SEABEE COMBAT
WARFARE
COMMON CORE
Communications/
Electronic Key
Management System
(EKMS) Fundamental
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
• Reference:
• Navy Electronic Key Management System (EKMS 1).
• MCRP 3-40.3(series) FMFM 3-36 Radio Operators
• TM 11-5820-890-10-8 Operators Manual, SINCGARS
GROUND COMBAT NET RADIO, ICOM
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
• Reference:
• PUB. NO. 10515-0103-4100, AN/PRC 150 MANPACK
Radio Operators Manual
• PUB. NO. 10515-0109-4100, AN/PRC-117F Operations
Manual
• MCWP 6-22 Communications And Information System
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
• Reference:
• NAVEDTRA 14235, SEABEE COMBAT
HANDBOOK, Vol. 2
Overview
• Communication Terms
• Communications Security (COMSEC)
• Two-Person Integrity (TPI)
• Electronic Key Management System
(EKMS)
Overview
• Receiver-Transmitter (RT) “Radio”-AN/PRC 119,
AN/PRC 117, AND AN/PRC 150.
• Phonetic alphabet, numerals, and pro-words
• Line Of Sight (LOS)
• Purpose Of Retransmissions
Communications / EKMS
PQS Question 107.1 Discuss Communication
Security ( COMSEC) and the Role of
Electronic Key Management System
(EKMS) Local element
COMSEC/EKMS
An organization that requires COMSEC material
must obtain such material through an EKMS or
COMSEC account managed by a designated
EKMS Manager. When it is not possible to draw
needed COMSEC material from an existing
EKMS account (either within the organization or
located in close proximity thereto), the
requirement to establish a new EKMS account
must be validated by the organization's
Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC).
COMSEC/EKMS
At least 45 days is required to establish an
EKMS account and to provide the initial
COMSEC material.
Communications / EKMS
PQS Question 107.2 What is meant by TwoPerson Integrity (TPI) and how it is related
to COMSEC?
TPI
TPI is a system of handling and storing,
designed to prevent single-person access to certain
COMSEC material
– TPI handling requires that at least two persons, authorized access
to COMSEC keying material, be in constant view of each other
and the COMSEC material requiring TPI whenever that material is
accessed and handled. Each individual must be capable of
detecting incorrect or unauthorized security procedures with
respect to the task being performed.
– TPI storage requires the use of two approved combination locks
(each with a different combination) with no one person authorized
access to both combinations.
Communications / EKMS
PQS Question 107.3 Discuss the following terms:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Controlled Cryptographic Item ( CCI)
Physical Security
Practice Dangerous to Security (PDS)
Emergency Action Plan / Emergency Destruction Plan
(EAP/EDP)
Data Transfer Device (DTD)
COMSEC Incident
Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI)
A secure telecommunications or information
handling equipment, or associated cryptographic
component, which is unclassified but controlled.
Designated items will bear the designation
Controlled Cryptographic Item or CCI.
General Access
requirments for CCI
(1) A security clearance is not required for access to
un-keyed CCI. Normally, access must be restricted
to U.S. citizens whose duties require such access.
(2) Un-keyed CCI and/or CCI keyed with unclassified
key marked or designated CRYPTO, must be stored
in a manner that affords protection against pilferage,
theft, sabotage, or tampering, and ensures that
access and accounting integrity are maintained.
CCI Access
Access Requirements for Resident Aliens:
Resident aliens who are U.S. Government employees, U.S.
Government contractor employees, or National Guard, active duty, or
reserve members of the U.S. Armed Forces may be granted access to
CCI provided their duties require access.
Access Requirements for Foreign Nationals:
Non-U.S. citizens who are employed by the U.S. Government at
foreign locations where there is a significant U.S. military presence
(two or more military bases) may handle CCI material in connection
with warehouse functions, provided they are under the direct
supervision of an individual who has been granted access to CCI
material.
Physical Security:
Physical security is the COMSEC component that results from all
physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment,
material, and documents from access or observation by unauthorized
persons.
