Russian Theory of International Relations
Andrei P. Tsygankov, Pavel A. Tsygankov
San Francisco State University, Moscow State University
In International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert A. Denemark. Vol. X,
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2010, pp. 6375-6387.
Introduction
Russian society has changed dramatically since the Soviet disintegration, and the
emergence of new theories of international relations heralded this change. Following
the breakup of the Soviet Union and its officially sanctioned “Marxist” social science,
Russian scholars have been making intellectual headway in adjusting to new realities.
Analyzing the emerging Russian IR studies helps us answer some of the key questions
about Russia. How does the new Russia see itself in the world? How does it perceive
the new international environment? Which social and political institutions does it see
as appropriate to develop after the end of the Cold War? These are the questions that
are at the heart of the new Russian IR scholarship, and these are the questions that
continue to drive Western scholarship about the new Russia.
The recent revival of the sociology of knowledge tradition in international
studies has drawn scholarly attention to the fact that IR scholarship is grounded in
certain social conditions and may reflect cultural premises. Historically the tradition is
rooted in work by Karl Mannheim (1936) and Max Weber, among others. (For
contemporary scholarship focusing on social foundations of knowledge, see
Hoffmann 1977; Weaver 1998; Crawford and Jarvis 2001.)
In particular, it has become more common to view international relations as a
branch of research that often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases
of Western, particularly American, civilization (Hoffmann 1977; Crawford and Jarvis
2001). Recently scholars from across the globe have attempted to understand IR from
the perspective of various peripheries – Asian (Callahan 2004a; Acharya and Buzan
2007), East European (Guzzini 2007), Latin American (Tickner 2003), and Russian
(Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007; Tsygankov 2008) – suggesting the emergence of a
new subdiscipline of comparative IR theory (Callahan 2004b).
In addition, some well-known and still widely practiced classifications of IR
theory in the West, such as realism, liberalism, and critical theory or constructivism
(Viotti and Kauppi 1998; Weber 2005; Nau 2006), are shaped by theorists’
ideological preferences. As they each emphasize concepts of balance of power,
international institutions, and human exploitation/emancipation in their research, these
theories reflect broader ideological concerns about Self/Other relationships. Realists,
for example, tend to perceive the rise of alternative communities or Other as
threatening and recommend that Self prepare to defend its security. On the other hand,
many Western liberals, while recognizing the increasingly globalized character of
world politics, maintain an image of a progressive assertion of Self’s values and
overlook the forces of identity and diversity associated with the Other. Some critical
theorists too have a tendency to oversimplify the Self/Other relationships (Shani
2008).
In this essay we argue that Russian theory of international relations is
nationally specific, yet it is also grounded in three main intellectual traditions of
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presenting Self, Other, and their relationships. We refer to these traditions as
Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism because they each emphasize categories of
the West, the independent state, and the distinct civilization as their desired
identifications of the Russian Self. Although the Russian intellectual traditions have
recovered their strengths after the Soviet disintegration, they have their roots in the
history of Russia’s relations with Europe and the nineteenth century debates about the
“Russian idea.” We therefore adopt a broad definition of IR theory, viewing it as a
systematically developed image of the world that is grounded in a local cultural
history, rather than in evolution of the Western social science.
The essay is organized as follows. We first review the nature of Russian
historical intellectual debates and the impact of the Soviet legacy on discussions of
international relations in Russia. We then discuss some post-Soviet discussions within
the field, focusing on theories of international system, regional order, and foreign
policy. Although Russian IR cannot be fully reduced to these areas of research, they
remain the most developed. (For other overviews of the Russian discipline of
international studies, see Sergounin 2000; Bogaturov et al. 2002; Shakleyina 2002;
Lebedeva 2003; 2004; Torkunov 2004; A. Tsygankov and P. Tsygankov 2004; 2006;
Kokoshin and Bogaturov 2005.)
We conclude by reflecting on future directions of Russian international studies
and the dialectic of global and local in development of IR theory.
