Philosophy 220
The Moral Status of the Non-Human
World: Cohen and Warren
Regan and Animal Rights

Tom Regan makes clear his commitment to the
animal rights movement in the article “Are Zoos
Morally Defensible.”

As he articulates it, that movement has three
central goals.
1. Abolition of the use of animals in science.
2. The dissolution of commercial agriculture.
3. The elimination of sport hunting and trapping.

Only abolition is possible. “You don’t change
unjust institutions by tidying them up.”
Some Key Assumptions
 Regan specifies three assumptions central to
his effort to establish that NHAs have moral
rights and thus that we are wrong when we
treat them like resources.
1. Some creatures are possessed of inherent value.
2. Those that are, are possessed of it equally.
3. Inherent value necessitates respect, where respect
is understood (following Kant) as requiring treating
possessors of inherent value as ends in themselves
rather than means.
Advantages of the Rights View
 According to Regan, there are a number of
advantages to thinking about moral
standing in terms of rights.
1. In principle this view finds all forms of racial,
sexual and social discrimination immoral.
2. In principle it denies that it is ever acceptable to
trample on rights in pursuit of good
consequences (zoos are cool, and presumably
add a lot of utility, but if animals are rights
holders, zoos are morally dubious enterprises).
The Argument
1.
No appropriately rational argument can limit the scope of this
respect to human beings. Can’t specify a non-question begging
account of inherent value that doesn’t also include NHAs.
2.
The property that explains our inherent value is being “the
experiencing subject of a life.” In our other vernacular, this is the
property that establishes DMS.
3.
We do not know (can not?) how far this notion extends, but we
do not need to. It is clear that NHAs exhibit this characteristic.
4.
Therefore, they have inherent value and thus the same right to
respect as human beings.
Cohen, ”Do Animals Have Rights?"
 Cohen takes up Regan's argument, ultimately
rejecting his claim on the grounds of a different
account of DMS.
 From his account, talk of animal rights is
mistaken, as is Regan’s characterization of a
Cohen-type position as morally equivalent to
racism or sexism (speciesism).
 He also disputes Regan’s analysis of the moral
status of the use of non-human animals on
basically consequentialist grounds.
Rights and Animals
 Cohen begins his discussion with a definition of rights.
 “A right (unlike an interest) is a valid claim, or potential
claim, made by a moral agent, under principles that
govern both the claimant and the target of the claim”
(348c1).
 Important features: distinction of rights from interests
(disputed by other accounts of rights); specification of the
function of moral agency.
Moral Standing and Rights
 Acknowledging the complexity of rights talk, Cohen
offers an account of DMS which rules out the claim that
animals (or other natural kinds) have rights.
 “Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only
among beings who actually do, or can, make moral
claims against one another” (486c1).
 He ultimately grounds the capacity here indicated in a
Kantian notion of autonomy.
 There is, Cohen makes clear, no CI for non-human
animals.
What about Speciesism?
 Here too, the question of DMS looms large.
 Without arguing directly against Singer's use of
sentience as the defining quality of DMS,
Cohen denies that, "…all sentient animals have
equal moral standing" (487c1).
 While racism has, "no rational grounds," insists
Cohen, preferring humans to other animals
does. They have rights after all?
What are the Consequences?
 It's easy to guess how Cohen is going to address
questions concerning possible consequentialist
analyses addressing, for example, animal
experimentation.
 Any such analysis is going to have to provide a
weighing mechanism by which we can compare the
various utilities and dis-utilities involved. Cohen insists
that the only appropriate mechanism should privilege
human value over that of non-human animals.
Warren, “Rights Compared”
 The common moral intuition about the rights of
Non-Human Animals seems to be that if they
have rights, these rights are limited relative to
human rights.
 If you could only save one would it be your new born infant or
a loyal family dog that you’ve had for a decade?
 Warren thinks that advocates of rights for NHAs
need to account for this intuited difference and
she aims to provide it.
Strength and Content
 Warren focuses our attention on two
different features of rights where
differences between rights of humans
and rights of NHAs might be apparent.
 Content: what the right protects.
 Strength: how strong overriding reasons would have
to be.
Human v. NHA: Content
 Given the differences between the forms of
consciousness and activity of humans and
NHAs, there are going to be many, specific
distinctions in content between human and
NHA rights.
 Ex. Freedom of Movement
 These distinctions should not mask a great
deal of commonality in terms of content.
 Ex. Right to Life
Human v. NHA: Strength
 In those places of overlapping content, the
distinguishing feature of human and NHA rights is
strength.
 In general, human rights can only be overwhelmed
by reasons stronger than those which would
overwhelm the rights of NHAs.
 Even if this is not true, the lack of autonomy and
reciprocity in the granting and respecting of rights
is good reason to hierarchize rights holders.
Infanticide, Again?
 Does this argument strand the human
infant or the severely retarded individual
on the side of the limited rights holders?
 Warren thinks not, both because they are
potentially or partially autonomous and
have value for us
Curnutt, “Vegetarianism”
 Curnutt is convinced that moral
arguments for vegetarianism coming
from consequentialism and rights-based
theories are incapable of addressing all
of the issues that have been raised.
 He offers in replacement an argument
grounded in something like the harm
principle.
The Old Arguments
 As Regan highlighted, consequentialists
like Matheny will find it difficult to argue
that the moral value of the
consequences of actions will always
require vegetarianism.
 Rights talk is so complex and
contentious that even Regan doesn’t get
the job done.
NEW
 Review the NEW argument for vegetarianism
as it is presented on (364c1).
 Some Notes:
 Prima Facie: on its face, presumed to be (but can be
overridden).
 Ultima Facie: on its face, (can't be overridden).
 Animal: vertebrate.
 Clearly, (3), (5) and (6) are the key moves in
the argument.
Killing Animals is Prima Facie Morally
Wrong.
 Harm: something that adversely affects an
individual or entity's interests
 Severity of harm dependent on centrality of interests. Welfare interests
are those that are (a) definitive of basic well-being, and (b) because
their realization is the necessary precondition of having interests.
 Killing NHAs harms them, independent of any
consequentialist or rights-based analyses.
 Therefore, assuming harm is prima facie morally
wrong, it is prima facie wrong to kill NHAs.
Animal Eating is Prima Facie Morally
Wrong
 On the basis of the conclusion that killing NHAs is prima
facie wrong, the conclusion that eating animals is also prima
facie morally wrong follows from the acknowledgment that
eating them requires killing them.
 A possible response comes from the recognition that rarely
do animal eaters actually kill the animals they eat.
 Curnutt rejects this response on the grounds of an analogy
with other forms of transfer (holocaust lamp; stolen stereo).
 Benefitting from a “morally nefarious practice” makes one complicit in the
immorality.
 In some cases, we may have no choice. However, animal eating is clearly
not one of them.
From Prima Facie to Ultima Facie
 The last step of Curnutt’s argument is demonstrating that the Prima Facie
wrongness of animal eating is in fact Ultima Facie wrongness.
 Demonstrating this requires arguments to the effect that the wrongness of
animal eating is not overridden by competing moral concerns.
 Curnutt identifies 4 different claims to overridingness
1.
2.
3.
4.

Traditional/Cultural: many obviously immoral practices have been so
supported, but that doesn’t change our evaluation.
Aesthetic: aesthetic appreciation is not generally regarded as sufficient to
override moral concerns.
Convenience: again, the fact that something is convenient is insufficient to
override its immorality.
Nutrition: NEW is not committed to veganism, just lacto-ovo vegetarianism.
Absent any persuasive claim to overringness, the prima facie
wrongness of animal eating is thus ultima facie.