TIME SERIES APPROACHES TO TESTING INCOME CONVERGENCE IN MENA COUNTRIES HALUK ERLAT Department of Economics Middle East Technical University 06531 Ankara, Turkey Fax: 90-312-2107964 Email: herlat@metu.edu.tr Prepared for presentation at the 27th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Economic Association, January 5-7, 2007, Chicago, USA. . 1. Introduction Our objective is to test for income convergence in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries using time series techniques. Income convergence for these countries was tested, previously and quite extensively, by Guetat and Serranito (2004), using panel root tests. Underlying this approach is the assumption that the per capita income of countries approach or diverge from a target level which may either be the average of the per capita income of the group of countries being considered (which is what Guetat and Serranito use) or the per capita income of an advanced country. Pesaran (2006), however, argues that the choice of such a target level may be arbitrary and that, following Bernard and Durlauf (1995), the pair-wise convergence of all countries involved should be investigated. Pesaran (2006) shows that, to overcome the dimensional limitations of the cointegration approach used by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), the stationarity of the pair-wise logarithmic differences between the per capita incomes may be tested. If N is the number of countries, then one has to carry out N ( N 1) / 2 unit root tests, which may be quite a large number if N is large, even moderately so. In fact, Pesaran (2006) has applied his approach to the per capita incomes of various groups of countries (including the MENA countries), the largest of which consisted of 101 series and this implied that 5050 unit root tests were performed. Of course, the number of countries to be considered in our case, as we shall explain below, is only nine which implies 36 pairs of countries but we, nevertheless, decided to use a screening procedure due to Webber and White (2004) where, roughly speaking, for a given period, the per capita income difference between two countries at the end of the period is compared, in ratio terms, to the income difference at the beginning of the period and countries are said to be converging if this ratio lies between zero and unity. Pesaran’s procedure was applied to those countries that satisfied this requirement. The plan of our paper will, then, be as follows. In the following section, an account of the empirical methods will be given. In Section 3 the data will be described and the empirical results will be presented in Section 4. The final section will contain our conclusions. 2. Methodology We shall investigate convergence in two stages. We shall first use a descriptive method due to Webber and White (2004), by which we shall reduce the number of pair wise tests of convergence that we shall conduct. We shall then perform pair-wise unit root tests. 1 Let y it and y jt denote the per capita incomes of countries i and j at time t respectively. The descriptive method is based on investigating the behaviour of y it vis-à-vis y jt by looking at their differences in two points in time, namely, y it y jt versus y i ,t h y j .t h . If y it y jt y i ,t h y j .t h then one may take this as evidence of convergence since it implies that country i grows slower than country j. Similarly, one may compare y it y jt with y i ,t k y j ,t k or ln y it ln y jt with ln y i ,t h ln y j .t h , which is the same thing. We may then state that If the observations converge in both ratios and differences, we have strong convergence If the observations converge in ratios or differences, we have weak convergence. It is also possible that y it y jt but y i ,t h y j .t h , i.e., the countries may switch positions. The procedure described below takes switching also account. We shall assume, throughout, that y it y jt . Hence, for convergence in ratio we shall calculate X i, j (1) ln y i ,t k ln y j ,t k ln y it ln y jt and conclude that if, X ij 1 , countries i and j diverge in ratio without switching. 0 X ij 1 , countries i and j converge in ratio without switching. 1 X ij 0 , countries i and j converge in ratio with switching. X ij 1 , countries i and j diverge in ratio with switching. For convergence in difference, we first apply a normalizing transformation on y it as (2) cit yit yt yt 2 where yt i 1 yit / N , so that any bias that may result from ignoring the growth of the N N countries as a group is avoided. We then calculate Yij (3) c i ,t k c j ,t k cit c jt and conclude that if Yij 1 , countries i and j diverge in ratio without switching. 0 Yij 1 , countries i and j converge in ratio without switching. 1 Yij 0 , countries i and j converge in ratio with switching. Yij 1 , countries i and j diverge in ratio with switching. Thus, 0 X ij 1 and 0 Yij 1 would imply strong convergence without switching. 