A Missed Opportunity: The Re-Creation of the Urban
Underclass in the Schools of Post-Disaster New Orleans
Anh Nguyen
March 13, 2008
Urban Sociology
1
Cover page photo: a barge that collided with a school bus in the Lower Ninth Ward, by Gabrielle Geiselman
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many saw a golden opportunity to recreate
the New Orleans public schools into one that would not only provide high-quality education
but also ensure equal educational opportunities for all residents. In the two years since the
rebuilding of the schools has begun, this opportunity has all but faded. As of October 2007,
only 60 percent of the schools in New Orleans are open. Moreover, in the so-called
Recovery School District, 97 percent of all students are black. The recovery process, then,
has not re-worked the failing school system and instead has restored and exacerbated the
preexisting inequities. It has created a more formidable urban underclass in New Orleans’
schools.
The aim of this research project is to examine how the recovery process has re-built
and strengthened the structural stratifications and produced a de facto apartheid in New
Orleans’ school system. Such a topic is in dire need of attention given the current crisis in
the rebuilding of New Orleans; for without equitable and quality schools, the larger
reconstruction of New Orleans will be seriously stalled. Furthermore, for urban sociologists,
this project will contribute to the understanding of how the built spaces—in this stance
schools—profoundly affect the lives and opportunities of urban residents. While the current
state of pubic education in New Orleans is bleak, a glimmer of hope, though ever-shrinking,
still remains. Thus, by exposing the underpinnings of this inequitable structure and its
resulting concentration of the children of the urban underclass, this research calls attention
to the urgency of the crisis and urges for new and more just policies and actions in order
adequately address these disparities. Before discussing the current situation of New Orleans’
public schools, I first provide a theoretical foundation for framing the analysis of the urban
underclass in the schools.
2
Theoretical Foundations of the Urban Underclass
William Julius Wilson (1987) and Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993)
examine the creation and maintenance of the concentration of poverty by attributing the
cause to the larger economic structure and racial segregation. While their theories of the
urban underclass speak specifically to the impoverished and hyper-segregated
neighborhoods, they can be re-worked and extended to apply to the schools in New
Orleans, in order to explain the concentrations of poor and black students—the urban
underclass of children.
In The Truly Disadvantaged, Wilson argues that it is the structural economic changes
that are principally responsible for the concentrations of impoverished neighborhoods. The
transformation of the economy to services-producing industries has had the effect of
exacerbating the social and economic isolation of the urban underclass (Wilson: 39).
Furthermore, the “concentration effects” of such social and economic isolation creates
neighborhoods with “massive joblessness, flagrant and open lawlessness, and low-achieving
schools” (Wilson: 58). Wilson particularly highlights the sharp rise in the number of single
female-headed households as an important factor in the growing isolation of the underclass.
With lower educational attainment and work experience, these householders are especially
vulnerable to poverty (Wilson: 70-1). Without stable employment histories and without the
black middle class to serve as role models and social buffers, the truly disadvantaged
segments of the black population are not likely to overcome the tremendous effects of
economic changes (Wilson: 56). Ultimately, the creation and perpetuation of the urban
underclass is a result of economic inequalities.
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton reframe this debate to focus on contemporary
racial segregation and argue that the “institutional apparatus” of segregation is responsible
3
for concentrations of black poverty (Massey & Denton: 8-9). For them, racial segregation
produces “an oppositional culture that devalues work, schooling, and marriage,” all factors
that further contribute to and reinforce the disadvantaged position of the urban underclass
(Massey & Denton: 8). In a challenge to Wilson, they argue that even with the economic
means to escape these concentrations of poverty, the institutionalized racial discrimination
remains a formidable obstacle to spatial mobility. The racist institutions create the American
Apartheid, where the urban underclass is segregated into areas with high rates of “drug use,
joblessness, welfare dependency, teenage childbearing, and unwed parenthood” (Massey &
Denton: 13, 38-9). Thus, significant disadvantages arise for the urban class by virtue of living
in these concentrations; moreover, prolonged exposure to these concentration effects lead to
the drastic reduction of “social and economic success” (Massey & Denton: 2). The greatest
challenge for the urban underclass, then, is the undeniable institutional racism.
To place these two theories in the context of post-disaster recovery, I draw on the
work of Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin (1997), who analyzed the rebuilding process after
Hurricane Andrew. They argue that a family’s social and economic position and ties to the
larger community are critical for their welfare and success in the “highly competitive postdisaster recovery period” (Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin: 143). Wilson’s statement that the
urban underclass is both socially and economically isolated suggest an all too predicted
outcome for the impoverished in post-disaster recovery. With few social and economic
resources, the poor, too often forgotten and abandoned, cannot return and rebuild;
moreover, their already disadvantaged conditions are further exacerbated and reinforced by
natural disasters (Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin: 201).
