Tracking developments in technoscience: regulation of incapacitating
chemical agents under the Chemical
Weapons Convention
Biochem 2030
1st October 2013
Dr Michael Crowley
Project coordinator
Bradford Nonlethal Weapon Research Project
.
Chemical Weapons Convention
Article 1:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or
transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical
weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use
chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention.
OPCW structures and mechanisms to review S&T
“We are facing a time of rapid advances in science and technology. New
chemical compounds and production methods are constantly being
researched and discovered, affording the global community many benefits
but also bringing with them certain risks. The need to understand these
changes and to bring them to the attention of our States Parties has never
been more pressing. The Convention is a disarmament treaty tied closely to
science, and the dynamic nature of science has a direct impact on our own
work. It is, therefore, our responsibility to adequately assess and address
new developments that may affect the implementation of the Convention.”
Director General’s Opening statement, 16th Conference of the States Parties
29th November 2011
“The Convention’s objective…will only be successfully achieved and
maintained if advances in science and technology are effectively monitored
and evaluated. To achieve this, the OPCW, building on its accomplishments
so far, should improve and widen the scope of monitoring and evaluating
developments in chemical science and technology and, at the same time,
make full use of these developments to improve the quality of its own work.”
Report of the advisory panel on future priorities of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 25th July 2011.
OPCW structures and mechanisms to review S&T
Technical Secretariat
“…the Organisation’s scientific competence must be strengthened further.
Therefore, resources should be set aside for the creation within the
Technical Secretariat of adequate capacity to manage and support the
systematic monitoring of relevant scientific developments. This could
for example be a Science Adviser, or a small unit or part of an office
working directly under the guidance of the Director-General and at the
same time having access to all Divisions of the Technical Secretariat.
Such a function could also serve as a permanent secretariat of the SAB and
assist with the proposing and drafting of the agenda of the SAB and the
compilation of documentation on scientific matters under review by the
SAB. Furthermore, it could assist the Director-General and the Executive
Council in assessing scientific and technological information made available
to the Organisation, including the findings of the SAB.”
OPCW, Technical Secretariat, Ekeus Panel Report, (25th July 2011) paragraph
78.
OPCW structures and mechanisms to review S&T
Scientific Advisory Board – terms of reference
a. assess and report to the Director-General developments in scientific and
technological fields relevant to the Convention;
b. as necessary, provide advice on proposed changes to the Annex on Chemicals
originated by States Parties in accordance with Article XV of the Convention;
c. co-ordinate the efforts of the working groups temporarily established…;
d. as necessary, provide scientific and technological advice relevant to the
Convention, including advice on technical matters related to co-operation and
assistance, to the Technical Secretariat upon request;
e. upon the request of the Director-General, assess the scientific and technological
merit of a present, or proposed, methodology for use by the Technical
Secretariat in verification under the Convention;
f. …provide advice and make recommendations taking into account any relevant
scientific and technological developments for the purpose of assisting the
Conference in its review of the operation of the Convention;
g. assess and report on emerging technologies and new equipment which could be
used on verification activities.
OPCW structures and mechanisms to review S&T
Conference of States Parties/Review Conference
“The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth
and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and at such
other times within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in
special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.
Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and
technological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, unless
otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be
convened with the same objective.”
OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) Article VIII, paragraph 22.
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Review Conference will:
“review scientific and technological developments that could affect
the operation of this Convention...”
OPCW, Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) Article VIII, paragraph 21.
Incapacitating chemical agents
(Incapacitants)
Can be considered as: substances whose
chemical action on specific biochemical
processes and physiological systems,
especially those affecting the higher
regulatory activity of the central nervous
system, produce a disabling condition
(e.g. can cause incapacitation or
disorientation, incoherence, hallucination,
sedation, loss of consciousness) or at
higher concentrations, death.
(Adapted from Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. and Wheelis, M. (eds) (2007) Incapacitating
Biochemical Weapons, Lanham: Lexington Books).