0 X ij 1 or 0 Yij 1 would imply weak convergence without switching. 1 X ij 0 and 1 Yij 0 would imply strong convergence with switching. 1 X ij 0 or 1 Yij 0 would imply weak convergence with switching. After having classified the pairs of countries, we shall choose those that exhibit strong convergence with or without switching and apply pair wise tests of convergence. The investigation of convergence using a pair wise approach is based on the definition of convergence for two countries provided by Bernard and Durlauf (1995): (4) lim k E ( wi ,t k w j ,t k | I t ) 0 at any fixed time t where wit ln yit and I t is the information set at time t, containing the current and past values for wi ,t k for i 1,..., N and k 0, 1, 2, , . From this definition, it is concluded that in order for countries i and j to converge, their per capita outputs should be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1,-1). Pesaran (2006) offers an alternative definition based on the probability of the output gap wit w jt falling outside a predetermined interval; i.e., that the probability of 3 | wi ,t k w j ,t k | being larger than some finite positive constant g should be smaller than some preassigned small probability, , for all horizons, k. Using this definition avoids the pretesting for unit roots in wit and w jt that the cointegration approach, advocated by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), requires. wit w jt may now be tested, first, for the presence of a unit root in an autoregression that contains a linear trend and, if no unit root is found, for the presence of a linear deterministic trend. When there are more than two countries to consider, Pesaran (2006) offers a definition which, basically, requires that the definition of convergence given for a pair of countries should hold for all N(N-1)/2 pairs of countries being considered. Hence, unit root tests are applied to all the pairs chosen in the first stage of our investigation and to conclude that there is convergence in the group, all pairs must converge.. We initially followed Pesaran (2006) and implemented the ADF test, where the null hypothesis is divergence, and the KPSS (Kwiatowski et al, 1992) test where the null hypothesis is convergence. Let z it wit w jt . Then the ADF test was obtained by estimating P z ijt d tr r z ijt i z ijt ijt , r 0,1 (5) i 1 where d tr 1 and r 0 for r = 0 and d tr (1, t ) and r ( 0 , 1 ) for r = 1, and the tratio of was used as the statistic to test for a unit root. In the case of r =1, 1 0 was tested for those cases where the null hypothesis of 0 were rejected. The KPSS test, on the other hand, is based on assuming that the z ijt are stationary so that they are generated by (6) z ijt 0 ijt Under the alternative hypothesis of nonstationarity, it is assumed that 0t 0 ut , i.e., a random walk, with E (ut ) 0 and E(ut ) u2 0 . Hence, the null hypothesis of stationarity 2 becomes H o : u2 0 vs H 1 : u2 0 . The test statistic for this hypothesis is based on the Lagrange Multiplier approach and is obtained as 4 T (7) where KPSSij T 2 S ijt t S ijt 1 ij , t 1 ˆ 2 ˆ T 1 t 1 ijt2 2T 1 1 w(m l ) t 1 ijt ij,t l , T m T w(m l ) 1 ( /( m 1)) and the ijt are obtained from the OLS estimation of (6). The choice of m was made using a data dependent procedure due the Newey and West (1994). The results of our descriptive approach and the plots of the pair-wise differences led to the expectation that structural shifts in the level of the output gaps, i.e., the intercept term in (5), needed to be taken into account when testing for unit roots. We did this by following the approach developed by Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Perron (1997) where the shift in 0 is taken to be endogeneous. Such tests are sequential tests. For the single shift case that we shall consider, we start at a shift point t h0 , where h0 [T ] and is an appropriately chosen trimming fraction, and estimate (5) sequentially as this shift point is moved towards t T h0 . This may be done by using the dummy variables (8) DU t (h) 0 1 Dt (h) 1 for t 1,, h for t h 1,, T for t 1,, h 0 otherwise where h0 h T h0 . We would then be estimating p (9) zijt d tr DU t (h) Dt (h) yt 1 s zij,t s ijt s 1 The test statistics is simply the minimum value of the sequentially obtained ADF statistics (min ADF) and the shift point, h will be the date corresponding to this minimized value.1 1 Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Perron (1997) call this the innovational outlier model, implying that the shift in the intercept term is gradual. 