CRITO 50a-b: THE ARGUMENT FROM HARM
A1. If Socrates were to leave the jail without the consent of the Athenians,
we would be rendering the decision of the court of no force, making it
invalid and annulling it as a private person.
A2. If the decisions reached by the courts of the city have no force and are
made invalid and annulled by private persons, the laws of the city are
destroyed and the whole city overturned.
A3. Hence, if Socrates were to leave the jail without the consent of the
Athenians, he would be destroying the laws and the whole city in so far as it
is in his power.
A4. If Socrates were to destroy the laws and whole city in so far as it is in
his power, he would be doing harm (supplied)
A5. Hence, if Socrates were to leave jail without the consent of the
Athenians he would be doing harm (to the laws, and presumably to the
citizens).
A6. One must not do harm. (P5)
A7. Hence, Socrates must not leave the jail without the consent of the
Athenians.
NOTE:
--Premise A1 is stated indirectly. Premise A2 is explicitly stated in the text.
--Conclusion A3 can be derived from A1 and A2 by hypothetical syllogism.
--Premise A4 is supplied in order to make A6 operative.
--Conclusion A7 is derived from premises A5 and A6 by modus tollens.
CRITO 50c-52e: THE ARGUMENT FROM JUST AGREEMENTS
B1. Socrates has agreed to abide by the judgments reached by the courts of
the city (or Socrates has agreed to abide by the law that commands that the
judgments reached by the jury courts of his city shall be supreme), even if he
thinks or knows that a given judgment is incorrect and does him injustice.
(50c, 51e, 52d, 52e)
B2. What Socrates has agreed to do, namely abide by the judgments reached
by the courts of his city even if he thinks or knows a judgment to be
incorrect and do him injustice, is just. (50d-51c)
B3. One must do what he has agreed to provided it is just. (P9)
B4. Hence, Socrates must abide by the judgments reached by the courts of
his city, even if he thinks or knows that a judgment is incorrect and does
injustice to him. (from B1, B2, and B3)
B5. The courts of Socrates’ city have reached the judgment that Socrates is
to be put to death. (known fact)
B6. Hence, Socrates must abide by the judgments reached by the courts of
his city that he is to be put to death, though he thinks it unjust. (from B4 and
B5)
B7. If Socrates must abide by the judgments reached by the courts of his city
that he is to be put to death, he must not escape (undisputed assumption)
B8. Hence, Socrates must not escape. (from B6 and B7)
NOTE:
--In 50c Socrates argues in support of premises B1 and B2.
--In 50d-51c, he argues in support of premise B1.
--In 51c-52a, he argues in support of premise B1.
--In 52a-53a, he further reinforces the argument in support of premise B1
CRITO 49a-c: PRINCIPLES
Having secured Crito’s agreement on the subject of the investigation,
Socrates asks Crito whether he agrees with him on what to take as the
starting point of the investigation (48e). This starting point consists of
certain general principles which are later used as premises in the arguments
Socrates advances to the conclusion that he must not escape.
P1. To do injustice in any way is neither good nor praiseworthy (as we have
admitted on many occasions before now) (49a)
P2. To do injustice in any way is bad and disgraceful to the wrongdoer.
(49b)
P3. (Then) One must not do injustice in any way (or, in any circumstances).
(49b)
P4. One must not do injustice in return for injustice done to one (as the
many think, since one must not do injustice in any way). (49b)
P5. One must not do harm (or evil). (49c)
P6. To return harm for harm (evil for evil) is not just (as the many say).
(49c)
P7. (For doing harm (evil) does not differ at all from doing injustice.) (49c)
P8. (Then) One must mot return injustice for injustice nor do harm (evil) to
any men, no matter what one has suffered from them. (49c)
CRITO 50a-b: THE ARGUMENT FROM HARM (revisited)
There is a problem with the first derivation of this argument. The antecedent
of A2 is not the same as the consequent of A1. Specifically, the former is a
general statement, the latter is a singular statement. One way to resolve the
gap depends on whether we conceive Socrates’ argument as a version of a
rule utilitarian argument. Hence, A2 would read as follows:
If everyone were to render decisions reached by the courts of the city of no
force and make them invalid and annul them as a private person, the laws of
the city would be destroyed and the whole city overturned.
The argument then would follow a different course:
A*1. If everyone were to render decisions reached by the courts of the city
of no force and make them invalid and annul them as a private person, the
laws of the city would be destroyed and the whole city overturned.
A*2. If the laws of a city were destroyed and the city overturned, the laws
and that city (and the citizens?) would be harmed (supplied)
A*3. Hence, If everyone were to render decisions reached by the courts of
the city of no force and make them invalid and annul them as a private
person, the laws and that city (and the citizens?) would be harmed. (from
A*1 and A*2 by hypothetical syllogism)
A*4. If everyone’s doing something resulted in harm then no one must do
that thing.
A*5. Hence, no one must render decisions reached by the courts of his city
of no force and make them invalid and annul them as a private person. (from
A*3 and A*4)
A*6. If Socrates were to leave jail without the consent of the Athenians, he
would be rendering the decision of the court of his city of no force and
invald and would annul it as a private person.
A*7. Hence, Socrates must not leave the jail without the consent of the
Athenians. (from A*5 and A*6 by modus tollens)