Classical
Industrial
Bioregulators
chemical
pharmaceutical
Peptides
weapons
chemicals
Toxins
Genetically
Traditional
modified
biological
biological
weapons
weapons
Cyanide
Fentanyl
Substance P
Staphylococcal
Modified
Bacteria
Phosgene
Carfentanil
Neurokinin A
enterotoxin B
bacteria and
Viruses
Mustard
Remifentanil
(SEB)
viruses
Rickettsia
Nerve
Etorphine
Agents
Dexmedetomidine
Anthrax
Midazolam
Plague
Tularemia
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
Poison
Infect
Biochemical threat spectrum chart adapted from: Pearson, G. (2002) Relevant Scientific And
Technological Developments For The First CWC Review Conference, University of Bradford.
Potential dangers from
development/use of incapacitants
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dose-response problem
Erosion of norm against weaponization of toxicity
Proliferation and legitimization by states
Proliferation to, and misuse by, non-state actors
Camouflage offensive chemical weapons
programmes
Escalation to lethal chemical weapons
Use as a lethal force multiplier
Facilitation of torture and other human rights
violations
Militarisation of biology
Feasibility of “non-lethal”
incapacitants
• “The agent whereby people could be
incapacitated without risk of death in a tactical
situation does not exist and is unlikely to in the
foreseeable future. In such a situation, it is
and will continue to be almost impossible to
deliver the right agent to the right people in
the right dose without exposing the wrong
people, or delivering the wrong dose.”
British Medical Association Board of Science, The use of drugs as
weapons: The concerns and responsibilities of healthcare
professionals, London: BMA, May 2007
Use of incapacitant by Russian Federation:
Moscow theatre siege, October 2002
“The events in Moscow have opened up the
potential for this area of research (i.e.
incapacitating/immobilizing chemicals) to be
explored in much greater depth. It would not be
surprising if a number of countries were
conducting more detailed and renewed research
as a result.”
Stanley, T. Director of the Anaesthesiology Research Laboratories at the University
of Utah, 2004
“There is clearly an on-going attraction to
“incapacitating chemical agents” but it is not easy
to determine the extent to which this has moved
along the spectrum from academia and industrial
circles into the law enforcement, security and
military apparatuses of States.”
International Committee of the Red Cross, Incapacitating chemical agents,
implications for international law, report of expert meeting, Montreux, 24th-26th
March 2010
Advances in science and technology:
agent development
“In addition to drugs causing calming or
unconsciousness, compounds on the
horizon with potential as military agents
include noradrenaline antagonists such as
propranolol to cause selective memory loss,
cholecystokinin B agonists to cause panic
attacks, and substance P agonists to induce
depression. The question thus is not so
much when these capabilities will arise —
because arise they certainly will — but what
purposes will those with such capabilities
pursue.”
Wheelis, M. and Dando, M. Neurobiology: A case study of the imminent militarization of
biology. International Review of the Red Cross, September 2005.
Advances in science and technology:
agent development
“Recent years have seen a rapid advance in
the discovery of new bioregulators,
especially of the incapacitating ones, in the
understanding of their mode of action and
synthetic routes for manufacture. Some of
these compounds may be many hundreds of
times more potent than the traditional
chemical warfare agents. Some very
important characteristics of new
bioregulators that would offer significant
military advantages are novel sites of toxic
action; rapid and specific effects; penetration
of protective filters and equipment, and
militarily effective physical incapacitation.”
Boken, S. The toxicology of bioregulators as potential agents of bioterrorism, Arh Hig
Tokiskol, 2005, Vol.56,pp.205-211.
Advances in science and technology:
means of delivery
“New nanotechnologies have allowed molecular
conjugation or encapsulation that may permit
unprecedented access [of drugs] to the brain”…
Nanotechnologies can also exploit existing transport
mechanisms to transmit substances into the brain in
analogy with the Trojan horse”
•
Gas phase techniques/nanotechnologies:
“pharmacological agents are not used as weapons of
mass effect, because their large-scale deployment is
impractical” as it is “currently impossible to get an
effective dose to a combatant.” However the report
states that “technologies that could be available in
the next 20 years would allow dispersal of agents in
delivery vehicles that would be analogous to a
pharmacological cluster bomb or a land mine.”
