EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE
THEORETISCHE
PHILOSOPHIE:
SPRACHPHILOSOPHIE
Nathan Wildman
nathan.wildman@uni-hamburg.de
SOMETHING TO PONDER
Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy
finally established: namely, first, that the goal of
philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought;
secondly, that the study of thought is to be sharply
distinguished from the study of the psychological process
of thinking; and, finally, that the only proper method for
analysing thought consists in the analysis of language.
[...] [T]he acceptance of these three tenets is common to
the entire analytical school… (Dummett 1978: 458)
MORE ABOUT RUSSELL’S
THEORY OF
DESCRIPTIONS
Or, the lecture where we discuss a series of puzzles &
problems that concerned the Third Earl Russell
THE PLAN
(1) Restate the Basics of Russell’s view
(2) Russell’s solutions to the Puzzles
(3) Strawson’s Objection to Russell
(4) Donnellan’s Objection to Russell
(5) Evaluation of The Two Pictures
RUSSELL’S OBJECTIONS TO FREGE

‘Darth Vader is tall OR Messi is the best in the world.’
 This disjunction is true!
The argument re-constructed:
(1) We can use non-denoting phrases in logically
complex expressions.
(2) These expressions retain their truth values when a
term used therein doesn’t have a referent.
(3) Frege would have us say they become truthvalueless.
(4) Therefore Frege is wrong.
THE HEART OF RUSSELL’S OBJECTIONS
1.
2.
a)
b)
c)
According to Russell:
The meaning of a sentence and the object of a
thought is a proposition
Propositions are composed of objects and properties
A genuine proper name contributes the object it
stands for
Predicates contribute the properties/relations they
stand for
If ‘a’ is a name for a and ‘F( )’ is a one-place predicate
that stands for the monadic property F, then ‘Fa’
expresses a proposition, <Fa> composed of a and F.
THE HEART OF RUSSELL’S OBJECTIONS
Russellian propositions: a proposition is a complex
consisting of the very objects which are the values of the
words which express the proposition
The propositions can be either:


Object dependent – when the subject of the sentence is
a term that refers to an object
Object independent – when the subject of the sentence
is a term that does not refer to an object
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
Propositional functions: functions which take you from
phrases to propositions
Two ways to ‘complete’ propositional function:
(1) With a genuine proper name
(2) With a quantifier expression
Note that (1) would give us an object dependent
proposition, but (2) an object independent proposition!
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
One notable kind of quantifier expression:
Definite Descriptions

‘the F is G’ means
There is at least one x which is F; and
(ii) There is at most one x which is F; and
(iii) all Fs are G
(i)
‘The present king of France is bald’ means:
 There is a present king of France; and
 There is only one present king of France; and
 Everything that is a king of France is bald
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
Everything, nothing, and something, are not assumed to
have any meaning in isolation, but a meaning is
assigned to every proposition in which they occur. This is
the principle of the theory of denoting I wish to advocate:
that denoting phrases never have any meaning in
themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal
expression they occur has a meaning. (Russell, OD)
These terms do not express dependent but rather
independent propositions – there need not be a
particular object denoted to express a proposition
involving one of the above.
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
In ‘On Denoting’, Russell suggests treating empty names
as disguised descriptions:
A proposition about Apollo means what we get by
substituting what the classical dictionary tells us is
meant by Apollo, say ‘the sun-god’. All propositions in
which Apollo occurs are to be interpreted by the above
rules for denoting phrases. (Russell, OD)


Apollo helped kill Achilles
There is an x such that, x is a sun-god, and, for all
objects y, if y is a sun-god, then y=x, and x helped kill
Achilles.
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
The upshot of this move is that, if the above
argumentation is correct, we can understand and
evaluate for truth propositions involving empty names:

<Apollo helped kill Achilles> is false because there is
no x which satisfies the definite description!
Similarly, we can say that

