Rational Engagement, Emotional Response,
& the Prospects for Moral Progress
in Animal Use Debates
Ethicists have increasingly turned their attention to moral
questions about the treatment of non-human animals.
Arguments from a range of perspectives have been given for
the conclusion that routine uses of animals in agriculture, the
fashion industry, and experimentation are morally wrong.
Defenses of these practices, however, have been far fewer,
and generally less developed, than the cases in favor of
animals.
My aim in this presentation is to encourage development of
stronger arguments in favor of animal use and provide
methodological guidance on how to do so.
Nathan Nobis
For Animal Research in Theory & Practice,
ed. Jeremy Garrett, Rice, Philosophy
Harms & Moral Justification
• Many fields and occupations involve
harming animals, making them worse off.
– ‘Animals’ = for our purposes, mammals &
birds; least controversial cases for discussion.
• Typically, people in these fields will agree
that animals are being harmed.
• They claim, however, that these harms are
morally justified: not all harms are wrong,
and these harms aren’t wrong (indeed,
perhaps some are morally obligatory).
Common experimental
procedures include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
drowning,
suffocating,
starving,
burning,
blinding,
destroying their ability to
hear,
• damaging their brains,
• severing their limbs,
• crushing their organs
• inducing
– heart attacks,
– cancers
– ulcers
– paralysis,
– Seizures
• forcing them to inhale
tobacco smoke, drink
alcohol, and ingest various
drugs, such as heroine and
cocaine.
A few commonly overlooked
observations about harm:
(1) “Painless” killing can be
(and often is) harmful for
the one who is killed; it is
bad for him/her.
– Why? They are
deprived of whatever
goods they would have
experienced. No
interests can be
satisfied.
Thus, the common “if
‘painlessly killed,’ then
‘humane’, so nothing
morally objectionable”
views need defense.
(2) Recent ethological
research shows that just
being in a laboratory, and
undergoing routine
procedures, is stressful
(and thus harmful) for
animals.
Balcombe JP, Barnard ND, Sandusky C, “Laboratory
routines cause animal stress,” Contemporary Topics in
Laboratory Animal Science, 2004, Nov, 43 (6):42-51
Abstract: Eighty published studies were appraised to document
the potential stress associated with three routine laboratory
procedures commonly performed on animals: handling, blood
collection, and orogastric gavage . . .
Significant changes in physiologic parameters correlated with
stress . . were associated with all three procedures in multiple
species in the studies we examined.
The results of these studies demonstrated that animals responded
with rapid, pronounced, and statistically significant elevations
in stress-related responses for each of the procedures . . .
We interpret these findings to indicate that laboratory routines are
associated with stress, and that animals do not readily
habituate to them. The data suggest that significant fear, stress,
and possibly distress are predictable consequences of routine
laboratory procedures, and that these phenomena have substantial
scientific and humane implications for the use of animals in
laboratory research.
Balcombe JP, “Laboratory environments and
rodents’ behavioural needs: A review,” Laboratory
Animals (in press)
Abstract: Laboratory housing conditions have significant physiological
and psychological effects on rodents, raising both scientific and
humane concerns. Published studies of rats, mice and other rodents
were reviewed to document behavioural and psychological problems
attributable to predominant laboratory housing conditions.
Studies indicate that rats and mice value opportunities to take cover,
build nests, explore, gain social contact, and exercise some control
over their social milieu, and that the inability to satisfy these needs
is physically and psychologically detrimental, leading to impaired
brain development and behavioural anomalies (e.g., stereotypies). To
the extent that space is a means to gain access to such resources,
spatial confinement likely exacerbates these deficits. Adding
environmental “enrichments” to small cages reduces but does not
eliminate these problems, and I argue that substantial changes in
housing and husbandry conditions would be needed to further reduce
them.
Many ethicists have argued that it’s wrong to use
animals these ways; they’ve given reasons for
their views and defended them:
• utilitarianism and other consequentialisms,
• rights-based deontologies,
• ideal contractarianisms (“veil of ignorance,”
“Golden rule” ethics),
• virtue ethics,
• “common-sense” (“least harm,” “needless harm”)
moralities,
• religious moralities, feminist ethics,
• and more: indeed almost every major, influential
perspective in moral theory.
