Grand Theories of International Security
The Twentieth Century
The Case for Theories of IR
• Every decision maker relies on theoretical
notions
• Bad theories lead to bad decisions
• Modern social science offers tools to help
distinguish bad theories from good ones
IR Theory: A Contested Field
• Normative vs. positive theory
• Role of political science
– Positivist vs. interpretivist
• Scope of Inquiry
– Micro vs. macro
• Behavioral assumptions
– Rationalist vs. psychological
Positivism --- Interpretivism
(epistemology)
Marxism,
systems theorists
Scientific
Rational choice
Anthropology of IR
Constructivism
Historians
Psychological
approaches
Positivism --- Interpretivism
(epistemology)
Standards for Scientific Theories
1. Define the variables
y = f (x1, x2, x3) + 
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
State assumptions (may be heuristic)
State the causal argument (mechanism)
Define the conditions (domain)
State the microfoundations
Derive falsifiable hypotheses
Parsimony
Controversial claim
• If IR theory must be vague, unscientific
It can safely be ignored
• If IR theory can be scientific and precise
It will have policy implications
It will be essential to understanding history
I hope to convince you that political science adds
value to the study of international relations
Timeline
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
International Society
Realpolitik (Balance of Power)
Institutionalism
(Classical) Realism
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
Neorealism
Constructivism
International Society
• Norman Angell. The Great Illusion. (1910). : What are the
fundamental motives that explain the present rivalry of armaments in
Europe, notably the Anglo-German ? Each nation pleads the need for
defence; but this implies that someone is likely to attack, and has
therefore a presumed interest in so doing. What are the motives which
each State thus fears its neighbors may obey?
• They are based on the universal assumption that a nation, in order to
find outlets for expanding population and increasing industry, or
simply to ensure the best conditions possible for its people, is
necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political
force against others.... It is assumed that a nation's relative prosperity is
broadly determined by its political power; that nations being
competing units, advantage in the last resort goes to the possessor of
preponderant military force, the weaker goes to the wall, as in the other
forms of the struggle for life.
• Angell challenges this whole doctrine. He attempts to show that it
belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed that
the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend upon the
expansion of its political frontiers; that a nation's political and
economic frontiers do not now necessarily coincide; that military
power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation to
the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for one
nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another -- to enrich itself
by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another; that in short,
war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which
people strive....
• The fight for ideals can no longer take the form of fight between
nations, because the lines of division on moral questions are within the
nations themselves and intersect the political frontiers. There is no
modern State which is completely Catholic or Protestant, or liberal or
autocratic, or aristocratic or democratic, or socialist or individualist;
the moral and spiritual struggles of the modern world go on between
citizens of the same State in unconscious intellectual cooperation with
corresponding groups in other states, not between the public powers of
rival States.
• War has no longer the justification that it makes for the survival of the
fittest; it involves the survival of the less fit. The idea that the struggle
between nations is a part of the evolutionary law of man's advance
involves a profound misreading of the biological analogy.
• The warlike nations do not inherit the earth; they represent the
decaying human element....
• Are we, in blind obedience to primitive instincts and old prejudices,
enslaved by the old catchwords and that curious indolence which
makes the revision of old ideas unpleasant, to duplicate indefinitely on
the political and economic side a condition from which we have
liberated ourselves on the religious side? Are we to continue to
struggle, as so many good men struggled in the first dozen centuries of
Christendom -- spilling oceans of blood, wasting mountains of treasure
-- to achieve what is at bottom a logical absurdity, to accomplish
something which, when accomplished, can avail us nothing, and
which, if it could avail us anything, would condemn the nations of the
world to never-ending bloodshed and the constant defeat of all those
aims which men, in their sober hours, know to be alone worthy of
sustained endeavor?
To summarize: The thesis of this work is commonly (and incorrectly)
described as saying that the integration of the economies of European
countries had grown to such a degree that war between them was
unimaginable, making militarism obsolete.