While economic resources are crucial for rebuilding, Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin
also argue that the “series of obstacles built into the urban social structure” are equally
4
responsible for the “racial disparities in opportunity” (189, 201). Racial segregation
intensifies the traumas of disasters, for the poor are disproportionately located in areas most
susceptible to damage. Furthermore, segregation limits evacuation from disaster areas and
stalls recovery for the poor by preventing access to the “market mechanisms that underlay
recovery” (Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin: 201-3). Ultimately, the poor must not only
contend with the economic consequences of being displaced but also the racist institutions
in the post-disaster urban social structure.
Using these theoretical frames in the context of post-disaster recovery, I argue that
rebuilding of the public education in New Orleans has recreated and reinforced the
concentration of poor and underachieving black students—an urban underclass—in the
schools. Drawing from Wilson, I show that the economically disadvantaged reality of black
residents in New Orleans before and even more so after the storm has resulted in the
concentration of their children in New Orleans’ public schools. I then tie in Massey and
Denton’s arguments to further nuisance the discussion by arguing that racism embedded in
the educational institutions are equally responsible for the concentrations. Thus, I ultimately
contend that Hurricane Katrina intensified the bleak conditions and concentration effects of
urban underclass of poor and black students by presenting significant roadblocks to equal
educational opportunities. I next present a historical analysis of New Orleans and its public
schools to show that the urban underclass and the de facto apartheid in the school system
did not simply result from Hurricane Katrina. It was already well fixed in New Orleans.
A City of the Urban Underclass
High racial segregation is an undeniable reality of New Orleans even before the
storm. In relation to the surrounding areas New Orleans had a remarkable concentration of
5
blacks: to the north, St. Tammany Parish was predominantly white with 86 percent being so
and only 12 percent was black; Jefferson Parish to the south had a population that was 68.9
percent white and 26.1 percent black (Louisiana Department of Education, District
Composite Report, 2004-2005).1 Within the city of New Orleans itself, 67.8 percent of the
population was black and 23 percent was white, which is an astounding contrast to its
neighborhoods (LDE).2 Moreover, before Katrina the New Orleans metropolitan area was
the 11th most segregated of 43 large metropolitan areas in the U.S. (2000 Census).3 The
existence of the urban underclass can be found in many neighborhoods within the city. The
Central District, Desire, Dixon, and Holy Cross, were 80 percent or more black while those
such as the Garden District, Lake Catherine, City Park, and Audubon were 80 percent or
more white (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center). Massey and Denton (1993)
certainly give examples, specifically discriminatory market housing practices, which may
explain these extreme concentrations. Nevertheless, residential segregation not only existed
in the region but also among the neighborhoods in the city.
Vast socioeconomic disparities are also a reality of New Orleans; they further show
that racial segregation is inseparable from economic disadvantages. The median household
income in the city was $27, 133 compared with $32, 566 for the state of Louisiana, a
difference of more than $5, 000 (LDE).4 When the median income is broken down into
racial groups for the city, the disparity is more enhanced. The median income was $21, 461
for blacks and $40, 046 for whites (Census 2000).5 The tremendous gap in median income,
1
St. Tammany and Jefferson Parish were chosen because they are the next largest school districts near Orleans
Parish.
2
See Appendix I for an overview of the parishes.
3
The ranking is an average of the dissimilarity, isolation, delta, absolute centralization, and spatial proximity
indices from the 2000 Census. See Appendix II for more details.
4
The median income in 2004 for the nation was $44, 684.
5
See Appendix III for demographic profiles of black and white residents from the 2000 Census.
6
when compared with St. Tammany and Jefferson Parish—$47, 883 and $38, 435,
respectively—reinforces the economic isolation of New Orleans, particularly for the black
population (LDE). According to the 2000 Census, 34 percent of black residents in the city
are below the poverty level, while only 11 percent of white residents are so.6 The dire
economic reality of New Orleans is further compounded by the percentage of children who
were living below poverty—a remarkable 40.3 percent, compared with 26.3 percent for the
state (LDE). Moreover, the percentage of female housholders for New Orleans, 17.4
percent, is almost triple that of the state (LDE).