Even Kant’s, Rawls’, and other moral theories
have been modified to be friendly to non-rational
moral patients (not moral agents):
• Improve the theory so there are direct
duties to baby (& other ‘non-rational’ &
powerless humans : she’s of moral value
not because others care about her,
despite her
not being a
moral agent,
rational, etc.
If the theory is now not Bad for Baby
(and other vulnerable humans),
it is now not Bad for Animals?
Thus, an abundance of ethical
resources in defense of animals.
• However, this hasn’t made much of a
difference in thought or deed regarding uses
of animals.
– Possible explanations:
• big changes are always slow; trickle-down is slow…
• philosophers (and other thinkers and authors)
typically just aren’t very influential,
• personal, financial, legal, political, institutional
barriers to doing the right thing,
• ???
A competing explanation:
• There are strong arguments that morally
justify (much of) the current treatment of
animals.
– Since these arguments are strong / sound / very
reasonable to accept, the defenses of animals are weak /
unsound / unreasonable.
• I’m going to suggest that this explanation is
unlikely, because these arguments are weak.
– I encourage development of more and stronger arguments in favor
of, defending, animal use and provide methodological guidance on
doing so.
Emotional responses
to moral issues:
“It sometimes appears
that the quality of our
thought on a topic is
inversely proportional
to the intensity of our
emotions concerning
that topic.”
-- Fred Feldman, Confrontations
With the Reaper: A Philosophical
Study of the Nature and Value of
Death (Oxford, 1994).
Rational engagement
of moral issues:
• Identify some past instances of “moral progress”
in thought, attitude, & deed:
– Hopefully, rational evaluation of arguments contributed
to this, somewhat!
• We can identify some basic “logical skills” that
can help us improve the quality of our thought.
– Apply these “skills” to some recent arguments made by
scientists and philosophers regarding animals.
– This is important because it seems that not enough
people consistently use these skills; this is not good.
Formerly “controversial”
issues and simple arguments:
• “Women shouldn’t be allowed to go to
university because women are so emotional
that abstract thought is so difficult for
them.”
• "Slavery is morally right because we slaveowners benefit greatly from slavery."
• "Since animals are not rational, it's morally
ok to raise them to be killed and eaten."
These are arguments; what are their faults?
Women (1)
• Conclusion:
– “Women shouldn’t be allowed to go to university.”
• Why think that?
– “Women are such emotional beings that abstract
thought is difficult for them.”
• Imprecise! ‘SOME’? or ‘ALL’?
– “Some women are so emotional that abstract thought is
difficult.” [True, and true for some men!]
– “All women are so emotional …” [False, empirically
indefensible claim, so unsound argument]
Women (2)
(1) “Some women are so emotional that abstract
thought is difficult.” [True, and true for some
men!]
(2) “Therefore, [no] women should be allowed to go
to university.”
But how do you get from (1) to (2)? What’s the
missing linking premise?
A question: How would some women’s
“emotionality” justify restricting educational
opportunities from all women? Not clear.
Women (3)
• However, even if some or even all women
are so “emotional” and have difficulty with
“abstract thought” why would that justify
denying any women the opportunity to
“improve themselves” through education?
• “If my cup won't hold but a pint, and yours holds a
quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have my
little half measure full?”
• Sojourner Truth, “Ain't I A Woman?” 1851
Slavery
"Slavery is morally right because we slave-owners
benefit greatly from slavery.“
(1) Slave-owners benefit from slavery. [True]
(C) Therefore, slavery is morally right. [?]
-------------------------------------------------------------How do you get from (1) to (2)?
What’s the missing, assumed linking premise?
(1) Slave-owners benefit from slavery. [True]
(2) If some group benefits from some
arrangement, then that arrangement is right. ?
(3) Therefore, slavery is morally right.
Animals
"Since animals are not rational, it's morally ok to
raise them to be killed and eaten.”