Three Intellectual Traditions in Russia
<p>Across different historical eras, Russia has developed three traditions or schools
of thinking about Self and Other – Westernist, Statist, and Civilizationist. Throughout
centuries, Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists sought to present Russia’s
international choices in ways consistent with their historically established images of
the country and the outside world. This section relies on discussions in Tsygankov
(2006), Neumann (1996), Prizel (1998), Ringmar (2002), and Hopf (2002).
Westernizers saw the Russian idea as an essentially Western idea, and they
placed the emphasis on Russia’s similarity with Western nations and viewed the West
as the most viable and progressive civilization in the world. The early Westernizers
sought to present Russia as a loyal member in the family of European monarchies.
Alexander I, for instance, championed the so-called legitimist policies and established
the “Holy Alliance” with Germany and Austria in order to suppress revolutionary
activities on the continent. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Westernizers,
such as Alexander II, identified with the West of constitutional freedoms and political
equality. Westernizers within the Soviet system saw Russia as not standing too far
apart from European social-democratic ideas. For instance, one of Gorbachev’s
favorite lines of thinking was that the Soviet Union had to “purify” itself of Stalinist
“distortions” and become a democratic, or “human,” version of socialism (gumannyi
sotsializm). Finally, the post-Soviet liberal Westernizers argued the “natural” affinity
of their country with the West based on such shared values as democracy, human
rights, and a free market. Sharing the prejudices of many in the West, liberal
Westernizers, like Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yelstin, were fearful of the Other and
warned against relations with former Soviet allies. They insisted that only by building
Western liberal institutions and integrating with the coalition of what was frequently
referred to as the community of “Western civilized nations” would Russia be able to
respond to its threats and overcome its economic and political backwardness.
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Statists have equated the Russian idea with that of a strong independent state
and emphasized the state’s ability to govern and preserve the social and political
order. They too showed their wariness of the Other and introduced the notion of
external threat as central to Russia’s security. Depending on a situation, the
threatening Other was presented as coming from either an eastern or western
direction. Ever since the two-centuries-long conquest by Mongols, Russians has
developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to sacrifice
everything for independence and sovereignty. For instance, when justifying the need
for rapid industrialization, the leader of the Soviet state Josef Stalin famously framed
his argument in terms of responding to powerful external threats.
<ex>The history of the old Russia was the continual beating she suffered because of
her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the
Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the
Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the English and French capitalists.
She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her – for her backwardness […] We
are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this
distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed” (Sakwa 1999:187–8).
<p>The Statists are not inherently anti-Western; they merely seek for the West’s
recognition by putting the emphasis on economic and military capabilities. The
Statists of the monarchical era valued Russia’s autocratic structure of power, partly
because such were the structures of European monarchies as well. The socialist
Statists insisted on the importance of the Communist Party’s firm control over the
society for the purpose of maintaining political order and averting external “capitalist”
threats. In foreign policy, some Statists advocated relative accommodation with the
West, while others favored balancing strategies. Maxim Litvinov, for instance,
supported a “collective security” system in Europe in order to prevent the rise of
Fascism. Nikita Khrushchev, too, wanted to break taboos of isolationism and to bring
Soviet Russia closer to Europe. On the other hand, Stalin’s pact with Hitler, as well as
Brezhnev’s “correlation of forces” strategy, reflected the will to balance perceived
dangerous influences from the outside world. That dualism survived the Soviet era.
For instance, both Primakov and Putin viewed Russia’s greatness and strength as key
goals of their foreign policies, yet the former was trying to rebuild the former Soviet
Union and contain the United States through a strategic alliance with China and India,
whereas the latter emphasized bilateral relations in Russia’s periphery and had the
ambition to develop partnership with America to deter terrorism.
Finally, Civilizationists conceptualized the Self/Other relationships in terms of
cultural oppositions. This intellectual tradition positioned Russia and its values as
principally different from those of the West. Viewing Russia as a civilization in its
own right, many Civilizationists insisted on Russia’s “mission” in the world and
spreading Russian values abroad (Duncan 2000). As a policy philosophy,
Civilizationism dates back to Ivan the Terrible’s “gathering of Russian lands” after
the Mongol Yoke and to the dictum “Moscow is the Third Rome” adopted under the
same ruler. Some representatives of this school advocated a firm commitment to
values of Orthodox Christianity, while others viewed Russia as a synthesis of various
religions. In the nineteen century, Civilizationists defended the notion of Slavic unity,
and their ideology of Pan-Slavism affected some of the Tsar’s foreign policy
decisions. Born out of the agony of autocratic and liberal Europe, the Soviet Russia
saw itself as superior to the “decadent” and “rotten” Western capitalist civilization.