<The Present King of France is bald> is false because
there is no x which satisfies the definite description!
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
But the Russell of ‘Descriptions’ is more radical: therein,
we are told that it is ‘a very rash assumption’ to regard
‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and ‘Aristotle’ as genuine proper
names. In fact:
We may even go so far as to say that, in all such
knowledge as can be expressed in words—with the
exception of ‘this’ and ‘that’ and a few other words of
which the meaning varies on different occasions—no
names, in the strict sense, occur, but what seem like
names are really descriptions. (Russell, Descriptions)
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
In other words: every singular term is in fact a concealed
definite description!
(1)
(2)
(3)
Lionel Messi is the greatest living footballer
The Argentinian striker who plays for Barcelona is
the greatest living footballer
There is an x such that, x is an Argentinian striker
who plays for Barcelona, and, for all objects y, if y is
an Argentinian striker who plays for Barcelona, then
y=x, and x is the greatest living footballer
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
One small exception: Logically proper names!
They are particular instances of ‘this’ and ‘that’.
For these expressions, if you don’t know the reference,
you can’t use the term correctly
Importantly, this means that the problematic cases
involved in the puzzles could never come up – you’d
simply not know the denotation (and thus the meaning)
of the term!
RUSSELL’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL
This gives us Russell’s picture:
I.
Definite descriptions are quantifier expressions,
rather than referring expressions
II.
All singular terms (barring logically proper
names) are concealed definite descriptions
Upshot: Singular terms are concealed definite
descriptions, the meaning of which is the associated
quantifier expression, and propositions involving them
turn out to be object independent
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS – AN ASIDE ON SCOPE
Wide scope
(primary occurrence)
(1a) The present king of France is believed by Frank
to be bald.
(2a) The present king of France is not bald
Narrow scope
(secondary occurrence)
(1b) Frank believes that the present king of France is
bald.
(2b) It is not the case that the present king of France is
bald.
THE PUZZLES AGAIN
(1) Frege’s Puzzle: How can two identity statements
differ in cognitive value, if the terms involved refer
to the same thing?
(2) Predicational Puzzle: How can two predicational
statements differ in cognitive value, if the singular
terms involved refer to the same thing?
(3) Substitution Puzzle: How can a = b but ‘S
believes that a is F’ not mean the same as ‘S
believes that b is F’?
THE PUZZLES AGAIN
(4) Empty Names Puzzle: how can ‘a is F’ be
meaningful when ‘a’ stands for a non-existing or
fictional entity?
(5) Law of Excluded Middle: How can it be that, for
any formula ϕ, (ϕ V ϕ)?
(6) Negative Existentials Puzzle: How can ‘a does
not exist’ be true?
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
General strategy
Definite descriptions, like ‘the F’, are not genuine
singular terms; their function is to describe, not denote
 Whether or not anything satisfies a definite
description, it is still meaningful


Unlike for Frege, there is no appeal to senses
While ‘the F’ is the grammatical subject of ‘the F is G’,
it is not its logical subject

The surface grammar misled us into thinking that ‘the F’ is
a singular term, but it’s really a definite description!
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(1) Frege’s Puzzle: How can two identity statements
differ in cognitive value, if the terms involved refer
to the same thing?
(1a) The father of Luke is Vader.
(1b) Vader is Vader.
‘The father of Luke’ doesn’t mean ‘Vader’ – rather, it
means ‘For some x, x is a father of Luke, and, for all y, if
y is a father of Luke, then y=x ’
So (1a), properly translated, says
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(1a’) For some x, x is a father of Luke, and, for all y, if y
is a father of Luke, then y=x, and x = Vader
Of course, given that singular terms are definite
descriptions, ‘Vader’ must also be translated too, e.g. as
‘For some x, x is a Dark Lord of the Sith, and, for all y, if
y is a Dark Lord of the Sith, then y=x‘
So, this means that (1a) really says
(1a*) For some x, x is a father of Luke, and, for all y, if y
is a father of Luke, then y=x, and for some z, z is a
Dark Lord of the Sith, and, for all y, if y is a Dark
Lord of the Sith, then y=z, and x=z
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(1b*) For some x, x is a Dark Lord of the Sith, and, for
all y, if y is a Dark Lord of the Sith, then y=x and
for some z, z is a Dark Lord of the Sith, and, for all
y, if y is a Dark Lord of the Sith, then y=z, and x=z
So translated, it is obvious what the difference between
the two is: (1a) asserts that there is one thing that
satisfies two different definite descriptions, while (1b)
asserts that one thing satisfies the same definite
description.
Answer: Because the definite descriptions invoked differ!
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(2) Predicational Puzzle: How can two predicational
statements differ in cognitive value, if the singular
terms involved refer to the same thing?