(1) “Animals are not rational.”
(2) Therefore, it’s OK to kill them…
Observations and questions:
(A) (1) is imprecise: some, or all, animals are not
rational? Which animals?
(B) Ambiguity, lack of clarity: what is meant by
‘rational’?
(C) ‘Missing-link’ premise needed to make argument
logically valid: ‘If a being is not ‘rational’, then it’s
ok to kill it.’ [False?]
“Logical skills”: The (moral)
value of basic predicate logic
• Attending to the intended meanings of
unclear or ambiguous words:
– what do you mean?
– ‘animal,’ ‘human’, ‘being human’, ‘human
being’, ‘person’, ‘human person’, ‘humanity’
• Precision regarding #, quantity: some, all?
• Assumed, unstated premises that link stated
reason(s) to conclusion. (Logical validity).
It seems these “logical skills”
are generally useful.
A bioethicist disagrees about the value of
these skills for professional ethics:
“Frankly, science students would have very
little patience for the abstract
argumentation and reasoning that one
finds in your paper and is standard fare in
philosophy journals.”
Apply these (& other) logical skills
to some recent arguments:
• Scientists
– Stuart Derbyshire, Ph.D., U
Birmingham UK (used to
be at Pitt); pain researcher.
– Mark Mattfield, Ph.D.,
Research Defense Society,
UK
– Colin Blakemore, Ph.D.,
Medical Research Council,
UK
– Adrian Morrison, Ph.D.,
DVM, U Penn, sleep
disorders
• Philosophers
– Carl Cohen
– Neil Levy, “Cohen &
Kinds: A Response to
Nathan Nobis,” JoAP)
– Tibor Machan, Putting
Human’s First
– Matthew Liao, “Virtually
All Human Beings as
Rightholders: A NonSpeciesist Approach”
The issue needn’t be whether
animals have ‘rights’:
• Moral or legal rights?
• Which moral rights? (be specific)
• ‘Rights’ conflicts: ‘right’ to smoke, ‘right’ to a smoke-free
environment
– ‘Rights’ appeals can conceal details.
• Common invalid argument:
– ‘If animals have rights, then serious change is needed.
But they don’t have rights, so change isn’t needed.’
– Logically invalid – conclusion doesn’t follow – and
avoids the concrete questions.
The issue needn’t be whether
animals have ‘rights’:
• Better to consider
– (1) whether various (specific) uses of animals
are morally permissible or not, whether any
ways of treatment are morally obligatory and
– (2) why or why not.
• Keep this the focus on these ‘deontic’ categories
is helpful for many practical and theoretical
reasons.
The issue also needn’t be whether
animals are “equal” to humans:
• Are any animals “equal” to humans? Are all
humans “equal”? Hard to answer:
– What is meant by “equal”? Not obvious.
– Which humans, which animals? (What is meant by
‘humans’ and ‘animals’?). (fetus, baby, adult, 100 y/o?)
• Common invalid argument; avoids the concrete
questions.
– ‘If animals are ‘equal’ to humans, then serious change
is needed. But they aren’t equal, so change isn’t
needed.’
– “Equal consid.” vs.“No consid.”vs. “mid-level” consid?
• Again, ideal Q’s are about moral permissibility.
Objection: An abundance of resources
is a philosophical embarrassment?
• “Many philosophers argue that animals are
treated wrongly, but disagree on why (e.g.,
Peter Singer ‘demolishes’ Tom Regan and
Regan ‘demolishes’ Singer). Therefore,
there is no justification for thinking that
animals are treated wrongly.”
– Adrian Morrison; Richard Vance, JAMA
A parallel argument:
• Many thinkers argue that animals are not
treated wrongly, but disagree on why (e.g.,
Carl Cohen ‘demolishes’ Jan Narveson &
Narveson ‘demolishes’ Cohen). Therefore,
there is no justification for thinking that
animals are not treated wrongly.”
