Joke Goddaer, ‘Contractual remedies for unfair commercial practices to reach social
justice’ [2014] Social Justice Conference 5
Conference at London School of Economics
1 and 2 August 2014
Working paper
Social Justice 2014: the institutions of social justice
“Contractual remedies for unfair commercial practices to reach social justice”
JOKE GODDAER1
I.
Introduction
1.
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive - The Green Paper on European Union
Consumer Protection2 revealed the need to harmonise the divergent national legislation on unfair
commercial practices in business-to-consumer relationships. With directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May
2005 (hereinafter: UCPD)3, a new framework directive, based on full harmonisation, was established
in this field.4 Main purposes of the EU were the contribution to the proper functioning of the internal
market and the achievement of a high level of consumer protection by approximating the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States on unfair commercial practices which
harm the consumers’ economic interests.5 According to the European Commission’s Green Paper, the
fragmentation of the national law within the EU concerning unfair commercial practices, paves the way
to legal uncertainty, consumer distrust and high transactional costs for businesses which led
consequently to the lack of cross border trade exercised both by consumers as well as businesses.6
1
PhD assistant at KU Leuven [Consumer, Competition, Market (CCM)] and UHasselt.
2
Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, Brussels 2 October 2001, COM(2001)531 final.
3
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and
of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ, L149, 11 June 2005, 22-39.
4
G.B. ABBAMONTE, "The unfair commercial practices directive: an example of the new European consumer protection
approach", Columbia Journal of European Law 2006, v. 12, issue 3, (695) 696; M.F.H. BROEKMAN, “De Richtlijn Oneerlijke
Handelspraktijken”, TvC 2005, (175) 175, nr. 1; L. DE BROUWER, "Consumentenrecht. Richtlijn 2005/29/EG van 11 mei 2005
betreffende oneerlijke handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 7, (790) 790; L. DE BROUWER, "De oneerlijke handelspraktijken en
de gereglementeerde handelspraktijken" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (eds.), De wet handelspraktijken anno
2008 (Handelspraktijken na omzetting Richtlijn 2005/29) in Studiecentrum voor consumentenrecht, 10, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008,
(143) 143, nr. 1; Y. MONTANGIE, "De Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken: de weg vrij voor grensoverschrijdende
handelstransacties?" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (eds.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de Handelspraktijkenwet in Collectie
bedrijfsrecht, (5) 5, nr. 1.
5
Art. 1 UCPD; G. ANAGNOSTARAS, "The unfair commercial practices directive in context: from legal disparity to legal
complexity?", CMLRev. 2010, issue 47, (147) 147; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke
handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers,
2011, 10; F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 49, nr. 19; Y.
MONTANGIE, "De Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken: de weg vrij voor grensoverschrijdende handelstransacties?" in A. DE
BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (eds.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de Handelspraktijkenwet in Collectie bedrijfsrecht, (5) 5, nr. 2; R.
STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, "De implementatie van de Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken in België en Nederland", TPR 2011,
issue 1, 681, nr. 1.
6
G.B. ABBAMONTE, "The unfair commercial practices directive: an example of the new European consumer protection
approach", Columbia Journal of European Law 2006, v. 12, issue 3, (695) 696; L. DE BROUWER, "Consumentenrecht. Richtlijn
2005/29/EG van 11 mei 2005 betreffende oneerlijke handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 7, (790) 790; L. DE BROUWER, "De
oneerlijke handelspraktijken en de gereglementeerde handelspraktijken" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (eds.),
De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008 (Handelspraktijken na omzetting Richtlijn 2005/29) in Studiecentrum voor
consumentenrecht, 10, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (143) 146, nr. 7; J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through
fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market", CMLRev. 2006, issue
43, (107) 152.
1
2.
Article 3, par. 1 UCPD indicates that the scope of the directive concerns unfair business-toconsumer commercial practices before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a
product. This means that the scope of the directive interacts without doubt with elements of contract
law. Nonetheless, article 3, par. 2 UCPD stipulates that the directive is without prejudice to contract
law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation and effect of a contract.7 The question
arises whether this separation is feasible, especially in view of an effective enforcement of the unfair
commercial practices regulation. Is there no need for a contractual remedy if a contract is concluded
with a consumer after an unfair commercial practice occurred?
II.
The UCPD and its implementation in the national law of Belgium, the
Netherlands, the UK and France
3.
Since the European legislator opted for a directive as the instrument for the harmonisation of the
law on B2C-commercial practices, the UCPD needed to be implemented in the national law of the
member states. The implementation had to take place at latest at 12 June 2007 and the new
provisions had to apply at latest at 12 December 2007 (art. 19 UCPD).8
BELGIUM – The UCPD was implemented by the Act of 5 June 20079 in the Belgian national law, and was
integrated in the Act of 14 July 1991 concerning Trade Practices and Consumer Protection (hereinafter:
TPA 1991). These new provisions entered into force at 1 December 2007 (art. 44 Act of 5 June 2007).
After the TPA was replaced by the Market Practices and Consumer Protection Act of 201010, the
provisions concerning B2C-commercial practices can nowadays be found in Book VI of the Code of
Economic Law (hereinafter: CEL) which entered into force at 31 May 2014.
THE NETHERLANDS - The UCPD was implemented in Dutch law in section 6.3.3A “Unfair commercial
practices” of the Dutch Civil Code (hereinafter: DCC), more specific in the articles 6:193a to 6:193j DCC.11
These articles entered into force at 15 October 2008.12 By the Act of 12 March 201413, which implements
the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU, a paragraph 3 was added to article 6:193j DCC.
THE UK – The UCPD was implemented in the UK legislation by the Unfair Trading Regulations 2008
(hereinafter: CPR 2008).14 This legislation entered into force on 6 April 200815. Recently, this Regulation
7
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 51, nr. 26; B.
KEIRSBILCK, "De private handhaving van de WMPC in het licht van het gemeen recht" in A. DE BOECK, S. STIJNS, R. VAN
RANSBEECK and I. SAMOY (ed.), Knelpunten in het buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht in Leerstoel professor Constant
Matheeussen, 7, Brugge, Die Keure, 2013, (94) 103.
8
B. KEIRSBILCK, "The implementation of the unfair commercial practices directive in the United Kingdom, Germany and The
Netherlands" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (eds.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008 (Handelspraktijken na
omzetting Richtlijn 2005/29) in Studiecentrum voor consumentenrecht, 10, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (219) 220, nr. 2.
9
Act of 5 June 2007 amending the Act of 14 July 1991 concerning trade practices and the information and protection of
consumers, Belgian Journal Official 21 June 2007, 34272.
10
Act of 6 April 2010 on Market Practices and Consumer Protection, Belgian Official Journal 12 April 2010, 20803.
11
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 17; F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International
Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 418, nr. 71.
12
Stb. 2008, 397 and 398.
13
Act of 12 March 2014 on the adaptation of Book 6 and 7 of the Civil Code, the Act enforcement of consumer protection and
some other acts concerning the implementation of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and repealing Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council; M.
LOOS, ‘Onvolkomendheden bij de implementatie van de richtlijn consumentenrecht”, Nederlands Juristenblad 2013, issue 38,
(2684) 2684.
14
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 612, nr. 23.
2
was amended by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading (Amendment) Regulations 2014
(hereinafter: CP(A)R 2014).
FRANCE – In France, the UCPD was implemented in 2008 in the Code de la Consommation by the Act n°
2008-776 of 4 August 2008 concerning the modernization of the economy.16 A recent ‘Loi de la
Consommation’17 amends the Code de la Consommation and is of great importance for the doctrine
concerning the civil law remedies in case of unfair commercial practices.
§1
Scope ratione personae
4.
BUSINESS TO CONSUMER (B2C) - The UCPD’s purpose is to protect consumers in a B2Crelationship against unfair commercial practices. A consumer is defined in article 2 (a) UCPD as “any
natural person who, in commercial practices covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are
outside his trade, business, craft or profession”. The benchmark is the average consumer as known in
the CJEU-jurisprudence (Infra nr. 13). A ‘trader’ is described as “any natural or legal person who, in
commercial practices covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business,
craft or profession and anyone acting in the name of or on behalf of a trader” (art. 2 (b) UCPD).
Business-to-business, consumer-to-consumer and consumer-to-business relationships consequently
fall outside the scope of the UCPD, but the member states are allowed to apply the B2C-provisions in
those situations. However, not only consumers can rely on the UCPD provisions. Article 11, par. 1
UCPD mentions the possibility for competitive businesses to sue their competitor in case of an
infringement of the unfair B2C-commercial practices legislation because of their interests (to prevent
damage to their reputation, or the reputation of their products, to avoid losing their goodwill, etc.).18
BELGIUM – In Belgian law, a consumer is defined in article I.1, 2° CEL as “any natural person who is acting
for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession" Even when the contract has a dual
purpose (non-professional and professional), the natural person is to be considered a consumer as long as
the trade purpose is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the contract.19 Article I.1,
1° CEL defines 'business' as "any natural or legal person pursuing a commercial objective on a lasting
basis, including an association of such persons". This general definition requires that the commercial
activity is exploited within the framework of an organisation.20 A certain sustainability of the activity in
conjunction with a particular structure and frequency is required.21 Also liberal professions are businesses
in the sense of this article. It must however be noticed that book VI of the CEL will only apply to the
intellectual performances which are non-characteristic to the liberal profession. In the other case, book XIV
CEL will apply.
THE NETHERLANDS – In Dutch law, a consumer is defined as “a natural person who does not act for
purposes of his profession or business” (art. 6:193a DCC). In article 6:193b DCC a definition of ‘trader’ can
15
B. KEIRSBILCK, "The implementation of the unfair commercial practices directive in the United Kingdom, Germany and The
Netherlands" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (eds.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008 (Handelspraktijken na
omzetting Richtlijn 2005/29) in Studiecentrum voor consumentenrecht, 10, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (219) 223, nr. 3
16
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 215, nr. 29;
17
Loi n° 2014-344 de 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation.
18
M.F.H. BROEKMAN, “De Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken”, TvC 2005, (175) 181, nr. 5.
19
Recital 17 CRD; ME of the Bill of 27 May 2013 concerning the establishment of Title I "General definitions" in Book I
"Definitions" of the Code of Economic Law, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2012-2013, No. 2836/001, 6; E. PIETERS, K. BYTTEBIER and R.
FELTKAMP, "Le Code de droit économique - Survol du contenu et des principals nouveautés", TBH 2014, issue 4, (327) 335, nr.
15.
20
ME of the Bill of 27 May 2013 concerning the establishment of Title I "General definitions" in Book I "Definitions" of the Code
of Economic Law, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2012-2013, No. 2836/001, 5-6.
21
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 37.
3
be found: “a natural or legal person who acts for purposes of a profession or a business or another person
acting in the trader’s name”.
THE UK –The UK applies the provisions of the UCPD also in case of a C2B-transaction.22 A consumer is
defined in regulation 2(1) CPR 2008 as amended by regulation 2(3) CP(A)R as “an individual acting for
purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s business”. A trader is defined as “(a) a person
acting for purposes relating to that person’s business, whether acting personally or through another person
acting in the trader’s name or on the trader’s behalf and (b) except in Part 4A, includes a person acting in
the name of or on behalf of a trader” (Reg. 2(1) CPR 2008 as amended by Reg. 2(7) CP(A)R). A business
is defined as including “(a) a trade, craft or profession and (b) the activities of any government department
or local or public authority” (Reg. 2(1) CPR 2008, as amended by Reg. 2(2) CP(A)R). Pure B2Brelationships fall outside the scope of the CPR/CP(A)R.
FRANCE – By the Act n° 2014-344 of 17 March 2014 concerning the consumption23, a definition of
‘consumer’ was established for the whole Code de la Consommation. Article 3 of this recent act adds a
preliminary provision which defines the concept of consumer for the first time in the Code de la
Consommation. According to that provision, a consumer is “any natural person acting for purposes which
are outside his trade, business, craft or profession.” A definition of ‘le professionel’ remains however
absent in the Code de la Consommation.
§2
Scope ratione materiae
5.
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER A COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION IN RELATION TO
– The UCPD applies to unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices before, during
and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product (art. 3, 1 UCPD). Though useful, the
directive did not define the concept of ‘commercial transaction’. According to KEIRSBILCK, there is no
doubt that, in view of the definitions of a ‘commercial practice’ and a ‘transactional decision’ (Infra nr. 6
and 12) this concept includes all sales and services contracts.24 Furthermore the words ‘before, during
and after’ make clear that not only practices in the precontractual phase (such as comparative
advertising, marketing and advertisements)25 are subjected to the UCPD, but all practices up to and
including the sale or delivery of the product, as well as the postcontractual services and complaints
procedure.26 So during the promotional period, the negotiation, conclusion, performance and
enforcement of the contract, the business has to be aware of the fact the provisions of the UCPD
apply.27 KEIRSBILCK regrets this wide scope of the UCPD28, since it was stated that the UCDP was
without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation and effect of a
contract.29
A PRODUCT
22
COM(2013) 139 final, 10.
23
Loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation
24
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 452, nr. 4, voetnoot 14.
25
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 451, nr. 4.
26
B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, issue 2, (233)
243; D.W.F. VERKADE, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten, Monografieën BW B49a, Deventer, Kluwer, 2009.
27
C. WILLET, “Fairness and Consumer Decision Making under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”, J.Cons.P. 2010,
(247) 249.
28
In his opinion, the regulation of unfair commercial practices which occur after the conclusion of the contract or during its
execution, should have been left to national law as to provide for adequate individual contract law remedies (B. KEIRSBILCK,
“Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, vol. 2, (233) 243, footnote 71).
29
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 51, nr. 26; B.
KEIRSBILCK, "De private handhaving van de WMPC in het licht van het gemeen recht" in A. DE BOECK, S. STIJNS, R. VAN
RANSBEECK and I. SAMOY (ed.), Knelpunten in het buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht in Leerstoel professor Constant
Matheeussen, 7, Brugge, Die Keure, 2013, (94) 103.
4
BELGIUM – The implementation of article 3, 1 UCPD can nowadays be found in article VI.92 CEL. The
wording has however not been copied. The Belgian legislation stipulates that the provisions concerning
B2C unfair commercial practices apply to commercial practices before, during and after an offer for sale
and sale of products.30 Though this article refers to ‘a sales contract’, also services contracts are
included since the concept of ‘products’ is defined in article I.1, 4° CEL as "goods and services,
immovable property, rights and obligations” and also the content of article 3 UCPD would be denied.31
THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE– Neither in the DCC, nor in the Code de la Consommation a provision
can be found which stipulates explicitly that the unfair commercial practices provisions are to be applied
to B2C-commercial practices before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product.
The obligation to interpret the national law in conformity with the UCPD, leads however to the same wide
scope of this national legislation as mentioned above.
THE UK – In the UK the legislator opted for the implementation of article 3, 1 UCPD by integrating it in the
definition of a commercial practice (Reg. 2(1) CPR 2008).
6.
DEFINITION (UNFAIR) B2C COMMERCIAL PRACTICES – The commitment of unfair commercial
practices is prohibited according to article 5 UCPD. A business-to-consumer commercial practice is
described as “any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication
including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply
of a product to consumers”. This concept is obviously interpreted in a large way, by consequence of
which the scope of the prohibition concerning unfair commercial practices is very extensive.32 The
CJEU confirmed in several judgements that a very wide interpretation must be given to the concept of
‘commercial practice’.33
BELGIUM – The Belgian definition of a B2C commercial practice is identical to the one mentioned above
(art. I.1, 23° CEL).
THE NETHERLANDS – Article 193a, d) DCC provides for the same definition.
THE UK – For the UK, a definition of ‘commercial practice’ was implemented in regulation 2(1) CPR 2008.
The UK definition is however not identical to the one in the UCPD and the scope of regulation 2(1) CPR
2008 is wider than the one of the UCPD. Not only the sale or supply of a product to consumers, but also
the sale or supply of a product from consumers falls under the scope of the unfair commercial practices
regulation. Since those cases are outside the scope of the UCPD and thus outside the full harmonization
area, the UK is free to apply the UCPD provisions for these cases.34
FRANCE - The Code de la Consommation does not contain a definition of the concept ‘(B2C) commercial
practice’. Reference has to be made to the definition in the UCPD itself.
30
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 452, nr. 4; E. TERRYN and J. GODDAER, “Unfair B2C Commercial Practices: the General Clause” in G. STRAETMANS, J.
STUYCK (Eds.), Commercial Practices, Brussel, Larcier, 2014, (41) 43.