When a commander or designated representative has determined that an
individual has a need to know and is eligible for access, then access to
classified cryptographic information will be formally authorized. The
authorization process must include an introduction to the unique
nature of cryptographic information, its unusual sensitivity, the special
security regulations governing its handling and protection, and the
penalties prescribed for its disclosure. Reportable violations include—
– Loss of material.
– Unauthorized viewing.
– Capture of individuals having access to COMSEC information
Practice Dangerous TO
Security (PDS)
PDSs, while not reportable to the national level (NSA), are
practices, which have the potential to jeopardize the
security of COMSEC material, if allowed to perpetuate.
Examples of NON-reportable PDSs
– (1) Improperly completed accounting reports (i.e., unauthorized signatures, missing
signatures or required accounting information, incomplete short title information).
– (2) Physical COMSEC keying material transferred with status markings still intact.
– (3) Mailing of SF 153 Forms with status dates annotated for material listed.
– (4) COMSEC material not listed on account, local element (LE), or user inventory
documents when documentation exists to indicate that the material is charged to the
account.
– (5) Issue of keying material in hardcopy form marked/designated CRYPTO, without
authorization, to a LE more than 30 days before its effective period.
– (6) Late destruction (includes key in a fill device) of COMSEC material (i.e., destruction
not completed within the timeframes in this manual), except where a waiver has been
Practice Dangerous TO
Security (PDS)
Examples of Reportable PDS outside of the command:
(1) Premature or out-of-sequence use of keying material before its effective date, as long as
the material was not reused.
NOTE: Premature use is defined as an on-the-air Attempt to establish
communications/transmit data. If material prematurely used is reused without consent of
the CONAUTH, report as a CRYPTOGRAPHIC incident.
(2) Inadvertent (i.e., early) destruction of COMSEC material, or destruction without
authorization of the controlling authority (CONAUTH), as long as the destruction was
properly documented.
NOTE: Whenever this occurs, annotate the destruction record of the material as follows:
“Material destruction was not authorized, but was properly destroyed and witnessed.
(3) Not completing and returning FC Inventory IAW except where a waiver has been granted.
(4) No Special or Combined Inventory was conducted due to Change of Command IAW
Article 766.c.(3) or change of Manager
Emergency Action Plan
Emergency Destruction Plan
Emergency Destruction Planning: Three
categories of COMSEC material which may
require destruction in hostile emergencies are:
– COMSEC keying material
– COMSEC-related material (e.g., maintenance
manuals, operating instructions, and general
doctrinal publications)
– Equipment
Emergency Action Plan
Emergency Destruction Plan
a. Precautionary Destruction: When precautionary
destruction is necessary, destroy keying material and
non-essential manuals in accordance with EKMS
EAP/EDP procedures.
b. Complete Destruction: When sufficient personnel
and facilities are available, assign different
persons to destroy the material in each category by
means of separate destruction facilities and follow
the priorities listed herein asincorporated into your
EAP/EDP.
Emergency Action Plan
Emergency Destruction Plan
•
Every command that holds classified COMSEC or CCI material
must prepare emergency plans for safeguarding such material in the
event of an emergency.
• For commands located within the continental United States (CONUS),
planning must consider natural disasters (e.g., fire, flood, tornado, and
earthquake), civil/mob actions, and terrorism.
• For commands located outside of CONUS and deployable commands,
planning must consider both natural disasters and hostile actions (e.g.,
enemy attack, terrorism, mob action, or civil uprising).
These plans will be incorporated into the overall Emergency
Action Plan (EAP)/Emergency Destruction Plan (EDP) of
the command. Further instructions for EAP/EDP can be
found in the EKMS Manual or the S6 shop.
Data Transfer Device
The DTD is an integral component of the
EKMS. It is used to securely distribute key
generated by the LMD/KP to consumers.
The consumers are either an end
cryptographic unit (ECU) or another DTD.
The DTD is also able to replace current
common fill devices (FDs).
Data Transfer Device
The DTD is a small, lightweight, electronically
programmable fill device in a ruggedized case.
The DTD has a keyboard for input of commands
and an alphanumeric screen to display the status
of the unit and operator instructions.