The false, unstated assumption:
• If you believe p, and for reasons X, Y, & Z,
but others believe p for reasons A, B, C, etc.
and these reasons are logically
incompatible (and you recognize this), then
either you have no (good) reason to believe
p or there is no good reason to believe p.
– At the very least, this principle isn’t one
typically accepted or universally applied (e.g.,
global warming is bad).
Appeals to evolution /
“biological perspectives”
• Morrison: “to refrain from exploring nature
in every possible way would be an arrogant
rejection of evolutionary forces.”
• “Evolution has endowed us with a need to
know as much as we can.” (Nicoll, Russell).
– “Humans evolved; therefore, morally we
should ….” Does not follow.
– Constraints on using other humans to advance
our own genetic line, when it’s in our interest?
Benefits Arguments /
Arguments from “Necessity”
• “animal experiments are vital to the future
well-being of humans and, as long as they
are conducted to high ethical standards, they
are entirely justifiable.” – Mark Matfield
– The argument: Benefits for humans justify
animal experimentation (and other uses)
– The are “necessary.”
Is animal use ‘necessary’? (1)
• Depends on what you mean by necessary.
• In one sense, yes!
– To do animal experiments, it is necessary to do
animal experiments. To make these exact
scientific discoveries using animals, it is
essential to use animals: if animals weren’t
used, the experiments would be different.
Is animal use ‘necessary’? (2)
• In other senses, perhaps not. Is animal necessary
for making medical progress and for, more
generally, bettering human welfare?
– “Necessary for the well-being of humans,” but which
humans? A few? (Maybe!). Everyone? Doubtful that
every human benefits from (every) animal experiment.
– There are other ways of bringing about goods for
humans:
• clinical research, epidemiology, in vitro research, uses of
technology, autopsies, prevention, etc.;
• feeding people, getting existing medical care to them, etc.. It’s
been argued that these would yield greater human utility.
Defenses of the low (human) utility
of animal experimentation
• RC Greek & N Shanks, Animal Research in Light
of Science (2006? Rodopi)
• N Shanks & LaFollette, Brute Science (Routledge
1997)
• RC Greek & J Greek [DVM], Sacred Cows &
Golden Geese (Continuum 2000), Specious
Science (2002), What Will We Do if We Don’t
Experiment on Animals? (2004)
• They argue that other methods of research are
more effective at addressing human needs.
Benefits argument:
1. Animal experiment yields [some] benefits.
2. If some action benefits someone (or some
group), then that action is right. [false; needs
refinement and serious defense]
3. Therefore, animal experimentation (and other
uses) are right.
What about direct harms (to animals, to humans, esp.
indirect harms from opportunity costs)? How are
these weighed? A careful methodology would be
nice, at least; is necessary for serious defense.
Want benefits?
“Whatever benefits animal experimentation is
thought to hold in store for us, those very same
benefits could be obtained through
experimenting on humans [esp. vulnerable
ones] instead of animals. Indeed, given that
problems exist because scientists must
extrapolate from animal models to humans, one
might think there are good scientific reasons
for preferring human subjects.”
– Philosopher Ray Frey
Why not use these humans?
Blakemore’s answer
• “The only firm line [to make moral distinctions] on genetic
and morphological grounds is between our own species
and other species.”
– Suggested: if something is of our species, then it is
more morally valuable than any animals.
• But he says a human “embryo, certainly before the nervous
system begins to develop, is just a bundle of cells.”
– Suggested : being of our species does not necessarily
confer moral value.
• “We should have a special attitude toward other humans,
so crucial to this argument is how we define a person.” He
did not do this.
Why not use these humans?
Derbyshire’s answer
• “Animals lack the capacity for reflection (and
therefore an inner world) and the capacity for
reasoning” (So do many humans!!)
• “It’s remarkable that we have to consider the
question.”
– Not remarkable if someone suggests that what’s
required for a presumption against harm are properties
that many, many human beings lack.
• “Society cares about vulnerable humans.”
– All of them? What about secret experiments? What if
they could be re-educated? Why do they care? (Harms)
Avoiding objections from
non-rational human beings.