31
See also G.L. BALLON in cooperation with S. VERVERKEN, De wet marktpraktijken. Een eerste commentaar, Kluwer, Mechelen,
2011, 184.
32
P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen in Bibliotheek handelsrecht larcier. Mededinging, handelspraktijken en intellectuele
rechten, 9, Gent, Larcier, 2009, 83, nr. 99; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Het gebruik van oneerlijke of intransparante bedingen als oneerlijke,
misleidende of agressieve handelspraktijk", TvC 2011, issue 4, (138) 139, nr. 4.
33
See joined cases CJEU C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB NV / Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA / Sanoma Magazines
Belgium NV, 2009; CJEU C-304/08, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, 2010; CJEU C-288/10, Wamo, 2011; CJEU C-540/08,
Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG/'Österrech'-Zeitungsverlag GmbH, 2010; CJEU C-453/10,
Perenicova, 2012; CJEU C-206/11, Köck, 2013; C-343/12, Euronics, 2013; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn
oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 452, nr. 4; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward
for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, issue 2, (233) 242.
34
B. KEIRSBILCK, "The implementation of the unfair commercial practices directive in the United Kingdom, Germany and The
Netherlands" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (eds.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008 (Handelspraktijken na
omzetting Richtlijn 2005/29) in Studiecentrum voor consumentenrecht, 10, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (219) 223, nr. 4.
5
§3
Unfair commercial practices
1.
Grand general provision
7.
TWO CUMULATIVE CONDITIONS – Article 5, par. 1 UCPD provides that a commercial practice is
unfair if it is (1) contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and (2) materially distorts or is
likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer
whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of the average member of the group when a
commercial practice is directed to a particular group of members. Those two conditions are to be
fulfilled cumulative.35
BELGIUM – This grand general provision can be found in article VI.93 CEL for Belgian law.
THE NETHERLANDS - In the Dutch legislation these two conditions are provided for in article 6:193b, par. 2,
DCC.
THE UK – For the UK, regulation 3(3) CPR 2008 has implemented the general provision of article 5
UCPD.
FRANCE: In France, the implementation of article 5 UCPD took place in article L.120-1 Code de la
Consommation.
A. First condition - Contrary to the requirements of professional diligence
8.
PROFESSIONAL DILIGENCE – The first condition requires some interpretation with regard to the
concept of ‘professional diligence’. Article 2, h) UCPD defines it as “the standard of special skill and
care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with
honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity”.36 The
‘bonus pater familias’, known from the general law of obligations, might be recognized within this
provision. Some authors state that the first condition of article 5 UCPD softens slightly the second one
(Infra nr. 9).37 Given the fact that both conditions need to be fulfilled cumulatively, it is possible that the
economic behavior of a consumer is strongly distorted, but that the commercial practice which was
used therefore, is not contrary to the requirements of profession diligence. By consequence the
commercial practice cannot be qualified unfair.
B. Second condition - The material distortion of the economic behaviour of consumers
9.
(LIKELY) MATERIALLY DISTORT THE ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR OF CONSUMERS – Secondly, the
commercial practice has to materially distort or be likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of
a consumer. The UCPD states in article 2, (e) UCPD that 'to materially distort the economic behaviour
of consumers' means “using a commercial practice to appreciably impair the consumer’s ability to
make an informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he
would not have taken otherwise”.38 In the first place it is thus required that the commercial practice has
35
CJEU C-540/08, Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG/'Österrech'-Zeitungsverlag GmbH [2010]; B.
KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, vol. 2, (233) 268, nr.
42.
36
Belgium: art. I.1, 25° CEL – identical definition, there is only no reference to the principle of good faith.
37
F. ROOSE, "Een uniforme Handelspraktijkenwet", NJW 2003, (1286) 1289, nr. 12. See also A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe
bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en de algemene voorwaarden in het
bijzonder", in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTAGNIE (ed.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de Handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vanden Broele,
2008, (19) 26, nr. 15.
38
See also for Belgium: Pres. Comm. Nivelles 18 February 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (132) 134; G. STRAETMANS, "Recente
tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 235.
6
a certain influence. Besides, this influence has to be ‘appreciable’ as to (probably) change the original
decision into another decision.39 In fact, this second condition of the general unfairness test focusses
on the consequences of the businesses' behaviour which was contrary to the requirements of
professional diligence.40 The essence of this requirement is to ensure that the economic behaviour of
a consumer is based on the ability to make an informed choice.41 The consumer must be able to make
his choice in full knowledge of the facts in order to make sure his choice meets his preferences.42
The addition of 'likely' in this second condition makes its scope very wide. No actual distortion needs to
be proved. It is sufficient that a commercial practice is likely to have impact on the economic behaviour
of the consumer.43 Some Belgian authors still use the wording '(potential) damage'44, though the word
does not occur anymore in the Belgian general clause of the unfair commercial practices legislation
since the implementation of the UCPD in 2007. These authors make clear that no actual damage
needs to be demonstrated and that the proof of a mere potential damage to the consumer's interests
is sufficient.45
THE NETHERLANDS – The Dutch legislator opted for a different wording than the UCPD, as to the second
condition to consider a practice as unfair. Article 6:193b, par. 2 a-b DCC stipulates that commercial
practice is unfair if (a) the trader acts contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and (b) the
average consumer’s ability to take an informed decision is or can be appreciably impaired, thereby
causing the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would or could not have taken
otherwise. It is clear the second requirement of this provision refers directly to the definition of ‘to material
distort the consumer’s behaviour’ as provided in article 2, (e) UCPD.
10. APPRECIABLE IMPAIRMENT – The impairment of the consumer's ability to make an informed
decision has to be material, in other words: appreciable. It means that the impairment must have been
significant enough to change - at least likely to change - the behaviour of the consumer when he was
making a transactional decision.46 It is not the effect of the impairment, namely the consumer making a
transactional decision which he would not have made otherwise, that has to be appreciable, but the
impairment itself.47 Both elements are nevertheless closely connected. The impairment will only be
39
See also G.L. BALLON in cooperation with S. VERVERKEN, De wet marktpraktijken: een eerste commentaar, Mechelen, Kluwer,
2011, 185, nr. 296; A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele
relatie en de algemene voorwaarden in het bijzonder", in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTAGNIE (ed.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de
Handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vanden Broele, 2008, (19) 26, nr. 16.
40
G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 235.
41
Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (144) 149. M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and
consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005, 262; J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK,
"Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market",
C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 125.
42
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 262 and 263.
43
Guidance Commission UCPD, 24.
44
Comm. Brussels 5 March 2008, DBF 2008, issue 4, (227) 230; L. DE BROUWER, "Richtlijn 2005/29/EG van 11 mei 2005
betreffende oneerlijke handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 7, (790) 791; R. STEENNOT, in cooperation with S. DEJONGHE,
Handboek consumentenbescherming en handelspraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2007, 85, n° 141; R. STEENNOT, "Overzicht
van rechtspraak consumentenbescherming 2003-2007", TPR 2009, issue 1, (229) 393, n° 211; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D.
BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010, 63, n° 81.
45
H. DE BAUW, "De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E.
TERRYN (ed.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (107) 118, n° 26; L. DE BROUWER, "Richtlijn
2005/29/EG van 11 mei 2005 betreffende oneerlijke handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 7, (790) 791.
46
COM (2003) 356, final, 10, n° 37 and 13, n° 55; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER, "European Framework for Unfair
Commercial Practices: Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 30; R. STEENNOT, in cooperation with S. DEJONGHE,
Handboek consumentenbescherming en handelspraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2007, 85, n° 141.
In DE BROUWER'S opinion, the condition of the materially distortion resembles the condition of fraud and error with regard to the
substantial character (L. DE BROUWER, "Richtlijn 2005/29/EG van 11 mei 2005 betreffende oneerlijke handelspraktijken", TBH
2005, issue 7, (790) 792).
47
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 263; J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 125.
7
appreciable when it has an impact on the consumer's transactional decision. RADEIDEH therefore finds
one of both elements superfluous.48 If the impairment has no effect on the behaviour of the consumer,
the impairment will certainly not be appreciable.49
When a consumer makes a decision, a lot of factors play a role. In the first place, human limitations
such as motivation, knowledge and abilities influence his decision-making process. Furthermore,
several circumstances are determinable for the decision such as opportunity, time pressure, absentmindedness and presentation. Last but not least, also the frequency and the importance of the
decision for the consumer are qualifying factors in the decision-making process.50 All those factors
might be influenced or manipulated by businesses, but that does not make the practice of the
business unfair right away.51 A mere misconception which does not influence the decision-making
process of the consumer in any reasonable respect is irrelevant.52 Incentives such as offering free
coffee or tea, offering transport to the business’s premises, etc., simply do not materially impair the
consumer's free choice.53 Advertising practices which may influence the consumer's perception of the
product or service in a way the decision of the consumer is not affected, are also outside the scope of
the provision.54 Examples of those general advertising practices are legal product placement, trade
mark differentiation or the mere incentive to purchase a product.55 DE GROOTTE and DE VULDER
nonetheless emphasize that particular incentives in a certain context can create enough moral
pressure to give the consumer the feeling that he cannot simply refuse the presented offer and has to
buy a product or contract a service.56 It is obvious that it will not always be easy to draw the line
between what is an appreciable impairment and what is not.57 In the same line, BAEKELAND also
remarks that the appreciable impairment is a blank norm which may cause legal uncertainty due to
difficulties with regard to the burden of proof on the one hand, and the variety of interpretations the
national courts will give to it, on the other hand.58
48
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 262.
49
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 263.
50
J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 126.
51
J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 126.
52
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 263; J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 126.
53
COM (2003) 356, final, 12, n° 54; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER, "European Framework for Unfair Commercial Practices:
Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 30. (see also G.L. BALLON in cooperation with S. VERVERKEN, De wet
marktpraktijken: een eerste commentaar, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2011, 185, nr. 296; A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet
Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en de algemene voorwaarden in het bijzonder", in A. DE BOECK
and Y. MONTAGNIE (ed.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de Handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vanden Broele, 2008, (19) 26, nr. 16).
54
F. LONGEFILS, "Propos sur les instruments financiers dans l'offre conjointe et sur la directive CE 2005/29 relative aux pratiques
commerciales déloyales" (note Comm. Brussels 5 March 2008), DBF 2008, issue 4, (232) 238, n° 22; J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and
T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the
internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 127.
55
COM (2003) 356, final, 13, n° 53; EM Act of 5 June 2007, Parl. Ch. Sess. Ord. 2006-07, n° 2983/001, 14. See also L. DE
BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du consommateur: une occasion
manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 385, 53; G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 20052006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 238-239; J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new
directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 127.
56
B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER, "European Framework for Unfair Commercial Practices: Analysis of Directive 2005/29",
JBL 2007, (16) 30.
57
J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 126.
58
C. BAEKELAND, "Het gezamenlijk aanbod van art. 71 WMPC en het Europese recht: conformiteit of diversiteit?", DAOR 2011,
issue 97, (59) 69, n° 18.
8
11. CAUSING A TRANSACTIONAL DECISION THAT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN OTHERWISE – A second
element requires that the consumer had to take or was at least likely to take, as a consequence of the
impairment, a transactional decision concerning the product that he would not have taken otherwise.
This phrase involves two elements. First and foremost, it is important that the (likely) change of
behaviour was caused by the impairment of the consumer. Thus, the causality between both events is
an absolute requirement.59
BELGIUM - The President of the Commercial Court of Brussels decided that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated the causality between the advertisement 'washes as clean as a brilliant, both at 15°C and at
40°C' and the average consumer's decision to purchase.60
Furthermore the pivotal point is that the consumer's decision to purchase - in its most wide sense
(Infra nr. 12) - is or can be influenced.61 Without influence, a commercial practice can in no way be
considered as unfair.62
12. TRANSACTIONAL DECISION - A 'transactional decision' is any decision taken by a consumer
concerning whether, how and on what terms to purchase, make payment in whole or in part for, retain
or dispose of a product or to exercise a contractual right in relation to the product, whether the
consumer decides to act or to refrain from acting (art. 2, k) UCPD – art. I.8, 28° CEL – art. 6:193a, e)
DCC - Reg. 2(1) CPR). It is important to mention that the interests of the consumer are limited to the
economic sphere. The impairment of or the damage to the general interest is not in view.63 However,
the scope of the provision is very wide within the economic sphere. Because of the broad formulation
of the definition of 'a transactional decision' many decisions made by a consumer in relation to a
certain product or service can be considered as transactional decisions.64 From the moment a
consumer is exposed to the marketing of a product or service, he may take transactional decisions.65
There is no doubt that a decision to purchase a product or to contract for a service is a transactional
decision.66 The same holds for the decision to place an order, make a reservation or accept a
commercial offer.67 Even the decision whether or not to go to a shop, or to enter a shop is a
transactional decision.68 In the Guidance on the implementation and application of the UCPD this kind
of decision is called a 'pre-purchase decision'.69 Not only decisions made in the pre-contractual phase,
but also decisions made during the execution of the contract, might be transactional decisions.70 Postpurchase decisions are mainly taken as part of the exercise of contractual rights and can also be
considered as transactional decisions.71 Some examples are: the right of withdrawal, the cancellation
59
COM (2003) 356, final, 13, n° 55.
60
Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (144) 152.
61
G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 238.
62
EM Act of 5 June 2007, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2006-07, n° 2983/001, 117.
63
H. DE BAUW, "De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E.
TERRYN (ed.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (107) 117, n° 24.
64
Guidance Commission UCPD, 22 and 24.
65
Guidance Commission UCPD, 23.
66
H. DE BAUW, "De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E.
TERRYN (ed.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (107) 117, n° 24.
67
Guidance Commission UCPD, 22.
68
Guidance Commission UCPD, 23.
69
Guidance Commission UCPD, 23.
70
P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen in Bibliotheek handelsrecht larcier. Mededinging, handelspraktijken en intellectuele
rechten, 9, Gent, Larcier, 2009, 84, nr. 101; L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce
et la protection du consommateur: une occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 385, 52; I. FERRANT, Les pratiques du
marché (depuis les lois du 6 avril 2010) in Pratique du droit, 49, Waterloo, Kluwer, 2011, 133, n° 364.
71
Guidance Commission UCPD, 23; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER, "European Framework for Unfair Commercial Practices:
Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 30.
9
of the contract, the right to terminate a service contract, the right to change the product or to switch to
another business.72 Moreover, the choice not to make a transactional decision is also a transactional
decision.73 A transactional decision thus does not necessarily lead to the conclusion of a valid contract
between a business and a consumer or to the creation of one or more legal consequences under
national contract law.74 Finally, the change in the economic behaviour also concerns the decision to
contract merely under other conditions.75
BELGIUM - Under the TPA of 1991, proof of potential damage to the interests of the consumer was a
minimum prerequisite. An actual damage for the consumer was not required.76 In that option the 'likelihood'
which article 94 TPA contained, still exists with regard to article VI.93 CEL.77 Whereas earlier the (likelihood
of) damage needed to be proved, today it has to be demonstrated that the undertaking behaved contrary to
the requirements of professional diligence and that an appreciable impairment of the economic behaviour of
the average consumer occurred / was likely to occur. Consequently the question is raised whether the
different formulation of the provision, as a result of the implementation of the UCPD, makes it more difficult
for the plaintiff to prove an unfair commercial practice.78 The condition of the (potential) material distortion
excludes in any case the scenario that an infringement of a legal provision, which (possibly) damages the
interest of consumers, is automatically considered as an unfair commercial practice.79 As a result, the new
legislation seems to be more stringent.
Belgian jurisprudence confirms that it is not obvious to prove that both conditions of the general unfairness
test have been met. Especially the proof of the (potential) material distortion seems to be an obstacle. In the
past, courts have decided more than once that certain combined offers did not infringe the general provision
of ex-article 84 MPCPA (now art. VI.93 CEL).80 For example, the Court of Appeal of Brussels decided that it
was not proved in the circumstances of the case that the combined offer of the publication of a small
advertisement in the printed edition of the newspaper and on its webpage, was able to affect the economic
behaviour of the average consumer as required.81 Nor was the combined offer of a flight and free transport
to the airport, unfair in the opinion of the President of the Commercial Court of Turnhout.82 He agreed a
detailed quotation about the several parts of the package had not been drawn up by the agency, but added
that the consumer had not requested it either. Furthermore, he reasoned that this case concerned a mere
personal request with a mere personal answer from the agency. Finally, the judge stated that the consumer
ultimately did not respond to the offer, so that an actual impairment of his behaviour was not
72
Guidance Commission UCPD, 23; L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la
protection du consommateur: une occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 385, 52; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER,
"European Framework for Unfair Commercial Practices: Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 30; I. FERRANT, Les
pratiques du marché (depuis les lois du 6 avril 2010) in Pratique du droit, 49, Waterloo, Kluwer, 2011, 133, n° 364; J. STUYCK, E.
TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial
practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 126.
73
Guidance Commission UCPD, 22; H. DE BAUW, "De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument" in G.
STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (ed.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (107) 115, n° 15;
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 263.
74
Guidance Commission UCPD, 22.
75
L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du consommateur: une
occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 385, 52.
76
Brussels 4 May 2010, NJW 2011, issue 238, (182) 183.
77
L. DE BROUWER, "Richtlijn 2005/29/EG van 11 mei 2005 betreffende oneerlijke handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 7, (790)
791.
78
J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN, "Recente ontwikkelingen inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en
Economisch recht in Themis. School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 51, 2008-2009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 56, n°
12.
79
J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN, "Recente ontwikkelingen inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en
Economisch recht in Themis. School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 51, 2008-2009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 57, n°
12.
80
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Koppelverkoop is niet langer per se verboden, maar kan wel nog in concreto oneerlijk blijken" (note Brussels 4
May 2010), DCCR 2011, issue 90, (115) 126, n° 14.
81
Brussels 4 February 2010, JT 2010, issue 6387, 179.
82
Comm. Turnhout 8 July 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (303) 303.
10
demonstrated.83 In our opinion, the judge overlooked that only a potential impairment is required for the
infringement of the then article 94/5 TPA and the present article VI.93, b) MPCPA. By contrast, the second
condition was held to be met in a case in which a consumer, as part of a certain marketing practice, was
enticed by a deposit account with an exceptional high interest rate (7%) in order to invest in a relatively high
risk financial service, because the consumer would not have taken that transactional decision otherwise.84
His ability to make an informed decision was without doubt appreciably impaired.85 The fact that the
advertisement mentioned that the offer was 'under certain conditions', was considered irrelevant. That
announcement only told the consumer that there were certain conditions to be satisfied. As KEIRSBILCK
points out, the consumer had no idea that he had to invest in unfamiliar, risky products, which resulted in the
consumer's incapability to assess the concrete advantages of the offer.86 The same Court of Appeal took the
view that the imitation of a package for, in casu, the sale of tea was contrary to the prohibition to commit
unfair commercial practices as prescribed in article 94/5 TPA (ex-article 93 TPA of 1991). The court decided
that the practice of imitating packages confused the consumer and was likely to appreciably impair the
consumer's economic behaviour.87 The consumer was driven to purchase the products of a competitor.88
13. THE AVERAGE CONSUMER – The definition of the average consumer stems from the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Justice. In various cases, the European Court has made clear that the
average consumer is the consumer who is reasonably well-informed as well as reasonably observant
and circumspect.89 The European legislator omitted the definition of 'the average consumer' in the final
text of the UCPD90, although the Proposal contained this definition in article 2, b).91 This omission
allows the concept of the average consumer to evolve together with the interpretation given by the
European Court of Justice.92 Yet, the European legislator chose not to delete the definition completely
and decided to insert it into the considerations of the Directive, more precisely in recital 18.93 Although
it was found appropriate initially to protect all consumers from unfair commercial practices, the
directive clearly chose to protect the average consumer as a general rule, in line with the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the principle of proportionality.94
83
Comm. Turnhout 8 July 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (303) 307.
84
Brussels 4 May 2010, NJW 2011, issue 238, (182) 184.
85
Brussels 4 May 2010, NJW 2011, issue 238, (182) 184. See also Comm. Brussels 5 March 2008; B. KEIRSBILCK,
"Koppelverkoop is niet langer per se verboden, maar kan wel nog in concreto oneerlijk blijken" (note Brussels 4 May 2010),
DCCR 2011, issue 90, (115) 132, n° 21.
86
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Koppelverkoop is niet langer per se verboden, maar kan wel nog in concreto oneerlijk blijken" (note Brussels 4
May 2010), DCCR 2011, issue 90, (115) 129, n° 18.
87
Brussels 5 May 2009, IRDI 2009, (266) 274.
88
Brussels 5 May 2009, IRDI 2009, (266) 275.
89
Guidance Commission UCPD, 27; Case C-373/90, X. (Nissan) [1992] ECR I-00131; Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen
in Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v. Mars GmbH [1995] ECR I-01923; Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH v. R. Tusky
[1998] ECR I-04657; Case C-303/97, Verbraucherschutzverein eV v. Sektkellerei G.C. Kessler GmbH & Co [1999] ECR I00513; Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder Consmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH [2000] ECR I-00117; Case C99/01, Gottfried Linhart v. Hans Biffl [2002] ECR I-09375; C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises
à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION, Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur,
Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 37, n° 28; M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal
market, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005, 187; G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBRJaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 252.
90
L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du consommateur: une
occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 386, n° 55; W. DE MEESTER, "De omzetting van de Richtlijn oneerlijke
handelspraktijken. Hoeveel vrijheid heeft België nog?", Jura Falconis 2008-09, volume 45, issue 1, (49) 67; I. FERRANT, Les
pratiques du marché (depuis les lois du 6 avril 2010) in Pratique du droit, 49, Waterloo, Kluwer, 2011, 133, n° 366.
91
COM (2003) 356, final, 22.
92
L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du consommateur: une
occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 386, n° 55; M. RADEIDEH, The principle of fair trading in the EC law,
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Groningen, 2004, 237.
93
C. DESMECHT, "Le consommateur moyen: origine et portée d'une notion clé", Jb.Hand.Med. 2011, (182) 184-185, n° 9.
94
Guidance Commission UCPD, 24; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER, "European Framework for Unfair Commercial Practices:
Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 29; C. DESMECHT, "Le consommateur moyen: origine et portée d'une notion clé",
Jb.Hand.Med. 2011, (182) 185, n° 9.
11
BELGIUM - In the TPA of 1991, article 94 referred to the interests of consumers in its unfairness test. Since
the UCPD referred to the average consumer as the benchmark consumer for the unfairness test of
commercial practices, one could have thought that the Act of 2007, which implemented the provisions of the
UCPD in the Belgian legislation, would adopt the terminology of 'average consumer' into the new article 94/5
TPA. That was not the case.95 In the opinion of the Belgian legislator, it was clear that the consumer
mentioned in the TPA was the average consumer, as meant in the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice.96
Different national case-law, preceding the implementation of the directive existed, however. In 2000 the
Court of Cassation held that, although the TPA did not define its benchmark consumer, it was clear that the
TPA had always aimed to protect the least informed consumer.97 This consumer was characterized by a lack
of a critical thought and was susceptible to pitfalls and exaggerated and deceptive statements.98 This
judgement seemed to be contrary to the concept of the average consumer, the benchmark of the European
Court of Justice. Several lower courts, however, defined the average consumer as the consumer who is
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, is critical and has a minimum of
common sense.99 The Court of Appeal of Brussels judged in the same way, saying that the assessment of
the danger of confusion caused by the selling of tea in imitated packages had to take place from the
perspective of the consumer displaying an average attentiveness, which means that he is neither a
specialist, nor an uninterested party.100
As a consequence of the replacement of the TPA by the MPCPA in 2010, the current general clause and the
related definitions became identical to these in the UCPD. The wording 'average consumer' is now still
explicitly present in the Belgian Book VI of the CEL.101
95
L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du consommateur: une
occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 385, n° 54; W. DE MEESTER, "De omzetting van de Richtlijn oneerlijke
handelspraktijken. Hoeveel vrijheid heeft België nog?", Jura Falconis 2008-09, volume 45, issue 1, (49) 68; I. FERRANT, Les
pratiques du marché (depuis les lois du 6 avril 2010) in Pratique du droit, 49, Waterloo, Kluwer, 2011, 133, n° 365; H.
JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.), Les pratiques du
marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles,
Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 80, n° 10; J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN, "Recente ontwikkelingen inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY
and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en Economisch recht in Themis. School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 51, 20082009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 56, n° 11.
96
J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN, "Recente ontwikkelingen inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en
Economisch recht in Themis. School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 51, 2008-2009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 56, n°
11. See, by analogy with the jurisprudence of misleading publicity (art. 94/2 TPA): Pres. Comm. Nivelles 20 December 2007
(259) 263.
97
Cass. 12 October 2000, Saint Brice v. Belgium. See also about this jurisprudence: L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La
nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du consommateur: une occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5,
(371) 386, n° 54; C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N.
THIRION, Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 37, n° 28; P.
DE VROEDE and H. DE WULF, "Overzicht van rechtspraak: algemeen handelsrecht en handelspraktijken (1998-2002)", TPR
2005, (111) 264, n° 280; M. DUPONT, "La Cour européenne de justice sonne le glas de l’interdiction des offres conjointes", J.T..
2009, 423; H. JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.),
Les pratiques du marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune
Barreau de Bruxelles, Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 80, n° 10; J. STUYCK, "De nieuwe richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken.
Gevolgen voor de wet op de handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 9, (901) 911; J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and P. WYTINCK, "Actuele
vraagstukken van het recht inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en Economisch recht in
Themis. School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 15, 2005-2006, Brugge, Die Keure (53) 74, n° 40.
98
Cass. 12 October 2000, Saint Brice v. Belgium.
99
Pres. Comm. Nivelles 18 February 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (132) 134.
100
Brussels 5 May 2009, IRDI 2009, (266) 274.
101
E. BALATE and M. GOUVERNEUR, "La loi du 6 avril 2010 relative aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du consommateur:
premiers éléments et analyse", DCCR 2010, issue 88, (3) 73; C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des
entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION, Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du
consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 36, n° 28; I. FERRANT, Les loi du 6 avril 2010 relatives aux pratiques du marché et à la
protection du consommateur, Waterloo, Wolters Kluwer Belgium, 2010, 37, n° 28 and 75, n° 91; A. HALLEMANS, "Hoofdstuk 4:
Verboden praktijken - Afdeling 1 Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten" in T. HEREMANS (ed.), Nieuwe wet
marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming. Alles over oud en nieuw - La nouvelle loi relative aux pratiques du marché et à la
protection du consommateur. Tout sur l'ancien et le nouveau régime, Brussel, Larcier, 2010, (120) 121, n° 246; H. JACQUEMIN,
"La loi du 6 avril 2010 relative aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du consommateur", JT 2010, (545) 556, n° 32; H.
JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.), Les pratiques du
marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles,
Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 80, n° 10; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Koppelverkoop is niet langer per se verboden, maar kan wel nog in
concreto oneerlijk blijken" (note Brussels 4 May 2010), DCCR 2011, issue 90, (115) 128, n° 16; J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN,
12
The average consumer benchmark still allows for social, cultural and linguistic factors to be taken into
account when assessing the unfairness of a commercial practice.102 Those factors differ in each
member state and may justify a different interpretation of a commercial practice, or of the message the
business wanted to communicate by the use of the commercial practice.103 It is for the national judge
to assess those elements in the concrete circumstances of the case.104 The Estée Lauder-case can
illustrate this.105 The European Court of Justice decided in this case that it was for the national
authority to determine whether social, cultural or linguistic factors may justify that the word 'lifting', as a
feature of a cosmetic product, is interpreted differently by German consumers as opposed to
consumers in other member states; or whether the instructions for the use of the product are in
themselves sufficient to make it clear that the effects are short-lived, thus neutralising any conclusion
to the contrary that might be derived from the word 'lifting'.106 Even when an average consumer ought
not to expect the cosmetic product to produce enduring 'lifting' effects, the national court has to
investigate whether that is the position in the concrete circumstances.107 As a second example, an
older Estée Lauder-case can be mentioned.108 The European Court of Justice decided in that case
that the fact that a commercial practice was ordinarily employed in other countries without causing
consumer protection concerns, had to be an element in assessing whether such a practice was unfair
or not.109
Other relevant factors must also be taken into account. These other factors include the circumstances
in which the undertaking sold the product or service, (the clarity of) the information that was given to
the consumer, the presentation of the product or service, the content of the advertising material and,
finally, also the risk of error that exists in relation to the group of consumers concerned.110 In line with
this remark, reference can be made to the Koipe-case.111 In this case the European Court of Justice
decided that the average consumer who buys products in a supermarket, is the consumer who does
not analyse the packages thoroughly or compares them to other products, but who rapidly, easily
skims the products he purchases.112
"Recente ontwikkelingen inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en Economisch recht in Themis.
School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 51, 2008-2009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 56, n° 11.
102
Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder Consmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH [2000] ECR I-00117; W. DE
MEESTER, "De omzetting van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken. Hoeveel vrijheid heeft België nog?", Jura Falconis 200809, volume 45, issue 1, (49) 68; M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market,
Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005, 188-189; G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek
2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 252.
103
Guidance Commission UCPD, 27.
104
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 189.
105
Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder Consmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH [2000] ECR I-00117.. See also C.
DESMECHT, "Le consommateur moyen: origine et portée d'une notion clé", Jb.Hand.Med. 2011, (182) 186, n° 11.
106
Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder Consmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH [2000] ECR I-00117, para. 29.
107
Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder Consmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH [2000] ECR I-00117, para. 30.
108
Case C-315/92, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH [1994]
ECR I-00317.
109
Case C-315/92, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH [1994]
ECR I-00317, para.21.
110
Guidance Commission UCPD, 27; Case C-313/94, Fratelli Graffione SNC v. Ditta Fransa, [1996] ECR I-06039, para. 26; A.
HALLEMANS, "Hoofdstuk 4: Verboden praktijken - Afdeling 1 Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten" in T. HEREMANS
(ed.), Nieuwe wet marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming. Alles over oud en nieuw - La nouvelle loi relative aux pratiques
du marché et à la protection du consommateur. Tout sur l'ancien et le nouveau régime, Brussel, Larcier, 2010, (120) 121, n°
246.
111
Case C-498/07, Aceites del Sur-Coosur, SA v. Koipe Corporación and OHIM [2009] ECR I-07371.
112
Case C-498/07, Aceites del Sur-Coosur, SA v. Koipe Corporación and OHIM [2009] ECR I-07371; A. HALLEMANS, "Hoofdstuk
4: Verboden praktijken - Afdeling 1 Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten" in T. HEREMANS (ed.), Nieuwe wet
marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming. Alles over oud en nieuw - La nouvelle loi relative aux pratiques du marché et à la
protection du consommateur. Tout sur l'ancien et le nouveau régime, Brussel, Larcier, 2010, (120) 122, n° 246.
13
BELGIUM - The Court of Appeal of Ghent takes the view that the average consumer's degree of attention
depends on the category of service which is involved. In the Court's opinion, a consumer is more attentive
during the visitation of a website, as opposed to other means of communication.113
The average consumer is without any doubt a very wide and open concept. The average consumer
test is, as a result, not a statistical test.114 It is thus important to bear in mind that the concept of the
average consumer is still receptive to the diversity of consumers.115 In addition, an important role is
reserved for the national authorities or courts.116 These will have to exercise their own faculty of
judgement to determine the typical reaction of the average consumer in a given case.117 When
investigating whether the average consumer was impaired by a commercial practice, the national
judge will have to investigate the facts and circumstances of the particular case that has been brought
before court (in concreto), but will also have to assess whether an appreciable impact on the decision
of the average consumer did occur (in abstracto).118 In this context, he will have to take into account
the case-law of the European Court of Justice.
BELGIUM – It should be noted that article VI.93, b) CEL prescribes that the benchmark consumer whose
behaviour must be materially distorted or likely to be distorted is not only the average consumer who is
addressed, but also the average consumer who was reached by the commercial practice. This means that,
although a commercial practice might not have been addressed to certain consumers, they are nevertheless
protected by the general unfairness clause when the commercial practice has reached them.119 A Belgian
judgement of 12 January 2011 illustrates the concept 'average consumer who is addressed or reached' in a
case which revolved around the selling of dishwashing liquids. Whereas the plaintiff considered that the
dishwashing liquid of the defendant was able to affect the consumer in general, the judge determined that,
even though the dishwashing liquid was sold large-scale, it merely reached the interested consumer. Since
especially the ecological features were emphasized during the marketing of the product, the consumer in
view was the consumer who is receptive to ecological products, i.e. 'the green consumer'.120
14. THE AVERAGE MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CONSUMERS AND THE VULNERABLE CONSUMER – The
European Court of Justice has accepted that a particular group of consumers may be in need of extra
protection because they are weaker compared to the average consumer. The Court has indeed
abandoned the standard interpretation of the average consumer in certain cases.121 According to the
European Commission, these divergences need to be seen in the light of article 114 TFEU which
provides for a high level of consumer protection.122 As a result, the European legislator attenuates the
average consumer concept in two specific provisions.123 Article 5, par. 2, b) UCPD contains a
113
Ghent 29 June 2009, IRDI 2010, (72) 76.
