SMART GRID COMMUNICATION
SECURITY
EE5970 Computer Engineering
Seminar
Professor : Dr. Zhuo feng
OVERVIEW
• Introduction
• History
• Why do we need cyber security
• How do we achieve it
• Summary
• Conclusion
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What is smart grid
• Smart grids – add communication capabilities and
intelligence to traditional grids
• What enables smart grids
I. Intelligent sensors and actuators
II. Extended data management system
III. Expanded two way communication between
utility operation system facilities and customers
IV. Network security
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Primary objectives of smart grids
• National integration
• Self healing and adaptive –Improve distribution and transmission system
operation
• Allow customers freedom to purchase power based on dynamic pricing
• Improved quality of power-less wastage
• Integration of large variety of generation options
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Economic and social benefits of smart
grids
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Provide Customer Benefits
Reduce Peak Demand
Increase Energy Conservation & Efficiency
Reduce Operating Expenses
Increase Utility Worker Safety
Improve Grid Resiliency and Reliability
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Promote Energy Independence
Promote Economic Growth & Productivity
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HISTORY
Need to automate
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Transformation from mechanical relays
to microprocessors
GE CFD
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Intel 4004
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Intelligent electronic devices
(IED)explosion
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Protection relay
Auxiliary relay
Cheap contractors
Remote terminal units
Circuit breaker monitor
Revenue meters
Solar flare detectors
Power quality monitors
Phasor measurement units
Communication processors
Communication alarm etc
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Telecontrol
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SCADA (North America)
Different protocols for different operations
Proprietary protocols (more than 100)
Modbus
DNP
IEC61850
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SCADA Protocols list (Not complete
list )
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Siemens quad 4 meter
CONITEL 2000
CONITEL 2100
CONITEL 3000
CONITEL 300
HARRIS 5000
HARRIS 5600
HARRIS 6000
UCA 2.0 or MMS
PG & E 2179
MODBUS
DNP3
ICCP
IEC 61850
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Few existing general protocols
• MODBUS -Primitive with no security and not
very extensible
• DNP3 –Advanced SCADA protocol
• DNP1 and 2 are proprietary protocols
• IEC 61850 the most used protocol for new
implementations
• ICCP
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ARCHITECTURE OF SMART GRIDS
Architecture of smart grids
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Source : Fluke corporation
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Architecture of communication
infrastructure [1]
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Communication media used for smart
grids[1]
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Urge for new FCC allocation for smart grids
PLC –Power line carriers
Ethernet
WLAN
Zigbee
Bluetooth
Optical fiber
Microwave etc
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Priority and types of information
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security for smart grid
Communication modelCyber
, source:
NIST Vol 1
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Why ?
• Network security is a priority and not a add
on for smart grids
• Protecting control center alone - not enough
• Remote acess to devices
• Qos requirement from security system
• Safety (line worker public and equipment)
• Reliability and availability
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Physical Manifestation
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Source : YouTube
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Different communication
systems[4]
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Adversaries[5]
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Nation states
Hackers
Terrorist /Cyber terrorists
Organized crime
Other criminal elements
Industrial competitors
Disgruntled employees
Careless and poorly trained employees
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Classification of attacks
• Component based attacks
• Protocol based attack
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COMPONENT BASED ATTACKS
COMPONENT BASED ATTACK STUXNET
• Specifically programmed to attack scada and could
reprogram PLC’s
• Zero day attack
• Highly complex
• 0.5 Mb file transferred able to multiply
• Targets- Iran nuclear plants ,Process plants in Germany and
ISRO India
Source: wikipedia
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SCADA attacks
• Internal attacks
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Employee
Contractor
• External attacks
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Non specific- malware , hackers
Targeted
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Special knowledge – former insider
No special knowledge –hacker terrorist
Natural disaster
Manmade disasters
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Scada vulnerability points
• Unused telephone line – war dialing
• Use of removable media – stuxnet
• Infected Bluetooth enabled devices
• Wi-Fi enabled computer that has Ethernet connection to scada
system
• Insufficiently secure Wi-Fi
• Corporate LAN /WAN
• Corporate web server email servers internet gateways
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CYBER ATTACKS ON SCADA
• Web servers or SQL attacks
• Email attacks
• Zombie recruitment
• DDOS attacks
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Protocol based attacks
• All protocols runs on top of IP protocol and IP protocol has its own
set of weakness
• DNP3 implements TLS and SSL encryption which is weak
• The protocol is vulnerable to out-of-order, unexpected or
incorrectly formatted packets
• A significant weakness for IEC 61850 is that it maps to MMS
(Manufacturing message specification)as the communications
platform, which itself has a wide range of potential vulnerabilities
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Unique security challenges in smart
grids
• Scale
• Legacy devices
• Field location
• Culture of security through obscurity
• Evolving standards and regulations
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How ?