5 3. The Data The data were obtained from the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aken, 2002). They consist of annual Purchasing Power adjusted per capita real GDP series constructed in international dollars at 1996 prices. Even though the series are constructed to cover the 1951-2000 period only four MENA countries have data for this period; Israel, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. We, thus, used the 1961-2000 period for which data exist for nine countries; Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The same data have also been utilized by Guitat and Serranito (2004) and Pesaran (2006). 4. Empirical Results We first consider the results of the descriptive procedure used in the first stage. We considered four base years, 1961, 1970, 1980 and 1990. We then calculated the X ij and Yij values using equations (1) and (3). The results are given in Table 1 and in Tables A1-A3 in the Appendix. To see how we may use these results, let us consider the 1961-based figures for Algeria as presented in Table 1. We find that Algeria strongly converges with Egypt for the 1961-1990 and 1961-2000 periods (both X and Y are between 0 and 1), strongly diverges from Iran for all four periods (with switching in 1961-1980 and 1961-1990), converges weakly with Israel in 1961-1980 (X lies between 0 and 1 but Y is greater than unity), converges strongly without switching with Morocco in all periods except 1961-1980 when convergence is weak; converges strongly, without switching, with Syria in 1961-1990 and 1961-2000, weakly in 1961-1980 and diverges strongly in 1961-1970; converges strongly, without switching, with Tunisia in 1961-1980 and 1961-1990 but diverges strongly, without switching, in 1961-1970 and with switching 1961-2000; and, finally, converges strongly, without switching, with Turkey in 1961-1970, diverges strongly, with switching, in 19611980 and without switching, in 1961-1990 and 1961-2000. 6 Table 1 X and Y values: Base 1961 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 X alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 1.18 4.77 1.05 -18.62 0.87 1.43 -1.91 0.97 -6.99 0.96 0.90 -2.79 1.12 -15.57 0.70 0.33 2.30 1.38 -9.85 0.57 alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 1.46 1.39 0.52 0.93 0.42 -1.07 0.93 0.03 1.42 0.36 -1.56 3.27 Y alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 1.14 5.71 1.09 -15.07 0.90 1.41 -1.81 1.03 -6.87 1.05 0.92 -2.36 1.19 -12.87 0.74 0.31 1.94 1.35 -6.94 0.50 alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 1.33 1.35 0.51 1.01 0.48 -1.04 0.94 0.03 1.45 0.33 -1.63 2.94 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 1.74 1.10 0.25 -13.83 5.78 1.01 1.06 0.91 1.13 1.04 -21.22 -6.74 2.23 0.99 0.32 1.05 0.13 -9.06 1.31 1.59 0.99 0.64 1.02 -0.14 11.89 0.70 1.83 0.85 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 2.04 1.10 0.19 -13.82 4.98 0.93 1.00 0.77 1.11 0.92 -20.85 -6.69 2.33 0.86 0.27 1.14 0.11 -9.94 1.36 1.80 1.04 0.63 1.14 -0.12 12.30 0.77 2.24 0.89 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 0.65 13.14 1.47 1.95 2.40 -26.43 1.29 -0.09 0.52 0.50 -0.27 4.22 1.55 1.78 0.16 0.37 -0.81 28.14 1.28 6.65 0.84 0.65 -0.41 9.41 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 0.78 12.83 1.84 2.16 2.79 -30.87 1.23 -0.08 0.49 0.48 -0.27 3.60 1.43 1.24 0.14 0.32 -0.76 24.40 1.31 4.98 0.78 0.63 -0.45 8.92 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 isr-jor 1.57 1.18 1.57 1.68 isr-mor 0.99 0.97 0.97 1.10 isr-syr 1.20 0.96 1.05 1.01 isr-tun isr-tur 1.12 1.12 0.87 1.24 0.92 1.09 0.83 1.14 jor-mor 0.52 0.60 -0.05 0.09 jor-syr jor-tun jor-tur 1.10 0.57 2.67 0.58 -0.32 0.67 0.20 -1.54 6.43 -0.09 -2.39 7.13 isr-jor 1.36 1.16 1.43 1.49 isr-mor 1.05 1.04 1.10 1.17 isr-syr 1.14 1.03 1.14 1.13 isr-tun isr-tur 1.12 1.14 0.97 1.20 1.06 1.17 1.01 1.22 jor-mor -0.02 0.59 -0.05 0.07 jor-syr jor-tun jor-tur 0.41 -0.47 4.87 0.57 -0.33 0.59 0.17 -1.40 5.46 -0.08 -2.22 5.70 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur 15.00 0.47 0.81 0.07 1.38 0.61 6.19 1.20 0.82 -4.57 2.19 1.04 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur 13.97 0.47 0.81 0.08 1.59 0.59 6.77 1.43 0.90 -4.75 2.56 1.04 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 syr-tun syr-tur 1.51 1.30 1.28 0.59 1.56 1.01 1.71 0.85 syr-tun syr-tur 1.31 1.15 1.50 0.58 1.76 1.05 2.11 0.89 1961-1970 1961-1980 1961-1990 1961-2000 tun-tur 1.11 -0.07 0.49 0.03 tun-tur 1.04 -0.07 0.55 0.03 7 Table 2 Numbers and Percentages of Strongly Diverging and Converging Pairs 1961 1970 1980 1990 1961 1970 1980 1990 Strongly Diverging Pairs 1970 1980 1990 23 (63.9%) 14 (38.9%) 20 (55.6%) 13 (36.1%) 11 (30.6%) 20 (55.6%) Strongly Converging Pairs 1970 1980 1990 6 (16.7%) 16 (44.4%) 13 (36.1%) 21 (58.3%) 20 (55.6%) 14 (38.9%) 2000 21 (58.3%) 14 (38.9%) 18 (50.0%) 19 (52.8%) 2000 14 (38.9%) 21 (58.3%) 11 (30.6%) 17 (47.2%) An overall picture of convergence may be obtained from Table 2 where the numbers and percentages of strongly diverging and converging pairs are given for each period. We note that, for the 1961 