114
Recital 18 UCPD; C. DESMECHT, "Le consommateur moyen: origine et portée d'une notion clé", Jb.Hand.Med. 2011, (182)
185, n° 9.
115
Case 382/87, R. Buet and SARL Educational Business Services [1989] ECR I-01235; Case C-373/90, X. (Nissan) [1992]
ECR I-00131; M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen,
Europa Law Publishing, 2005, 188.
116
Guidance Commission UCPD, 24; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER, "European Framework for Unfair Commercial
Practices: Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 30; W. DE MEESTER, "De omzetting van de Richtlijn oneerlijke
handelspraktijken. Hoeveel vrijheid heeft België nog?", Jura Falconis 2008-09, volume 45, issue 1, (49) 67.
117
Recital 18 UCPD; Guidance Commission UCPD, 25.
118
Guidance Commission UCPD, 24; Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (144) 150.
119
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 262 and 264.
120
Pres. Comm. Nivelles, 12 January 2011, Jb.Hand.Med. 2011, (162) 173-174; C. DESMECHT, "Le consommateur moyen:
origine et portée d'une notion clé", Jb.Hand.Med. 2011, (182) 183, n° 3.
121
A. GARDE and M. HAVARON, "La directive européenne sur les pratiques commerciales déloyales: vers un renversement de la
protection des consommateurs en Europe, RDTI 2007, (171) 174.
122
Guidance Commission UCPD, 26.
123
C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION,
Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 37, n° 29; H.
JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.), Les pratiques du
14
particular rule which addresses the average member of the group in case a group of consumers is
targeted. Article 5, par. 3 UCPD addresses the vulnerable consumer.
BELGIUM – Article 5, par. 2, b) UCPD was implemented in article 94/5 TPA, now article VI.93, b) CEL.
Article 5, paragraph 3 UCPD was implemented in article 94/5 TPA, now article VI.93, last par. CEL.
15. (A) THE AVERAGE MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CONSUMERS – Article 5, par. 2, b) UCPD states that in
case a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of consumers, the benchmark consumer is
the average member of the relevant group.124 As such, the differing capacity to process information is
taken into account.125 Particular groups that may fall within the scope of this provision, are 'children',
'housewives' and 'students'.126 To assess the presence of an unfair commercial practice, it is sufficient
- at least for the second condition of the general unfairness test - to demonstrate that the practice was
likely to impair the economic behaviour of the average member of the group.127
BELGIUM - A particular example of this provision, can be found in article VI.103, 5° CEL. This article
provides a prohibition in all circumstances (black list) of advertisements which are directed to children and
which incite the children or their parents to purchase a certain product.128
16. (B) THE VULNERABLE CONSUMER – In case a commercial practice is likely to materially distort the
economic behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable to
the practice or the underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a
way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee, the practice must be assessed from
the perspective of the average member of that group.129 In the Guidance on the UCPD, the example of
an advertisement for a ringtone for teenagers is given. In this case the expectations and the likely
reaction of the average teenager of the targeted group has to be taken into account, whereas the
expectations of an exceptionally immature or mature teenager belonging to the same group, are not
relevant.130
marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles,
Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 95, n° 27.
124
Art. 5, par. 2, b) UCPD; COM (2003) 356, final, 9, n° 35; Guidance Commission UCPD, 28; Case C-313/94, Fratelli Graffione
SNC v. Ditta Fransa, [1996] ECR I-06039; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER, "European Framework for Unfair Commercial
Practices: Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 30; A. HALLEMANS, "Hoofdstuk 4: Verboden praktijken - Afdeling 1
Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten" in T. HEREMANS (ed.), Nieuwe wet marktpraktijken en
consumentenbescherming. Alles over oud en nieuw - La nouvelle loi relative aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du
consommateur. Tout sur l'ancien et le nouveau régime, Brussel, Larcier, 2010, (120) 120, n° 246; M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in
EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005, 188 and 264.
125
COM (2003) 356, final, 9, n° 30.
126
Recital 18 UCPD; EM Act of 5 June 2007, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2006-07, n° 2983/001, 25.
127
L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du consommateur: une
occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 386, n° 56; J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN, "Recente ontwikkelingen inzake
handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en Economisch recht in Themis. School voor postacademische
juridische vorming, 51, 2008-2009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 56, n° 11.
128
A. GARDE and M. HAVARON, "La directive européenne sur les pratiques commerciales déloyales: vers un renversement de la
protection des consommateurs en Europe, RDTI 2007, (171) 174; A. HALLEMANS, "Hoofdstuk 4: Verboden praktijken - Afdeling 1
Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten" in T. HEREMANS (ed.), Nieuwe wet marktpraktijken en
consumentenbescherming. Alles over oud en nieuw - La nouvelle loi relative aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du
consommateur. Tout sur l'ancien et le nouveau régime, Brussel, Larcier, 2010, (120) 122, n° 246.
129
Art. 5, par. 3 UCPD; M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market,
Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005, 264; R. STEENNOT, in cooperation with S. DEJONGHE, Handboek
consumentenbescherming en handelspraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2007, 86, n° 142; G. STRAETMANS, "Recente
tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 258; J. STUYCK, "De nieuwe richtlijn
oneerlijke handelspraktijken. Gevolgen voor de wet op de handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 9, (901) 911; J. STUYCK, E.
TERRYN and P. WYTINCK, "Actuele vraagstukken van het recht inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.),
Handels- en Economisch recht in Themis. School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 15, 2005-2006, Brugge, Die Keure
(53) 70, n° 35.
130
Guidance Commission UCPD, 28-29.
15
The reasons mentioned by article 5, from which the vulnerability or weakness might be deduced, are
listed indicatively and cover a wide range of situations.131 STEENNOT mentions that some authors
regret the absence of other reasons in the list such as the degree of education, income and race.132
Since the list is indicative, there is no obstacle to consider those elements as reasons for the
weakness or vulnerability of the consumer. It is also possible to consider the unemployed as especially
prone to subscribe for easy loans or credits.133
Firstly, the mental or physical infirmity is mentioned in the provision. According to the Guidance, this
includes sensory impairment, limited mobility and other disabilities.134 Examples given include
consumers who need to use a wheelchair as a vulnerable group in relation to advertising claims about
ease of access to a holiday destination or entertainment venue, or consumers with a hearing
impairment in relation to advertising claims about hearing aid compatibility in a telephone
advertisement.135
Secondly, vulnerability might be inferred from age. Elderly people might be more susceptible to
aggressive door-to-door selling, the selling of burglar alarms and certain bus trips, organised by a
business only to merchandise their products during the trip.136 Children, on the other hand, are
perceived as more susceptible to the marketing of videogames and the possible confusion concerning
the compatibility of the product with a specific device.137 Furthermore, teenagers are also considered
to be vulnerable. Because of their lack of attention and reflection due to immaturity, they are often
targeted by rogue businesses.138 A striking example is the offer of a mobile phone service with the
message that, by subscribing to a particular loyalty plan, the consumer can easily make and maintain
friends.139
Finally, credulity is mentioned as an indication of vulnerability. This concept covers those consumers
who may more readily believe particular claims by businesses. It is doubtless that this category causes
difficulties as regards the delimitation. For example, reference can be made to a dishonest business
who sells the winning lottery number on its website which is open to the general public, although he
knows that only the credulous consumers will be attracted to his site and be the victim of his scam.140
Last but not least, it is necessary to pay attention to the condition that the impairment of the vulnerable
consumer had to be reasonably foreseeable by the business.141 This condition makes clear that
businesses do not have to do more than can be reasonably expected, in line with the principle of
proportionality,142 both in considering whether the practice would have an unfair impact on a clearly
identifiable group of vulnerable consumers, and in attempting to mitigate such influence. It is doubtless
that some consumers are extremely naïve or ignorant, or just act very irrationally in response to an
131
Guidance Commission UCPD, 29; G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006,
Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 259.
132
R. STEENNOT refers to J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 122 (R. STEENNOT, in
cooperation with S. DEJONGHE, Handboek consumentenbescherming en handelspraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2007, 86, n°
142, footnote 310).
133
G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 259.
134
Guidance Commission UCPD, 30.
135
Guidance Commission UCPD, 30.
136
Guidance Commission UCPD, 30.
137
Guidance Commission UCPD, 30.
138
Guidance Commission UCPD, 30.
139
Guidance Commission UCPD, 30.
140
Guidance Commission UCPD, 30.
141
G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 258.
142
Guidance Commission UCPD, 31.
16
absolutely fair commercial practice.143 In that case, the commercial practice will not be considered as
unfair and thus the business will not be held liable.
RADEIDEH points out that the above-mentioned provision might be interpreted in such a manner that
the benchmark consumer is the vulnerable consumer, as it will always be likely that the vulnerable
consumer will be affected in his capacity to make an informed choice.144 Such a reasoning implies the
acceptation of the vulnerable consumer as the benchmark consumer of the UCPD, which is absolutely
contrary to the aim of the legislator,145 who decided to reject the 'weak and vulnerable' consumer as
the benchmark consumer.146
The difference between paragraphs 2, b) and 3 of article 5 UCPD is subtle. Article 5, par. 2, b) UCPD
only applies when a commercial practice is directed at a particular group. If the commercial practice
was directed towards the generality of consumers, article 5, par. 3 UCPD is applicable.147 This division
can, however, be put into perspective by to following reasoning: when commercial practices are likely
to materially distort the economic behaviour only of a group of consumers, the practices were typically
directed to that particular group. As a consequence, article 5, par. 2, b) would apply anyway.148
17. TWO-STAGE TEST – Summarizing, it can be stated that the research into the interpretation of the
'average consumer', is a two-stage test.149 First and foremost, the consumer in a given case is in
principle considered to be reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and circumspect. The
consumer has a reasonable understanding of reality and is able to carefully process the acquired
information. Deception can hardly take place. This is the so called, objective ex-ante approach which
takes place.150 In the second stage of the test, the judge will investigate whether some consumers
belong to a particular group of consumers or are specifically vulnerable. Especially particular
circumstances are taken into account at this stage of the test. Among others, the cultural, linguistic or
social factors will play a part in this phase of the assessment.
C. Exaggerated statements and statements which are not meant to be taken literally
18. EXCEPTION: EXAGGERATED STATEMENTS, NOT MEANT TO BE TAKEN LITERALLY – The UCPD inserted
a special safeguard for common and legitimate advertising practices in which exaggerated statements
or statements which are not meant to be taken literally are used.
BELGIUM - A similar provision was unknown in the Belgian legislation before the implementation of the
UCPD-provision in article 94/5, par. 2, in fine TPA, by the Act of 2007151, now article VI.93, b) last section
CEL.
143
Guidance Commission UCPD, 31.
144
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 264.
145
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 264.
146
Guidance Commission UCPD, 29; L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la
protection du consommateur: une occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 385, n° 54; B. DE GROOTTE and K. DE VULDER,
"European Framework for Unfair Commercial Practices: Analysis of Directive 2005/29", JBL 2007, (16) 29.
147
G. STRAETMANS, "Recente tendensen in handelspraktijken", CBR-Jaarboek 2005-2006, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, (163) 258.
148
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 264.
149
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 188.
150
M. RADEIDEH, Fair Trading in EC Law. Information and consumer choice in the internal market, Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing, 2005, 188.
151
Notwithstanding the absence of such a particular provision, the jurisprudence referred to the hyperbolic character of some
advertisements to conclude they were not unfair.
17
THE NETHERLANDS – Also the DCC provides a similar provision in article 193b, par.4 DCC.
Some advertisements make subjective or exaggerated statements about the qualities of a particular
product, the so called 'puffery', which is not meant to be taken literally.152 These statements may even
contain information that does not correspond to reality at all.153 On the condition that the average
consumer easily recognises the exaggeration or the striking falsehood, those advertisements are
legitimate.154 Most authors confirm the obviousness of this provision, since clearly exaggerated
statements do not mislead the consumer.155 Moreover, it would be contrary to the principle of
proportionality to prohibit advertisements that might deceive only the very naïve, credulous or cursory
consumer, given the general purpose of the legislation and the prohibition to create unjustifiable
barriers to trade.156 It is however important to keep the requirement of the easy recognition of the
exaggeration by the average consumer in mind. Some jurisprudence and some authors seem to
consider the average consumer to be always fully aware that publicity contains exaggerations. They
base their reasoning on the single fact that the average consumer is showered each day with
advertisements and is consequently able to put all hyperbolic advertisements into perspective.157 In
our opinion, that is jumping to conclusions because not every exaggeration is easily recognisable for
the average consumer. The more concrete the advertisement, the more difficult it will be for the
consumer to recognise the exaggeration.158 In addition, WELLENS states that the reference to
E.g. Pres. Comm. Brussels 19 September 1994, Jb.Hand.Med. 1994, 109 where the Court decided that the slogan "no other
washing-powder in the world washes better" was superlative advertising; Pres. Comm. Brussels 28 October 2002,
Jb.Hand.Med. 2002, 240 where the same was concluded about advertisements which contain slogans as "the best" and "the
widest choice". The same was judged about the slogans "indispensable" and "nothing is that useful and advantageous" (Pres.
Comm. Mechelen 12 June 2001, Jb.Hand.Med. 2001, 194) and the advertisement "Did you know that Dixan is preferred to the
most sold washing-powder?" (Pres. Comm. Brussels 12 September 2005, Jb.Hand.Med. 2005, (304) 308 and DCCR 2007,
issue 73, (141) 145).
Contra: Brussels 26 June 1998, Jb.Hand.Med. 1998, (127) 130; Brussels 29 January 2004, Jb.Hand.Med. 2004, (115) where
the judge decided that the superlatives "the best" and "the number one of the feed veterinarians give to their dogs and cats"
could not be considered as to be interpreted as mere subjective, hyperbolical and without any objective value because the
consumer might interpret them as true and real due to the scientific tests referred to in the advertisement.
152
Guidance Commission UCPD, 25, footnote 37. See also Pres. Comm. Brussels 20 September 2002, Jb.Hand.Med. 2002,
(226) 235.
153
H. DE BAUW, "Misleidende reclame en superlatiefreclame", (note Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009) Jb.Hand.Med. 2009,
(152) 156, n° 11.
154
H. DE BAUW, "Misleidende reclame en superlatiefreclame", (note Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009) Jb.Hand.Med. 2009,
(152) 156, n° 11. See also Pres. Comm. Brussels 20 September 2002, Jb.Hand.Med. 2002, (226) 236.
Reference to this condition was already made in jurisprudence before the implementation of the UCPD-provision into the TPA.
E.g. Brussels 17 May 2005, DCCR 2007, issue 73, (129) 138 where the court decided that the slogan "You want to save more
money? Discover our discount programs and fixed sums on the back side" preceded by a comparative chart of prices from
which, in reality, no saving could be deduced, had a weak hyperbolic character through which it was impossible for the
consumer to recognise the exaggeration. Also the slogan "N° 1 in Europe with regard to the processing and administration of
coupons" did, in the court's opinion, not contain a manifest lie which the public could recognise immediately (Brussels 19
December 2006, Jb.Hand.Med. 2006 (193) 200. In the framework of an alleged infringement of article 94/2, 3° and 4° and 94/3
TPA the President of the Commercial Court of Antwerp decided that exaggerations are inherent in advertisements, but added
that hyperbolic publicity is only legitimate when the consumer can easily identify the exaggerations (Pres. Comm. Antwerp 8
January 2009, (117) 121).
155
H. DE BAUW, "Misleidende reclame en superlatiefreclame", (note Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009) Jb.Hand.Med. 2009,
(152) 156, n° 12; F. DE PATOUL, "Livre 1 Les pratiques de commerce (Volume I)" in M. COIPEL and P. WERY (ed.), Les pratiques
du commerce l'information et la protection du consommateur. Commentaire de la loi du 14 juillet 1991 et de la loi du 2 aoüt
2002, Waterloo,Wolters Kluwer Belgium, 2006, (1) 21, n° 290; I. FERRANT, Les pratiques du marché (depuis les lois du 6 avril
2010) in Pratique du droit, 49, Waterloo, Kluwer, 2011, 134, n° 369; H. JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des
consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.), Les pratiques du marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le
concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles, Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 95, n° 27; R.
STEENNOT, in cooperation with S. DEJONGHE, Handboek consumentenbescherming en handelspraktijken, Antwerpen,
Intersentia, 2007, 86, n° 142; V. WELLENS, "Verwijzing in reclame naar testresultaten", DCCR 2007, issue 76, (211) 212.