Elements of Wilson and Massey and Denton’s arguments can be found in New
Orleans, for there is a large presence of a socially and economically isolated urban
underclass. The concentration effects of this hyper-segregation reinforce these theorists’
conclusions that life in these neighborhoods is accompanied by profound disadvantages and
limited life opportunities. In terms of educational attainment, 67 percent of black residents
twenty and older have at least a high school diploma compared to 89 percent for white
residents and 75 percent for the state (Census 2000). This suggests that black students have
fewer parents who are able to contribute to their academic work (Bankston III & Caldas:
141). Furthermore, in addressing Massey and Denton’s claim of the prevalence of welfare
dependency, about 21% of residents in New Orleans receive food stamps, compared only 7
percent for the nation (Urban Institute). As these statistics show, New Orleans before the
storm was highly segregated not only alone racial but socioeconomic lines. Furthermore, the
intersection of racial and economic isolation often defined the experience of blacks, who
constitute the majority of the population.
6
The rate was 27 percent for the city, 19 percent for the state, and 13 percent for the nation.
7
The Disaster Before the Storm
The public schools before the storm predictably recreated these structurally
stratifications of the larger the society, concentrating poor black students in schools systemic
of failure. In the 2004-05 school year, 93.4 percent of the student population in the Orleans
Parish school district was black and only 3.4 percent white, compared with a relatively even
distribution for the state, 47.7 percent and 48.3 percent, respectively (LDE).7 This largely
contrasted with the St. Tammany Parish school district, in which 78.3 percent was white and
18.1 percent was black (LDE). When the individual school enrollments are examined, 118 of
New Orleans’ 128 schools before the storm consisted of 95 percent or more black students
(LDE).8 The school district, then, had high concentrations of blacks and particularly those
who were economic disadvantaged, since 77.3 percent of the student population in the
district participated in the federal free or reduced price lunch program (LDE). Thus, the
apartheid in New Orleans’ school system was already in place well before Hurricane Katrina.
The profiles of achievement in these schools point to the disastrous concentration
effects of these impoverished minority students. In the 2004-05 school year, 63 percent of
schools in the public school system were considered “academically unacceptable” compared
to 12.5 percent for the state and zero percent for St. Tammany Parish (LDE).9 In the same
year, the results of the Graduation Exit Examination (GEE) show that students in New
Orleans scored 20 percent or more below the state averages across every testing section,
whereas students in St. Tammany scored 10 percent or more above the state averages across
every testing section (LDE). Furthermore, only 8 percent of high school black students were
7
It is important to note that this composition has been consisted. The data from the 1999-2000 school year
reflects the same picture.
8
The other 10 schools were often the highest achieving. For example, Benjamin Franklin Senior High—the
district’s only U.S. Department of Education Blue Ribbon School—had a student population that was only 27
percent black and 7 percent who received free lunch.
9
See Appendix IVfor performance labels.
8
proficient in English Language Arts, compared to 69 percent for white students (LDE).10
Coupled with the factor that only 7 percent of economically disadvantaged students versus
17 percent of non-economically disadvantaged students are proficient, the consequences for
poor blacks students, who constitute the majority of the district, are profound (LDE).11
The data before the storm clearly show that for many residents the New Orleans
public school system was a “school system of last resort, which increasingly divided students
along socioeconomic and racial lines” (The State of Pubic Education pg. 8). Even before
Hurricane Katrina, the disaster in New Orleans’ school system was already happening. I now
turn to how the reorganization of the school system following the storm not only reinforces
but also strengthens the marginalization of this urban underclass.
Post-Disaster Reorganization: The Reestablishment and Strengthening of the
Apartheid
Two months after Hurricane Katrina, under legislative Act No. 35, the state of
Louisiana took over governance of all “academically unacceptable” schools in New Orleans
and in effect reinforced the segregation of the urban poor by creating a “dual school
system,” the under-achieving schools of the Recovery School District (RSD) and the highachieving and often selective schools of the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) (No
Experience Necessary, p.13).12 In the formation of the RSD, the state broadened its definition
of “academically unacceptable” so that the majority (112 schools) of New Orleans’ schools
became reorganized into the Recovery School District, save for 13 high-performing schools,
which remained under the control of the Orleans Parish School Board (Reading, Writing, and
I define proficient as attaining Mastery or Advanced achievement levels instead of including the LDE’s
definition, which includes Basic. See Appendix V for achievement descriptors. See also Appendix VI for a
complete profile of achievement levels for the subgroup population from the 2003-04 report.
11
Economically disadvantaged students are those who receive free or reduced lunch prices.