However this is not what Angell actually argued. His central argument
was that war between modern powers was futile in the sense that no
matter what the outcome, he thought both the losing and the victorious
nations would be economically worse off than they would have been
had they avoided war.
Some have contested that the two World Wars that took place after The
Great Illusion was published were in fact a tragic confirmation of his
thesis. Other historians have argued that Angell disregarded the reality
of the complex situation in Europe with its alliances, hatreds and
rivalries between nations and therefore he was being utopian.
Realisms
• Realpolitik
• Classic Realism
• Neorealism
Fundamental principles common to realist
theories:
• The international system is anarchical.
• Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system.
– Dismissal of the independent influence of international organizations, substate, or trans-state actors.
– Focus on the primary importance of nationalism, as opposed to subnational groupings, or transnational ideological of cultural groupings.
• States are rational actors, acting in their national interest.
– Distrust of long-term cooperation or alliance.
• The overriding goal of each state is its own security and survival.
– Fundamental nature of the security dilemma.
• State survival is guaranteed best by power, principally military in
character.
– Focus on relative power (i.e. "zero sum") versus absolute power.
Realpolitik
• The term realism comes from the German compound word
"Realpolitik", from the words "real" (meaning "realistic", "practical",
or "actual") and "Politik" (meaning "politics"). It focuses on the
balance of power among nation-states. Realpolitik is foreign policy
based on practical concerns (political expediency) rather than ideals or
ethics.
• Bismarck coined the term after following Metternich's lead in finding
ways to balance the power of European empires. Balancing power was
the means for keeping the peace, and careful realpolitik practioners
tried to avoid arms races. However, during the early-20th Century,
arms races and alliances occurred anyway, culminating in World War I.
Origins of Realism
• Thucydides (460-400 B.C.)
• The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.)
• Leads to the destruction of Athens and the
decline of Greek civilization
• “The growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in
Lacedaemon [Sparta], made war inevitable”
Thrace
Macedonia
Aegean Sea
Epidamnus
Thessaly
Thebes
Corcyra
Athens
Corinth
Sparta
Ionian Sea
Crete
Asia
Minor
Balance of Power
Athens
Corcyra
Epidamnus
Sparta
Corinth
Scene One: Corinth vs. Corcyra
• Epidamnus rebels, expels nobles, seeks aid
from Corcyra, Corinth
• Corinth intervenes
• Corcyra intervenes on behalf of the nobles
Scene Two: Athens vs. Corinth
• Corcyraean arguments:
– We have the second strongest navy
– Corinth will punish us if we defect
– War is inevitable
• Corinthian arguments:
– Justice
– We have precedents for good relations
– War is not inevitable—yet
The Athenians believed war with Sparta was inevitable
Scene Three: Athens vs. Sparta
• Corinthian arguments:
– Athens broke the treaty
– Your credibility is in question
– Do we need to seek other allies?
• Athenian arguments:
–
–
–
–
Remember our role in defeating Persia
Naval superiority
Our empire does not prove threatening intentions
Obtained by accident; we refused to give it up because
we are insecure
Sparta feared the growth of Athenian power. Ultimatum
Scene Four: Pericles in Athens
•
•
•
•
Submission to Sparta’s demands is slavery
Athens has the military advantage
We should have limited goals
The Peloponnesian League has a collective
action problem
• War is inevitable because we cannot commit
to refrain from increasing our power in the
future
Features of Thucydides’ Realism
• Low estimate of human nature
– “The strong do as they may, the weak suffer what they
must”—Melian dialogue
• Prominence of reputation and prestige
• Richness of unit-level analysis
– Epidamnus civil unrest
– Athens and Sparta impose their forms of government
on their allies
– National power is a function of form of government
Features of Thucydides’ Realism
• Consequences of anarchy
– Commitments are not enforceable
– Self-defense is the primary motivation
– Security dilemma-no one can lose Corcyra
•
•
•
•
Pivotal role of small allies
Power transition hypothesis
Defensive balancing
Interests are defined in terms of power
Institutionalism
• Developed as a reaction to the catastrophe of WWI
• Agnostic (generally) as to the nature of humankind but optimistic that
learning and incentive structure can ameliorate behavior
• Domestic solutions can be applied to the trans-national environment
and the lack of such state-like structures allowed the War to come
• The Peace can best be preserved with the construction of institutions –
long-lasting organizations with specified functions – whose job it is to
mediate the peace
• To some degree building upon the Palmerston-Metternich-Bismarck
management of the Concert but diminishing the roles of “national”
individuals
• Many advocates were idealistic about the replacement of state-identity
with that of a global humankind
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points
•
1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall
be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view
•
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants.