National Research Council 2008, Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience
and Related Techniques
Chemical Weapons Convention
Article 1:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or
transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical
weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use
chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention.
Article 2.2 defines a “toxic chemical” as:
any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of
production, which, through chemical action on life
processes, can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans…”
Article 2.1(a), states that chemical weapons include all
‘‘toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where
intended for purposes not prohibited, as long as
the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes.’’
Under ‘‘purposes not prohibited’’ Article 2.9 includes:
(c) “Military purposes not connected with the use of
chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of
the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of
warfare”
(d)‘‘Law enforcement including domestic riot control
purposes,’’
Resolving ambiguities
•
Second CWC Review Conference, 2008, Swiss Government National Statement:
“Switzerland fears that the uncertainty concerning the status of incapacitating agents
risks to undermine the Convention. A debate on this issue in the framework of the
OPCW should no longer be postponed.”
•
Pakistan Government National Statement:“We are particularly concerned about the
question of what have on different occasions been called either non-lethal agents or
incapacitating agents. Irrespective of the terminology used, it is important to bear in
mind that the influence of advanced military technologies has often led to a search for
exploiting real or perceived loopholes in legal instruments in order to circumvent their
prohibitions. It would be unfortunate if the CWC were to be subjected to similar
treatment. We believe this issue needs more attention than has so far been devoted
to it.”
•
Swiss Government Working Paper called:“upon States Parties to consider adopting
during the Second Review Conference a mandate for a discussion of, inter alia, an
agreed definition of incapacitating agents, the status of incapacitating agents under
the Convention, and possible transparency measures for incapacitating agents.”
•
Ambassador Pfirter, OPCW Director General Opening Statement, 14th CSP, 30th
November 2009:“One other matter I wish to refer to is my perception about the need
for the OPCW, at some stage in the not too distant future, to take stock of the growing
interest on the part of some governments and civil society, in developments related to
matters where the Convention might be—perhaps purposely—ambiguous or
have lacunae, and which might impact on the ultimate effectiveness of the ban
on chemical weapons. Incapacitants or non-lethal weapons is one such area
when it comes to the exact types and quantities of chemicals and their
permitted use. The Scientific Advisory Board could help shed some light on
this matter and the Third Review Conference might offer the appropriate
context for an initial formal look into it.”
Third Review Conference: SAB Report
“12…The Board considers the term “non-lethal” as inappropriate when referring
to chemicals intended for use as incapacitants, because for all chemicals
toxicity is a matter of dosage. The Board noted that chemicals considered
having high safety margins in the context of controlled pharmaceutical use
can have very low safety margins in the context of incapacitants when
factors such as uneven dissemination, variability in human response, and
the possible need for a rapid onset are required. It was also emphasised that
the issue is not just what incapacitating chemical is used for law enforcement
purposes, but how it is used, and the consequences such a use may have.”
“13… In the view of the SAB the technical discussion on the potential use of toxic
chemicals for law enforcement purposes has been exhaustive. It may continue its
discussions once technical information about specific candidate chemicals and/or
dissemination systems is made available…
The SAB recommends that the Secretariat start preparations for verification
activities, relevant to incapacitating chemicals, that could be required in an
investigation of alleged use (IAU). Such preparations should include developing
analytical methods and procedures, as well as collecting analytical reference data
for the analysis of such chemicals. The Secretariat should invite laboratories in
Member States to contribute to this effort.”
OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and
Technology for the Third Review Conference RC-3/DG.1, 8th – 19th April 2013 29th October 2012, paragraph s12&13.