Data Transfer Device
For compatibility with existing equipment, the DTD
has a 6-pin Input/output connector
A fill device application program is provided with the
DTD to perform functions comparable to those
currently performed by the KYK-13, KYX-15A, and
KOI-18.
This software also allows the DTD to handle keys with
lengths other than 128 bits.
AN/CYZ-10
The AN/CYZ-10 is the full keyboard version and the
AN/CYZ-10A is the limited keyboard version of the DTD.
COMSEC Incident
To some degree, every item of COMSEC material
is accounted for and controlled because of the role it
plays in the cryptographic processes that protect or
authenticate U.S. Government information
transmitted electrically. To counter the threat posed
to secure communications by COMSEC material
mishandling, losses, or thefts, the National Security
Agency (NSA) established the National COMSEC
Incident Reporting and Evaluation System or
NCIRES.
COMSEC Incident
The COMSEC incident reporting APPLICABILITY:
(1) Classified and unclassified COMSEC keying material marked or
designated CRYPTO (includes NSA-produced electronic key and
tape key and field generated electronic key generated from a key
variable generator (e.g., KG-83/KGX-93/KP) or STU-III
Operational and Seed Key.
(2) Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) equipment.
(3) Classified COMSEC equipment.
(4) Floppy disks containing key or other EKMS information.
(5) Malicious codes/viruses on the EKMS system.
(6) Classified COMSEC-accountable maintenance manuals,
operating instructions, and publications.
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals C
PQS Question 107.4 Explain the three
different types of “supersession”
a. Regular
b. Irregular
c. emergency
Supersession
COMSEC MATERIAL SUPERSESSION
Supersession refers to a time when a particular item of
COMSEC material is no longer eligible for use.
COMSEC material is superseded in one of three ways:
– Regular
– Irregular
– Emergency
Supersession
Regular
Regular supersession: is based on a specific,
pre-determined supersession date for each
edition of material.
For example, each edition of a monthly key-tape is
superseded on the first day of the month after its
implementation; each edition of ten-day material
is superseded on the 11th, 21st, and the 31st of the
month.
Supersession
Irregular
Irregular supersession: it is not pre-determined but
which occurs as a result of use. Editions and
individual segments of irregularly superseded
COMSEC material are to be destroyed after the
material has been used operationally, when the
CONAUTH directs supersession, or, in the case of
maintenance key, it may be used until the key
becomes unserviceable. Irregular supersession is
normally associated with one-time pads, test key,
maintenance key, publications, and equipment.
Supersession
Emergency
Emergency supersession: An unplanned
change of supersession, usually as the
result of a compromise.
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.5 Explain the function and
the contents of Communications Electronic
Operating Instruction (CEOI)
CEOI
The CEOI contains the technical guidance
required to establish and maintain
communications support of operations. The
CEOI amplifies the communication and
information systems (CIS) standing operating
procedures (SOP) by providing detailed
guidance for the coordination and control of
communications means and functions.
CEOI
Input is normally requested from
subordinate commands by higher HQ.
Sufficient copies of the CEOI should
be maintained by the issuing HQ to
allow issue to other units that may be
attached for an operation.
CEOI
The following information and instructions can usually be included in the CEOI:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Call sign assignments.
Frequency assignments.
Radio guard charts.
Radio net identifiers.
Telephone directory names and numbers.
Identification and marking panel codes.
Signal panel message instructions.
Pyrotechnic and smoke codes.
Ground-to-air signals.
Sound warning signals.
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS (ACEOI)
A locally generated ACEOI containing daily
changing frequencies and call signs can be
produced to support specific operations or special
exercises (Kennel Bear, Gallant Eagle, and
homeport field exercises). Units desiring a special
ACEOI must submit a written request to higher
HQs a minimum of 30 days in advance of the
requirement. Units conducting training at
deployment sites are required to request
frequencies through the local area frequency
coordinator.
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS (ACEOI)
The request for an ACEOI will contain:
• a. Unit(s) involved
• b. Inclusive dates, and number of days required
• c. Net name(s) or circuit titles
• d. Location of adjacent units
• e. Number of copies required
• f. Required delivery date
• g. Point of contact, email address, and telephone number
• Note: Call signs contained in a locally generated ACEOI
are not compatible with effective editions of the AKAC.