•
3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance.
•
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will
be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
• 5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable
claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
•
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all
questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest
cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy
and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations
under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome,
assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire.
The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to
come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of
her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their
intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
• 7-13 deal with territorial adjustments especially owing to the collapse
of the Austrian, German, Russian and Ottoman empires in eastern
Europe
• 14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
League of Nations
• The League of Nations was an international organization founded after
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The League's goals included
disarmament; preventing war through collective security; settling
disputes between countries through negotiation and diplomacy; and
improving global welfare. Under institutionalism, the League was a
government of governments, with the role of settling disputes between
individual nations in an open and legalist forum.
• The League lacked an armed force of its own and so depended on the
Great Powers to enforce its resolutions, which they were often very
reluctant to do. After a number of notable successes and some early
failures, the League ultimately proved incapable of preventing
aggression by the Axis Powers in the 1930s. The onset of the Second
World War made it clear that the League had failed in its primary
purpose—to avoid any future world war. The United Nations
effectively replaced it after World War II and inherited a number of
agencies and organizations founded by the League.
Absent from the League
By the beginning of WWII (1940), the following
states were noticeably missing:
• Germany (1933)
• Italy (1937)
• Japan (1934)
• Soviet Union (1939)
• Spain (1939)
• United States (never joined)
Classical Realism
• States seek to maximize interests (defined
as national power)
• Zero-sum game
• States expand when they can
• Conquest pays
• Interdependence leads to conflicts as states
seek autonomy
Principles of realism
Hans Morgenthau formulated six principles of political realism in his book
Politics Among Nations. [1] These principles form the base of
realism:
1.
Politics, like society in general, are governed by objective laws that
have their roots in human nature which is unchanging: therefore it is
possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these objective
laws.
2.
The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest
defined in terms of power which infuses rational order into the
subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical
understanding of politics possible. Political realism stresses the
rational, objective and unemotional.
3.
Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective
category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is
fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man.
Principles of realism
4.
5.
6.
Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political
action. It is also aware of the tension between moral command and
the requirements of successful political action.
Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It is
the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from
the moral excess and political folly.
The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere.
He asks "How will this policy affect the power of the nation?"
Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human
nature. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a
beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. But, in
order to develop an autonomous theory of political behavior,
"political man" must be abstracted from other aspects of human
nature.