12
See Appendix VII for a chart of the reorganization.
10
9
Reality Check pg. 29).13 This segregation of under-achieving schools from high-achieving ones
certainly has larger implications for the rate of recovery among these schools.
By virtue of being under state control, the RSD must submit to oversight policies
that often significantly impede rebuilding. As a state-run entity, the RSD must abide by the
state procurement process, which requires the superintendent to obtain three bids for any
purchase that is $500 or greater (The State of Public Education in New Orleans pg. 18). While this
was intended to ensure fair distribution of contracts after the storm, the bureaucratic nature
of this process coupled with the fact that most of the school facilities were built before 1950
and thus are in need of dramatic repairs lead to a dramaticly stalled recovery for the RSD
(Cowen Institute). As Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin (1997) notes, the post-disaster period
further marginalizes the disadvantaged. These already underachieving and poor schools must
now also contend with challenges of the bureaucratic structure.
The reorganization, on the other hand, has provided significant advantages for the
Orleans Parish School Board. Foremost, the OPSB directly control only five schools and
oversee twelve charter schools, which makes management immensely easily compared to the
RSD’s daunting task of reopening 112 schools. Furthermore, the OPSB has the authority to
set enrollment caps, enrollment deadlines, and selective admission policies (9 of 17 schools
are selective), which in turn have negative effects on the RSD, for it must bear the weight of
all students who return mid-year (The State of Public Education in New Orleans pg. 13; No
Experience Necessary pg. 13). Finally, the reorganization has also greatly expedited the creation
Act 35 expanded the definition of academically unacceptable to include schools with a School Performance
School that is below the state average, 87.4 in 2004-2005, instead of the 60 standard. Furthermore, this
expansion only applied to the New Orleans School district, since the legislation also stipulates that the district
must have 30 or more academically unacceptable schools or more than half of its schools enrolled in
academically unacceptable schools. New Orleans was the only district that fulfilled these criteria.
13
10
of charter schools, which were eligible for specific federal and private funding, and thereby
draws considerable resources away from traditional public schools.14
The post-disaster reorganization of the school system has created disproportionate
advantages for the OPSB and tremendous disadvantages for the RSD. The reestablishment
of the apartheid certainly results in the intensification of the concentration effects on urban
minority in the RSD. In the next part, I examine the current state of public education in
New Orleans to see how the institutions of recovery have reinforced the concentrations of
poor black students in the RSD.
The Re-Creation of the Urban Underclass in the Schools
The reopening of schools in New Orleans is inequitable. Schools that are located in
the least devastated areas are the first to reopen. This has had the effect of
disproportionately benefiting higher income, white neighborhoods, which are predominantly
located in dry areas (The State of Public Education in New Orleans 26). This disparity can
foremost be observed between New Orleans and its neighborhoods. In September of 2005,
all 128 schools in New Orleans were closed due to extensive damage, while only 5 schools in
Jefferson and only 4 schools in St. Tammany Parish were closed (GNOCDC). Two months
later, all 84 schools in Jefferson and all 52 schools in St. Tammany were open, while only one
school in New Orleans was open (GNOCDC). Furthermore, as of January 2008, 49 have yet
to open in New Orleans (GNOCDC). Following Wilson’s argument, the economically
prosperous surrounding areas were able to reopen quicker because being in drier and thus
more costly areas they sustained less damage.
Within the city, the disparity was equally striking. For example, there are 6 (of 17)
OPSB schools in the wealthy Audubon neighborhood alone, and no RSD schools
14
Fifty one percent of all schools currently in New Orleans are charters (GNOCDC p.9).
11
(GNOCDC). On the other hand, in the more impoverished and predominantly black
Central City neighborhood, 3 of the 9 schools before the storm are opened, and all are RSD
schools (GNOCDC). This, then, shows how economic factors are contributing to the
concentration of black students in the RSD schools, especially since many black families do
not have any option but to send their children to these schools. As Wilson would argue, they
simply do not have the economic means to do so.
The composition of the current the public schools in New Orleans show that the
structurally stratifications that existed before the storm are largely being recreated, for the
RSD have significant concentrations economically disadvantaged and black students.
Public School Enrollment in Orleans Parish
2004
#
Total
Black
Hispanic
White
Asian
Free
Lunch
Reduced
Lunch
L.E.P.