Clark Kent = ‘the mild mannered reporter’
Superman = ‘the man from Krypton’
(2a) ‘Clark Kent is a reporter’
(2b) ‘Superman is a reporter’
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(2a*) For some x, x is a m. m. reporter, and, for all y, if y
is a m.m. reporter, then y=x and x is a reporter.
(2b*) For some x, x is a man from Krypton, and, for all
y, if y is a man from Krypton, then y=x and x is a
reporter.
 The difference: (2a) says something that satisfies a
particular description and has a further property, while
(2b) asserts that something that satisfies a different
description possess the property
Answer: Because the definite descriptions invoked differ!
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(3)
Substitution Puzzle: How can a = b but ‘S
believes that a is F’ not mean the same as ‘S
believes that b is F’?
Answer: because (i) ‘a’ & ‘b’ are different concealed
definite descriptions; and (ii) belief has wide scope
(3a) Luke believes that Vader is Vader
(3b) Luke doesn’t believe that the father of Luke is
Vader
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
Two ways to read both
(3a’) Vader is believed by Luke to be Vader
(3a*) Luke believes that Vader is Vader
(3b’) The father of Luke is not believed by Luke to be
Vader
(3b*) Luke does not believe that the father of Luke is
Vader
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
Two ways to read both
(3a’) Vader is believed by Luke to be Vader.
(3a’’) For some x, x is a Dark Lord of the Sith, and, for
all y, if y is a Dark Lord of the Sith, then y=x and x
is believed by Luke to be Vader
(3a*) Luke believes that Vader is Vader
(3a**) For some x, x is a farm-boy from Tatoone, and, for
all y, if y is a f.b. from Tatoone, then y=x and x
believes that for some z, z is a Dark Lord of the
Sith, and, for all y, if y is a Dark Lord of the Sith,
then y=z and z=z.
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
The important point:
(3a’’)’s subject is Vader, (3a**)’s subject is Luke
We want to say something about what Luke believes, so
we need to use (3a**)
Upshot: it isn’t blatantly contradictory to believe
something concerning an object under one designation,
but not under another!
(Compare what would happen if we used (3a’) & (3b’))
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(3a*) Luke believes that Vader is Vader
(3b*) Luke does not believe that the father of Luke is
Vader
But how can both of these be true?
Answer: the difference in the definite descriptions
involved! We can apply the lessons from the previous
cases and see that the propositions Luke is related are
different in the two situations!
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(4) Empty Names Puzzle: how can ‘a is F’ be
meaningful when ‘a’ stands for a non-existing or
fictional entity?
 The Present King of France is bald
Answer: because ‘a’ is a concealed definite description,
which means that ‘a is F’ expresses an object
independent proposition
 <For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K.
o. F., then y=x, and x is bald>
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
 <For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K.
o. F., then y=x, and x is bald>
This proposition is false, not meaningless
 False because there is no x that is a Present King of
France
Upshot: we can have meaningful talk about things that
don’t exist. Even better…
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(5)
Law of Excluded Middle: How can it be that,
for any formula ϕ, (ϕ V ϕ)?
Answer: because ‘a’ is a concealed definite description, ‘a
is F’ expresses an object independent proposition
Recall that the problematic cases involved empty
singular terms:
 The Present King of France is bald
 <For some x, x is the P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is the
P.K. o. F., then y=x, and x is bald>
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
 <For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K.
o. F., then y=x, and x is bald> is false
 Because there is no x that is a Present King of France
Consequently,
<  For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K.
o. F., then y=x, and x is bald> is true
 Because it is not the case that there is an x that is a
Present King of France
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
(6)
Negative Existentials Puzzle: How can ‘a does
not exist’ be true?
Answer: because (i) ‘a’ is a concealed definite description;
and (ii) the negation has wide scope.
 The consequence of (i) is that ‘a does not exist’ expresses an object
independent proposition
 Consequence of (ii) is that the expression is true whenever the object
denoted doesn’t exist!
 The Present King of France does not exist
RUSSELL’S SOLUTIONS
Two ways to read:
(Narrow): <For some x, x is a P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y
is a P.K.o.F., then y=x, and x does not exist>
 This ascribes to objects the property of ‘not existing’,
which quickly leads to contradiction
(Wide): <It is not the case that, for some x, x is a
P.K.o.F, and, for all y, if y is a P.K.o.F., then y=x>
 This doesn’t lead to contradiction, and fits
intuitive truth conditions!
OBJECTIONS TO RUSSELL
Two Key Points of Russell’s picture:
I.
Definite descriptions are quantifier expressions,
rather than referring expressions
II.
All singular terms (barring logically proper
names) are concealed definite descriptions
Both are employed in his solutions to the puzzles;
both have received some rather heavy criticism…
STRAWSON ON RUSSELL
Strawson holds that, generally, we must be careful to
focus upon the actual use of language; this is important
because not all putative definite descriptions are used as
singular terms:
(1a) The whale is a mammal.
(1b) Napoleon was the greatest French soldier.
However, let’s focus on cases where definite descriptions
are used as singular terms.
STRAWSON ON RUSSELL
Distinguish between sentences/expressions from
particular utterances of them and uses of them to
assert and to refer