Liberalism (in modern forms)
•
•
•
•
•
States seek to maximize wealth
Positive-sum game
Focused on absolute gains
Multi-centric: state, IGO, NGO, TNC
The “I” terms matter: ideas, institutions,
individuals, interdependence, interactions,
ideologies, idealism, integration, issue areas
• Conquest doesn’t pay
• Interdependence leads to peace
• Learning is possible (proactive adaptation)
Neoliberal institutionalism
and relative gains
Summary of Repeated Games
• Repeated Games are used to model ongoing interaction
• 3 Types of Repeated Games
• Finitely repeated with known end
• Finitely repeated with unknown end
• Infinitely repeated
• Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
• In finite game with known end, the only Nash Equilibrium [NEQ]
(the optimal collective strategy) is for both players to always defect
• In infinite games and finite games with unknown end, there may
be an infinite number of NEQ
• When future payoffs are valued sufficiently in infinite games,
cooperation is possible in NEQ — but not guaranteed
Neoliberal
Claims
institutionalism
• RPD demonstrates the feasibility of
cooperation under anarchy
• Variation in cooperation can be explained
by:
– Issue areas (Stage game payoffs and iteration—
e.g., Lipson)
– Institutions (Iteration and transaction costs—
e.g., Keohane & Axelrod)
– Norms (equilibrium expectations)
Neoliberal hypotheses
Stage game payoffs
– Taxonomy of games: PD, Harmony, Zero-sum,
Coordination
– Magnitude of the temptation to cheat (DC-CC)
– Magnitude of the punishment (DD-CC)
– Variation in cooperation by issue area
• Economics vs. security
• Cooperation in security? Arms races & crisis
management
Neoliberal hypotheses
Iteration
– Frequency of interaction
– Expectation of future interaction
• Potential for surprise attack renders security affairs
more conflictual
– Linkages across issues
– Institutions
• Monitoring
• Break up large transactions into small ones
Neoliberal hypotheses
Norms
– What is an equilibrium? A set of expectations
– Enforced by social pressure (punishment
strategies)
– Newcomers to a social system become
socialized into cooperation (evolutionary game
theory)
– Norms of the international system vary over
time
Relative vs Absolute Gains
• (Neo)Realists argued that cooperation is unlikely
under anarchy, because there is no one to enforce
commitments.
• Neoliberals showed that cooperation is possible in
repeated PD situations.
• (Neo)Realists then respond that states are worried not
just about absolute gains, but relative gains.
– Even if I am gaining through our cooperation, if you
are gaining more, you will have advantage over me
in the future.
Grieco (Realism)
 Neoliberals emphasize absolute gains (long-term, allow
for cooperation)
Neoliberal utility function: U1 = V1
state 1’s payoff
 Realism emphasizes relative gains (prevent other states
from advancing in relative capabilities; can mitigate
cooperation – states unlikely to cooperate if other state
gains more)
Realist utility function: U1 = V1 – k(V2 – V1)
coefficient of
sensitivity to gap
state 1’s payoff
state 2’s payoff
k>0
k small in pluralistic security community; long-term ally
k large in state of war; long-term adversary
Snidal (Neoliberalism)
Relative gains argument not sufficient
 Only in special case of high concern for relative gains and
low regard for absolute gains does it dominate
 Otherwise, neoliberal case for cooperation still strong
 Relative gains can be expressed as absolute gains
Absolute vs Relative Gains
relative gains argument not sufficient
 absolute gains game:
C
D
M
C
M
F
C
F
0
0
0
U = unilateral cooperation
F = free ride payoff, F > M > U
M = mutual cooperation, M > 0
D
0
C
U
U
D
 pure relative gains:
F-U
U-F
U-F
D
F-U
0
0
zero-sum:
D dominant strategy
no cooperation is possible
Implications of relative gains
• As long as there is some potential for mutual gain,
cooperative equilibria exist for discount factors
high enough (Folk Theorem)
• If there is no room for mutual gain (the game is
constant-sum), non-cooperation is efficient
• In cases like this, “cooperation” is undefined
• Whenever cooperation is a meaningful concept, it
is possible when discount factors are sufficiently
high
Neorealist hypotheses
• Less durable arrangements lead to more
cooperation
• Cooperation is greater with large numbers
because relative gains concerns are reduced
• Linkage reduces cooperation because it raises
the stakes
• More cooperation between allies under bipolarity
Relative gains as absolute gains
• Anything we say about relative gains can be
rewritten in terms of absolute gains
• The realist argument is that I’m afraid to
cooperate because I think I may be attacked
in the future
Powell’s conclusions
• Cooperation is possible if the cost of war is
high enough that surprise attacks are not
tempting
• Security concerns can prevent cooperation
if
– The cost of war is low enough, AND
– Economic cooperation gives one side a
significant military advantage
Summary
• Neoliberals emphasize absolute gains
• Realists and Neorealists emphasize relative gains
• Relative gains arguments do not rule out cooperation
• Only in special case of high concern for relative gains
and low regard for absolute gains does it dominate
• Otherwise, neoliberal case for cooperation still strong
• Relative gains can be expressed as absolute gains
• Relative gains logic depends on utility of force
• Relative gains turn all games considered eventually into PD
and make original PD more serious
• More difficult to sustain cooperation with relative gains
concerns
Neorealism
•
•
•
•
States seek to maximize security
Zero-sum game
Avoid relative losses
Conquest doesn’t always pay; depends on
relative gains
Understanding Waltz
Theory of International Politics
What does Waltz want to
explain?