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The early socialist Civilizationists challenged the West in a most direct fashion,
defending at one point the doctrine of the world revolution. Other Soviet thinkers,
however, advocated a peaceful coexistence and limited cooperation with the world of
“capitalism.” Yet another version of Civilizationist thinking was the so-called
Eurasianism that saw Russia as an organic unity distinctive from both European and
Asian cultures. (On Eurasianism and its influence in the contemporary Russia, see
Solovyev 2004; Bassin and Aksenov 2006; Shlapentokh 2007; Laruelle 2008.)
The Soviet Interlude
<p>Soviet Marxism helped to legitimize Russia’s new socialist identity and provided
intellectuals with new lenses through which to analyze the outside world. Both
ontologically and epistemologically, Marxism presented an important challenge to
Western social sciences and international relations. At least three key features deserve
to be mentioned here. First, the new way of thinking about the world was socially
critical or emancipatory. Marx’s dictum that philosophers must go beyond explaining
the world and toward changing it radically drew attention to the relationships between
theory and practice and therefore shattered the very foundations of status-quo-oriented
positivist thinking. Second, Marxist historically structural approach meant to link
world affairs to the existing phenomena of global exploitation and inequality and to
reveal their origins and social roots. Finally, Marxist analysis was holistic and global,
as it understood the world as globally united and globally divided at the same time. As
opposed to the three familiar levels of analysis in mainstream international relations –
individual, national, and systemic – Marxism viewed the struggle for human liberation
and emancipation as universal and without boundaries.
The Soviet period in Russia’s development also suppressed the described
debate among Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists. By legitimizing Russia’s
new socialist identity, the Soviet regime also developed a self-serving vision of
Marxism and legitimized the country’s relative isolation from Western intellectual
developments. In addition to some of its progressive and liberating elements, the
Soviet version of Marxism served as an ideologically pretentious way to preserve the
state-favored status quo and as a tool for suppressing dissent. The official ideological
hegemony of Soviet Marxism stiffened creative thought by imposing rigid cannons on
scholars of international relations and encouraging dogmatic interpretations of world
affairs. IR “scholarship” was all too often reduced to interpretations of official
documents and speeches of the leaders to the Communist Party congresses. Soviet
Marxism also allowed for only a minimal dialogue with non-Marxist scholars. Even
Marxist and neo-Marxist developments outside the Soviet Union, such as the
Frankfurt School in Germany, were not welcome. Cross-fertilization with the outside
world was therefore negligible and confined to narrow circles of elite scholars with
privileged access to information.
Still, the centuries-old intellectual debate on the Russian idea could not be
eliminated partly because Soviet Marxism had never been entirely homogeneous –
ever since the death of its founder Vladimir Lenin in 1924, at least two schools
competed for the status of official ideology and “loyal” interpreter of Leninist
intellectual legacy. Radicals advocated forceful methods of industrialization, whereas
moderates argued for a more gradual process of development and proceeded from the
late Lenin’s notion of “coexistence” with the Western “capitalist world.” This debate
had been terminated by Stalin after his break with Lenin’s post-1921 philosophy of
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moderation in relations with the peasant class and the external world, and was only
revived after Stalin’s death. The Soviet social science also began to slowly absorb
ideas from the West, some of which were revisionist Marxist in nature, others liberal
and anti-communist, and still others fiercely nationalistic. Although for decades the
Russian idea debate was to develop within the officially sanctioned version of
Marxism, it was alive with Westernizers advocating European social democratic
ideas, Statists insisting on preservation of balance of power, and Civilizationists
arguing Russia’s cultural distinctiveness.