• A common claim:
– It’s wrong to seriously harm a being only if
that being is rational, autonomous, makes
moral choices, is creative, intelligent,
contributes to society, etc.
• OK, animals aren’t like that, but neither are
lots of (conscious, feeling) humans. This
principle suggests it’s not seriously wrong
to harm them. Is this principle correct?
Some odd inferences:
Cohen, Levy & Kinds
• Cohen [NEJM]: Moral “rights” depend on moral
agency, the ability to respond to “moral claims.” A
being has rights only if it’s a of a kind
characterized by moral agency.
– Finnis: “to be a person is to belong to a kind of being
characterized by rational (self-conscious, intelligent)
nature.”
– Scanlon: “the class of beings whom it is possible to
wrong will include at least all those beings who are of a
kind that is normally capable of judgment-sensitive
attitudes.”
Cohen, Levy & Kinds
• Cohen: All humans are of a kind capable of
moral agency, but
– “[animals] are not beings of a kind capable
of exercising or responding to moral claims.
Animals therefore have no rights, and they
can have none.”
• What kind are animals? How are humans
who are not moral agents of the kind
“moral agent”? Cohen doesn’t explain.
Cohen’s possible answer?
• Humans who are non-moral agents are of this kind
because they are members of a set – e.g., the kind,
a species – some of which are moral agents.
– Response: But animals are also members of a set – e.g.,
the kind, sentient beings – some of whom are moral
agents also! They have rights too, on Cohen’s account!
• Humans and animals are of many kinds, some
overlapping, some not. Inconsistent conclusions
follow from Cohen-esque reasoning.
Levy’s attempt to find the right kind:
the “narrowest” natural kind
If (1) an individual A is a member of some
species S and (2) some, most or all of the
other members of that species have some
property C and (3), on the basis of having
property C, they have moral property R,
then individual A has moral property R as
well, even though A lacks property C.
If (1) an individual A is a member of some species S and (2)
some, most or all of the other members of that species have
some property C and (3), on the basis of having property C,
they have moral property R, then individual A has moral
property R as well, even though A lacks property C.
C = non-moral property
of "having done
no serious crimes”;
R= "not deserving life
imprisonment."
Implications for lone
criminal?
C= "intelligent" and
"aware“;
R= "being such that one
ought to be allowed to
make decisions to
direct one's own life."
Implications for young
children and others?
Machan’s Arguments from
What’s “Normal”
• A being has “moral rights” (presumably making it
wrong to harm it) only if it a “moral nature,” a
“capacity” to see the difference between right and
wrong and choose accordingly.”
• “It is this moral capacity that establishes a basis
for rights, not the fact that animals, like us, have
interests or can feel pain.”
• Humans are of the “kind” of being that have such
a moral nature and animals are not; thus humans
have rights and animals do not.
What about humans who seem
to lack this moral “capacity”?
• We must consider humans as they exist “normally,
not abnormally” and focus on the “healthy cases,
not the special or exceptional [or “borderline”]
ones.”
• “We do need to deal with borderline cases. But we
can do so only by applying and adapting the
knowledge we acquire from the normal case. We
can’t start with the exception and infer the rule.”
The suggested argument:
1. Humans who lack “moral capacities” are
human.[T!]
2. If someone is human, then they have all the
(moral) properties that ‘normal’, ‘healthy’,
typical humans have.
3. Therefore, these humans have moral capacities,
and so they have “rights.”
Reply: 2 is, at least, unsupported, and is an instance
of a generally false principle for moral & nonmoral properties. (e.g., 4 limbs; Ted Bundy)
Matthew Liao, “Virtually All Human Beings
as Rightholders: The Species-Norm Account”
• to be a rightholder (“a being with the highest
moral status”), something need not:
– be a moral agent
– have the potential to be a moral agent
– be of the kind (species) that normally is a moral
agent
– be actually sentient, conscious, etc. or even
have the potential, i.e., that it’s “possible” in
some sense
• Could be tinkered into a pro-animal exper. view.
