anyone’s rights; this excludes
impersonal wrongs)? (4) Are its activities morally legitimate (i.e., such that others have a duty
not to interfere forcibly with its activities). For elaboration on these issues, see “Moral
Assessment”.
State legitimacy:
The State
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A state is (morally) legitimate just in case others are not permitted to interfere forcibly
with its actions—either because these actions are permissible or because they are nonenforceably impermissible.
A state is externally (morally) legitimate just in case outsiders (e.g., other states) are not
permitted to interfere forcibly with its actions—either because these actions are
permissible or because they are impermissible but not enforceable by outsiders.
A state is internally (morally) legitimate just in case insiders (e.g., its citizens) are not
permitted to interfere forcibly with its actions—either because these actions are
permissible or because they are impermissible but not enforceable by outsiders.
Above “legitimacy” is used to mean a kind of sovereignty. The term is used other senses as well,
such as:
(1) having empirical popular support (common in political science);
(2) having a certain kind of normative (moral or prudential) popular support: e.g., justifiable to
those affected in terms of (perhaps, public) reasons they accept;
(3) permissibility, or justice (because of a liberty-right), of its enforcement of its directives (even
if it uses impermissible force for other purposes, or it fails to satisfy various other duties of
justice).
(4) the impermissibility or injustice (because of a claim-right), of others (outsides, and perhaps
members) forcibly interfering with its enforcement of its directives.
(5) some kind of right to rule (see below).
Political Power: The empirical power to make, apply, and enforce laws.
Political Authority: In addition to those assessments, a state can be assessed in terms of political
authority:
- A state has weak political authority just in case citizens have a (interpersonal or impersonal)
pro tanto moral duty to obey the state’s directives in virtue of the state having issued them (and
not some other reason).
- A state has strong political authority just in case citizens have a pro tanto interpersonal moral
duty (i.e., owed to someone; e.g., government officials or fellow citizens) to obey its directives in
virtue of the state having issued them.
- A state has ultimate political authority just in case (1) citizens have a pro tanto interpersonal
moral duty to obey the state’s directives in virtue of the state having issued them, and (2)
government official have no moral duty to obey the directives of some other organization (other
than the state in question).
The right to rule can be understood in several ways:
- Political authority (of one of the above sorts).
- The permissibility/justice of its exercise of political power (even if unjust in other ways,
no political authority, and no legitimacy).
- Legitimacy (even if no political authority and its exercise of political power is
impermissible/unjust).
- Political authority combined with the permissibility/justice of its exercise of political
power (even if not legitimate).
- Political authority combined legitimacy (even if impermissible/unjust to exercise its
political power).
Peter Vallentyne (February 6, 2016)
The State
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Permissibility/justice of its exercise of political power combined with legitimacy (even if
no political authority).
Political authority combined permissibility/justice of its exercise of political power (even
if unjust in other ways) combined with legitimacy.
Political authority combined permissibility/justice of all its actions (not merely the
exercise of political power).
Philosophical Anarchism comes in different forms: as the denial that the state has political
authority, as the denial that the state is just, and as the denial that the state is legitimate. (Political
anarchism as such does not entail that violence against state official is permissible. There will be
different views on this. Pacific political anarchism is one possibility.)
The above forms of anarchism can either be apriori (holding for all possible states) or a
posteriori (holding only of all states that have existed so far).
3. Dimensions of Basic Legal Social Structures
(1) The Political Dimension:
(a) How are the main government officials (key members of the executive, legislature, and
judiciary) selected?
In a direct democracy all citizens are members of the government.
In an indirect democracy the key members are chosen by the members of society.
In a system of tradition the key members are chosen on the basis of some tradition (e.g., hereditary
principle).
In a tyranny the key members use force and coercion to impose their rule.
(b) What is the role of the main government officials:
In rule by law the government officials establish laws, which are made public and are nonretroactive. They enforce such laws with no power to go beyond them.
In a dictatorship the government officials rule largely by decree with no constraint that the decrees
be made, or be made public, in advance of their application.
(c) How are powers divided between the government and individuals?
In a liberal state, there is a bill of rights protecting certain basic individual rights (limiting the
official power of the government).
In a totalitarian state, there is no bill of rights protecting certain basic individual rights.
(c) How are powers divided between the federal government and state (and local) government?
Peter Vallentyne (February 6, 2016)
The State
In a unitary state, the federal government has all the power (although it may revocably delegate it to
constituent state or local governments). (Many European states are unitary.)
In a federative state, the power is officially divided between the federal government constituent
state or local governments. (The U.S. and Canadian states are federative. A federative state is
different from a confederation. The latter is an association of independent states, where each state
agrees to, by treaty, each agrees to have certain specified matters (normally external) governed by
some specified collective decision process.)
(2) The Economic Dimension:
(a) Ownership: What kinds of things may be privately owned? What kind of things may be the
state? (Who decides how the operations are to be run? Who gets the profits of operation?)
Here and below “state ownership” is short for some form of ownership by all citizens of the state.
(i) Focusing on the means of production and distribution (and assuming that consumer goods may
be privately owned):
In pure capitalist systems all means of production and distribution may be privately owned, and
none may be state owned.
In impure capitalist systems all means of production and distribution may be privately owned, and
major means of production and distribution may also be owned by the state.
In a minimal socialist system major means of production and distribution may be owned by the
state, but may not be privately owned. Minor means of production and distribution may be privately
owned, but may not be state owned.
In a maximal socialist system all means of production and distribution must be state owned.
(ii) The above classification scheme focuses on the means of production. A different approach
focuses on the three factors of production and consumption: agents, natural resources
(unproduced non-agent resources such as land, water, air, and oil), and artifacts (produced nonagent resources such as cars, machines, and chocolate bars)—where it makes no difference
whether the factors are used for production (using water to produce soft-drinks) or for
consumption (drinking water).