The Soviet decline and Gorbachev’s perestroika further opened up the space
for debate. Reflecting Gorbachev’s own evolution, official Marxism evolved along
the lines of European Social Democracy (Herman 1996; English 2000). Opposition to
it came from the neo-Orthodox thinking advocated by the newly emerged Communist
Party of the Russian Federation and its leader Gennadi Zyuganov. Zyuganov’s (1999;
2002) “Marxism” is a merger of the old Stalinist ideas, traditional geopolitics, and
Russian imperial nationalism. Aside from Gorbachev and Zyuganov, Marxist scholars
also developed an interest in world-system approaches, often associated in the West
with the name of Immanuel Wallerstein. Both Gorbachev’s New Thinking and worldsystem analysis (Ilyin 2004; Kagarlitsky 2005) have continued a long-standing
tradition of Marxist “global thinking” and have roots in the domestic interests in the
study of such global issues as the environment, population dynamics, and the arms
race. A variety of new approaches have emerged outside of the Marxist worldview.
Liberals pursue the ideas of globalization and democratic peace and are often political
scientists by training (Davydov 2002; Trenin 2006; Kulagin 2007). Russian realism is
emerging as a complex intellectual movement, in which historians, philosophers,
sociologists, and economists develop their own schools and research agendas
(Shakleyina and Bogaturov 2004; Konyshev 2007). Finally, Russia is beginning to
respond to the Western “post-structural turn,” and philosophers and sociologists are
increasingly taking a lead in exploring the cultural foundations of Russia’s
development (Kapustin 1998; Neklessa 2000).
Russian New IR Theory
<p>Heavily influenced by the West, Russian international thinking has developed
consistently with the country’s historical experience. Consistently with their
historically established images of the country and the world, the above-described
intellectual traditions have each produced a new type of IR scholarship.
Liberalism
<p>Russian liberal IR theory is much more heavily shaped by Western approaches
than other Russian approaches. Although there are deep divisions and disagreements
within Russian liberalism (P. Tsygankov and A. Tsygankov 2004), those who favor
following American theories enjoy a position of considerable dominance. In
international relations theory, this position of dominance means that the
overwhelming majority of conceptual tools gets borrowed from Western, particularly
American, colleagues (Lebedeva 2004:276; Konyshev 2007:20; Tsygankov and
Tsygankov 2007). Thus, many Russian scholars treat the world’s institutional
development as predominantly West-centered. One example of it is the
conceptualization of the emerging world as “democratic unipolarity” (Kulagin 2002;
2008). The concept is Western in its origins because democracy is understood to be a
5
West-centered universal phenomenon, rather than developing out of local cultural,
historic, and political conditions. The supporters of the concept contend that
“[Francis] Fukuyama and [Robert] Heilbronner were basically correct in arguing the
‘end of history’ thesis which implied the absence of a viable alternative to Western
liberalism” (Shevtsova 2001). The argument implies that Russia too would do well to
adopt standards of Western pluralistic democracy if it wants to be peaceful and
“civilized,” even if this means granting the right to use force to the only superpower
in the world, the United States (Kremenyuk 2004; 2006).
An example of conceptualizing a regional order by Russian liberal scholars is
the notion of the end of Eurasia introduced by the co-director of the Moscow Carnegie
Center Dmitri Trenin (2001) in one of his books. The concept is a liberal attempt to
respond to Russia’s conservative geopolitical projects of integrating the region around
Moscow’s vision, and it reflects the “no security without the West” thinking
associated with politicians like Yegor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev, who held key
government positions during the early stages of Russia’s postcommunist
transformation. The concept assumes that the age of Russia as the center of gravity in
the former Soviet region historically associated with the Tsardom of Muscovy, the
empire, and the Soviet Union is over. Trenin maintains that, because of pervasive
external influences, especially those from the Western world and the West-initiated
globalization, the region of the Russia-centered Eurasia no longer exists. Russia
therefore must choose in favor of its gradual geopolitical retreat from the region.