156
Guidance Commission UCPD, 25. See also C. DESMECHT, "Le consommateur moyen: origine et portée d'une notion clé",
Jb.Hand.Med. 2011, (182) 187, n° 13.
157
E.g. Pres. Comm. Nivelles 18 July 2003, Jb. Hand.Med. 2003 (213) 220; Pres. Comm. Nivelles 25 May 2005, Jb.Hand.Med.
2005 (260) 265; Pres. Comm. Brussels 12 September 2005, Jb.Hand.Med. 2005, (304) 308 and DCCR 2007, issue 73, (141)
145.
158
G. STRAETMANS, "Over hyperbolen, misleiding en vergelijkende reclame", DCCR 2007, issue 73, (146) 152.
18
(scientific) tests excludes the qualification of hyperbolical advertisement.159 Finally, it is also possible
that an advertisement contains several exaggerations which are without doubt easily recognisable for
the average consumer, but that the overall picture of the advertisement is nonetheless misleading to
the average consumer.160
BELGIUM - Examples of hyperbolical advertisements that are mentioned in literature and the explanatory
memorandum are advertisings such as "the most beautiful", "it gives you wings" or "washes whiter than
white".161 In the jurisprudence, the slogan "Washes as clean as a brilliant" was found a legitimate
exaggerated advertisement, not meant to be taken literally by the consumer.162 In the Court's opinion,
exaggerated advertisements are typical of the sector of washing products and have been generally
adopted so that consumers cannot be misled anymore.163
D. Burden of proof and assessment for UCP’s under the grand general provision
19. BURDEN OF PROOF AND ASSESSMENT IN CONCRETO – When an undertaking is claimed to have
infringed the grand general provision, it is for the plaintiff to prove that both conditions of the general
unfairness test are met.164 The national authority or court has to assess whether both conditions are
indeed fulfilled.165 A judge will have to make an in concreto assessment, taking into account all the
above-mentioned circumstances.166 He will have to decide how an average consumer, a member of a
particular group consumers or a vulnerable consumer behaves in view of a certain commercial
practice.167 The assessment is nevertheless still partially in abstracto, since the judge does not have to
159
V. WELLENS, "Verwijzing in reclame naar testresultaten", DCCR 2007, issue 76, (211) 212.
160
Brussels 9 February 2010, Jb.Hand.Med. 2010 (81) 92.
161
EM Act of 5 June 2007, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2006-07, n° 2983/001, 26; C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales
des entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION, Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du
consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 38, n° 30; L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du
commerce et la protection du consommateur: une occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 386, n° 57; J. STUYCK, "De
nieuwe richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken. Gevolgen voor de wet op de handelspraktijken", TBH 2005, issue 9, (901) 911.
162
Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (144) 151; H. DE BAUW, "Misleidende reclame en
superlatiefreclame", (note Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009) Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (152) 156, n° 11.
163
Pres. Comm. Brussels 17 July 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009, (144) 151. See also Pres. Comm. Brussels 19 September 1994,
Jb.Hand.Med. 1994, 109; Pres. Comm. Brussels 12 September 2005, Jb.Hand.Med. 2005, (304) 308 and DCCR 2007, issue
73, (141) 145.
In our opinion, reference can also be made to following jurisprudence which dates from before 2007:
Considered as legitimate advertisements: Pres. Comm. Brussels 19 September 1994, Jb.Hand.Med. 1994, 109 where the Court
decided that the slogan "no other washing-powder in the world washes better" was superlative advertising; Pres. Comm.
Brussels 28 October 2002, Jb.Hand.Med. 2002, 240 where the same was concluded about advertisements which contain
slogans like "the best" and "the biggest choice". The same was judged about the slogans "indispensable" and "nothing is that
useful and advantageous" (Pres. Comm. Mechelen 12 June 2001, Jb.Hand.Med. 2001, 194) and the advertisement "Did you
know that Dixan is preferred to the most sold washing-powder?" (Pres. Comm. Brussels 12 September 2005, Jb.Hand.Med.
2005, (304) 308 and DCCR 2007, issue 73, (141) 145).
Contra: Brussels 26 June 1998, Jb.Hand.Med. 1998, (127) 130; Brussels 29 January 2004, Jb.Hand.Med. 2004, (115) where
the judge decided that the superlatives "the best" and "the number one feed veterinarians give to their dogs and cats" could not
be considered as to be interpreted as merely subjective, hyperbolical and without any objective value because the consumer
might interpret them as true and real due to the scientific tests referred to in the advertisement.
164
COM (2003) 356, final, 12, n° 51; L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, "La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la
protection du consommateur: une occasion manquée", TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 384, n° 48; C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques
commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION, Actualités en matière de pratiques du
marché et protection du consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 35, n° 25; R. STEENNOT, "Overzicht van rechtspraak
consumentenbescherming 2003-2007", TPR 2009, issue 1, (229) 393, n° 211; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D.
GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010, 62, n° 81.
165
C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION,
Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 35, n° 25.
166
H. DE BAUW, "De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E.
TERRYN (ed.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (107) 117, n° 25.
167
J. STUYCK, E. TERRYN and T. VAN DYCK, "Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market", C.M.L. Rev. 2006, issue 43, (107) 125.
19
investigate whether a commercial practice actually impaired the behaviour of a consumer.168 Given
this in concreto assessment, the grand general provision is rather used as a safety net in case no
appeal can be made to the provisions enumerated in Annex I of the UCPD (black lists) or the small
general provisions (Infra nr. 20 et seq.).169
2.
Small general provisions and a black list
20. Besides the general provision which prohibits the use of commercial practices, the UCPD
provides also two smaller general provisions which prohibit on the one hand ‘misleading commercial
practices’ and on the other hand ‘aggressive commercial practices’. Those prohibitions are based
upon the assumption that the first condition of the general provision, namely that the practices is
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, is fulfilled.170 In the CHS Tour Services case,
the latter was confirmed with regard to the small general provision concerning unfair misleading
practices.171
BELGIUM – The CEL prohibits misleading and aggressive commercial practices in article VI.94 CEL.
Reference is made for misleading practices to articles VI.97 to VI.100 CEL. The provisions concerning
aggressive commercial practices can be found in articles VI.101 to VI.103 CEL.
THE NETHERLANDS - Article 6:193b, par. 3 DCC states that misleading or aggressive commercial practices
are particularly unfair. The provisions concerning misleading practices are articles 6:193c to 6:193g
DCC. Those concerning aggressive commercial practices can be found in articles 6:193h and 6:193i
DCC.
The UK – The CPR 2008 provides in regulation 3(4)(a), (b) and (c) that misleading and aggressive
commercial practices are unfair.
FRANCE - Article L.120-1, II Code de la Consommation implements the UCPD provision which states that
misleading and aggressive commercial practices are unfair. The provisions concerning misleading
commercial practices can be found in article L.121-1 – L.121-7 Code de la Consommation, and the
provisions concerning aggressive commercial practices in article L.122-11 – L.122.15 Code de la
Consommation.
168
H. DE BAUW, "De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E.
TERRYN (ed.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, (107) 117, n° 25.
169
M.F.H. BROEKMAN, “De Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken”, TvC 2005, (175) 176, nr. 2; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way
forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, vol. 2, (233) 268, nr. 43; F. HENNING-BODEWIG
(ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 53, nr. 29.
170
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 52, nr. 29.
171
In this case Team4Travel, competing tour operator of CHS, described in its sales brochure for the selling of skiing lessons
and snow holidays certain establishments as ‘exclusive’ which meant that the hotels in question had a fixed contractual
relationship with Team4 Travel and could not, on the specified dates, be offered by another tour operator. Team4 Travel had
also made reference to the exclusive reservation of bed quotas in their price list. After concluding a contract for bed quotas,
Team4 Travel had checked with the establishments that no pre-bookings had been made by other tour operators. She had also
made sure that, having regard to the available capacity, no other organised group could be put up in the hotels concerned
during the periods in question. CHS had however also bed quotas blocked in the same accommodation establishments and for
the same periods as Team4 Travel had. The hotels in question where therefore in breach of their contractual obligations to
Team4 Travel. CHS argued that the brochures of Team4 Travel contained false information and infringed the provisions
concerning the prohibition of misleading commercial practices. Team4 Travel indicated that they had not acted contrary to the
requirements of professional diligence, but the court judged that if a commercial practice satisfies all the criteria specified in
Article 6(1) of the UCPD, it is not necessary to determine whether such a practice is also contrary to the requirements of
professional diligence as referred to in Article 5(2)(a) UCPD in order for it legitimately to be regarded as unfair and, therefore,
prohibited in accordance with Article 5(1) of the directive.
20
A. Misleading unfair commercial practices
21. A misleading commercial practice might occur as a misleading act, as well as a misleading
omission.
22. MISLEADING ACT – A commercial practice shall be qualified misleading if it contains false
information and is therefore untruthful or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is
likely to deceive the average consumer in relation to one or more of the elements as enumerated in
article 6, paragraph 1 UCPD.172 Again, it is important to mention that the consumer has to take, or was
likely to take another transactional decision than he would have taken otherwise, due to the
commercial practice. A causal link is thus necessary.173 The CJEU confirmed in the Trento Sviluppocase that, a commercial practice which contained factual false information, but did not influence the
consumer’s behaviour, was not to be considered unfair, and thus not prohibited.174
BELGIUM – Article VI.97-98 CEL
THE NETHERLANDS – Article 6:193c DCC
THE UK – Regulation 5 CPR 2008
FRANCE – Article L121-1-I Code de la Consommation
23. MISLEADING OMISSION – A misleading omission is a commercial practice which in its factual
context, taking into account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the
communication medium, omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to
the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the
average consumer to take a transactional decision that h he would not have taken otherwise.175 Even
if the trader hides or provides in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner material
information, this can be qualified a misleading omission if this causes or is likely to cause the
consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.176 In a certain way,
this provision contains a duty to inform the consumer.177
BELGIUM – Article VI.99 CEL
THE NETHERLANDS – Article 6:193d-f DCC
THE UK – Regulation 6 CPR 2008
FRANCE – Article L121-1-II Code de la Consommation
B. Aggressive unfair commercial practices
24. AGGRESSIVE UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICE – A commercial practice shall be regarded as
aggressive if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances, by
172
Art. 6, par. 1 UCPD; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL
2013, vol. 2, (233) 262, nr. 35.
173
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 54, nr. 34
174
CJEU C-281/12, Trento Sviluppo [2013]. J. STUYCK, “Prijsvergelijking in de detailhandel: ze moeten niet altijd up-to-date zijn”,
TBH 2014, issue 4, (388) 392.
175
Art. 7, par. 1 UCPD; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL
2013, vol. 2, (233) 262, nr. 36.
176
Art. 7, par. 2 UCPD.
177
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 55, nr. 39
21
harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, or undue influence, it significantly impairs or
is likely to significantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct with regard to the
product and thereby causes him or is likely to cause him to make a transactional decision that he
would not have taken otherwise.178
Elements to determine whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion or undue influence
are the timing, location, nature or persistence of the commercial practice, the use of threatening or
abusive language or behavior, the exploitation by the business of any specific misfortune or
circumstance of such gravity as to impair the consumer’s judgment, of which the business is aware, to
influence the consumer’s decision concerning the product; any onerous or disproportionate noncontractual barriers imposed by the business where a consumer wishes to exercise rights under the
contract, including rights to terminate a contract or to switch to another product or another business;
any threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken. One might not overlook that the impairment
has to be ‘significantly’. If not, the commercial practice falls outside the scope of the UCPD.179
BELGIUM – Article VI.101-102 CEL
THE NETHERLANDS – Article 6:193h DCC
THE UK – Regulation 7 CPR 2008
FRANCE – Article L.122-11 – L.122-15 Code de la Consommation
C. Black list with practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair
25. BLACK LIST – Finally, annex I of the UCPD contains a list of commercial practices which are in
all circumstances to be considered unfair. The ‘black’ character that was assigned to the list, means
that the list was established in an exhaustive and normative manner by the European legislator. By
consequence, the national legislators cannot, in view of the full harmonization, add commercial
practices to the list, nor can they decide to consider a commercial practices which occurs on the list as
‘fair’.180 The same goes for the national courts. Contrary to the practices which might be unfair under
the grand general provision or the small general provisions, there is thus no case-to-case or in
concreto assessment in case of a blacklisted commercial practice.181 The introduction of the black list
was there to increase legal certainty.182 Nevertheless, KEIRSBILCK states that many of the blacklisted
practices are formulated in an unclear manner and do not occur frequently in practice.183
BELGIUM – The Belgian legisator opted for the establishment of two black lists. One concerning
misleading commercial practices, to be found in article VI.100 CEL, and one concerning aggressive
commercial practices in article VI.103 CEL. Practices which occur on these lists are presumed
irrebutably to be contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and to may have appreciably
impaired the consumer’s behaviour.184
178
Art. 8 UCPD.
179
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 55, nr. 41.
180
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 53, nr. 32.
181
M.F.H. BROEKMAN, “De Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken”, TvC 2005, (175) 175, nr. 2; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way
forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, vol. 2, (233) 260, nr. 33; F. HENNING-BODEWIG
(ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 52, nr. 29.
182
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 53, nr. 30.
183
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 455, nr. 9.
184
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 454, nr. 7.
22
THE NETHERLANDS – The black list for misleading practices can be found in article 6:193g DCC and the
black list for aggressive practices in article 6:193i DCC.
THE UK – In the UK only one list is used. In schedule 1 of the CPR 2008 the blacklisted commercial
practices can be consulted.
FRANCE – In France, the black lists are integrated in article L121-1-1 Code de la Consommation for
misleading commercial practices, and article L122-11 Code de la Consommation for aggressive
commercial practices.
D. Scheme
BLACK LIST
(ANNEX I)
SMALL GENERAL PROVISION
SMALL GENERAL PROVISION
MISLEADING COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
AGGRESSIVE COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
MISLEADING ACT
(ART. 6)
(ARTT. 8 AND 9)
MISLEADING OMISSION
(ART. 7)
GRAND GENERAL PROVISION
(ART. 5, PAR. 1)
23
III.
Lack of harmonization
26.
Absence of a contractual remedy at the European level – As mentioned, article 5 of the
UCPD prohibits unfair commercial practices. The European legislator however decided to leave the
enforcement and establishment of remedies to the member states. No (full) harmonisation took place
and since this – factual – complete liberty for the member states, a wide range of enforcement regimes
occurred in the EU.185 The directive only prescribes in general terms that member states shall ensure
that adequate and effective means exist to combat unfair commercial practices in order to enforce
compliance with the provisions of the directive in the interest of the consumer. Furthermore, it states
that penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive (art. 11 and 13 UCPD).186 According to
these provisions, member states are thus free to provide either for administrative, private or criminal
law sanctions.187 In no way the UCPD excludes the introduction or use of particular remedies, nor
does it impose any subsidiarity between certain kinds of enforcement.188
The only remedy provided for at European level, is the action for injunction. From the consumers’ point
of view, this remedy is however not satisfactory since it only affects the future, and does not
compensate the harm suffered.189 Furthermore, a claim based on national tort law will rarely succeed
because of the heavy burden of proof. Criminal sanctions such as a fine and imprisonment are once
again not in favour of the consumer. Although the UCPD does not require the introduction of individual
rights for the consumer190, it would be very useful for the consumer if the use of an unfair commercial
practice by a business would affect the validity of his contract, completely or partially while it must be
emphasised that unfair commercial practices materially distort the economic behaviour of the
consumer and thus affect his free consent.
Some of the member states established already a contractual remedy in case of the use of an unfair
commercial practice.191 This contribution will address those remedies as provided for in the legislation
of Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and France.
IV.
Comparison with directive 93/13/EEG concerning unfair terms
27. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ARE NON-BINDING – When it comes to contractual remedies related to
aspects which are harmonised at European level, one might in the first place make reference to the
185
M.F.H. BROEKMAN, “De Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken”, TvC 2005, (175) 181, nr. 5; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R.
STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC,
Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 45; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair
commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, vol. 2, (233) 273; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair
Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J.
STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 17.
(conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/elibrary/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf); W.H. VAN BOOM, “Inpassing en handhaving van de Wet oneerlijke
handelspraktijken”, TvC 2008, (4) 6; D.W.F. VERKADE, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten, Monografieën BW
B49a, Deventer, Kluwer, 2009.
186
M.F.H. BROEKMAN, “De Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken”, TvC 2005, (175) 181, nr. 5; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way
forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, vol. 2, (233) 272, nr. 50; W.H. VAN BOOM,
“Inpassing en handhaving van de Wet oneerlijke handelspraktijken”, TvC 2008, (4) 6.