• Security by obscurity
• Trust no one
• Layered security framework
• Efficient firewall
• Intrusion detection
• Self healing security system
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Key management[1]
• Issue of key management – Scale
• PKI with trusted computing elements-
considerable amount of security
• Embedded computing Vs general purpose
computing
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Basic PKI Infrastructure [1]
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Issues with PKI[3]
• Updating the keys
• Parameter generation
• Key distribution
• Staffing for key management
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Types of security[1]
• Reactive Vs Proactive security
• Reactive
– Incident response plan
– Applied for general purpose computers more
• Proactive Security for embedded computers
• High assurance boot
• Secure software validation
• Secure association termination if found infected
• Device assertation
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Incidence response plan[1]
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Attack trees for assessment of
cyber security[2]
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Calculation of cyber security
conditions (omega)
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Weighing factor for password
policy
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Calculations of vulnerability index
• Leaf VI : max( total countermeasures
implemented /total countermeasures
available x ω , ω x weighing factor of password
policy)
• Scenario vulnerability index : Product of its
leaf vulnerability indices
• System vulnerability index is the max of all
scenario vulnerabilities indices
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Use of attack trees to assess security
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Summary
• Different security constraints that makes securing smart
grids a difficult problem
• Several highly efficient adversaries
• Use existing protocols like IP with known vulnerabilities and
work around to using new protocols with unknown
vulnerabilities
• Use of layered security architecture and attack tree’s for
efficient security and risk assessment
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Groups working on smart grids
• UCA International user group
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www.ucaiug.org
• International electrochemical commission
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www.iec.ch
• Electric power research institute
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www.epri.com
• Intelligrid consortium and architecture
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www.intelligrid.epri.com
• IEEE smart grid
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www.smartgrid.ieee.org
• NIST
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Conclusion
• 25% of united states already runs smart grids
• Any tiny vulnerabilities should be not be compromised
• Scalable and adaptable security system
• Light weight and self healing capabilities
• Hybrid between centralized and distributed
• Impenetrable and fail proof
• Security should be real time
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References
[1] Metke, A.R.; Ekl, R.L.; , "Security Technology for Smart Grid Networks," Smart Grid, IEEE
Transactions on , vol.1, no.1, pp.99-107, June2010
doi: 10.1109/TSG.2010.2046347
[2] Chee-Wooi Ten, Chen-Ching Liu, and Manimaran Govindarasu, "Vulnerability Assessment of
Cybersecurity for SCADA Systems," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 23, no. 4, pp.
1836-1846, Nov. 2008
[3] Khurana, H.; Hadley, M.; Ning Lu; Frincke, D.A.; , "Smart-Grid Security Issues," Security &
Privacy, IEEE , vol.8, no.1, pp.81-85, Jan.-Feb. 2010
doi: 10.1109/MSP.2010.49
URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5403159&isnumber=5403
138
[4] Dong Wei; Yan Lu; Jafari, M.; Skare, P.; Rohde, K.; , "An integrated security system of protecting
Smart Grid against cyber attacks," Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 2010 , vol., no.,
pp.1-7, 19-21 Jan. 2010
doi: 10.1109/ISGT.2010.5434767
URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5434767&isnumber=5434
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[5] NIST guidelines for smart grid security Vol 1
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THANK YOU FOR LISTENING