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.6
Define the following terms:
a. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)
b. Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)
c. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (C4)
d. Communications Information System Officer (CISO)
Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR)
The information required for situational awareness
falls into three general categories:
– information about the enemy
– information about the environment,
– information about friendly forces.
The identification of CCIRs is a means to
focus and direct the collection and processing of
information in those categories.
Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR)
CCIRs are the information regarding the enemy
and friendly activities and the environment
identified by the commander as critical to
maintaining situational awareness, planning
future activities, and facilitating timely
decision-making. Designation of CCIRs
reduces the volume of information to a
manageable level and helps to ensure the
accuracy, relevance, and timeliness of that
information.
Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR)
CCIRs is comprised of:
– priority intelligence requirements (PIRs),
– friendly force information requirements (FFIRs),
– essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs)
Essential Elements of Friendly
Information (EEFI)
EEFIs are specific facts about friendly
intentions, capabilities, and activities needed
by adversaries to plan and execute effective
operations against our forces.
Identification of the EEFIs is key to
planning effective INFOSEC, operations
security, and other force protection
operations.
Communications Information
System Officer (CISO)
The CISO is responsible to the
commander for all matters concerning
the planning and employment of CIS
within the command. As a general or
executive staff officer, the CISO serves
as an advisor, planner, supervisor, and
coordinator.
Command, Control, Communications,
Computers and Intelligence (C4)
The GCCS implements the joint C4I for the warrior
concept. This concept calls for the capability
to move a joint force anywhere on the globe at
any time and to provide that force with the
information necessary to accomplish its mission.
The GCCS is a revolutionary approach designed
to resolve joint C2 interoperability issues and
evolve incompatible, Service-specific C2
programs into a single integrated C2 system.
GCCS.
C4I
C4I
MAGTF C4I is the concept for the integration of
Marine Corps tactical information systems and the
migration of selected systems MAGTF C4I
provides commanders and their staffs at all levels
of the MAGTF with the capability to send,
receive, process, filter, and display data to aid
them in their decision-making process. MAGTF
C4I also provides a shared situational awareness
through a common picture of the battlespace.
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.7 What is the primary
tactical Radio used by the NCF and what
man-pack is used in infantry operations.
Single-channel radio
Single-channel radio is the primary tactical
means of communication for MAGTF/NCF
units. Single-channel radio communications
equipment is easy to operate. The networks are
easily established, rapidly reconfigured, and,
most importantly, easily maintained on the
move. Single-channel radio provides secure
voice communications and supports limited
data information exchange.
Single-channel radio
The most widely employed tactical radios provide
integrated communications security (COMSEC)
and jam resistance through frequency hopping.
Tactical Single-channel radios operate in the three
military radio frequency bands
HF- high frequency
VHF- very high frequency
UHF- ultra high frequency
Single-channel radio
Single-channel radio:
VHF and UHF bands is normally limited to line of
sight.
HF band can support long-range communications.
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) provides
mobility, flexibility, and ease of operation with
unlimited range.
Single-channel radio
SINGARS
The primary MAGTF/NCF VHF radio is the
single channel ground and airborne radio system
(SINCGARS). SINCGARS is a family of
lightweight combat radios that serves as the
primary means of communications for command
and control and fire support on the battlefield.
SINGARS
The system provides high security against threat
electronic warfare (EW) by using frequency
hopping with integrated COMSEC. It is
capable of voice and data transmission (up to 16
kbps under optimum conditions and over limited
distances) over the VHF-FM frequency range of
30 to 87.975 MHz
AN/PRC 119
Man-pack AN/PRC-119 is typically used in
infantry operations,
AN/PRC 119
3 ft tape, 10 ft whip antennae
30 to 87.975 MHz freq.
