Abortion
Vaughn Ch. 7
History
Historically, abortion has been a controversial
issue.
• Abortion and euthanasia are forbidden in the
Hippocratic oath (written 400 BCE) –p253
• Aristotle recommended abortion “before life
and sense have begun” for families with too
many children. –p253
2
History
Vaughn claims the Hebrew and Christian
scriptures do not denounce abortion, citing
Exodus 21.
Whether those scriptures prohibit abortion is
too difficult a question for here
Vaughn’s interpretation is too quick, and it is
not well done. 3
History
Vaughn leaves out crucial information that provides context.
He says:
“Exodus 21:22 says that if a man causes a woman to have a
miscarriage, ‘but [she] is not harmed in any other way,’ the
penalty is just a fine.” –p253
But, the passage actually says:
“And if men struggle with each other and strike a woman with
child so that she has a miscarriage, yet there is no [further]
injury, he shall surely be fined …” -NASB
Does Vaughn’s version seem equivalent?
Might there be serious translation questions?
4
History
Aquinas believed the “ensoulment” of a fetus
happened in stages. At conception life is
• vegetative, then it develops
• lower sensitive life,
• more advanced sensitive life, etc.,
until, at 40 days for males (90 days for females),
God directly imparts a rational soul to the
fetus.
So, while Aquinas says abortion is always wrong,
it is only murder after 40 days for males, 90
days for females
http://www.pregnancy.org/fetaldevelopment
For a scholarly
discussion of
Aquinas on
abortion, see
link
5
http://www2.franciscan.edu/plee/aquinas_on_human_ensoulment.htm
History
“In English Common Law, abortion was
considered a crime only if performed after
quickening …” –p253
Quickening =df historically, when the mother
can detect movement initiated by the fetus
(20 weeks gestation)
http://www.pregnancy.org/fetaldevelopment
Anima = Latin, ‘breath’; anemos = Greek,
‘wind’
‘Animal soul’ is the principle of self-motion
So, a fetus is ‘quickened’ when it receives or
develops the power of self-motion, an animal
soul (9 weeks gestation, though not detectable
by the mother)
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http://www.pregnancy.org/fetaldevelopment
history
In England, Henry de Bracton, who lived at the same
time as Aquinas, affirmed the killing of a fetus after
quickening was murder.
But “practically every” major legal writer thereafter
claimed it was not murder “at common law.” (see link
below)
Not until the early 1800s did England have a law saying
abortion of a quickened fetus was murder, punishable
by death. (see link below)
7
http://law.jrank.org/pages/445/Abortion-Abortion-in-English-law.html
Warning: unsure of
quality of source
Definitions
“Abortion is the ending of a pregnancy.” –p255
What’s
wrong
here?
Spontaneous abortion or miscarriage = abortion due to
birth defects or injury.
Induced abortion = intentional abortion
Therapeutic abortion = intentional abortion for the life
or health of the mother
8
Roe vs. Wade
Roe vs. Wade is the landmark court case begun in Texas
between Norma McCorvey (Jane Roe), and Texas
(represented by the Dallas County District Attorney Henry
Wade)
Based on a disputed right to privacy found in the 14th
Amendment, the Supreme Court determined abortion
should be
• legal by choice in the first trimester,
• restricted by therapeutic concerns in the second trimester,
• restricted by therapeutic needs in the third
9
Arguments
1. Who has the burden of proof in the battle over
abortion rights?
2. Standing presumption?
3. Who asserted first?
4. What does ‘conservative’ mean in this argument?
5. What does ‘liberal’ mean here?
10
argument 1
Vaughn’s first “conservative” argument:
Killing Innocents Argument (p258):
1. The killing of an innocent human being is wrong;
2. the unborn is an innocent human being;
3. therefore, it is wrong to kill the unborn
What does Vaughn find wrong with this argument?
Which fallacy does he think is committed?
11
argument 2
Vaughn presents this argument as an improvement of
Argument 1:
Killing Innocent Persons Argument (p258-259):
1. The killing of an innocent person is wrong;
2. the unborn is an innocent person;
3. therefore, it is wrong to kill the unborn
For Vaughn, what’s wrong with the argument?
Which premise is disputed?
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Noonan's defense of
argument 2
Receipt of genetic code is what makes someone a
“human” or “man” (the equivalent of a person):
Noonan’s Argument: “It is this genetic information
which:
1. determines his characteristics
2. is the biological carrier of the possibility of human
wisdom
3. makes him a self-evolving being.” –John C. Noonan
(see Vaughn, p259, fn 5)
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non-sequitur response
to noonan?
Vaughn’s Response to Noonan’s argument is to reject sorites
arguments (p259).
We can think of a sorites argument as a fallacy, an Argument
to the Heap (soros means heap in Greek):
•
•
•
•
•
How many grains of rice does it take to make a heap?