187
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 56, nr. 45.
188
D.W.F. VERKADE, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten, Monografieën BW B49a, Deventer, Kluwer, 2009.
189
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 56, nr. 45.
190
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 56, nr. 45.
191
Overview: F. HENNING-BODEWIG, Die Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten:
Bestandsaufnahme, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil (GRUR Int) 2010, p. 273 et seq.
24
Eine
remedy as may be find in the European directive concerning Unfair Terms in B2C-contracts192, namely
that unfair contract terms are not binding for the consumer (art. 6 UTD). The effectiveness and
deterrent character of the UTD-remedy is striking. Certainly the evolution in the consumer-friendly
jurisprudence of the CJEU where the national judge has the obligation to control the content of the
contract and assess the fairness of a term of its own motion193, supports the effective enforcement of
the legislation and thus makes sure the 'just social balance' can be reached.
28. DRAWING AND USE OF CONTRACT TERMS AS A COMMERCIAL PRACTICE – Given the wide
interpretation of the concept ‘commercial practice’ it is clear that the drawing up of, the information
about and the use of (non-negotiated) contract terms is considered a commercial practice in the sense
of the UCPD. (Non-negotiated) contract terms are obviously established with a purpose to promote
the sale or supply of goods and services, and by consequence the use of a contract term is directly
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product, as required in the definition of ‘commercial
By
practice’, since those terms influence directly the transactional decisions of the consumer.
means of contract terms, expression is also given about what the consumer has been informed about
The
by the trader, and what reasonable expectations a consumer might have about the transaction.
fact that the use of contractual terms creates the existence of a commercial practice has also been
confirmed by the CJEU.197
29.
UNFAIR
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE BASED ON A CONTRACT TERM DOES NOT AFFECT DIRECTLY THE
- Recently the CJEU judged in the case Pereni ová and Pereni (2012) 198
about the relationship between unfair commercial practices and unfair contract terms. In the
Pereni ová and Pereni -case two consumers had signed a consumer credit standard agreement with
SOS finance. The agreement contained a term in which an annual percentage rate of charge lower
than the real rate was mentioned. The Court judged that the use of such a contract term was in the
first place to be considered a commercial practice. Even more, as an unfair misleading commercial
practice in the sense of article 6(1)(d) UCPD. This article provides namely that a commercial practice
is regarded as misleading if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful or in any way,
including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer in relation to one
or more of the elements listed in article 6(1) and in either case causes or is likely to cause him to take
a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.
VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT
192
Council directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ, L 096, 21 April 1993, 29-34.
193
CJEU C-240/98 - C-244/98, Océano Grupo, 2000; CJEU C-473/00, Cofidis, 2002; CJEU C-168/05, Elisa María Mostaza
Claro, 2006; CJEU C-429/05, Max Rampion, 2007; CJEU C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Györfi, 2009;
CJEU-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, 2009; CJEU C-227/08, Eva Martín Martín, 2009; CJEU C-484/08, Caja de
Ahorros, 2010; CJEU C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, 2009; CJEU C-453/10, Jana Pereni ova, Vladislav Pereni , 2012; CJEU
C-742/10, Invitel, 2012; CJEU C-618/10, Banco Español, 2012; CJEU C-475/11, Banif Plus Bank, 2013; CJEU C-415/11,
Mohamed Aziz, 2013; CJEU C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb AG, 2013; CJEU C-397/11, Erika J rös, 2013; CJEU C-32/12, Soledad
Duarte Hueros, 2013.
194
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Het gebruik van oneerlijke of intransparante bedingen als oneerlijke, misleidende of agressieve
handelspraktijk", TvC 2011, issue 4, (138) 138, nr. 1; B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair
commercial practices?”, EJCL 2013, issue 2, (233) 242, nr. 16. B. KEIRSBILCK, "The interaction between consumer protection
rules on unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices: Pereni ová en Pereni ", CMLRev. 2013, issue 50, 247-263.
195
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Het gebruik van oneerlijke of intransparante bedingen als oneerlijke, misleidende of agressieve
handelspraktijk", TvC 2011, issue 4, (138) 139, nr. 5; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke
handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 452, nr.4.
196
P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen in Bibliotheek handelsrecht larcier. Mededinging, handelspraktijken en intellectuele
rechten, 9, Gent, Larcier, 2009, 84, nr. 100.
197
CJEU C-453/10, Jana Pereni ova, Vladislav Pereni ,2012 and the jurisprudence concerning the broad definition of
'commercial practice': CJEU C-261/07 and C-299/07, VTB-VAB, 2009; CJEU C-304/08, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, 2010;
CJEU C-540/08, Mediaprint, 2010; CJEU C-288/10, Wamo, 2011; CJEU C-265/12, Citroën Belux NV, 2013; CJEU C-391/12,
RLvS Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013.
198
CJEU C-453/10, Jana Pereni ova, Vladislav Pereni [2012], nr. 20.
25
Furthermore, the question raised whether the finding of a commercial practice, based on the use of a
contract term, affected the existence or validity of the contract. The Court started its reasoning by
stating that for the assessment of the fairness of a contract term by a national court, all circumstances
attending the conclusion of the contract have to be taken into account (art. 4(1) UCPD). The mere fact
that an unfair commercial practice occurred, is however only one of the elements a national court can
take into account while assessing the unfairness of the contract term, and does not lead automatically
to the conclusion that the contract term is unfair as well. 199 There is thus no direct connection between
both elements, but an indirect connection is nonetheless present. By consequence of this, the finding
of an unfair commercial practice, based on the use of a contract term, can also not directly affect the
validity of the contract by causing the ‘non-binding’ remedy in accordance with article 6 UTD. 200 Only
an indirect effect is possible.
According to the opinion of Advocate-General TRSTENJAK, the absence of any direct link between the
finding of an unfair commercial practice and the validity of the contract is obvious, given the provisions
of the UCPD. Article 13 UCPD obliges the member states to lay down penalties for infringements of
national provisions adopted in application of the UCPD and requires they take all necessary measures
to ensure that those provisions are enforced. In the view of AG TRSTENJAK, this provision can however
not be interpreted as the ability for the member states to establish a penalty consisting a contractual
term being declared invalid following an unfair commercial practice, as article 3, par. 2 UCPD provides
that he directive is without prejudice to contract law, and in particular, to the rules on the validity,
formation or effect of a contract. To reason otherwise, would, in his opinion be clearly inconsistent with
the purpose of the European legislator not to regulate contract law by the UCPD.201 It is however, in
my opinion, rather doubtful whether this view is correct. In the first place, the CJEU has not explicitly
repeated this consideration in its judgement. Secondly, if no contractual remedy might be established
by the national legislators within the framework of the implementation of article 13 UCPD, it makes it
very difficult to fulfil their obligation to provide for effective, proportional and deterrent remedies to
enforce the provisions of the UCPD. Finally, it is certain that a commercial practice can indirectly affect
the validity of a contract by way of the application of the non-binding remedy of article 6 UTD. In
accordance with the view of the Advocate-General, this seems also contrary to the stringent
separation between the law on unfair commercial practices on the one hand, and contract law on the
other hand, he pleads to hold on.
V.
Contractual remedies in the law on unfair commercial practices
§1
[Belgium] Contractual remedy of article VI.38 CEL
1.
General analysis
30. In 2007, at the moment of the implementation of the UCPD in the Belgian national law, the
legislator opted for the introduction of a particular civil law remedy in case an unfair commercial
practice has led to the conclusion of a B2C-contract. The remedy was introduced because of the
finding by the legislator that the doctrine of the vices of consent was inadequate and not consumer
friendly enough in case a consumer concluded a contract following an unfair commercial practice. The
aim of the legislator was thus to provide a presumption according to which the consent of the
consumer was vitiated whenever he contracted a business which infringed the prohibition to commit
unfair commercial practices.202
199
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 61, nr. 53.
200
CJEU C-453/10, Jana Pereni ova, Vladislav Pereni [2012], nr. 42-46.
201
CJEU C-453/10, Jana Pereni ova, Vladislav Pereni [2012], opinion of GA TRSTENJAK, nr. 111.
202
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 468, nr. 32; B. KEIRSBILCK, "De private handhaving van de WMPC in het licht van het gemeen recht" in A. DE BOECK, S.
26
At present, this remedy can be found in article VI.38 CEL which reads as follows:
“Where a contract with a consumer has been concluded following an unfair commercial practice referred to
in article VI.100, 12°, 16° and 17°, and article VI.103, 1°, 2° and 8°, the consumer may, within a
reasonable period from the time when he was aware or should have been aware of its existence, demand
the reimbursement of the amounts paid, without returning the product delivered.
Where a contract with a consumer has been concluded following an unfair commercial practice referred to
in articles VI.93 to VI.95, VI.100, 1° to 11°, 13° to 15°, 18° to 23° and article VI.103, 3° to 7° the court may,
without prejudice to the penalties under general contract law, order the reimbursement to the consumer of
the amounts he has paid without returning the product delivered.
In cases of unsolicited supply to the consumer, within the meaning of article VI.103, 6° the consumer shall
in any case be exempted from payment of the price or the provision of any other consideration, the
absence of a response not constituting consent.”
31. B2C – It is important to notice that the remedy provided for in article VI.38 CEL only applies in
case of a B2C-contract. KEIRSBILCK wonders why the legislator did not opt for the application of the
remedy (although KEIRSBILCK is in general not in favour of this remedy) in case an unfair commercial
practice led to a B2B-contract and an infringement of article VI.104 CEL occurred.203
32. UNCLEAR DIVISION – The division between the six blacklisted unfair commercial practices which
are subject of paragraph 1 and the residual category of unfair commercial practices (amongst other
also blacklisted practices) to which paragraph 2 applies, is not justified. In the Explanatory
Memorandum no reason can be found for this distinction.204 According to KEIRSBILCK it would have
been more logic to apply the same remedy for all blacklisted commercial practices, as they are all of a
similar gravity.205 Moreover the author warns that judges will not pay attention to the ‘strange’ division
and will apply the remedy quasi-automatic even if none of the unfair practices enumerated in
paragraph 1 occurred, but a paragraph 2-situation is present.206
A. Paragraph 1 – Obligatory reimbursement without return of the product delivered
33. SIX BLACKLISTED UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES – Article VI.38, par. 1 CEL refers to the
following six blacklisted unfair commercial practices:
Article VI.100, 12° CEL: making a materially inaccurate claim concerning the nature and extent of the
risk to the personal security of the consumer or his family if the consumer does not purchase the
product.
STIJNS, R. VAN RANSBEECK and I. SAMOY (ed.), Knelpunten in het buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht in Leerstoel
professor Constant Matheeussen, 7, Brugge, Die Keure, 2013, (94) 1; J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN, "Recente ontwikkelingen
inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en Economisch recht in Themis. School voor
postacademische juridische vorming, 51, 2008-2009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 76, n° 63.
203
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 469, nr. 33.
204
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 41; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de
Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 468, nr. 31; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian
Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series,
WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science,
(http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
205
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 468, nr. 31.
206
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 469, nr. 33.
27
Article VI.100, 16° CEL: claiming that products are able to facilitate the winning in games of chance
Article VI.100, 17° CEL: falsely claiming that a product is able to cure illnesses, dysfunction or
malformations
Article VI.103, 1° CEL: creating the impression that the consumer cannot leave the premises until a
contract is formed
Article VI.103, 2° CEL: conducting personal visits to the consumer’s home ignoring the consumer’s
request to leave or not to return, without prejudice to the laws or regulations authorising this with a view
to enforcing a contractual obligation
Article VI.103, 8° CEL: creating the false impression that the consumer has already won, or will win,
whether or not by accomplishing a formality, a prize or other equivalent benefit, when in fact either
there is no prize or other equivalent benefit, or accomplishing any formality in relation to claiming the
prize or other equivalent benefit is subject to the consumer paying money or incurring a cost
34. IN THEORY: NO JUDGE – In case a consumer concluded a contract with a business following the
infringement of the abovementioned provisions, he may demand the business to reimburse the
amounts he paid, without the returning of the product delivered. Remarkable in this provision is the
aim of the legislator to apply this remedy without the intervention of a judge.207 Although this might
seem to reinforce the efficiency of the remedy, KEIRSBILCK remarks that the factual reimbursement of
the paid sums will be dependent on the goodwill of the business and their commercial policy.208 If the
business refuses to comply with the request of the consumer, the latter will however be obliged to
address to the court.209
35. IN THEORY: NO DISCRETIONARY POWER FOR THE JUDGE – In court, the judge will however have no
discretion power to apply the remedy or not, if all conditions for the application are met.210 Even if the
consumer is the defendant in legal proceedings (e.g. the business sues the consumer for the nonpayment of the delivered products), he can put forward article VI.38 CEL and the judge will have to
apply this remedy.211
36. WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD – The consumer has to demand for the reimbursement within a
reasonable period from the time when he was aware or should have been aware of the existence of
the unfair commercial practice. This requirement causes without doubt some interpretation problems
207
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 40; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de
Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 467, nr. 31; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian
Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series,
WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science,
(http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
208
C. DELFORGE, “Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l’égard des consommateurs” in N. THIRION (red.),
Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Liège, Anthémis 2010, 39; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B.
KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41
WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 40.
209
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 467, nr. 31.
210
A. DE BOECK, “De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en de
algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder” in De nieuwe bepalingen in de Handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele,
2007, 37-40; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in
België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 41; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil
Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?”
in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press,
2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/elibrary/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf)
211
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
28
since it is, in the first place, unclear which term can be considered as ‘reasonable’.212 It would have
been preferable if the legislator specified this term. Moreover, it will be difficult for the consumer to
prove at which time he knew about the existence of the unfair commercial practice, or to determine at
which moment in time the consumer should have known an unfair commercial practice occurred.
Contrary to what has been said before, the judge will still have some discretionary power at this point
and an in concreto assessment in thus not completely absent in case of the application of article VI.38,
par. 1 CEL. 213
37. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF 5 YEARS - The CEL does not provide for a particular period of
prescription, nor an expiration term, thus the general law prescriptive period of 5 years is applicable.214
B. Paragraph 2 – Possible reimbursement without return of the product delivered
38. DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE JUDGE – Article VI.38, par. 2 CEL provides that in case the
consumer concluded a contract with a business following the infringement of the general clause or the
small general clauses concerning misleading and aggressive practices215, or the blacklisted practices
which are not enumerated in paragraph 1, the court may order the reimbursement to the consumer of
the amounts he has paid without returning the product delivered. As opposed to the first paragraph of
article VI.38 CEL, the court is thus not obliged to order the reimbursement of the paid sums without the
return of the delivered product(s).216 As a consequence, the judge has discretion to decide whether or
not to comply with the claim of the consumer.
39. MODULATION OF THE REMEDY - The judge may even modulate the private remedy, taking into
account the concrete circumstances of the case.217 Article V.38, par. 2 CEL contains however no list of
elements or circumstances which might be taken into account by the judge. In view of legal certainty,
212
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 467, nr. 31; A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele
relatie en de algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe bepalingen
in de handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 30; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ,
Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische
uitgevers, 2011, 40; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer:
an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political
Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk
management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf); E. TERRYN,
"Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken" in G. STRAETMANS, J.
STUYCK and E. TERRYN (red.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, 84.
213
C. DELFORGE, “Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l’égard des consommateurs” in N. THIRION (red.),
Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Liège, Anthémis 2010, 39.
214
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 40.
215
DELFORGE explains that also infringes of the ‘semi-general provisions’ (art. VI.97-99 and VI.101-102 CEL) fall under the
scope of art. VI.38, par. 2 CEL, although this provision does not contain an explicit reference to those articles. Given the fact
that art. VI.38 CEL refers to the provisions VI.93-95 CEL, there is reference to article VI.94 CEL which prohibits unfair
commercial practices which are misleading or aggressive (C. DELFORGE, “Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des
entreprises à l’égard des consommateurs” in N. THIRION (red.), Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du
consommateur, Liège, Anthémis 2010, 38).
216
C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION,
Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 38, n° 32; P.G.F.A.
GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie
van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 41; H. JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des
consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.), Les pratiques du marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le
concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles, Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 96, n° 29; B.
KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451)
468, nr. 31; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010, 63, n° 82;
J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN, "Recente ontwikkelingen inzake handelspraktijken" in H. COUSY and J. STUYCK (ed.), Handels- en
Economisch recht in Themis. School voor postacademische juridische vorming, 51, 2008-2009, Brugge, Die Keure, (51) 76, n°
63.
217
R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010, 66, n° 85.