• The consequences of major shifts in the
balance of power
• Enduring and recurring patterns of
interaction
• Similar behavior by dissimilar units (states)
What does Waltz exclude from
the scope of his theory?
• Particular events (e.g., the causes of WWI)
• Foreign policies
• Variation in behavior under similar
circumstances
“A theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies
of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of
them” (72).
Reductionism
• Usually means “monocausal explanation”
• Waltz means explanation in terms of unitlevel or interaction-level variations
• Systemic explanations are always preferred.
Why?
– Parsimony
– Deduction vs. induction
The Argument
Social systems & social structure
• Reproduce themselves
• Constrain actors
• Repeat patterns
Definition: Equilibrium
What is the status of this claim?
• Heuristic assumption?
• Tautology?
• Empirical generalization?
Examples of social systems
•
•
•
•
Ecological systems (S. J. Gould)
Democratic systems (A. Przeworski)
The “cycle of poverty” (D. P. Moynihan)
Competitive market (M. Friedman)
Claims:
• Social systems are ubiquitous
• Need to understand social structure to
understand a social system
Elements of a social system
1.
2.
3.
4.
Units
Ordering principles
Functional differentiation of the units
Distribution of capabilities among the
units
1. What are the units?
Sovereign states
What else is out there?
•
•
•
•
•
IGO’s (UN, IMF, WTO, EU)
Transnational corporations
Transnational networks & movements
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Tribes, guerrilla factions
2. Ordering Principles
• Hierarchy
– Empires
– World government
• Anarchy
– International systems with independent states
Are there other possibilities?
Domestic vs. International Systems
Domestic
• Hierarchy; centralized
decision making
• Monopoly of
legitimate use of force
• Authority & functions
of units specified by
consensus
International
• Anarchy
• Formal equality
• Virtually no authority
• Consensus is absent
• There are no rules, and
there is no enforcer
Are these heuristic assumptions? Tautologies?
Empirical generalizations?
3. Functional differentiation
• Anarchy implies sovereignty: the state is
the locus of legitimate authority
• Sovereignty implies that all states have the
same function: self preservation
• Division of labor is intolerable because it
leads to dependence
4. Distribution of capabilities
• Ordering principles, the nature of the units,
and functional differentiation do not vary in
international systems
• Variations in the distribution of capabilities
explain variations in systemic effects
• The number of states and the balance of
power among them
Logic
What mechanism explains the link from
structure to behavior?
• Socialization (strategic interaction)
• Competition (selection)
• Anticipation
Paradox: Social structure arises from the
interaction of the units, and in turn explains that
interaction
Waltz’s Neorealism
The argument in favor
Facts and Assumptions
• Assumptions need not be true; what is
important is whether they are useful
• Useful assumptions lead to powerful
theories:
– Parsimonious
– Testable
• The test of structural realism is whether
it generates hypotheses that can be
supported by evidence
Waltz in Review
• Social systems impose constraints; all
actors are compelled to behave similarly
• Analogy to a competitive market
• The international system is anarchic
– Self-help
– Defensive balancing
• The number of important states and the
distribution of power among them
determines the constraints
Balance of Power
1. Balances form recurrently
2. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: States
prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions
3. If one coalition weakens, the opposing one
loosens
4. Anticipated balancing leads to restraint
BoP as a Reaction to a Threat:
Napoleon, 1802-1815
Major Powers:
FRA, UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS
After French Revolution (1789),
Napoleon Bonaparte rises to power.