2320 channels/freq.'s
Sends and receives secure voice and digital data
6 secure channels for SC or frequency hopping
2 additional Single Channels (SC) for plain text
Transmits 200 meters to 10 Kilometers or more
Batteries last 4 (BB690) to 30 (BA5590) hrs
depending on type & use
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.8 Identify the following
capabilities for the “ Radio” TransmitterTransmitter (RT) 1523: (AN/PRC119)
a. Characteristics
b. Frequency range
c. Configuration
d. Antennas
e. Power Sources
AN/PRC-119
AN/PRC 119A
General Characteristics
• VHF SINCGARS Radio
• 30 to 87.975 MHz freq.
• 2320 channels/freq.'s
• Sends and receives secure voice and digital
data
AN/PRC 119A
General Characteristics
• 6 Comsec channels/ 6 Frequency hopping
channels
• 8 Single Channels (SC) for plain text
• Transmits 200 meters to 10 Kilometers or
more
• Batteries last 4 (BB690) to 30 (BA5590) hrs
depending on type & use
AN/PRC 119A
Antenna Systems
• Antenna Systems
– 3ft Tape- up to 5 miles
– 10ft whip- up to 10 miles
– OE-254- up to 36 miles
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.9 Identify the following
capabilities for the “Radio” ReceiverTransmitter (RT) 1694 (AN/PRC) 150:
a. Characteristics
b. Frequency Range
c. Configuration
d. Antennas
e. Power sources
AN/PRC-150
AN/PRC-150
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.10Identify The Following
Capabilities For The “Radio” ReceiverTransmitter (RT) 1796 (AN/PRC 117)
a. Characteristics
b. Frequency Range
c. Configuration
d. Antennas
e. Power sources
AN/PRC-117
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
• PQS Question 107.11
Explain The Functions Of The Following
Communications Assets:
– Satellite Signals Navigations (AN/PSN 11)
– Data Transfer Device (AN/AZY-10)
Global Positioning System
AN/PSN 11
•
General Characteristics
•
PLGR - “Plugger”
GPS
Receives encrypted
code
Anti-jam capability
•
•
•
•
AN/CYZ-10
AN/CYZ-10
The DTD is cargo-pocket size, weighs1.5 pounds,
and requires three 3-volt batteries or one 9-volt
battery. DTD’s primary function is to serve as a
common fill device to load COMSEC keys into
any cryptographic equipment. The DTD can
receive, store, and transfer frequency hopping
data between DTDs or PCs. The DTD can also
receive, store, display, and edit CEOI information
and transfer one time period of CEOI information
over the air by using a SINCGARS radio.
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.12 Discuss The Proper
Use Of The Phonetic Alphabet, Numerals,
and Pro-words.
Phonetic Alphabet
Numerals
Pro-words
Pro-words
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.11
Explain Line-of sight (LOS)
Line-of-Sight
Line-of-Sight
The direct wave is that part of the radio wave
which travels directly from the transmitting
antenna to the receiving antenna. This part of the
wave is limited to the line of sight (LOS) distance
between the transmitting and receiving antennas,
plus the small distance added by atmospheric
refraction and diffraction of the wave around the
curvature of the Earth. This distance can be
extended by increasing the height of the
transmitting antenna, the receiving antenna, or
both.
Communications/ EKMS
Fundamentals
PQS Question 107.14
Discuss the purpose of a Retransmission
(RETRANS) site.
Retransmission Site
The Operation of single channel radios in
Mountainous or in urbanized terrain is poor due
to factors such as terrain, electrical interference
and climatic conditions. To improve
Communications a Retransmission site is put in
place usually at a high point so that the
obstacles blocking the transmission paths can
be redirected to establish a positive line of
sight.
Retransmission Site
HF radios do not require or rely on line of sight
as much as VHF radios because operating
frequencies are lower, and power output is
greater. The problem is that HF radios are not
organic to small units. To overcome this, the
VHF signals must be retransmitted.
Retransmission Site
Retransmission stations in aerial platforms can
provide the most effective means if they are
available. Organic retransmission is more likely
to be used. The antenna should be hidden or
blended in with surroundings. This will help
prevent the enemy from using it as a landmark to
“home in” his artillery bombardment. Antennas
can be concealed by water towers, existing
civilian antennas, or steeples.