Although the sentence ‘The president is wise’ itself is
neither true nor false, it may—depending on when it is
uttered—be used to say something (false) about Bush
or else used to say something (true) about Obama
Although the expression ‘the president’ itself does not
refer, it may—depending on when it is uttered—be
used to refer to Bush or else used to refer to Obama
STRAWSON ON RUSSELL
Expressions: the meanings of expressions (in
particular, singular terms) are rules, habits, and
conventions governing their correct uses to refer.
The meaning of a singular term is neither its referent,
nor a description; instead, the meaning of a singular
term is a set of instructions for determining whether a
particular use of it refers
 Note:
a singular term’s referent is what is introduced into the
statement made by an utterance

Consequence: singular terms are neither definite
descriptions nor logically proper names!
STRAWSON ON RUSSELL
Sentences. The meanings of sentences are rules, habits,
and conventions governing their correct uses to make
true or false assertions.

‘I am tall’ can be used to make a true assertion iff the
utterer is tall
The meanings of sentences are not the statements they
can be used to make; instead, the meaning of a sentence
is a set of instructions for determining whether a
particular use of it is true.
STRAWSON ON RUSSELL
Objection from neglect. In general, Russell has
focused too much on the meanings of linguistic
expressions apart from their uses. By doing so, he has
neglected the fact that speakers, not sentences or
expressions, assert and refer

Pace Russell, the meaning of ‘the F’ is not whatever (if
anything) the description describes; instead, it is a set of
instructions for how to introduce an object which satisfies
the description (this is why a definite description may be
meaningful even if it fails to describe anything).
Note: This objection is simply Strawson insisting his
view is correct. It’s not really an objection!
STRAWSON ON RUSSELL
Objection from assertion. On Russell’s view, to assert
K
The present king of France is bald.
is in part to assert that there is exactly one present king
of France. But even if this is presupposed by one’s
assertion of K, it is not part of what is asserted in
asserting K.
The use of ‘the’ signals that a unique reference is to be
made, but does not assert this.
STRAWSON ON RUSSELL
Objection from spurious uses. Russell’s view says K
is false since
E
There is a present king of France.
is false. This is implausible: K is neither true nor false
because K presupposes E.
Sentence S presupposes T iff S is either true or false
only if T is true.
 When a sentence’s presupposition is false, then ‘the
question of its truth simply does not arise’.