-- Consul (1802)
-- Emperor of France (1804)
Continues military campaigns to
build empire and feed war machine.
-- Poses major threat to Europe
UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS form
“coalitions” against FRA
-- Napoleon defeated (1814)
-- Congress of Vienna (1814)
-- Napoleon returns (1815)
-- Waterloo (1815)
Russia
BoP as a Peaceful Equilibrium: Concert of Europe, 1815-1848
After Napoleonic Wars, Congress of
Vienna continues (1815)
Defeated France let back into “club”
Quadruple Alliance:
Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia
Congresses held to attempt to
resolve issues.
Buffer states/territory traded.
Russia
Assessing Balance of Power
Hypotheses
1. Balances form recurrently
2. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: States
prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions
3. If one coalition weakens, the opposing one
loosens
4. Anticipated balancing leads to restraint
Subsidiary Hypotheses
1. Socialization
–
States emulate successful competitors
•
Military advances:
– Agincourt
– French Revolution and mass mobilization
– German general staff model
•
Organization:
– Market economy
–
Nonconformist states gradually adapt
•
Bolshevik Russia
Subsidiary Hypotheses
2. Interdependence
•
•
•
Relative gains impede cooperation
Interdependence increases probability of war
Economic vulnerability leads to imperialism
Bipolarity vs Multipolarity
1792
1815
1854
1866
1870
1914
1939
WW I
Napoleonic Wars
Crimean War
Franco-Prussian War
Concert of Europe
Austro-Prussian War (“peaceful”)
WW II
Multipolar
loose, shifting alliances, Britain as balancer
four or five Great Powers
1945
1990
Cold War—or “Long Peace”
Bipolar
(two Great Powers, tight blocs)
?
Bipolarity vs Multipolarity
• Bipolarity is more “stable.” Why?
• Multipolar balancing breaks down because
of uncertainty
States can maximize/accrue power in two ways:
Bipolar

internal balancing
Multipolar  external balancing
Cold War
19th Century Europe
Bipolarity vs Multipolarity
• Internal balancing is more reliable
• External balancing can give rise to
miscalculations that lead to general war
– Large influence of small allies
– Deterrence fails because there is an incentive to
defect from commitments
– As numbers grow, strategic complexity grows
geometrically
• Uncertainty is the leading cause of war
Structural Theories: WWI
Allied Powers
Central Powers
• France
• Great Britain
• Russia
• Austria-Hungary
• Germany
Multipolar System
• Abandoning an ally invites one’s own destruction
• In a moment of crisis, the weaker or more adventurous party
(Austria) is likely to determine its side’s policy
• Its partners (Germany) can afford neither to let the weaker member
be defeated nor to advertise their disunity by failing to back a
venture even while deploring its risks
Structural Theories: WWI
Allied Powers
Central Powers
• France
• Great Britain
• Russia
• Austria-Hungary
• Germany
Balance of Power
• The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance were approximately
balanced
• The defeat of any great power would give the opposing coalition a
decisive advantage in the overall European balance of power
• Britain entered the war to prevent Germany from upsetting the
balance of power on the continent
Structural Theories: WWI
Allied Powers
Central Powers
• France
• Great Britain
• Russia
• Austria-Hungary
• Germany
Alliance System
• The establishment of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance
divided the European powers into two camps
• While seen as a form of self-protection, the alliances also had the
potential to escalate small crises into major wars
• When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, this brought Serbia’s
ally Russia into the war, which brought Germany, France, and Britain
into the war
Assessing hypotheses about multipolarity in
WWI
External balancing can give rise to
miscalculations that lead to general war
– Large influence of small allies
– Deterrence fails because there is an incentive to
defect from commitments
Strengths of Structural Realism
• Parsimony
• Focus on systemic effects
• Power is defined as capabilities (nontautological)
• Explanatory power is in the constraints, not
in the preferences
• Collective action
• Probabilistic predictions
Structural realism (neorealism)
A critique
Structure of an argument
Assumptions
Logic
Hypotheses
Research
design
Evidence Conclusions
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Generality
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???