Third Review Conference Opening Statements
Switzerland was “particularly concerned about the issue of so-called incapacitating
chemical agents… [and] fear[ed] that the silence and uncertainty surrounding the use of
toxic chemicals for law enforcement purposes other than riot control agents risks eroding the
Convention.” …a debate on this issue in the framework of the OPCW should no longer be
delay[ed] until the next Review Conference, which is why my delegation has proposed language
for this Conference’s final document.
Germany: “In the past years the issue of “toxic chemicals for law enforcement” has been
extensively discussed in various fora outside the OPCW…There is now a substantial body of
scientific analysis on developments [regarding “incapacitating chemical agents”] that have taken
place since the entry-into-force of the Convention.” Citing, the Review Conference’s “specific
mandate to “take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments””,
Germany consequently recommended that the Conference should “through its final
declaration initiate discussions on the issue of “toxic chemicals for law enforcement.”
UK: involved in the “ongoing discussions on the place of incapacitating chemical agents
in the Convention, particularly given scientific change and the absence of any definition or
common understanding of law enforcement.” UK highlighted reports of the Royal Society and
the SAB, noted that “[b]oth have set out the scientific position as well as advancing our
understanding of the complex issues surrounding this topic” and declared that the OPCW should
“address such relevant issues and show leadership…UK recommended that the OPCW
“should work together to establish a norm to discourage the use of chemicals more toxic
than Riot Control Agents for law enforcement and consider transparency measures or
limitations.” UK stated it: neither holds, nor is developing, any incapacitating chemical agents for
law enforcement…and encourage[d] all other States Parties to state their positions on this
question.”
Incapacitants and the Third Review Conference
“The Third Review Conference noted that the application of toxic
chemicals, which through their chemical action on life process can
cause temporary incapacitation, for purposes not prohibited by the
Convention, including for law enforcement purposes, could be
discussed by meetings of governmental experts of States Parties,
operating on the basis of consensus. A factual report of such
meetings, setting out the views expressed, would be transmitted to
the Executive Council for further consideration.”
Draft incapacitants text for Third Review Conference Final Document
“Due to the increasing support we [have] experience[d] during the last months
the momentum has been built. Consequently we will continue our efforts in
order to further develop it.”
Closing Statement, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the OPCW
Third Review Conference: Convergence
SAB Report:
“Advances considered under the general term “convergence of chemistry and biology”
are accelerating at an unprecedented rate, particularly in synthetic biology. A
feature of the technology is that it overlaps the remits of the Convention and the
BWC, and some aspects, for example, bioregulators and their analogues, risk
falling between the two. The SAB considers it important that the Secretariat
expands its in-house knowledge of these developments. The SAB recommends
that regular assessments of the implications for implementation of the Convention
should be undertaken, using expertise within the SAB, the TWG on the
convergence of chemistry and biology, and the Secretariat. The SAB further
recommends that the Secretariat establish a process for increasing the interaction
of the Secretariat and SAB with experts associated with the BWC, in particular with
its Implementation Support Unit.”
Director General Response to SAB Report:
DG recommended that the Conference “acknowledge that... the convergence of
chemistry and biology and other sciences is a development that will likely pose both
challenges and opportunities for the Convention; and “note that this is a field of rapid
advances and therefore requires systematic monitoring by the Secretariat and by the
SAB.” He also recommended that the Conference “encourage States Parties to
submit their own assessments of the convergence of the sciences” and “recommend
increased interaction between technical experts in chemistry and biology.”
Third Review Conference Final Document: Convergence
The Review Conference:
“noted the increasing convergence of chemistry and biology, and
welcomed the establishment of the SAB temporary working group
on the convergence of chemistry and biology to explore and
consider the potential implications of these advances to the
Convention.”
Furthermore, the Conference:
“encouraged States Parties and the Secretariat to continue to keep
the convergence of chemistry and biology under review, including
through the SAB temporary working group on the convergence of
chemistry and biology, and encouraged greater interaction between
relevant experts”
OPCW, Report of the Third Review Conference, Part B, paragraphs 9.142 & 9.155(c)