based calculations, the number of strongly diverging pairs are higher than the number of strongly converging pairs except in 1961-1980. It is difficult to see a distinct pattern here except that the number of strongly diverging pairs is much higher than the number of strongly converging pairs in 1961-1970 but this difference diminishes in later periods. On the other hand, we find a reverse picture when 1970 is taken as the base; the number of converging pairs is higher than the number of diverging pairs in all three periods. This picture, however, does not continue for the 1980 and 1990 based calculations; the number of strongly divergent pairs is dominant in these cases. The overall picture that we obtain from Table 2 does not lead us to a clear cut conclusion as to whether convergence or divergence is the dominant trend for the nine countries that we have considered for the MENA region. We shall take this a step further and first choose those pairs that this analysis suggests to be exhibiting strong convergence behaviour and then subject them to unit root tests so that statistically stronger results may be obtained. The choice of the pairs in question was first made by tabulating, for each country, the countries with which strong convergence evidence was found. These are given in Table 3 and 8 in Tables A4 to A7 in the Appendix. For each country we counted the number of times it was paired with another country in its Table 3 Strongly Converging Pairs for Algeria and Egypt ALGERIA Without Switching EGYPT Without Switching Base Year 1961 1970 Base Year 1970 Morocco Turkey 1980 Tunisia Israel Jordan Syria Tunisia 1980 1990 1990 2000 Egypt Egypt Morocco Morocco Syria Syria Tunisia Egypt Egypt Jordan Iran Morocco Jordan Syria Morocco Tunisia Syria Egypt Egypt Morocco Morocco Tunisia Syria Egypt Jordan Morocco Syria 1961 1970 1980 1970 Jordan 1980 Iran Turkey 1990 Algeria Iran Jordan Iran Turkey Algeria Iran Jordan Morocco Syria Algeria Iran Jordan Morocco Tunisia 1990 Iran Iran 1961 1970 Iran 1980 Algeria Iran Tunisia Algeria Syria Israel Turkey With Switching 1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 Algeria Iran Syria Turkey Algeria Iran Syria Turkey With Switching Jordan Jordan Jordan Morocco Jordan Morocco 1990 Table and chose those pairs that occurred four or more times. For example, if we again consider Algeria, as given in Table 3, we find that it has been paired with Morocco 8 times, with Egypt and Syria 7 times with Tunisia 5 times and with Jordan and Iran 4 times. Hence, the pairs we shall consider from this Table are Algeria-Morocco, Algeria-Egypt, AlgeriaSyria, Algeria -Tunisia, Algeria-Jordan and Algeria-Iran. In Table 3 we also have Egypt and we find that it is paired with Jordan and Iran 8 times, with Algeria 7 times, with Syria 6 times, with Turkey 5 times and with Morocco 4 times. The additional pairs we shall consider from Table 3 then become Egypt-Jordan, Egypt- 9 Iran, Egypt-Syria, Egypt-Turkey, and Egypt-Morocco. Egypt-Algeria has, of course, been left out to avoid double-counting. Proceeding this way we find that Table A4 yields the pairs IranMorocco, Iran-Tunisia, Iran-Syria, Iran-Algeria, Iran-Jordan, Israel-Syria and Israel-Tunisia; Table A5, the pairs Jordan-Morocco, Jordan-Syria, Morocco-Syria and Morocco-Turkey; Table A6, the pairs Syria-Turkey and Tunisia-Turkey. Since all countries that pair with Turkey have been accounted for we obtain no additional pairs from Table A7. Table 4 ADF Test Results Intercept Intercept and Trend p ADF p ADF Algeria-Egypt Algeria-Morocco Algeria-Syria Algeria-Tunisia Algeria-Jordan Algeria-Iran Egypt-Iran Egypt-Turkey Egypt-Jordan Egypt-Syria Egypt-Morocco Iran-Morocco Iran-Syria Iran-Tunisia Iran-Jordan Israel-Syria Israel-Tunisia Jordan-Morocco Jordan-Syria Morocco-Turkey Morocco-Syria Syria-Turkey Tunisia-Turkey 0 9 0 8 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 8 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 -0.5662 (0.8666) -2.6781 (0.0896)* -2.7006 (0.0830)* 2.0903 (0.9998) -2.1913 (0.2127) -1.5842 (0.4801) -0.7893 (0.8110) -1.8465 (0.3531) -0.7962 (0.8091) -3.0141 (0.0423)** -1.2095 (0.6607) -1.5387 (0.5029) -1.4863 (0.5299) -1.7194 (0.8300) -2.5185 (0.1196) -3.4311 (0.0174)** -1.2688 (0.6340) -2.3111 (0.1741) -2.2700 (0.1864) -2.0281 (0.2741) -3.0688 (0.0374)** -3.2492 (0.0245)** -0.9835 (0.7497) 1 1 0 9 3 3 3 3 7 0 0 0 0 8 3 8 9 3 8 1 0 0 0 -1.9470 (0.6105) -2.3424 (0.4022) -3.2068 (0.0980)* -0.5220 (0.9768) -2.1218 (0.5168) -1.8162 (0.6759) -2.9673 (0.1550) -3.0654 (0.1297) -2.5131 (0.3201) -3.0955 (0.1215) -2.5441 (0.3066) -1.1657 (0.9037) -1.9524 (0.6082) -2.3361 (0.4035) -2.7349 (0.2312) -3.8312 (0.0281)** -3.1175 (0.1206) -2.4125 (0.3673) -2.2458 (0.4493) -2.5181 (0.3182) -3.4067 (0.0651)** -3.2350 (0.0926)* -1.8505 (0.6606) Notes: 1. The figures in parentheses are p-values. They are based on MacKinnon (1996). 2. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level The ADF test results for those chosen pairs are given in Table 4. When there is both an intercept and a trend term in (5); i.e., when r =1, we find that the per capita incomes of Algeria and Syria, Israel and Syria, Morocco and Syria, and Syria and Turkey converge. The tests of the trend term for these pairs are given in Table 5 from which we note that the trend term is not significant for any of these pairs. This, of course, implies that these pairs do not contain a common deterministic trend term. We then turn to the results for the model with 10 Table 5 Testing the Significance of the Trend Term in Models with Intercept and Trend where the Unit Root Hypothesis has been Rejected Trend Algeria-Syria -0.0033 (-1.6629) (0.1050) Israel-Syria -0.0028 (-1.4907) (0.1517) Morocco-Syria -0.0023 (-1.4410) (0.1582) Syria-Turkey -0.0007 (-0.4156) (0.6801) Notes: The first parenthesis under the coefficient estimates is the t-ratio while the second is its pvalue based on the standard normal distribution. only an intercept term (i.e., r = 0) and find that the same four pairs also converge in this case. In addition, we also find that the pairs Algeria-Morocco and Egypt-Syria also converge. The evidence, in the case of Algeria-Morocco, is not very strong, however, the significance level being only 10%. Turning to the KPSS results in Table 6, we now find the number of converging pairs to be 11. Pesaran (2006) provides similar figures based on testing for all 36 pairs. Evidence regarding the four converging pairs based on the ADF test is also obtained in this case if we regard the 10% percent significance of the KPSS statistic for Algeria-Syria as indicating convergence because it is below the 5% level. However, in addition to these four pairs, we have Algeria-Morocco (that also converged in the ADF case), Algeria-Jordan, Algeria-Iran, Egypt-Turkey, Egypt-Syria (that also converged in the ADF case), Iran-Jordan, JordanMorocco and Morocco-Turkey. However, when we plot the zijt’s for some of the nonconverging pairs, as given in Figure 1, we note that they show structural shifts in their levels. This is quite clear, for example, in the case of Algeria-Egypt, Egypt-Iran and Egypt-Syria. Thus, we applied the sequential unit root testing procedure described in Section 2, which involved sequentially estimating equation (9). The results are given in Table 7. 11 Figure 1 Plots of Selected Pairs Algeria_Egypt Algeria_Iran .8 Algeria_Jordan .4 Algeria_Tunisia .6 .6 .7 .2 .5 .0 .4 -.2 .4 .4 .6 .2 .2 .0 .3 .0 -.4 -.2 .2 .1 -.6 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 -.2 65 70 Egypt_Iran 75 80 85 90 95 00 -.4 65 70 Egypt_Jordan 0.0 -0.2 80 85 90 95 00 65 70 Iran_Jordan .1 1.0 .0 0.8 -.1 -0.4 75 75 80 85 90 95 00 90 95 00 Iran_Morocco 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 -.2 -0.6 0.4 -.3 -0.8 0.4 0.2 -.4 -1.0 -.5 0.0 -1.2 -.6 -0.2 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 65 70 Iran_Syria 75 80 85 90 95 00 0.2 0.0 65 70 Iran_Tunisia 1.2 .8 1.0 .6 0.8 .4 0.6 .2 0.4 .0 0.2 -.2 75 80 85 90 95 00 90 95 00 Iran_Turkey .6 .4 .2 .0 0.0 -.2 -.4 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 -.4 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 12 65 70 75 80 85 65 70 75 80 85 Table 6 KPSS Test Results m KPSS Algeria-Egypt 5 0.3637* Algeria-Morocco 4 0.2543 Algeria-Syria 4 0.3752* Algeria-Tunisia 5 0.6020** Algeria-Jordan 4 0.1593 Algeria-Iran 5 0.2921 Egypt-Iran 5 0.4772** Egypt-Turkey 4 0.3160 Egypt-Jordan 5 0.3776* Egypt-Syria 4 0.1499 Egypt-Morocco 5 0.3873* Iran-Morocco 5 0.4201* Iran-Syria 5 0.4372* Iran-Tunisia 5 0.6077** Iran-Jordan 5 0.1657 Israel-Syria 4 0.0742 Israel-Tunisia 5 0.5458** Jordan-Morocco 5 0.1881 Jordan-Syria 4 0.4755** Morocco-Turkey 4 0.2499 Morocco-Syria 4 0.2430 Syria-Turkey 4 0.1282 Tunisia-Turkey 5 0.5771** Notes: 1. The critical values for the KPSS test are from Table 1 of Kwiatowski et al (1992): 10% 0.347 5% 0.463 2. * Significant at the 10% level, 5% level+ 1% 0.739 ** Significant at the . We note, in the intercept and trend case, that there are five converging pairs; AlgeriaEgypt, Egypt-Morocco, Iran-Syria, Israel-Syria, Morocco-Turkey and Syria-Turkey. Only two of these are the same pairs that had converged according to the ADF results of Table 4. When we test if the trend terms for these pairs are significant, we find, from Table 8, that only for Iran-Syria and Israel-Syria is it not significant. For the other five pairs, we have to conclude that convergence takes place in the presence of a common deterministic trend. We also note that the structural shifts, as represented by the estimates associated with the dummy variables, are all significant. When we turn to the results of the intercept case, we find that there are only three pairs