The most plausible category for private ownership is that of agents. Each agent owns
him/herself. The most plausible category for state ownership is that of natural resources (which
no one produced). Artifacts are produced by applying the labor of agents to natural resources,
and perhaps to other artifacts. Hence, their status will largely be determined by the status of
agents and natural resources.
(b) The Regulation of Business: How much government regulation (as opposed to civil law) is
imposed on how businesses may operate? For example, what regulations are there concerning what
may be produced, how much may be produced, minimum wages, maximum work weeks, pollution,
workplace safety, product safety, or discrimination in the workplace?
Peter Vallentyne (February 6, 2016)
The State
In a laissez-faire market system the only government regulation is that against violating the
extended libertarian constraints (see Notes on Moral Theory).
In a regulated market system there is more government regulation, but the market remains the basic
mechanism for determining how much of what is produced for what price.
In a planned economy the government makes most of these decisions and the market plays little
role.
(c) The Regulation of the Economic Affairs of Private Individuals:
(1) To what extent is there paternalistic taxation (including obligatory contribution plans), i.e., to
what extent are individuals forced to pay for programs for their own good (e.g., pension plans,
health insurance, unemployment insurance, education)?
(2) To what extent is there public goods taxation, i.e., taxation for the purpose of providing goods
and services that are non-excludable (i.e., for which it is not practically feasible to provide for only
those who pay for it) and non-rival (i.e., for which the consumption by one person does not
diminish the opportunities for consumption by others). Non-polluted air and water, lights for public
areas, are examples.
(3) To what extent is there redistributive taxation, i.e., taxation for the purpose of transferring
wealth from one social group to another (e.g. from the rich to the poor, or the from the young to the
old, or from the non-handicapped to the handicapped)?
In an economic right-libertarian system there is no such taxation.
In an economic mixed system there is a moderate amount of such taxation.
In an economic welfare state system there is a lot of such taxation.
(3) The Social Dimension: How much government regulation (as opposed to civil law) is there of
the non-economic activities of individuals? (For example, to what extent are theft, assault, and
homicide prohibited by government regulation, as opposed to civil law? To what extent is there
freedom of speech, movement, and association, and privacy of the home? Are there laws regarding
drug and alcohol use [e.g., drinking age], seat belts, motorcycle helmets, sexual activities [e.g.,
premarital sex, and homosexual sex].)
In a social (civil) libertarian system the state prohibits all and only such activities that violate the
libertarian constraints (see notes on theories of justice).
In a social mixed system there is a moderate amount of regulation in this regard.
In a social totalitarian system there is a lot of regulation in this regard.
4. Why Have Government Regulations?
a. Against Government Regulations
Peter Vallentyne (February 6, 2016)
The State
The invisible hand argument against government regulations (a theorem of contemporary economic
theory): Under conditions of perfect competition, if all agents are perfectly rational, then a
laissez-faire purely capitalistic economic system will tend towards a pareto optimal allocation of
goods. Utilitarians might find this relevant for the justification of laissez-faire capitalistic systems,
but there are problems:
(a) in the real world there is no perfect competition,
(b) in the real world agents are not perfectly rational, and
(c) pareto optimality is a very weak property, it is compatible with one having all the goods and
everyone else having nothing; so there is no guarantee that pareto optimal results reached by a
laissez-faire system will maximize social welfare.
A market system is perfectly competitive only if:
(a) all agents are fully informed about product availability and characteristics,
(b) all agents behave as if they can not influence market prices (e.g., there are no monopolies),
(c) there are no externalities (no one is affected by the actions of others, except by consent),
(d) all goods are purely private (private = excludable and rival; excludable = effectively possible to
provide the good for only selected people; rival = consumption by one person precludes their
consumption by others),
(e) there is an established system of property rights (not necessarily private property rights),
(f) there are no transaction costs (e.g., agreements can be reached with no loss of time, money, or
other resources),
(g) there are no enforcement costs for property rights and agreements,
(h) there is freedom of market entry (e.g., new sellers are able to enter to the market on the same
terms as existing sellers), and
(i) all products are undifferentiated (buyers can't differentiate between products of different sellers).
An allocation of welfare (or goods) is Pareto optimal just in case no other feasible allocation (a)
makes everyone at least as well off and (b) makes at least one person (strictly) better off.
b. In favor of government regulations
Prisoner's dilemma (an example of how a laissez-faire system may not produce pareto-optimal
results when there are externalities): Two prisoners are in jail awaiting trial. There is enough
evidence to convict them but the prosecutor wants to speed things up by getting a confession. She
tells each the following (and they believe her): If neither of you confesses, you'll get 5 years each. If
you don't confess, and your partner does, you get 10 years, and your partner only gets 1. If you
confess, and your partner doesn't, I give you only 1 year, and your partner will get 10 years. If you
confess and your partner also does, you'll get 8 years each.
#2
#1 Confess
Not Confess
Confess
8,8
10,1
Not Confess
1,10
5,5
It is in the self-interest of each to confess, so each confesses, and each gets 8 years. That is not
pareto-optimal, since if neither confessed, they would have only gotten 5 years each, which both
prefer. So the invisible hand of self interest may not lead to good results when there are
externalities. The Mafia solves this problem by imposing some regulation: Anyone who confesses
Peter Vallentyne (February 6, 2016)
The State
is punished (gets his/her face busted). With the regulation, it is no longer in the self interest of each
of confess, and so neither confesses, which from the view of the prisoners is good. So regulation
can be helpful.
Exercise: Think of some real life "prisoner's dilemmas". E.g. driving vs taking the bus, voting vs.
not voting.
Peter Vallentyne (February 6, 2016)