Liberal foreign policy concepts too are influenced by Western IR scholarship
and reflect a preference for a pro-Western international orientation of Russia. To
support this argument, we briefly discuss two foreign policy concepts, Atlanticism
and liberal empire. Introduced by leading liberal figures Andrei Kozyrev and Anatoli
Chubais during Russia’s respective decline and recovery, they illustrate the
ideological connection we seek to highlight. Kozyrev’s Atlanticism (1992; 1995)
assumed a radical reorientation of Russia’s foreign policy toward Europe and the
United States, and it included radical economic reform, the so-called “shock therapy,”
gaining a full-scale status in transatlantic economic and security institutions, such as
the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, and G7, and separating the new Russia from the former Soviet
republics economically, politically, and culturally. The Atlanicist vision shaped the
new foreign policy concept prepared in late 1992 and signed into law in April 1993.
The concept of liberal empire articulated by the former Yeltsin’s privatization tsar
Anatoli Chubais (2003) too had in mind Russia’s pro-Western integration but mostly
by means of free commerce and enterprise. Not unlike the early prophets of
globalization, such as Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Friedman, Chubais argued for
the inevitability of Russia’s successful economic expansion within the former Soviet
region and outside due to its successfully completed market reform.
Realism, or Statism
Russian realists too borrow from Western, particularly American, IR many conceptual
tools (Konyshev 2004; 2005), yet they are driven primarily by Russian concerns of
preserving internal stability and security from outside threats.
In research on the international system’s structure and polarity, realists
developed a variety of concepts differentiating between various types of unipolar,
bipolar, and multipolar system (Shakleyina 2003) and security threats (Fenenko
6
2008). One example of it is Aleksei Bogaturov’s (1996; 1998; 2003) proposal to view
the post–Cold War international system as “pluralistic unipolarity,” in which the
unipolar center is a group of responsible states, rather than one state (the United
States). Bogaturov saw Russia as a member of the group and argued for consolidation
of its position within the global center, as well as for discouraging the formation of
one state-unipolarity in the world. His approach to world order included, not unlike
the British school tradition, the notions of norms and rules (Bogaturov 1999). It also
complicated the Self/Other ideological opposition because Russia’s Self was expected
to develop closer ties with the Other (West), while resisting the tendency of its
members (the US) to become predominant in the system.
Realists have been also critical of the liberal notion of universal democratic
ideas questioning the significance of internal characteristics in the international
struggle for power and security. Many in Russia see attempts to globally promote
Western-style democracy as little more than ideology covering a struggle for the
world’s domination (Volodin 2006; Gadzhiyev 2008; Karaganov 2008). Rather than
recommending development of this kind of democracy, realists propose that Russia
concentrate on strengthening its international position by consolidating regional ties
and pursuing even-handed relations with Western and non-Western nations.
With regard to the regional order, realists sought to defend the position of
Russia’s independence and power. One example of it is the concept of the former
Soviet region as a post-imperial space first introduced in a series of reports by the
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (1992; 1993; 1996), the influential nongovernmental organization that was launched and headed by Sergei Karaganov in the
early 1990s. The notion of post-imperial space served the ideological objectives of
those social groups – industrialists, businesspeople, intellectuals, and mass opinion
leaders – that saw themselves as defenders of the region’s order and stability based on
preservation of Russia’s influence. Just like the notion of pluralistic unipolarity, the
post-imperial space was a hybrid of hard-line and moderate influences because it
sought to revive social, economic, and political coherence of the former Soviet region,
without reviving the empire. While a departure from Kozyrev’s isolationism, the
notion of post-imperial space, as seen by its advocates, could not be likened to
restoration of the empire or revival of aggressive imperial nationalism. For instance,
the 1996 report by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy referred to the idea of
the Soviet restoration as a “reactionary utopia.” At the same time, the report argued
that a reasonable alternative to post-Soviet integration was not available and that
Russia should assume the role of a leader of such integration.
Defending Russia as a relatively independent power center, realists pursued
the notion of multi-vector foreign policy. A former senior academic and the second
foreign minister of Russia Yevgeni Primakov (1996; 1998) argued that, if Russia were
to remain a sovereign state with capabilities to organize and secure the post-Soviet
space and resist hegemonic ambitions anywhere in the world, there was no alternative
to acting in all geopolitical directions. Primakov and his supporters (Gadzhiyev 2007)
warned against Russia unequivocally siding with Europe or the United States at the
expense of relationships with other key international participants, such as China,
India, and the Islamic world. Such thinking was adequately reflected in official
documents. The country’s National Security Concept of 1997 identified Russia as an
“influential European and Asian power,” and it recommended that Russia maintain
equal distancing in relations to the “global European and Asian economic and
7
political actors” and presented a positive program for the integration of the CIS efforts
in the security area (Shakleyina 2002:51–90). The government’s official Foreign
Policy Concept of 2000 referred to the Russian Federation as “a great power […]
[with a] responsibility for maintaining security in the world both on a global and on a
regional level” and warned of a new threat of “a unipolar structure of the world under
the economic and military domination of the United States” (Shakleyina 2002:110–
11).