NOPS
%
2006
#
RSD
%
2007
#
OPSB
%
#
RSD
%
#
OPSB
%
65349
61017
758
2289
1247
93.4%
1.2%
3.5%
1.9%
15819
15352
169
102
172
97.1%
1.1%
0.6%
1.1%
9150
6931
247
1402
559
75.8%
2.7%
15.3%
6.1%
21648
20947
376
144
147
96.8%
1.7%
0.7%
0.7%
9719
7376
250
1497
586
75.9%
2.6%
15.4%
6.0%
47872
73.3%
10573
66.8%
5987
65.4%
17790
82.2%
6003
61.8%
2574
3.9%
261
1.7%
506
5.5%
597
2.8%
795
8.2%
957
1.5%
3
0.0%
442
4.8%
342
1.6%
510
5.3%
Source: Louisiana Department of Education
Multiple Statistics for Total Populations Public School Students - October 2004, 2006, 2007
Notes: NOPS = New Orleans Public School; RSD = Recovery School District; BESE = Louisiana State Board
of Elementary and Secondary Education; OPSB = Orleans Parish School Board; L.E.P. = Limited English
Proficiency
In the table above, black students constitute 97 percent of the student population in the RD
in 2007, whereas white students only make up 1 percent.15 Furthermore, the enrollment data
for the OPSB indicates that the majority of white students are concentrated in the OPSB
15
See Appendix VIII for tables of St. Tammany and Jefferson Parish.
12
schools. Not only is the RSD racially but also economically segregated for 82 percent of its
student qualifies for free lunch compared with 62 percent for the OPSB and 73 for the
district before the storm. The scatter plot below gives clear evidence that there is a strong
correlation between being black and having a low SES in the RSD.16
While the low economic resources of black families have resulted in the
concentrations of their children in the RSD by virtue of their residential segregation, the
existence of racial discrimination within the structure of the school system cannot be
ignored. When the student composition of students in the OPSB are examined for the
different management types, the structural racism that Massey and Denton argues for is
This scatter plot compares the number of students qualifying for free lunch with the number of black
students in each school of the RSD. See Appendix IX and X for scatter plots all schools in New Orleans and
for the state. Both further suggestion that the link between being black and having a low SES is strong.
16
13
quite apparent, for the policies of selective admissions schools have a negative consequences
for poor and black students.
Composition of Orleans Parish School Board Schools by Admissions
Type
Open
Charter
#
Total
Students
Total
Schools
Black
Hispanic
White
Asian
Free Lunch
Reduced
Lunch
L.E.P.
%
3195
Selective
Charter
#
%
3894
Selective
#
%
2437
Alternative
#
%
OPSB Total
#
193
%
9719
7
2667
70
201
254
2203
83%
2%
6%
8%
69%
5
2250
153
1275
212
1980
58%
4%
33%
5%
51%
4
2270
27
17
120
1681
93%
1%
1%
5%
69%
3
189
0
4
0
139
98%
0%
2%
0%
72%
19
7376
250
1497
586
6003
76%
3%
15%
1%
62%
356
240
11%
8%
306
167
8%
4%
133
103
5%
4%
0
0
0%
0%
795
510
1%
1%
Source: Louisiana Department of Education
Adopted from Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Tracking Recovery of New Orleans and the
Metro Area” January 2008
Notes: RSD = Recovery School District; BESE = Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education; OPSB = Orleans Parish School Board; L.E.P. = Limited English Proficiency
The selective schools with their often often-lengthy applications, essays, parentalinvolvement clauses, or behavioral clauses are significant obstacles for many disadvantaged
families. These “subtle forms of selection” prevent the urban underclass from attaining equal
educational opportunities particularly since (The State of Public Education pg. 14). The chart
above shows that in the OPSB open charter schools, 83 percent of the student population is
black compared to only 58 percent for the selective charter schools. Furthermore, the
selective charter schools have a large concentration of white students, 33 percent—the
largest of any New Orleans school operator. These selective schools also present obstacles
for economically disadvantaged students. In the open charter schools, almost 70 percent of
14
students qualify for free lunch compared with 51 percent for the selective charter schools.
Thus, the concentrations of poor black students in the RSD are created by economic and
racial factors.
To examine the result of this concentration in the underachieving RSD schools, I
look at the recently released data from the Graduation Exit Examination (GEE) of 2007. In
the table below, only 10 percent of high school students were proficient in English Language
Arts (ELA) and about 13 percent were proficient in Mathematics before the storm. Two
years later, less than one percent of students in the RSD are proficient in ELA and
Mathematics. All the while, students in the OPSB are performing significantly better than the
RSD, for 17 percent of its students are proficient in ELA and 27 percent are proficient in
Mathematics, both higher than the state average. The fact that the OPSB schools are
performing almost as well as St. Tammany schools, which performed almost three times as
well as New Orleans’ schools, is a clear indication of the profound transformation that has
taken place.