29
the uniform application of the remedy by the national courts and by consequence the equality of
consumers this is regrettable and a plea for such a list has already been made in literature.218
According to the doctrine, circumstances which might be taken into account are, for example, the
gravity of the infringement, the degree to which the behaviour of the consumer was influenced, the
financial implications of the infringement for the consumer and, last but not least, the proportionality of
the remedy with regard to the damages suffered by the consumer.219 In this manner, the judge may
order for example only a partial reimbursement of the paid sums.220 This is in fact equal to a price
reduction.221
According to several Belgian authors, the judge will be less severe in case an infringement occurs of
the (small) general provisions, than in case an infringement of a blacklisted unfair commercial practice
occurred. This might be justified by the fact that for the former category it is unpredictable for the
business whether or not the judge will conclude the practice was unfair. In case of a blacklisted
infringement, no real assessment takes place anymore.222
40. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE REMEDIES OF CONTRACT LAW – It is remarkable that only paragraph 2
of article VI.38 CEL provides that its remedy is without prejudice to the remedies under general
contract law.
C. Paragraph 3 – Unsolicited supply
41. SUPPLY WITHOUT DEMAND - Article VI.103, 6° CEL, which is a blacklisted aggressive unfair
commercial practice stating that it is prohibited for a business to demand for immediate or deferred
payment for, or the return or safekeeping of products supplied by it, but not solicited by the consumer.
If this happens, the consumer is exempted from any payment and from any other consideration. The
consumer becomes even the owner of the product.223
218
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 43.
219
H. DE BAUW, De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument in Handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen,
Kluwer, 2008, 140-142; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia,
2010, 66, n° 85.
220
A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en de
algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de
handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 39; C. DELFORGE, “Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à
l’égard des consommateurs” in N. THIRION (red.), Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur,
Liège, Anthémis 2010, 38; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken:
praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 41; B.
KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451)
468, nr. 31; R. STEENNOT, "Overzicht van rechtspraak consumentenbescherming 2003-2007", TPR 2009, issue 1, (229) 395, n°
212; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf); R. STEENNOT and P.
GEERTS, "De implementatie van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België en Nederland", TPR 2011, issue 3, 754, nr.
106; E. TERRYN, "Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken" in G.
STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (red.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, 82-84.
221
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 49.
222
H. DE BAUW, De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument in Handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen,
Kluwer, 2008, 140-142; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a
Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and
Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 19. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk
management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
223
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 39; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and
D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010, 64, n° 84.
30
42. NO TACIT ACCEPTANCE - Furthermore it is provided that the absence of any response of the
consumer does not constitute his consent. A tacit acceptance in thus not accepted. Even if the
business sent an accompanying letter, informing that the absence of any protest stands for the
acceptance of their offer, no implicit acceptance can take place.224
2.
Reimbursement of paid sums without return of the products delivered
43. PARTICULAR VOIDANCE - The remedy of article VI.38 CEL constitutes in fact the relative nullity of
a B2C contract. The most remarkable deviant element is nonetheless the absence of the obligation for
the consumer to return the products he received.225
44. REIMBURSEMENT AND RETURN OF THE PRODUCTS – In case of a sales contract which has been
completely performed, the business is obliged to reimburse the sums already paid by the consumer. In
case no payment was made yet, the consumer is released from his duty to pay the purchased
products.226 By contrast, the consumer does not have to return the products to the business if they
were delivered yet. In case the products were not delivered yet, the question arises whether the
business still has to deliver the product or not. According to KEIRSBILCK, the business still has the duty
to perform the contract and thus still has the obligation to deliver the goods which were the subject of
the B2C-contract.227 STEENNOT and GEERTS answer the question in the negative. If the business has
not yet delivered the goods purchased, or performed the service for which a contract was concluded,
the consumer cannot demand for the supply or performance of the contract without payment.228
STEENNOT refers hereby to the preliminary work about successive services. In case of a services
contract for long duration or a services contract which provides for a performance spread in time, the
reimbursement of what has been paid, takes place, but only the performed services are ‘acquired’.
The consumer cannot claim the further performance of the contract.229
224
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 39; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and
D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010, 65, n° 84.
225
A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en de
algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de
handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 38; C. DELFORGE, “Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à
l’égard des consommateurs” in N. THIRION (red.), Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur,
Liège, Anthémis 2010, 39; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (20072012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 468, nr. 32; E. TERRYN, "Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting van de
richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (red.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008,
Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, 82.
226
R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010, 65, n° 85.
227
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 468, nr. 32.
228
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 44, voetnoot 41; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil
Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?”
in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press,
2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/elibrary/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
229
EM, Parl.St. Kamer, doc; 51, 2983/001, 38.
31
3.
Causal link and the burden of proof
A. Interpretation of the causal link
45. ‘FOLLOWING’ – In accordance with article VI.38 CEL it is necessary that the contract was
concluded following the unfair commercial practice(s).230 If not, the private law remedy cannot be
applied. The question arises what kind of causality is required and needs to be proved by the
consumer. The parliamentary proceedings make clear that a connection between the establishment of
the contract and the unfair commercial practice is needed.231
46.
(1) WITHOUT THE UCP NO CONTRACT WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED - According to Minister VAN
DEN BOSSCHE232 it is required that without the unfair commercial practice, no B2C-contract would have
been established.233 DE BOECK and TERRYN state that a mere breach of the provisions concerning
unfair commercial practices is not sufficient. The word ‘following’ requires in their opinion that a vice of
consent has to be present as a consequence of which a common law nullity of the contract is
established.234 In case of a vice of consent, the contract is also only null if the vice of consent was
decisive.235 If a consumer would have contracted even without the occurrence of the unfair commercial
practice, the contract can impossible be null.
47. (2) LESS STRINGENT INTERPRETATION OF THE CAUSALITY REQUIREMENT - STEENNOT argues in
favour of a less stringent interpretation and states that no actual causality needs to be proved between
the occurrence of the unfair commercial practice and the establishment of the contract. It is,
conversely, sufficient to demonstrate on the one hand that the unfair commercial practices provision
was breached and on the other hand that a B2C-contract was established.236 In his opinion the
provisions concerning unfair commercial practice require by no means that a vice of consent is
decisive to conclude a contract.237 The only requirement that is stated is that the consumer takes (or
was likely to take) another transactional decision which he would not have taken otherwise.238 The
230
C. DELFORGE, "Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l'égard des consommateurs" in N. THIRION,
Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Luik, Anthemis, 2010, (7) 38, n° 31; H.
JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.), Les pratiques du
marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles,
Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 96, n° 29.
231
EM Act of 5 June 2007, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2006-07, n° 2983/001, 38.
232
Minister FREYA VAN DEN BOSSCHE, the then Minister of Budget and Consumer Affairs.
233
Report on behalf of the Commission for business, research policy, education, national scientific and cultural institutions, the
self-employed and the agriculture made by Mrs. Magda De Meyer belonging to the Bill on the amendment of the Act of 14 July
1991 on Trade Practices and Consumer Information and Protection, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2006-07, n° 2983/004, 9.
234
A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en de
algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de
handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 39; E. TERRYN, "Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting
van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (red.), De wet handelspraktijken anno
2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, 83-84.;
235
A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en de
algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de
handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 30; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ,
Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische
uitgevers, 2011, 42. E. TERRYN, "Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting van de richtlijn oneerlijke
handelspraktijken" in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (red.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer,
2008, 83-84.
236
R. STEENNOT, "Overzicht van rechtspraak consumentenbescherming 2003-2007", TPR 2009, issue 1, (229) 394, n° 212.
237
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 42.
238
R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, "De implementatie van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België en Nederland", TPR
2011, issue 3, 754-756, nr. 107-108; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen,
Intersentia 2010, 67.
32
mere fact that the consumer would have contracted under other conditions, is sufficient.239In respect of
the aforementioned theory, supported by DE BOECK and TERRYN, he even points out that cases in
which the unfair commercial practise was decisive to conclude a contract, are rather rare.240 According
to this theory, the only case in which the remedy of article VI.38 CEL cannot be applied is the case in
which the consumer has in no way been influenced by the unfair commercial practice while taking a
transactional decision.241
Again, in view of the legal certainty, the equality between consumers and the uniform application of
this provision, it would have been better that the legislator integrated a provision which makes clear
how to interpret the requirement of the causal link.242
B. Burden of proof
48. ART. VI.38, PAR. 1 AND 2 CEL – Since the CEL does not provide in a particular provision
concerning the burden of proof when article VI.38 CEL applies, one must look at article 870 Judicial
Code which provides that parties must provide evidence of the facts which they allege.243. The
consumer has thus to prove the infringement of one of the provisions concerning unfair commercial
practices, the establishment of a contract, and the causal link between both elements.244
To provide this proof is without doubt very difficult for the consumer. In the less stringent and more
consumer friendly view (Supra nr. 47), STEENNOT actually reasons starting from a rebuttable
presumption that the contract was established due to the infringement of the unfair commercial
practices provisions245 and transfers the burden of proof to the business. According to him, the latter
will have to demonstrate that no causality between both elements exists.246 In a contribution of 2012,
STEENNOT however writes that the transfer of the burden of proof to the business is difficult to make
239
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 20. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
240
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 19. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
241
R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, "De implementatie van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België en Nederland", TPR
2011, issue 3, 754-756, nr. 107-108.
242
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 43.
243
H. DE BAUW, De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument in Handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen,
Kluwer, 2008, 141; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)",
SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 468, nr. 32.
244
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 43; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in
Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D.
PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press,
2012, (17) 18. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/elibrary/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
245
R. STEENNOT, "Overzicht van rechtspraak consumentenbescherming 2003-2007", TPR 2009, issue 1, (229) 394, n° 212; R.
STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet Marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, Intersentia 2010, 67.
246
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 43; S. CLAEYS, Overeenkomsten met
consumenten in T. HEREMANS, De nieuwe wet marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming: volledig overzicht van oud en
nieuw, Brussel, Larcier, 2010, 67; A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de
contractuele relatie en de algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe
bepalingen in de handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 39; R. STEENNOT, "Overzicht van rechtspraak
consumentenbescherming 2003-2007", TPR 2009, issue 1, (229) 394, n° 212.
33
and concludes with the finding that, as long as the legislator does not explicitly prescribes that the
burden of proof is with the business, the consumer will have to deliver the proof.247
49. ARTICLE 16 CEL – Question arises whether article XV 16 CEL is applicable in the context of
article VI.38 CEL. STEENNOT, GEERTS and KEIRSBILCK allege that is not the case. Article 16 CEL
provides
“The Minister or the official appointed by him pursuant XV.2 may ask a business to provide proof
concerning the substantive accuracy of the factual data it communicates in the context of a commercial
practice.
The business shall provide proof concerning the substantive accuracy of these data within a maximum
period of a month.
If the proof required under the first subparagraph is not provided or is deemed to be insufficient, the
Minister or the official appointed for this purpose may consider the commercial practice to be contrary to
the provisions of this Chapter”.
This arrangement concerning proof does however not apply within the framework of proceedings,
brought before civil court and with the request to apply the civil law remedy of article VI.38 CEL.248
50. IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION – Some authors put forward a more (extra) consumer friendly
suggestion, namely to transfer the burden of proof to the business on the basis of the introduction of a
irrebuttable presumption of a vice of consent in case of an unfair commercial practice.249 This
suggestion is however completely contrary to general contract law, where the existence of a vice of
consent has to be proved, by all legal means, witness and presumptions included.
51. ART. VI.38, PAR. 3 CEL – The burden of proof with regard to an unsolicited supply, is completely
different. In that case it is sufficient for the consumer to allege that he never ordered the supply of the
goods or services.250 It is up to the business to proof that the consumer did order them.251
4.
The contractual remedy of article VI.38 CEL in practice
52. NON-APPLICATION IN BELGIUM – A research for the application of the contractual remedy of article
VI.38 CEL, the former article 41 MPCPA, has resulted in the conclusion that the remedy has so far
247
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL en M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business
and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 20. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and
Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
248
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 43; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de
Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 468, nr. 32.
249
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 468, nr. 32.
250
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 19. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
251
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 19. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf.
34
never been applied before court.252 According to this research, several causes might be enumerated
to declare this non-use.253
In the first place, the fact that lots of businesses prefer to settle their dispute with a consumer outside
the court. Secondly, the conditions for the application of article VI.38 CEL are rather unclear (Supra
assessment elements, reasonable time, causal link, burden of proof). Certainly the doubts about the
burden of proof as described above, are far from an incentive to ask for the application of the remedy.
Thirdly, there are in general few cases brought before court by consumers for infringements of unfair
commercial practices. Consumer disputes often concern rather limited amounts, so there might be an
absence of proportionality with regard to the fees of the lawyer. Furthermore there is the risk for the
consumer to pay the procedural costs if he loses the lawsuit. Finally, it is also remarkable that the
remedy is little known by consumers254 and even lawyers. Partially by the lack of ‘promotion’ by the
FPS Economy and consumer associations, but also partially caused by the illogical location of the
remedy in the CEL, and former MPCPA.
5.
Evaluation: effective, proportional and deterrent
53. DETERRENT AND DISPROPORTIONAL – Without doubt the remedy of article VI.38 CEL is deterrent
for businesses.255 Therefore, the proportionality of the private remedy is doubtless questioned in
literature.256 Especially when the remedy is applied in a non-modulated way as prescribed in
paragraph 1 of the article, concerning the six therein enumerated unfair commercial practices, it
seems disproportionate.257 By contrast, in case paragraph 2 is applied, the judge still has the ability to
modulate the sanction to make sure the sanction is adapted to the occurred infringement. The fact that
a consumer does not have to return the products delivered or is exempted from his obligation to pay
the delivered products, makes him to acquire a better position than when he had not concluded a
contract at all. Some authors state that the non-return of the products stands for the receipt of
damages which have actually nothing to do with the damage caused by the unfair commercial
practice.258 Especially when the infringement of the general clause did not cause actual damage to the
interests of the consumer, the reimbursement without restitution of the delivered products seems to be
252
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 469, nr. 34.
253
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 8.
Read also: R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, "De implementatie van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België en
Nederland", TPR 2011, issue 3, 758, nr. 111; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial
Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M.
PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 21. (conference: Advances
in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI01.pdf).
254
VAN DEN BERGH, “Consumentenrecht” in De economische analyse van het recht, Den Haag, Boom, 200, 137.
255
EM, Parl.St. Kamer doc 51, 2983/001, 38; B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in
België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11, (451) 469, nr. 33.
256
Report on behalf of the Commission for business, research policy, education, national scientific and cultural institutions, the
self-employed and the agriculture made by Mrs. Magda De Meyer belonging to the Bill on the amendment of the Act of 14 July
1991 on Trade Practices and Consumer Information and Protection, Parl.Ch. Sess. Ord. 2006-07, n° 2983/004, 9.
257
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 45.
258
C. DELFORGE, “Les pratiques commerciales déloyales des entreprises à l’égard des consommateurs” in N. THIRION (red.),
Actualités en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Liège, Anthémis 2010, 39.
35
excessive.259 For the business, the reimbursement of the paid sums, without receiving the delivered
product back, means in fact that he has delivered a good or service for free.260
In the general law of obligations, remedies such as the nullity of a contract, the dissolution of a
contract or damages based on tort law, all have a ‘compensatory’ character, while the remedy of
article VI.38 CEL is very punitive for the business.261 Furthermore the proportionality is questioned
because the remedy can be applied without prejudice to the common contract law remedies and
criminal penalties as provided for in the CEL. 262 Also TERRYN means the remedy is ‘draconic’.263 One
might furthermore not forget that many infringements within the framework of unfair commercial
practices are caused by negligence in which case a deterrent remedy has without doubt no effect.264
Reference can also be made at this point to the CHS Tour Services-case where the CJEU decided
that a business had committed an unfair misleading commercial practice, despite its good faith and
precautionary measures consistent with the requirements of professional diligence.265
At the time the UCPD was implemented into the Belgian legislation and the private remedy was
discussed in parliament, sir LANO266 suggested to link the legal effect of the common ‘nullity’ to the
sanction of, now, article VI.38 CEL and not keep the disproportionate right for the consumer to retain
the delivered products. 267 The amendment was however rejected.
54. PROPORTIONAL? – According to STEENNOT, the remedy has to be put into perspective.268 In the
first place, the cases in which the remedy has to be applied automatically, are limited. Besides, those
six commercial practices only occur rarely, given the fact they are easily formulated in law and it is
thus clear for the businesses not to commit an infringement.269 Most of the infringements, concern the
‘residual category’ as referred to in paragraph 2, and are thus subjected to the discretionary
259
H. JACQUEMIN, "Les pratiques déloyales à l'égard des consommateurs et des entreprises" in L. DE BROUWER (ed.), Les
pratiques du marché: une loi pour le consommateur, le concurrent et le juge in Collection de la Conférence du Jeune Barreau
de Bruxelles, Brussel, Larcier, 2011, (71) 97, n° 29, footnote 134.