Civilizational Tradition
<p>In addition to liberalism and realism, Russian IR scholars have developed a
distinct perspective to understand cultural foundations of the country and its regional
environment. The perspective combines culturally essentialist and constructivist
theories. Whereas cultural essentialists have been inspired by visions of a selfsufficient and autarchic Eurasian or Orthodox empire, constructivist scholars place the
emphasis on cultural syntheses and cross-civilizational dialogue. However, both
schools proceed from the assumption of Russia’s civilizational distinctiveness that
needs to be preserved and respected, rather than eliminated or suppressed.
Essentialists view the international system in terms of irreconcilable struggle
of cultures, or a conflict of civilizations, not unlike the one described by Samuel
Huntington (1996). Some, similarly to Huntington, identify multipolar civilizational
struggle (Nartov 1999; Zyuganov 1999; 2002), while others see an essentially bipolar
geocultural conflict. Alexander Dugin’s (2002) concept of a great war of continents is
of the latter kind. The bipolarity Dugin perceives is the result of a struggle for values
and power between the two competing rivals – the land-based Eurasianists and the
sea-oriented Ahlanticists. The Eurasianist orientation is expressed most distinctly by
Russia, Germany, Iran, and to a lesser extent, Japan, and the Ahlanticist posture is
well expressed by the United States and Britain.
From the constructivist perspective, the fact that the world is culturally
pluralist does not mean that cultures are doomed to a conflict. Instead, they should
strive to establish a “unity in diversity” regime, under which Self and Other would be
able to maintain an intense dialogue and cooperation by observing certain globally
acknowledged rules, yet still following their own internally developed sets of norms.
In order to sustain the culturally pluralist system, new ideas are necessary to challenge
the dominance of US-centered economic and political globalization (Batalov 2005;
Alekseyeva 2007; Voytolovski 2007). Some constructivists proposed the
strengthening of the United Nations as a prototype for future world government, with
the General Assembly as parliament, the Security Council as executive body, and the
Secretary General as president of the world state.
For example, former Gorbachev advisor Georgi Shakhnazarov (2000) argued
that such a structure was necessary in order to address urgent global problems, such as
growing militarism, depletion of world resources, overpopulation, and environmental
degradation, and to mitigate the selfish impulses of local civilizations. In his view, the
Huntington-proposed restructuring of the Security Council in accordance with the
civilizational representation would mean throwing away all the positive potential of
the United Nations and returning to the times of isolation and the rule of crude force
in world politics. Instead, and for the purpose of preserving and developing the central
governing structure of the world, he proposed a piecemeal development of the United
Nations by gradually incorporating in the Security Council those states that have
8
acquired indisputable world influence, including Germany, Japan, and possibly even
India, Brazil, and other states.
A similar divide between essentialists and constructivists concerns analysis of
the regional order. Eurasianists, like Dugin, view such order as a Russia-centered
empire free of any Atlanticist influences. Similarly, Russian religious nationalists
have advanced the notion of a Russian Orthodox empire. For instance, the recent
influential volume Russkaya doktrina (2007) set out a regional order capable of
resisting the West and becoming self-sufficient. Projecting the United States’ retreat
from the region between 2010 and 2015 nationalists call for “a full-fledged political,
economic and – ideally – military union in the manner of a Warsaw Pact” with China,
India, Iran, and other non-Western nations (Russkaya doktrina 2007:297, 313).
In their turn, more constructivist-oriented thinkers suggest concepts that
transcend the known dichotomy of the region as either pro-Western or Eurasian.