RUSSELL’S REPLY
These objections stem from the same claim: ‘The F is G’
presupposes the existence of something which is F, while
Russell’s analysis requires that ‘The F is G’ entails the
existence of something which is F.
A presupposes B iff, if B is false, then A is neither true nor
false
 A entails B iff it is impossible for B to be false and A true

Entailment contraposes, presupposition doesn’t:
Contraposition: P → Q iff ¬Q → ¬P
RUSSELL’S REPLY
Strawson finds his account more intuitive. Is it?
First problem: it’s easy to find instances where
Strawson’s intuition is simply wrong
(a) The king of France exists
(b) Arsenal won on the King of France’s goal
(c) The King of France does not exist
RUSSELL’S REPLY
Second Problem: presuppositions can be cancelled
If A putatively presupposes B, we can always assert the
joint falsity of A and B: e.g. by saying A is false because
B is false. This shows that presupposition simply does
not hold, for if it did, the falsity of B would be enough to
show that A lacked a truth value.
The king of England came to the reception and so did the
king of Norway, but France isn’t a monarchy, so the king of
France didn’t come
 The king of France isn’t bald, because there is no king of
France

DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
‘the’ – the centrepiece of Russell’s theory, is ambiguous
between attributive and referential interpretations.
A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in
an assertion states something about whoever or
whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite
description referentially in an assertion, on the other
hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick
out whom or what he is talking about and states
something about that person or thing.
-Donnellan, Reference & Definite Descriptions
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION


Attributive: object independent, as on Russell’s
analysis; the definite description is true of whoever
satisfies the description.
Referential: object dependent, as with demostratives;
‘The F’ functions as a singular term, with ‘F’ simply
being used to ‘point’ to a particular object that may or
may not in fact be F
Donnellan’s claim, then, is that, at best, Russell’s
account is partial: it completely ignores referential uses
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
Suppose we come across Smith foully murdered. I might
exclaim, due to the vileness of the scene:
M
The murder of Smith is insane
Now, we don’t know who murdered Smith. But,
whomever that is, when I utter M in this way, I am
attributing to that person the property of being insane.

Donnellan suggests this is an attributive use – it is
true just if whoever murdered Smith is insane.
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
Suppose we are in court, at the trial of Jones, who is
accused of murdering Smith. Jones is behaving quite
oddly (i.e. he’s foaming at the mouth, speaking in
tongues, etc.). I then assert:
M
The murder of Smith is insane
In this utterance of M, I mean to say something about
Jones – namely, that he is insane. But note that this
might be the case even if Jones didn’t murder Smith!

Donnellan suggests this is a referential use, true just if
Jones is insane, regardless of his relation to Jones
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
On Russell’s there is a logical entailment: ‘The Φ is ’
entails ‘There exists one and only one Φ.’ Whether or not
this is so for the attributive use, it does not seem true of
the referential use of the definite description. The
‘implication’ that something is the Φ , as I have argued,
does not amount to an entailment; it is more like a
presumption based on what is usually true of the use of
a definite description to refer. ...as a theory of
descriptions, Russell’s view seems to apply, if at all, to the
attributive use only.
- Donnellan
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
Another example
S
The sexiest man alive is surprisingly old.
Attributive use of S: True iff whoever actually satisfies
that description is surprisingly old
Referential use of S : True iff whoever I refer to is
surprisingly old
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
S
The sexiest man alive is surprisingly old
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
T
A Third Example
The woman listed as Number 98 in FHM
Magazine's 100 Sexiest Women in the World 2011
is quite thin.
Attributive: False!
Referential: True!
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
Upshot:
This seems to undercut both of Russell’s main points:
I.
Definite descriptions are quantifier expressions,
rather than referring expressions
 Some uses of definite descriptions (specifically, the
referential ones), give us object dependent propositions
II.
All singular terms (barring logically proper
names) are concealed definite descriptions
 Some singular terms – i.e. referential definite descriptions
– aren’t concealed attributive definite descriptions
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION
This undercuts Russell’s ability to give the answers he
does to the Puzzles:
Answers to (1) – (3) relied upon unpacking singular
terms as concealed definite descriptions
Answers to (4) – (6) relied upon definite descriptions not
leading us to object dependent propositions
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION – A RESPONSE?
As we’ll see in a few weeks, Grice distinguishes between:

Sentence meaning: The truth conditions of a sentence


(Kripke calls this ‘semantic reference’)
Speaker meaning: The proposition the utter intends
the audience to entertain

(Kripke calls this ‘speaker reference’)
Smith writes a reference consisting of nothing other than ‘Jones has
excellent handwriting’. Smith’s sentence means that Jones has
excellent handwriting, but readers will understand more. By
exploiting context, Smith has communicated a different proposition.
DONNELLAN’S OBJECTION – A RESPONSE?
M
The murder of Smith is insane
expresses an attributive proposition true of whoever is
the unique satisfier of ‘x murdered Smith’, but it can be
used referentially to have a speaker meaning which is an
object-dependent proposition about, say, Jones frothing
at the mouth in court.
The object-dependent proposition is communicated
because the audience can work out such a proposition
because he/she realises that the spectator thinks that
the man in the dock is the murderer of Smith, even
though he did not say that he was.
AN ASSESSMENT – WHERE ARE WE?
o
o
o
The Naïve Theory is unable to solve any puzzles.
Frege has a nice, lovely system which easily accounts
for the first three puzzles. However, he has trouble
with (5). Plus, his view forces us into postulating
senses.
Russell’s system looks grand at first glance, and has no
problem with the puzzles, but he can’t quite seem to
account for all the uses of definite descriptions. This
might undermine his whole account, in the end.
AN ASSESSMENT – WHERE ARE WE?
There is a kind of unifying thesis, underlying both Frege
& Russell’s views on singular terms:
A singular term links up with its referent in virtue of
describing it.
 Frege: the mode of presentation captured in the sense
determines the referent
 Russell: the ‘singular term’ just is a description, and
the referent is the thing that fits the description
AN ASSESSMENT – WHERE ARE WE?
We might say that both ascribed to The Description
Theory of Names (a.k.a. descriptivism), which says that
each name N has the semantic value of some description
(be it a logical one, as for Russell, or a mode of
presentation, as for Frege.
Both are pushed towards this idea because of the first
three puzzles: it seems that only by appealing to
‘descriptions’ are we able to account for the apparent
difference in semantic content between ‘a’ and ‘b’ when
both denote the same object.
AN ASSESSMENT – WHERE ARE WE?
What we’ll look at in the next few weeks is a theory that
rejects descriptivism; specifically, Kripke’s theory of
rigid designation & the associated causal theory of
reference
If descriptivism is wrong, two questions come up:
(1) Reference: What determines what a name refers to?

Kripke’s answer: the causal picture of reference
(2) Meaning: What is the meaning of a name?

Kripke answer: names are rigid designators, and the
meaning of a name is definitely not it’s sense
A FAVOUR
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
How do you find these lectures?
a. Too much/too little material being covered?
How do you find the reading?
a. Too much reading for each week?
b. Too little? (i.e. would prefer additional ‘extras’)
How do you find the assingments?
a. How long do you spend on the assignment?
b. Are there too many/too few questions?
c. Do the assignments help you understand the reading?
What is the worst thing about the class?
What is the best thing about the class?
If you were running the class, what one thing would
you do differently?