Is two enough? No?
Three? No.
Can you ever get a heap by adding one grain? No?
Then you can never make a heap!?
Was Noonan’s argument an argument to the heap?
What did Noonan argue exactly?
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Better response to
noonan?
Warren’s Response: Mary Ann Warren argues that the
conceptus, or fertilized ovum,
“cannot be identified with the embryo … because it is a mass of
undifferentiated cells, any of which could give rise to an
embryo…. This “pre-embryo” may spontaneously divide,
resulting in twins or triplets; alternatively, it may combine with
another pre-embryo giving rise to a single fetus.” (see Vaughn,
p259, top right)
Does this argument show pre-embryos are not persons in
Noonan’s sense, or that we can’t tell which part is a person
or persons? Both? Neither?
Is the use of “spontaneously” question begging?
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Devine’s defense of
argument 2
Devine’s Defense: Philip Devine provides a defense of
valuing adults and fetuses the same:
1.
2.
3.
What makes it wrong to kill someone is the stealing of their
future (their potential?)
But a fetus has a future no less than an adult
So, killing a fetus is wrong for the same reason killing an
adult is wrong (supplied conclusion) (see Vaughn, p259, fn 7)
Does a fetus have a future the way an adult has a future?
16
Is Devine's argument a
potentiality argument?
Vaughn characterizes Devine’s argument as a
“potentiality argument”:
“A common response to this potentiality argument is that
there is a world of difference between (1) possessing a
particular trait that gives you a right and (2) having the
potential to develop a trait that gives you that right. p259
Is that a fair characterization of Devine’s argument?
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potentiality
arguments
If someone argues,
1. only persons have rights
2. fetuses are potential persons
3. therefore, fetuses have rights
they will be susceptible to Warren’s and Tooley’s criticisms:
• potential persons are not persons
• having the potential to drive at 18 years old does not give
you a right to drive when you’re 12
But did Devine ever claim such a thing?
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personhood
Is merely being a human being, a member of Homo Sapiens, sufficient for
personhood?
Vaughn says, to think so is to be guilty of a prejudice called speciesism.
• The liberal argues that since the properties that make us persons
could be exhibited by non-humans, merely being a member of the
human species cannot be sufficient for personhood.
• And speciesism is a “close cousin to racism.” –p260 (bottom)
Is this right?
Isn’t the conservative position that being Homo Sapiens is sufficient, but
not necessary, for personhood?
That leaves open the possibility that other species are persons too, right?
Speciesism avoided?
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personhood
Warren lists features she thinks “most central” to personhood:
1. consciousness and capacity for feeling pain
2. reasoning
3. self-motivated activity
4. capacity to communicate
5. self-concepts, and self-awareness, individual, racial, or both
Warren thinks any being missing all of those “is certainly not
a person.” -p260
What about someone in a coma?
Vaughn mentions the mentally impaired, who may lack all 5.
Are they not persons? Can they be killed? …
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personhood
The liberal admits their view of personhood makes killing the
hopelessly mentally impaired or vegetative permissible.
Nonetheless, we protect them for other reasons: because
• their families care about them
• uncertainty about their mental status
• concern to avoid a general devaluing of life –p261
Wouldn’t the last reason, especially, also be a reason to
prohibit abortion?
21
personhood
2 reasons for why the liberal position does not justify
infanticide:
1. infants are “very close” to being persons
2. social utility (we, by nature, love babies, and killing
them would coarsen us, and it is wrong to coarsen
society) –p261
Does that sound like a sufficient account of what would
be wrong with killing a baby?
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personhood
Between conservative and liberal views, Vaughn mentions moderates.
Moderates view personhood as appearing somewhere during fetal
development:
1. brainwaves
2. viability
3. gradually on a scale of increasing personhood –p261
Vaughn seems to view these are arbitrary.
Is there anything specially relevant about brainwaves or viability?
Is the gradual development position reasonable?
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rights
Judith Jarvis Thompson argues that even if we grant fetuses person
status, their rights do not necessarily trump the rights of others.
Read p262, the example of the violinist.
What abortion case is this similar to?
Michael Tooley
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Judith Jarvis Thompson
Rights
Consider Michael Tooley’s argument based on an analysis of rights:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
to have a right you must be the kind of thing that can have an
interest (the newspaper has no right not to be torn up because it
has no interest in not being torn up … isn’t the kind of thing can
can be interested in not being torn up)
to have an interest in something, you must desire it
fetuses cannot have an interest in continued existence because
they cannot desire it
fetuses cannot desire continue existence because they cannot
have a concept of themselves existing in the future (because they
cannot form the concept of a self at all)
therefore, the unborn (and some infants), have no right to
continued existence (see Tooley, p316)
Can a fetus form a concept of itself existing through time?
Is such an enduring self necessary for personhood?
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