How would you attack Waltz or
anyone else?
Confidence
Scope
Waltz in Review
Structure:
• Ordering Principle
• Differentiation of units
• Distribution of capabilities
Explanatory power
Anarchy
Internal critique
The concept of anarchy
• Monopoly of force?
• Civil war
• Intervention
• Legitimacy?
• Authoritarianism
• International norms
• Governance without government
• International law and organization
Spectrum
vs.
dichotomy
Internal critique
Separation of structure from units
• Analogy of competitive markets
• Large n, price takers
• Structure  strategies
• Oligopolistic markets
• Small n, strategic interdependence
• Structure  strategies
• Multiple equilibria
External Critique
Systemic factors Waltz Ignores
• Norms, expectations, beliefs
• Institutions
• Iteration—“shadow of the future”
• Frequency of interaction
• Changing characteristics of
actors
• Opportunity costs
Assessing Balance of Power
Hypotheses
1. Balances form recurrently
2. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: States
prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions
3. If one coalition weakens, the opposing one
loosens
4. Anticipated balancing leads to restraint
Balancing vs. Bandwagoning
Ottoman Empire
•A
•
P
Eastern
question
Russia
Prussia
•
R
German question
Austria
Stability of Bipolarity
• External Balancing leads to miscalculations
• Uncertainty is the leading cause of war
• N E O R E A L I S M, S T R U C T U R A L T H E O R I E S
RussoJapanese
Boer
RussoTurkish
Crimean
FrancoPrussian
AustroPrussian
RussoTurkish
Stability of Bipolarity
• U.S.-Soviet Cold War
– Stable
• Sparta vs. Athens
– Not stable
• Carthage vs. Rome
– Not stable
Can we test a theory with just one case?
If we accept a margin of error of 100%
Explaining the “Long Peace”
• Bipolarity
• Low levels of interdependence between the
superpowers
• Neither domestic system inclined to war
(Circular?)
• Nuclear weapons
• “Reconnaissance revolution”
• Moderation of ideologies
• Emergence of rules
Gaddis 1986
Explaining the “Long Peace”
Emergence of rules
–
–
–
–
–
Spheres of influence
Avoid direct military confrontation
Non-use of nuclear weapons
“Predictable anomalies” (Cuba, Berlin)
Do not undermine the opponent’s leadership
Gaddis 1986
Structure of an argument
Assumptions
Logic
Hypotheses
Research
design
Evidence Conclusions
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Generality
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How would you attack Waltz?
Confidence
Scope
Constructivism
• Constructivism rejects standard materialist views
of international relations and argues that state
interests are constituted by ideas and norms.
Constructivists therefore argue that the effects of
international anarchy are not determinate, but that
'anarchy is what states make of it'.
• Through focusing on how language and rhetoric
are used to construct the reality of the international
system, constructivists are able to be more
optimistic about progress in international relations
than versions of realism loyal to a purely
materialist ontology.
• Alexander Wendt's most influential work to date is
Social Theory of International Politics
(Cambridge University Press, 1999), which builds
on and goes beyond his 1992 article "Anarchy Is
What States Make Of It". Social Theory of
International Politics places itself as a response to
Kenneth Waltz's 1979 work, Theory of
International Politics, the canonical text of the
neorealist school.
• Wendt shares the fundamental premise of realists that the
state system is in a situation of anarchy. However, he
denies that anarchy alone is sufficient to determine a
Hobbesian scenario of states competing against one
another for survival.
• For Wendt, violent competition is only one of three
possible forms that the anarchic international system may
take. Though the state system may at times conform to
such realist descriptions, anarchy alone does not determine
this state of affairs. By stressing the importance of ideas,
norms, and culture to the international system, Wendt aims
to show the possibility of a more cooperative outcome.