L E E J A R V I S
S C H O O L O F P O L I T I C S , P H I L O S O P H Y ,
L A N G U A G E A N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N S T U D I E S
U N I V E R S I T Y O F E A S T A N G L I A
L . J A R V I S @ U E A . A C . U K
1 9 N O V E M B E R 2 0 1 4

 Proscription powers:
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Render specific terrorist groups illegal within a particular territory
Criminalise support for and membership of proscribed groups
Trigger further crimes, e.g. uniforms
 Outlawing ‘enemies of the state’:
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Widespread within and beyond liberal democracies
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Considerable history

 The Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation:
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‘…if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for, promotes or encourages terrorism or is otherwise concerned in terrorism’
Extended, in 2006, to include glorification offences
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Both Houses may debate, but not amend proscription orders
 As of August 2014:
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60 international terrorist organisations
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14 in Northern Ireland

 ‘Discretionary factors’:
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 the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the UK; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and the need to support other members of the international community
 Four purported functions:
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Make the UK a hostile environment for terrorists and their supporters
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Signal condemnation of proscribed groups
Support international partners in counter-terrorism
Sends ‘a strong message’ re. UK intolerance to terrorism
 Orders targeting multiple organisations are common

 Two questions dominate academic debate:
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Does proscription work?
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No real evidence but much scepticism
Is proscription justifiable?
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Freedoms of speech and assembly; Parliamentary scrutiny; Rights to resistance; Criminalisation of wider communities
 Preoccupation with causal questions:
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What does proscription do?
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To terrorist groups; to liberal democracy; to minority communities?
 Alternative – constitutive - questions:
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How has proscription come to be seen as an appropriate response to terrorism?
How do proscription processes constitute identities of self and other?

 Identity as performative, contingent and relational:
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‘Whether we are talking of “the body” or “the state,” or of particular bodies and states, the identity of each is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an
“inside” from an “outside”, a “self” from an “other”, a
“domestic” from a “foreign”’ (Campbell 1998: 9).
 Methodology:
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27 Parliamentary debates between October 2002 and June 2014
Discourse analysis:
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Proscription powers; Counter-terrorism policy
(general)
Self-identity; Terrorist others (general and specific)

 Otherness:
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‘like battling a hydra’ (Heath, 2006)
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‘cowards like to target civilians’ (Hopkins, 2011)
‘a small number of contorted and evil individuals can grab international headlines’ (Mercer, 2013)
 Irrational, non-political, and ‘new’:
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‘fundamentalist organisations are, by their nature, barking mad’, (Simpson, 2005)
‘the random slaughter of innocent individuals can play no part in the process of trying to bring about political change’ (Grieve, 2005)
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‘we all know that the nature of terrorism has changed’
(Smith, 2013)
 A considerable, and continuing, threat:
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‘a perpetual threat in this country’ (Ruffley, 2008)
‘We will be attacked again’ (Mercer 2005)

 Identity-based designations:
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Asbat Al-Ansar: ‘a Sunni Muslim terrorist organisation’ (Filkin, 2002)
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Minbar Ansar Deen: ‘a Salafist group based in the UK’ (Atlee, 2013)
‘Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi…is a left-wing organisation’ (Brokenshire,
2014)
 Chronological catalogues of atrocities:
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Al-Shabaab: ‘…has also launched terrorist attacks outside areas under its control, most notably in October 2008 when five co-ordinated suicide attacks were mounted against targets in Somaliland and Puntland, including the Ethiopian embassy, presidential palace and UN Development Programme compound’
(West, 2010)
 Specific threat emphasised:
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Al-Shabaab: ‘a very nasty group’ (Hawee, 2010)
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Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: ‘a murderous organisation’ (Green, 2011)
Four groups have: ‘Discernible links with al Qaeda’ (Blunkett 2002)

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Liberal, democratic and multicultural:
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‘Free speech is a cornerstone of our democracy’ (Blunt, 2010)
‘We must ensure that we properly respect individual freedoms and liberties while providing collective security for the country as a whole’ (Brokenshire, 2013)
‘I want to say how lucky we are that the relations between different cultures and races in this country are so good’ (Field, 2013)
 A responsible global citizen:
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‘supporting the rest of the international community to tackle terrorism’ (Blears,
2005)
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A responsible legislator:
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Proscription decisions are:
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‘tackled with the utmost seriousness and care’
(Blunkett, 2002)
‘only after the most thorough scrutiny of all the intelligence’ (Bassam, 2005)

 Repetition within and across Parliamentary debates:
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Formulaic structure and explicit citation
Similar questions and criticisms resurface each time
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‘Why now?’; ‘Why not X group?’; ‘How does deproscription work?’
 Genuine dissent is rare, although existent:
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Organisations change:
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‘The Government’s argument…can be summed up this way: once a terrorist, always a terrorist. This is a nonsense’, (Corbett, 2008)
Subjectivity of terrorism:
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‘We also recognise that one man’s terrorist activity outside Britain is another person’s armed resistance’, (Wallace, 2008)
Right to resistance:
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‘whenever it is argued that the organisations that we are proscribing seek to overthrow a legitimate government, we should have a thorough discussion about the legitimacy of that government. We must be sure that not all those who are engaged in armed struggle are defined as terrorists (McDonnell, 2005)

 More frequently, critics of proscription reproduce self/other distinction:
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‘British citizens are made the subject of the criminal law and their rights to support political organisations are constrained
 by what is very largely an Executive action’ (Hogg, 2002)
‘When we put names on a list of proscribed organisations, it seems reasonable to ask what evidence we have of the involvement of any of them in current actions that have threatened the security of the United Kingdom. To be unable to get an answer to that is deeply worrying in the democratic process’
(Simpson, 2005)

 Limited conception of security politics within academic debate:
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Executives, exceptionalisms and emergency powers dominate debate (see Neal 2012a, b, c)
Similarly the case for critical/constructivist research:
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‘Securitization studies…suffer from being elitist. What matters above all for the school is ‘top leaders’, ‘states’, ‘threatened elites’ and ‘audiences’ with agenda-making power’ (Booth 2005: 166).
 Proscription matters:
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An important, yet neglected, counter-terrorism technique
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For the (re)production of national and other identities
For our understanding of the contemporary politics of security

Presentation from ongoing research with Dr. Tim
Legrand, Australia National University (ANU).
Comments and feedback most welcome: l.jarvis@uea.ac.uk
and tim.legrand@anu.edu.au