converging; Iran-Syria, Morocco-Syria and Syria-Turkey. We already have evidence on the convergence of Syria-Turkey from the ADF results. One can, probably, also claim 13 convergence for Israel-Syria as the value of min ADF is extremely close to the critical value at the 10% level. Table 7 Min ADF Test Results Intercept Intercept and Trend p min ADF p min ADF ĥ ĥ Algeria-Egypt Algeria-Morocco Algeria-Syria Algeria-Tunisia Algeria-Jordan Algeria-Iran Egypt-Iran Egypt-Turkey Egypt-Jordan Egypt-Syria Egypt-Morocco Iran-Morocco Iran-Syria Iran-Tunisia Iran-Jordan Israel-Syria Israel-Tunisia Jordan-Morocco Jordan-Syria Morocco-Turkey Morocco-Syria Syria-Turkey Tunisia-Turkey 1 1 3 5 3 3 5 1 5 1 1 3 3 3 3 5 0 3 1 1 5 5 0 -3.7601 -3.8300 -3.1968 -3.8245 -2.3463 -2.9582 -4.1202 -2.7619 -2.5360 -2.5802 -2.1767 -3.6217 -5.4829*** -4.0439 -3.3946 -4.1847 -3.8898 -2.9261 -2.9595 -3.0051 -4.5957** -4.8638** -3.1454 1989 1987 1990 1987 1977 1976 1979 1978 1988 1982 1989 1978 1979 1978 1977 1977 1974 1987 1987 1990 1977 1977 1970 1 1 3 4 3 3 5 3 5 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 1 3 3 0 5 5 1 -5.4318*** -4.7269 -3.2256 -3.1696 -2.5987 -3.7269 -3.8822 -4.8321** -3.5617 -3.8982 -5.3762*** -3.5664 -5.7118*** -4.2788 -4.1079 -4.5963* -3.6736 -3.6221 -3.9672 -7.4049*** -4.4968 -5.6185*** -3.5463 1971 1987 1990 1978 1977 1978 1979 1973 1977 1973 1973 1978 1979 1978 1977 1977 1974 1977 1975 1978 1977 1979 1986 Notes: 1. The asymptotic critical values for the min ADF test in the case of only an intercept have been obtained from Perron and Vogelsang (1992), Table 2 and are given as 0.10 -4.19 0.05 -4.44 0.025 -4.69 0.01 -4.95 2. The asymptotic critical values for the min ADF test in the case of an intercept and a trend term have been obtained from Perron (1997), Table 1 and are given as 0.10 -4.58 0.05 -4.80 3. * Significant at the 10% level, the 1% level ** 0.025 -5.02 0.01 -5.41 Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at In sum, of these test results the most favourable ones are those obtained from the KPPS tests. An exercise as to whether convergence clubs may be obtained from these results seems to indicate the following groupings: Algeria-Morocco-Syria, Algeria-Jordan-Iran, Syria-Egypt-Turkey. These groups overlap, so it is difficult to call them convergence clubs. 14 Table 8 Testing the Significance of the Trend Term in Models with Intercept and Trend with Shift in the Intercept and where the Unit Root Hypothesis has been Rejected Trend DU( ĥ ) D( ĥ ) Algeria-Egypt -0.0103 0.1515 -0.2616 (-7.2750) (4.7608) (-5.5676) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** Egypt-Morocco 0.0141 -0.2430 0.1453 (5.7236) (-4.9533) (2.6540) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0134)** Egypt-Turkey 0.0079 -0.1455 0.0798 (4.0838) (-3.3557) (1.4236) (0.0003)*** (0.0023)*** (0.1656) Iran-Syria 0.0037 -0.5722 0.3676 (1.0818) (-4.9849) (2.5645) (0.2893) (0.0000)*** (0.0165)** Israel-Syria 0.0039 -0.1066 0.3850 (1.6971) (-2.0087) (4.5808) (0.1008) (0.0543)* (0.0001)*** Morocco-Turkey -0.0089 0.1789 -0.0976 (-5.7679) (5.1377) (-1.9907) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0546)* Syria-Turkey -0.0110 0.3927 -0.2562 (-3.5254) (4.6281) (-2.1493) (0.0017)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0419)** Notes: 1. The first parenthesis under the coefficient estimates is the t-ratio while the second is its p-value based on the standard normal distribution. 2. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level The converging pairs based on the other tests are so few in number that such an exercise does not seem possible. 5. Conclusions In investigating the per capita income convergence of the MENA countires, we used a pair-wise testing approach as opposed to the panel unit root approach implemented by Guetat and Serranita (2004), where the convergence of countries to a target variable was sought after. We first subjected the nine countries, for which a complete data set was available, to a descriptive procedure due to Webber and White (2004) and then applied unit root tests that both excluded and included structural shifts in the levels of the variables in question. Our conclusions are as follows: 15 1. The descriptive procedure yielded results that differed depending upon the base year and the length of the period for which comparisons of per capita income between two countries were made. When 1961, 1980 and 1990 were chosen as the base year, the number of converging pairs was usually less than the diverging ones but this number appeard to increase as the period became longer. For 1970 as the base year, however, the number of converging pairs exceeded the number of diverging pairs. 