260
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 54.
261
P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met
de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011, 54.
262
B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011,
413. See also: E. TERRYN, "Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken"
in G. STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (red.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, 82-84; C.
DELFORGE, “Les pratiques commerciales déloales des entreprises à l’égard des consommateurs” in: N. THIRION (red.), Actualités
en matière de pratiques du marché et protection du consommateur, Liège, Anthémis 2010, 39.
Read also: A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele relatie en
de algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe bepalingen in de
handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 38; R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, "De implementatie van de richtlijn
oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België en Nederland", TPR 2011, issue 3, 759, nr. 112.
263
E. TERRYN, "Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken" in G.
STRAETMANS, J. STUYCK and E. TERRYN (red.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, 82.
264
Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, 362.
265
CJEU C-435/11, CHS Tour Services GmbH v. Team4 Travel GmbH [2013]. J. STUYCK, “Misleiding door een
reclameboodschap die buiten het toedoen van de adverteerder onjuist is”, DCCR 2014, to be published.
266
Amendment nr. 1 of sir Lano, Parl. St. Kamer 2006-2007, doc 51, 2983/004, 1.
267
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 469, nr. 32.
268
R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, "De implementatie van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België en Nederland", TPR
2011, issue 3, 757, nr. 110.
269
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 20. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
36
assessment power of the judge.270 Secondly, in case of high value goods, it is possible to avoid the
application of the severe sanction and to avoid that a consumer benefits unjustified advantages, by
applying general principles of contract law such as ‘the abuse of rights’. This principle might lead to the
moderating of excessive damages to the business, e.g. the right of non-return of the products
delivered, might be changed into the right to only pay part of the price.271 Thirdly, there is the adage ‘in
pari causa turpitudinis cessat repetition’. In case of nullity of the contract, the judge may – on the basis
of ‘in pari causa’ exempt the consumer from his duty to return the products delivered to his contract
party, the business.272 Furthermore, STEENNOT argues that private enforcement is needed beside
public enforcement. Criminal sanctions are often not applied in case an unfair commercial practice
occurs because priority policy and warning procedures are not deterrent enough.273
Though KEIRSBILCK states the remedy is disproportionate, he agrees with STEENNOT that deterrence is
needed to make sure businesses respect provisions of mandatory law protecting the interests of
consumers. It is especially important to make sure the costs which result from the violation of the law,
exceed the benefits of the infringement, taking into account the risk that the remedy is applied. 274
55. EFFECTIVENESS – As mentioned above, the contractual remedy is rarely applied in practice due
to several factors. To guarantee the effectiveness of the remedy, is it certainly needed that consumers
(and lawyers) are informed about the existence of the remedy.275 Without doubt, also certain
substantive adaptations of the remedy are required. Thinking about the explanation of some
application conditions and the clearance of the (burden of proof of the) causal link.276 Furthermore, the
rather limited possibilities for a consumer to proceed make the existent remedies lose their
effectiveness. Without doubt, the development and extension of the scope of (online) alternative
dispute resolutions might reinforce the effectiveness of the remedies provided for with regard to unfair
commercial practices.
270
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 20. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
271
Cass. 6 January 2011, Pasicrisie 2011/1, 44; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial
Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M.
PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 20. (conference: Advances
in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI01.pdf).
272
Antwerp 1 June 2004, NJW 2005, 801; Ghent 7 December 2005, NJW 2006, 854; Ghent 26 May 2004, Jb.Hand.Med. 2004,
373, noot De Vroede; A. DE BOECK, "De nieuwe bepalingen in de Wet Handelspraktijken en hun relevantie voor de contractuele
relatie en de algemene contractvoorwaarden in het bijzonder" in A. DE BOECK and Y. MONTANGIE (red.), De nieuwe bepalingen
in de handelspraktijkenwet, Brugge, Vandenbroele, 2008, 37-38; ; R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair
Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J.
STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 20.
(conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management, Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/elibrary/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
273
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 21. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
274
B. KEIRSBILCK, "Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-2012)", SEW 2012, issue 11,
(451) 469, nr. 33; STEENNOT refers to BECKER, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of Political Economy
1968, 169-217; VANDEN BERGH, “Should consumer protection la be publicly enforced?” in Collective enforcement of Consumer
Law, Europa Law Publishing, 2007, 196-198.
275
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 22. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
276
R. STEENNOT, “The Belgian Civil Remedy in Case of an Unfair Commercial Practice Towards a Consumer: an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction?” in D. PAVELKOVa, J. STROUHAL and M. PASEKOVA, Law and Political Science in
Business and Economics Series, WSEAS Press, 2012, (17) 22. (conference: Advances in Economics, Risk management,
Political and Law Science, (http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2012/Zlin/EPRI/EPRI-01.pdf).
37
§2
[The Netherlands] Contractual remedy of article 6:193j DCC
56. REJECTION OF THE AMENDMENT VOS - In the Netherlands, the adoption of a similar provision as
article VI.38 CEL was discussed in parliament, but the proposed amendment of Mrs. Vos had been
rejected in 2007.277 Minister BALLIN, the then minister of Justice, agreed however with a research
concerning the experience with the remedy in Belgian law of the then article 41 MPCPA (now article
VI.38 CEL).
57.
ACT OF 12 MARCH 2014: CONTRACT IS VOIDABLE – Very recently the Dutch legislator changed
his mind. By the Act of 12 March 2014, which implements the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU,
an important paragraph 3 was added to article 6:193j DCC, providing: “A contract, concluded following
an unfair commercial practice, is voidable”.278 LOOS describes the new provision as ‘a welcome
addition’ while up to now it was possible for a business to claim the performance of a contract by the
consumer, while the contract was concluded following the infringement of the provisions concerning
unfair commercial practices.279 A claim for damages by the consumer was possible, but very hard to
realise because of the heavy burden of proof concerning the damage. Contrary to the amendment of
mrs. Vos and the remedy as known in Belgian law, this provision does not exempt the consumer from
his obligation to return the products delivered. The traditional legal consequences of nullity are thus
applicable.
The consumer will however still have to prove the ‘causal link’ between the unfair commercial practice
and the conclusion of the contract. LOOS suggests to introduce a reversal of the burden of proof
towards the business.280 At least for practices enumerated in the blacklists this should be applied,
because the causal link is obvious in those cases, according to LOOS.281
§3
[The UK] Rights to redress in the CPR
58. RIGHTS TO REDRESS CP(A)R 2014 - Until recently, a consumer had no private right of action
granted by the UK legislation in case he concluded a contract following an unfair commercial practice.
The Regulations concerning unfair commercial practices were only enforceable by the enforcement
authorities, such as the OFT.282 As in Belgium and the Netherlands, there were also pleas in the UK to
give a consumer a right of redress in case he became a victim of misleading or aggressive commercial
practices. By the CP(A)R of 2014, this right of redress became reality. A right to unwind the
transaction (1) or to receive a discount on the price (2) are now established.
59. SCOPE - Regulation 3 CP(A)R inserts a new ‘Part 4A’ (Reg. 27A to 27L CPR 2008) into the CPR
2008 concerning the consumers’ right to redress. This part provides that a consumer has a right to
277
Kamerstukken II, 2007-2008, 30928, nr. 12; P.G.F.A. GEERTS, H.B. KRANS, R. STEENNOT and A.J. VERHEIJ, Oneerlijke
handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC, Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers,
2011, 10.
278
Act of 12 March 2014 on the adaptation of Book 6 and 7 of the Civil Code, the Act enforcement of consumer protection and
some other acts concerning the implementation of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and repealing Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council; M.
LOOS, ‘Onvolkomendheden bij de implementatie van de richtlijn consumentenrecht”, Nederlands Juristenblad 2013, issue 38,
(2684) 2684.
279
M. LOOS, ‘Onvolkomendheden bij de implementatie van de richtlijn consumentenrecht”, Nederlands Juristenblad 2013, issue 38,
(2684) 2684.
280
M. LOOS, ‘Onvolkomendheden bij de implementatie van de richtlijn consumentenrecht”, Nederlands Juristenblad 2013, issue 38,
(2684) 2684
281
M. LOOS, ‘Onvolkomendheden bij de implementatie van de richtlijn consumentenrecht”, Nederlands Juristenblad 2013, issue 38,
(2684) 2684.
282
F. HENNING-BODEWIG (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 617, nr. 33.
38
redress if (a) the conditions in the CPR 2008 are met, and (b) the conditions (if any) in the provisions
of Part 4A for the availability of the right to redress are met. At first, regulation 27A CPR stipulates the
scope of Part 4A. In general a B2C-contract, C2B-contract or a consumer payment has to be present.
The application to contracts, other than B2C-contracts, is remarkable and extends the scope of the
section significantly. Furthermore, the trader must have engaged in a prohibited practice in relation to
the product. It must be emphasised that by a ‘prohibited practice’ is meant: a misleading action as
under regulation 5 or an aggressive practice as described under regulation 7 (Reg. 27B CPR). The
rights to redress are though not applicable to misleading omissions as described in regulation 6. As a
third condition the regulation provides that the prohibited practice must have been a significant factor
in the consumer’s decision to enter into the contract or make the payment.
1.
Right to unwind the contract
60. RIGHT TO UNWIND THE CONTRACT – Regulation 27E CPR provides that in respect of a B2Ccontract, the consumer has the right to unwind his contract if he indicates to the trader that he rejects
the product, and does so (a) within the relevant period of 90 days283 and (b) at the time when the
product is capable of being rejected. If a good or the digital content has been fully consumed, the
service has been fully performed, the leas has expired or the right has been fully exercised, no
rejection is possible anymore (Reg. 27E (8) CPR). The consumer has however no right to unwind his
contract if he has exercised the right to a discount in respect of that contract and the same prohibited
practice (Reg. 27E (10) CPR).
61. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHT TO UNWIND – If a consumer has unwind his contract, the contract
comes to an end and both consumer and trader are released from their obligations. The trader has the
duty to give the consumer a refund and, if the contract was wholly or partly for the sale or supply of
goods, the consumer must make the goods available for collection by the trader. This means that if the
consumer has paid money under the contract or transferred anything else, he is entitled to receive this
back. If something cannot be given back, the consumer is entitled to be paid the market price as at the
time when the product was rejected (Reg. 27F CPR).
2.
Right to a discount
62. RIGHT TO A DISCOUNT – A consumer has the right to a discount in case of a B2C-contract, if (1)
the consumer has made one or more payments for the product to the trader or one or more payments
under the contract have not been made, and (2) the consumer has not exercised the right to unwind
the contract (Reg. 27I, (1) CPR). Depending on whether the prohibited practice was ‘more than minor’,
‘significant’, ‘serious’ or ‘very serious’, the percentage of the payment the consumer is entitled to
receive back, is respectively, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% (Reg. 27I, (4) CPR). The CPR provides that the
seriousness of the prohibited practice is to be assessed by reference to the behaviour of the person
who engaged in the practice, the impact of the practice on the consumer and, the time that has
elapsed since the prohibited practice took place. Furthermore regulation 27I, (6) CPR provides for
some exceptions concerning the aforementioned assessment criteria. More important is the last
provision stating that the application of the regulation concerning the right to a discount does not affect
any of the other rights and liabilities under contract (Reg. 27I, (8) CPR).
3.
Right to damages
63. RIGHT TO DAMAGES –In case a consumer has incurred financial loss, or has suffered alarm,
distress or physical inconvenience of discomfort which he would not have incurred or suffered if the
283
More details about the beginning of this period can be found in Reg. 27E (3) till (7) CPR.
39
prohibited practice in question had not taken place, regulation 27J CPR provides for a right to
damages. If the occurrence of the prohibited practice was however due to a mistake, reliance on
information supplied to the trader by another person, the act or default of a person other than the
trader, an accident or another cause beyond the trader’s control, the consumer will not have the right
to damages if the trader took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the
occurrence of the prohibited practice. It is up to the trader to proof this conditions are fulfilled.
§4
[France] Contractual remedies in the Code de la Consommation
64. AGGRESSIVE COMMERCIAL PRACTICES - In France article L.122-15 of the Code de la
Consommation stipulates since 2008 that the contract is null and has no effect when the consumer
was influenced by an aggressive commercial practice.284 The sanction does, by consequence, clearly
not apply in case a misleading commercial practice occurred, which is contrary to the remedy we see
in Belgium and the Netherlands, and partially equal to the situation in the UK, were only misleading
omissions are excluded from the rights to redress (Supra nr. 59).
65. ABUS DE LA FAIBLESSE – Recently the Act of 17 March 2014 was established. This act
implements in essence the Consumer Rights Directive into the France national law285, but more
important for this contribution is the modification by its article 130-VII, 2° of article L.122-8 of the Code
de la Consommation. Article L.122-8 Code de la Consommation concerns the prohibition of ‘l’abus de
la faiblesse’ or ‘the abuse of weakness’. This concept considers in the first place the situation in which
a business has convinced a consumer, after visiting him at home, to contract, thereby abusing the
weakness or the ignorance of the consumer. This weakness or ignorance might concern the higher
age, weaker health conditions or bad understanding of the language of the consumer. The weakness
might be physical, moral or economical. Article L.122-9 Code de la Consommation extends however
the scope of the section concerning the abuse of weakness. For example, when a consumer was
contacted by phone or received a personal request to go to the business premises for receiving gifts or
discounts, the provisions are also applied.
Since the Act of 17 March 2014, a fifth paragraph was inserted in article L.122-8 Code de la
Consommation. From now on, also a contractual remedy is available in case a contract has been
concluded following the abuse of weakness. Paragraph 5 namely provides that this contract is null and
has no effect. The same remedy thus applies as when a contract was concluded following an
aggressive commercial practice.
VI.
Contractual remedies in general contract law
[To be researched] Vices of consent / Dissolution / Price reduction / Damages
284
[France] - Article L122-15 Code de la Consommation: "Lorsqu'une pratique commerciale agressive aboutit à la conclusion
d'un contrat, celui-ci est nul et de nul effet." Inserted by article 39 of the Act ‘Loi n°2008-3 du 3 janvier 2008.
285
Loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation. Known as « loi Hamon ».
40
VII.
Conclusion
The wide scope of the UCPD and the use of a rather abstract concept of the ‘average consumer’,
while still having an eye for the ‘average consumer of a group’ and the more ‘vulnerable consumer’ are
without doubt elements which contribute to social justice. Social justice within the framework of the
enforcement of unfair commercial practices, means however also the establishment of effective,
deterrent and proportional remedies by which consumer protection can really be guaranteed.
This far, one might conclude to a tendency within the EU member states to provide for a contractual
remedy in case a contract was concluded following the use of an unfair commercial practice. Belgium,
the Netherlands, the UK as well as France provide for a (certain) nullity of the contract, the right to
unwind the contract or receive a price reduction, in general on top of the right to claim for damages
and the application of common contract law remedies.
As to consumers, it is definitely a good choice to establish a contract law remedy. It seems ‘fair’, or
better ‘just’, to punish the wrongdoer for the fact he made a consumer conclude a contract he did not
want to. But especially, it is important that the contract is “in the past” and no performance by the
consumer can be claimed anymore by his contracting party. As to the businesses, there are however
some serious doubts about the proportionality of a contractual remedy if no restitution obligation is
imposed to the consumer as we see in Belgium. On the other hand, the common law nullity with
restitution obligations for both parties, might be less deterrent for the businesses to avoid those
committing unfair commercial practices because they have rarely something to lose.
The fact that the establishment of remedies within the doctrine of unfair commercial practices is left to
the member states, results once more in fragmentation of the legislation within the European Union. It
is clear that a large fragmentation of the law and the diversity as, for example of the conditions for the
application of all those remedies, leads to ineffectiveness, uncertainty and inequality among the EUconsumers. All contra-ingredients to reach ‘social justice’. One might thus plead for a contractual
remedy at European level. Without doubt, the establishment of a European contractual remedy for
unfair commercial practices leads to a significant interference in national contract law, but in
comparison with the unfair terms directive and its obligation towards the member states to make sure
unfair B2C terms are non-binding, a harmonised contractual remedy for unfair commercial practices
would perhaps be not as shocking as put forward. Certainly, if the use of an unfair contract term is
seen as a commercial practice, and might (not rarely) constitute the unfairness of the commercial
practice itself, it is strange to find that an unfair term can have direct influence to the validity of the
contract, at least to the validity of the term as such, and an unfair commercial practice cannot.
41