Number and Percent of Proficient Students on the Graduation Exit Examination
English Language Arts
2005
Orleans
Parish
RSD
OPSB
Jefferson
Parish
St.
Tammany
Louisiana
State
Mathematics
2007
2005
2007
#
%*
Total**
#
%
Total
#
%
Total
#
%
415
NA
NA
10.2%
NA
NA
4056
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.0%
17.3%
NA
3
191
62
1107
525
NA
NA
12.9%
NA
NA
4079
NA
NA
NA
21
305
NA
0.0%
27.3%
NA
1182
1114
336
11.8%
2852
192
0.1%
2560
462
16.2%
2858
359
14.1%
2542
767
31.0%
2471
442
18.7%
2363
1314
53.3%
2463
802
33.9%
2365
7661
17.6%
43536
4699
11.4%
41349
10098
23.2%
43576
8953
21.7%
41346
Source: Louisiana Department of Education
Proficiency combines Advanced and Mastery achievement levels
*Percent of total test takers; **Denotes total test takers
RSD and OPSB did not exist before 2005
15
Total
To explain how this concentration of poor black students results in overwhelming
underachievement, I draw on the works of Bankston III and Caldas (2002) and James S.
Coleman et al (1966). As Massey and Denton have noted, the segregation of disadvantaged
minorities leads to an “oppositional culture” which devalues schooling and thus, “intensifies
the effects of social deprivation” (Massey & Denton: 8; Bankston III & Caldas 1996: 539).
Furthermore, since the establishment of the social environment of schools is determined by
the social resources that students and their peer bring to the schools, the hyper
concentrations of black students with significantly lower SES in the RSD have a tremendous
negative influence on the educational achievement (Coleman 1966; Bankston III & Caldas
1996: 538, 2002: 188-9). While SES is certainly a crucial factor in influencing educational
outcomes, Bankston III and Caldas (2002) ultimately contend that “racial concentration
continued to have an independent negative association with both white and black achievement,
even after controlling for important SES factors” (195). Thus for poor black students in the
RSD both the forces of social and economic isolation contribute to their low educational
achievement and compounds their marginalization.
Conclusions
As these data show, the reorganization of public schools into two separate but
certainly unequal districts has resulted in dramatic educational disparities and further
exacerbated the divisions racial and social divisions before the storm. The recovery process
has produced a school district that is almost completely black and poor. Furthermore, the
selectivity of many schools have reinforced and strengthened the degree of concentrations in
New Orleans’ schools. The urban underclass has been re-created and their experience of
16
limited educational opportunities is as profound as the limited life chances of the urban
underclass described by Wilson and Massey and Denton.
The golden opportunity to reform the public school system in New Orleans, it
seems, has been missed. Instead of ensuring equal educational opportunities, the recovery
process has rebuilt the structures of inequities that existed prior to the school. The
persistence of such inequities in the school systems will severely hamper the reconstruction
of New Orleans and its neighborhoods and communities. For without equitable access to
high-equality schools, an important factor in re-establishing communities, the social
infrastructure cannot truly be rebuilt.
A Glimmer of Hope
Since the rebuilding of schools is currently underway, there is a glimmer hope still
for the city. There is still a possibility for inclusive and sustainable communities, where all
residents not have equal educational opportunities but life chances as well. To rebuild these
communities, New Orleans must invest in the reconstruction of high-quality schools and
ensure access to them for all. The social infrastructure, then, may begin to be rebuilt.
Furthermore, there is also an opportunity for New Orleans to reshape the role of schools to
improve the lives of community members.
The challenge for New Orleans is to create an equitable educational system. Rather
than relying on the state for management of schools, New Orleans should give this role to
local communities. For the strengthening of links between schools and the community will
only contribute to the vitality of the community. Thus, New Orleans should seriously
consider the notion of schools as neighborhood community centers, as proposed in the
Unified Orleans Plan, to facilitate the rebuilding of communities.
17
References
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Experienced Teachers. United Teachers of New Orleans, Louisiana Federation of
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2007. Reading, Writing, and Reality Check: An Early Assessment of Student Achievement in PostKatrina New Orleans. United Teachers of New Orleans, Louisiana Federation of
Teachers, and American Federation of Teachers, New Orleans. Retrieved February
25, 2008 from www.aft.org.
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