2. We chose 23 pairs that we subjected to unit root tests. The ADF results yielded four converging pairs while the KPSS results gave us eleven such pairs. When we took the possibility of shifts in the intercept term into account, we obtained seven converging pairs but, as opposed to the previous ADF results, five of these pairs appeared to have common deterministic trends. 3. An exercise to see if we may identify convergence clubs based on the KPSS results was not fruitful. 4. Hence, we may state that convergence among the nine countries under consideration is not a dominant phenomenon. Whether, as Guetat and Serranito (2004) seem to have found, different groupings of these countries based on exogeneous criteria may lead us to revise this conclusion is a point we intend to look into. References Bernard, A.B. and S. Durlauf (1995): “Convergence in International Output”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, 97-102. Guetat, I. And F. Serranito (2004): “Using Panel Unit Root Tests to Evaluate the Income Convergence Hypothesis in Middle East and North African Countries”, Cahiers de la Maison de Sciences Economiques, Serie Blanche, TEAM-CNRS, Paris I. Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2002): “Penn World Table Version 6.1:, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). Kwiatowski, D., P.C.B. Phillips, P. Schmidt and Y. Shin (1992): “Testing the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity Against the Alternative of a Unit Root”, Journal of Econometrics, 54, 159-178. MacKinnon, J.G. (1996): “Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and Cointegration Tests”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11, 601-618. 16 Newey, W. And K. West (1994): “Automatic Lag Selection in Covariance Matrix Estimation”, Review of Economic Studies, 61, 631-653. Perron, P. (1996): “Further Evidence on Breaking Trend Functions in Macroeconomic Variables”, Journal of Econometrics, 80, 355-385. Perron. P. and T.J. Vogelsang (1992): “Nonstationarity and Level Shifts with an Application to Purchasing Power Parity”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 10(3), 301320. Pesaran, M.H. (2006): “A Pair-Wise Approach to Testing Output and Growth Convergence`, forthcoming in the Journal of Econometrics. Webber, D.T. and P. White (2004): “Concordant Convergence Empirics`, Discussion Paper, School of Economics, University of the West of England. 17 Table A1 X and Y values: Base 1970 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 X alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 1.22 -0.40 0.92 0.38 1.11 0.77 -0.59 1.07 0.84 0.80 0.28 0.48 1.31 0.53 0.66 alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 0.63 0.30 -2.08 0.63 0.02 2.76 0.24 -1.12 6.34 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 0.52 1.03 4.16 1.53 -1.17 2.21 0.93 0.18 0.96 0.52 0.65 0.23 1.58 0.94 0.37 0.93 -0.58 -0.86 0.12 1.82 0.81 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 1.98 -0.01 0.35 0.26 -0.11 -0.16 2.39 0.14 0.11 0.19 -0.34 -1.06 1.98 0.51 0.57 0.33 -0.17 -0.36 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 isr-jor 0.75 1.00 1.07 isr-mor 0.98 0.99 1.11 isr-syr 0.80 0.88 0.85 isr-tun isr-tur 0.78 1.10 0.82 0.97 0.74 1.02 jor-mor -21.04 1.81 -3.26 jor-syr jor-tun jor-tur 1.00 0.52 0.11 0.35 2.50 1.04 -0.16 3.90 1.16 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur 0.00 2.95 0.76 0.41 2.58 1.02 -0.30 4.70 1.29 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 syr-tun syr-tur 0.85 0.45 1.03 0.78 1.13 0.65 1970-1980 1970-1990 1970-2000 tun-tur -0.06 0.44 0.02 18 Y alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 1.23 -0.32 0.95 0.46 1.16 0.80 -0.41 1.10 0.85 0.82 0.27 0.34 1.24 0.46 0.56 alg-syr 0.76 0.71 0.25 alg-tun 0.36 0.02 -1.21 alg-tur -2.05 2.86 5.79 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr 0.38 1.01 4.84 1.51 -1.34 0.13 1.03 0.57 0.72 0.27 0.31 1.03 -0.62 -0.89 0.15 egy-tun 2.49 1.93 2.40 egy-tur 0.86 1.03 0.89 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 1.58 -0.01 0.27 0.22 -0.10 -0.12 1.84 0.10 0.08 0.15 -0.27 -0.79 1.68 0.39 0.43 0.29 -0.16 -0.29 isr-jor 0.86 1.05 1.10 isr-mor 0.99 1.05 1.12 isr-syr 0.90 1.00 0.99 isr-tun 0.87 0.95 0.90 isr-tur 1.05 1.03 1.08 jor-mor -25.22 1.93 -3.06 jor-syr 1.40 0.40 -0.19 jor-tun 0.71 2.97 4.70 jor-tur 0.12 1.12 1.17 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur 0.00 0.83 0.77 0.48 3.08 1.10 -0.34 5.51 1.27 syr-tun 1.15 1.35 1.61 syr-tur 0.50 0.91 0.77 tun-tur -0.07 0.52 0.03 Table A2 X and Y values: Base 1980 1980-1990 1980-2000 alg-egy 0.63 0.23 X alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 1.47 1.15 2.23 0.72 -1.21 1.42 1.41 0.59 alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 1.00 0.06 -1.33 0.38 -3.69 -3.05 1980-1990 1980-2000 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 0.35 0.93 0.12 0.43 -0.19 0.71 1.01 0.71 0.90 -0.14 -0.56 -0.10 0.82 0.87 1980-1990 1980-2000 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 1.20 -20.32 0.30 0.74 3.01 6.67 