The correct answer is…
A being has “rights” iff the entity has incorporated
into it the “genetic basis for the species capacity
for moral agency” (i.e. the relevant bits of DNA
that normally allow for moral agency) or the
functional equivalent thereof (e.g. software and/or
hardware that would normally allow for moral
agency in an artificial being). The “intrinsic value”
that resides in the relevant genetic bits “grounds”
rightholding even when that genetic material is
blocked from developing and cannot allow for
moral agency.
If X is like that, then X has “moral rights.”
Liao’s reasoning in
favor of the view, it seems:
(1) There are moral duties only if there are moral
agents. [T]
(2) There are moral agents only if there are beings
with the “genetic basis” for moral agency. [OK;
accept this for sake of argument]
(3) Therefore, there are moral duties only if there are
beings with the “genetic basis” for moral agency.
(4) Therefore (?), any being with the “genetic
basis” for moral agency is a ‘rightholder.’
A parallel argument:
(1) There are moral duties only if there are living
beings, or beings that can perceive, or …. [T]
(2) There are living beings, or beings that can
perceive only if there are beings with the
“genetic basis” for life, perception, etc. [OK]
(3) Therefore, there are moral duties only if there are
beings with the “genetic basis” for life,
perception, etc.
(4) Therefore (?), any being with the “genetic
basis” for life, perception, is a ‘rightholder.’
Objections [from Chris Grau, FIU]
• If the species-norm account is true, then:
– A cabbage that has "integrated" the relevant genetic bits
but is damaged such that the capacity for moral agency
is permanently blocked. (this cabbage has rights even
though it lacks moral agency and the potential for it.)
– A (future) computer with the relevant hardware.
software "integrated" but blocked. This computer has
rights even though it would lack both moral agency and
the potential for moral agency.
• Cabbage or computer vs. sentient animals and sentient
humans lacking the relevant genetic material for moral
agency?
• The species norm account seems entirely ad hoc.
Conclusions / Summary
• Presented a basic method for thinking about moral
issues; demonstrated its use; applied it to some
recent arguments defending current animal use
and/or criticizing pro-animal arguments.
• Suggested that these arguments are weak.
• My hope: since these methods are generally
useful, perhaps future defenders of current uses of
animals will utilize them for better arguments.
To make moral progress and contribute to
reasonable debate it is important that this is done.
For an overview of the recent literature on ethics and animals issues, see Angus
Taylor’s Ethics & Animals: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate (Broadview,
2003). For arguments from utilitarianism, see, among other sources, Peter
Singer’s Practical Ethics, 2nd Edition (Cambridge UP, 1993) and his Animal
Liberation, 3rd Edition (Harper, 2001) although the former is, strictly speaking,
not an argument from utilitarianism. From rights-based deontology, see, among
other sources, Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd Edition (U
California Press, 2004), as well as his more accessible Empty Cages: Facing the
Challenge of Animal Rights (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); for Rawlsian-style
ideal contractarianism, see among other sources, Mark Rowlands’ Animals Like
Us (Verso, 2002); from virtue ethics, see among other sources, Rosalind
Hursthouse’s Ethics, Humans and Other Animals (Routledge, 2000), from
common-sense morality, see, among other sources, Mark Bernstein’s Without a
Tear: Our Tragic Relationship With Animals (U Illinois Press, 2004) and David
DeGrazia’s Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2002); for
religious moralities, see, among other sources, Matthew Scully’s Dominion: The
Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (St. Martin’s,
2003); from feminism, see Carol Adams and Josephine Donavan (eds.) Beyond
Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals (Continuum,
1996).
Stuart Derbyshire,
an animal experimentation advocate:
• “It is not possible to advocate animal welfare
and at the same time give animals untested
drugs or diseases, or slice them open to test a
new surgical procedure. . .”
– The Scientist, 3/06, “Time to Abandon the Three Rs:
Submitting to ‘refinement, reduction, and replacement’ risks the future of animal research”
• “Once the perspective of the animal is adopted,
it is inevitable that all experimentation will be
seen negatively, as no animal experiments are
in the interest of the animal”
- “Why Animals’ Rights Are Wrong” (p. 39)