Unlike pro-Western liberals, who commonly see Russia as in need to “return” to
Europe, some scholars have assumed that Russia already is in Europe/the West. For
instance, Dmitri Trenin (2006), while granting Russia a right to pursue a distinct path,
assumes that the country needs to “become” a part of Europe and the “new” West.
Russia, he says, has been historically European, yet it often “fell out of” Europe
(2006:63, 167) as a result of failed reform efforts. If this is the case, then what Russia
really needs is to “return” to Europe, rather than preserve its identity and
distinctiveness.
By their historical accounts, Russia has been part of the West longer than
some other nations, including the United States. Therefore the challenge for Russia is
not to be included in, but to develop a deeper awareness of itself as a legitimate
member of Europe and of its special ties with the world. Put differently, Russia has to
intellectually absorb the world/the West, rather than let itself be absorbed by it. An
example of such thinking is Gleb Pavlovski’s (2004) concept of Euro-East, which
conceptualizes the region as a part of Europe and distinct in its own right. The EuroEast shares with Europe values of market economy and growing middle class, yet
being mainly preoccupied with economic and social modernization, the region is in a
special need for maintaining political stability.
Foreign policy too is viewed by cultural essentialists and constructivists in a
principally different light. Both Eurasianists and Russian Orthodox nationalists insist
on the toughest possible policy response as the way toward restoring Russia’s
geopolitical status of the Eurasian Heartland (Bassin and Aksenov 2006) and imperial
self-sufficiency, as well as offering a new attractive idea for the world (Russkaya
doktrina 2007:11; Kholmogorov 2006; Matveychev 2007). Constructivists see foreign
policy differently. More socialist-oriented thinkers (Tolstykh 2003) argue for a
cultural dialogue as a key humanistic principle that may set the world on the path of
solving the above identified global problems of militarism, poverty, and
environmental degradation. More conservative thinkers inspired by Orthodox
Christian values (Panarin 2002) advocate a cross-religious synthesis of Western
reason and Eastern myth. They see Russia as a natural place for such a synthesis and,
therefore, as a model for the world.
Conclusion
Although Russian IR theory cannot be understood outside the country’s relationships
with Western developments, it is also a product of Russia’s own intellectual history.
9
Russian IR theory after the Soviet breakup is only new in the sense that it represents a
new form of framing reality, yet behind new concepts, such as democratic unipolarity
or multi-vector foreign policy, one can recognize the same old debate about the
Russian idea that had been introduced by the Westernizers/Slavophiles polemics in
the mid-nineteenth century. As our analysis of concepts of international system,
regional order and foreign policy suggests, Russian distinct traditions of Westernism,
Statism, and Civilizationism have lived on and actively shape public discussions of
international relations. Not only in the United States, but also (and perhaps especially)
in Russia a national intellectual diversity is alive and well, and it has not been evicted
from social sciences by globalization and the rational spirit of modernity. It is in this
context that one may understand future development of Russian IR theory. While
borrowing from Western approaches and conceptual tools, Russian international
thinking is unlikely to principally deviate from some already established and
centuries-old patterns of thinking.
The Russian experience teaches us an important lesson about the progress of
knowledge in social science and IR. It adds support to the view that development of
global social science cannot and should not be a one-sided process, in which one (the
West) teaches and others learn. It also implies that, to constitute a meaningful
discourse of international relations, local intellectual impulses must meet global
reception and engagement. The world is both global and culturally pluralist, and that
alone assumes the reciprocity of learning. A promising way to achieve such reciprocal
learning is through development of global research projects. Exposure to a demand to
work together with scholars from different cultures would quickly, and positively,
affect our disciplinary, methodological, and political biases, and provide a powerful
impetus to think differently. Serious IR research must be reflective of various
localities, and no one can provide a richer account of those localities than their own
residents.
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About the Authors
Andrei P. Tsygankov is Professor at the departments of Political Science and
International Relations at San Francisco State University. His latest books are
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Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (2006) and AntiRussian Lobby and American Foreign Policy (2009).
Pavel A. Tsygankov is Professor and Chair at the Department of Sociology at
Moscow State University. He is the author of the first international relations textbook
in Russia and has written many books and articles on various issues of IR theory and
world politics.
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