1.00 -76.03 1.61 1.28 1.53 2.23 1980-1990 1980-2000 1980-1990 1980-2000 isr-jor 1.32 1.42 isr-mor 1.00 1.13 isr-syr 1.10 1.06 isr-tun isr-tur 1.05 0.88 0.95 0.92 jor-mor -0.09 0.15 jor-syr jor-tun jor-tur 0.35 4.79 9.56 -0.16 7.46 10.61 1980-1990 1980-2000 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur 88.72 0.88 1.35 -65.43 1.59 1.71 1980-1990 1980-2000 syr-tun syr-tur 1.22 1.71 1.33 1.44 1980-1990 1980-2000 tun-tur -7.08 -0.39 19 Y alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 0.65 1.31 1.15 1.87 0.71 0.22 -1.07 1.30 1.01 0.48 alg-syr 0.93 0.33 alg-tun 0.06 -3.37 alg-tur -1.39 -2.83 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr 0.35 1.02 0.12 0.48 -0.20 0.81 1.02 -0.13 -0.59 -0.11 egy-tun 0.78 0.96 egy-tur 1.20 1.03 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 1.17 -16.37 0.28 0.66 2.80 6.79 1.07 -66.02 1.59 1.32 1.68 2.48 isr-jor 1.22 1.28 isr-mor 1.06 1.13 isr-syr 1.11 1.10 isr-tun 1.09 1.04 isr-tur 0.98 1.02 jor-mor -0.08 0.12 jor-syr 0.29 -0.14 jor-tun 4.20 6.65 jor-tur 9.19 9.61 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur 87.64 0.90 1.52 -61.49 1.61 1.76 syr-tun 1.18 1.41 syr-tur 1.82 1.54 tun-tur -7.76 -0.44 Table A3 X and Y values: Base 1990 1990-2000 X alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 0.38 -57.18 2.30 1990-2000 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 0.53 1.15 0.86 1990-2000 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 0.83 3.74 5.36 1.73 0.51 0.33 1990-2000 1990-2000 isr-jor 1.07 isr-mor 1.13 isr-syr 0.96 isr-tun isr-tur 0.90 1.05 jor-mor -1.80 jor-syr -0.47 jor-tun jor-tur 1.56 1.11 1990-2000 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur -0.74 1.82 1.27 1990-2000 syr-tun syr-tur 1.09 0.84 1990-2000 tun-tur 0.05 20 Y alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 0.34 -0.82 1.13 0.54 0.68 alg-syr 0.35 alg-tun -54.21 alg-tur 2.03 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr 2.30 1.00 -1.09 -1.24 0.56 egy-tun 1.24 egy-tur 0.86 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 0.91 4.03 5.58 2.01 0.60 0.37 isr-jor 1.04 isr-mor 1.07 isr-syr 0.99 isr-tun 0.95 isr-tur 1.04 jor-mor -1.58 jor-syr -0.47 jor-tun 1.58 jor-tur 1.04 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur -0.70 1.79 1.15 syr-tun 1.19 syr-tur 0.85 tun-tur 0.06 Table A4 Strongly Converging Pairs for Iran and Israel IRAN Without Switching ISRAEL Without Switching Base Year 1961 Base Year 1970 Israel 1970 1980 Egypt Morocco Syria Egypt Morocco Syria 1980 1990 Egypt Morocco Syria Egypt Jordan Morocco Syria Egypt Morocco Syria 1990 1961 1970 2000 Egypt Morocco Syria Algeria Egypt Jordan Morocco Syria Egypt 1961 1970 1980 1990 1980 1990 2000 Algeria Jordan Morocco Syria Tunisia Syria Tunisia Syria Tunisia 1980 1990 Tunisia Israel Turkey With Switching Jordan Tunisia Tunisia Algeria Algeria Jordan Tunisia Tunisia Turkey 1970 Iran Morocco Turkey Egypt Iran Syria Tunisia With Switching 1961 1970 1980 1990 Tunisia Tunisia Turkey Algeria Table A5 Strongly Converging Pairs for Jordan and Morocco JORDAN Without Switching MOROCCO Without Switching Base Year 1961 1970 1980 Base Year 1970 Egypt 1980 Morocco Syria Turkey Algeria Israel Tunisia Turkey 1990 Egypt Syria 2000 Morocco Algeria Egypt Iran Syria Egypt Syria Algeria Iran Jordan Morocco Morocco 1990 1961 1970 1980 1990 1961 1970 1970 Algeria Israel Tunisia Turkey 1980 Iran Jordan Syria Turkey Iran Israel Turkey 1980 Algeria With Switching Egypt Morocco Iran Tunisia Iran Morocco Egypt Syria 1990 Algeria Iran Turkey 2000 Algeria Iran Jordan Algeria Egypt Iran Syria Algeria Egypt Iran Tunisia Algeria Iran 1990 Algeria Iran Algeria With Switching Egypt Syria Egypt Syria Syria 1961 1970 1980 1990 21 Jordan Egypt Syria Jordan Egypt Syria Table A6 Strongly Converging Pairs for Syria and Tunisia SYRIA Without Switching TUNISIA Without Switching Base Year Base Year 1970 1961 1970 1980 Jordan Morocco Turkey 1990 Algeria Jordan Iran Algeria Iran Israel Turkey Algeria Egypt Iran Israel Jordan Morocco Turkey Iran Jordan 1980 1990 2000 Algeria Egypt Iran Turkey Algeria Egypt Iran Israel Turkey 1961 1970 1980 Algeria 1961 1970 1980 1990 With Switching 1980 1990 Egypt 1980 Algeria Israel Algeria Israel Jordan 1990 Algeria Turkey Algeria Israel Turkey Algeria Egypt Morocco 1990 Algeria Egypt Israel Turkey 1961 1970 1970 Morocco Jordan Jordan Morocco Egypt Jordan Jordan Morocco 22 2000 Turkey Israel Turkey Egypt Iran Iran Israel Turkey With Switching Jordan Turkey Iran Turkey Iran Iran Iran Iran Turkey Table A7 Strongly Converging Pairs for Turkey TURKEY Without Switching Base Year 2000 1990 1980 1970 Egypt Egypt Morocco Morocco 1961 Syria Tunisia Jordan Tunisia Morocco Syria Egypt Syria Egypt 1970 Syria Tunisia Jordan Tunisia Morocco Syria Israel 1980 Egypt 1990 Iran Syria Tunisia With Switching Tunisia 1961 Iran Iran 1970 Tunisia Tunisia 1980 1990 23