British Airways (BA): Economic Issues
英航案：经济学问题
China Antimonopoly forum, Shanghai, 9 November, 2012 中国反垄断论坛.上海. 2012.11.9
Derek Ridyard, Partner, RBB Economics LLP, London
derek.ridyard@rbbecon.com
The BA case: form v effects-based approaches
英航案：形式分析和效果分析
Form (or rules) based approach Effects (economic) approach效果（经
形式（法律）分析
济）分析
Does BA account for >40% of the airline
ticketing business of UK travel agents?
BA在英国旅行公司出售飞机票市场上的份
额超过40%了吗？
Have BA travel agent rebates succeeded
in defending BA share above what it
would otherwise have been? BA的折扣制
度是否让它竞争中过的了非常规的成功？
Does BA face effective rivalry/competition
from other airlines, both in and outside UK?
BA面临着英国境内外航空公司的有效竞争吗？
Do BA rebates result in price differences
that cannot be explained by cost
differences – i.e. price discrimination? BA
的折扣是否不能通过成本差异进行解释，
也即是否是歧视？
Is the differentiation in BA ticket prices
caused by the rebates explicable in terms of
legitimate commercial objectives by BA?
Have BA rebates foreclosed effective rivalry
from other airlines within and outside the
UK?BA折扣行为是否排除了来自英国境内外航
空公司的有效竞争？
折扣所造成的机票价格的差异背后是否存在合
法的商业目的？
2
The importance of a clear theory of harm
竞争损害理论的重要性


Competition law intervention can change the way a market works, and
fundamentally affect economic incentives 竞争法的干预可以改变市场运作方
式，并且能根本性影响经济动机。
Bork’s “Antitrust paradox” – competition laws assume that competitive
markets provide efficient outcomes, but then use government intervention to
adjust those outcomes, and penalise winners 博克的“反垄断悖论”—竞争
法假设竞争性市场提供了有效率的产出，但是又通过政府干预调整这些产出并
惩罚获胜者。

Complainants have clear incentives to use competition laws to protect them
from competition – can’t assume their interests align with those of
consumers 原告们有着明确的动机：用竞争法使他们在竞争中得到保护—但
是不能假设他们的利益和消费者利益具有直接的联系。

Of course, valid competition law interventions do exist, but they need to be
clearly based on – and justified by – a valid theory of competitive harm 当然，
有效的竞争法干预的确存在，但是它需要清晰地建立在正当的竞争性损害理论
之上并为之调整。
3
Roll-back rebates – foreclosure theory of harm
反向折扣——排挤损害竞争



The BA case concerned the incentives BA paid to
UK travel agents when selling airline tickets 英航案
关注的是英航在销售机票时给旅行公司付费的动机
BA was by far the largest UK airline, and so it was
the most important airline customer for travel agent about 40% of the agent’s air tickets were BA 英航是
英国最大的航空公司，因此也是旅游公司最重要的航
空客户，他们大约40%的航空机票来自英航。
BA had incentive deals to encourage the agent to
choose BA over rival airlines, e.g. 英航从销售额度上
鼓励旅行公司选择自己的机票而不是他人的机票，例
如
4
Roll-back rebates – foreclosure theory of harm
反向折扣——排挤损害竞争


– 10% base rate travel agent commission on BA sales 给旅游公司英航销
售额10%的折扣
– But 11% on all tickets if the travel agent sold more than (say) 1000 BA
tickets 如果旅游公司销售BA公司机票超过1000张，则返还全部票款的
11%
– Key feature is that higher commission rate applied across all tickets
sold, so potentially powerful incentives for agent to favour BA 关键在于
更高的退款率适用于全部机票，因此促使旅游公司更乐意选择英航。
BA scheme thus amounted to a kind of “roll-back” rebate scheme 英航策
略就此相当于一种“反向”折扣
Concern was that the incentives to sell more BA tickets would prevent
rival airlines – including Virgin – from gaining sales, thus strengthening
BA’s UK market leadership 关注点在于估计销售更多英航的机票阻碍其他
航空公司的机票销售，并因此增强英航的领先地位。
5
DEREK RIDYARD
Illustrative roll-back rebate scheme 反向折扣的说明
Customer’s
Customer’s
Expenditure
Expenditure
客户的支出
Customer gains
cash rebate of €9
with 100th unit 每
销售100个客户获
得9英镑
Then €0.90
per unit if
sales之后
如果继续销
售每单位
€0.90
Price €1 per
unit for first
99 units前99
单位每单位
€1
Domco variable
Domco’s
Cost Cost
(€0.50 per unit)
Domco的成本
（每单位€0.50 ）
100
100
Purchases
Purchases
购货
6
Customer’s
Expenditure客户客户支出
DEREK RIDYARD
Analysing incentive effects 激励措施的效果分析
From point X,
additional units
cost customer
nothing从X开始，
额外销售不增加
客户的成本
A
At point Y,
marginal price
is negative
在Y点，边际价
格是负的
B
Y
€9 rebate
€9 折扣
X
Purchases
购货
C
90
Domco
Cost
Domco的成本
100
7
The competitor’s perspective 竞争者的观点
Price (€)
价格
C
A
0.90
B
Cost
0.50
成本
Total Sales
0
Competitor Sales
竞争对手的销售额
100
Domco Sales
Domco的销售额
Total sales
销售总额
8
The Court’s criticism of BA conduct 法院对BA行为的评判





BA incentives were not cost justified BA的动机不具备成本
合理性
BA scheme meant that BA enjoyed higher market share
than it would otherwise have achieved 英航折扣制度意味
着英航能够获得正常不能得到的市场份额
BA scheme was designed to achieve customer loyalty 英
航折扣旨在赢得客户的忠诚
But none of these distinguishes competitive from anticompetitive conduct 但是所有这些并没有将促进竞争的行
为与限制竞争行为区别开来
And none provides useful compliance guidance for other
dominant firms 也没有给其他具有支配地位的公司提供有
用的合规性指导。
9
Problems with the BA case (and others)
英航案件（以及其他案件）的问题


Could rebate schemes of the kind operated by BA foreclose rivals?
Clearly YES 英航的“折扣”策略能排除竞争对手吗？很明显能够。
But given the actual operation of schemes and market context, DID BA UK
travel agent incentives foreclose competitors?但是考虑到计划的实际操作
和市场环境，英航的英国旅游公司会不会被鼓励去排除竞争对手?
– BA continued to face competition from international rivals (Air France,
United Airlines, Lufthansa, etc) 英航继续面对来自国际对手的竞争（法
国航空公司、美国航空公司、德国汉莎航空公司等等）
– Many of these airlines enjoyed similar position to BA in domestic
markets许多航空公司在国内市场享有和英航类似的地位
– All were able to operate their own incentive schemes to travel agents
both in the UK and elsewhere在英国和其他地方，它们都能够对旅行社
实施自己的激励政策,
– Even amongst UK-based carriers, Virgin Atlantic steadily gained share
throughout period at BA’s expense 甚至在英国的航空公司中，维珍大西
洋航空公司正在稳步的抢夺英航的市场份额。
10
Problems with the BA case (and others)
英航案件（以及其他案件）的问题

Effects-based approach requires simple test:效果
分析方法只要需要进行很简单的测试:
– Theory of harm is foreclosure of competing airlines 对
竞争的损害是对排除竞争的航空公司
– BA plainly did not foreclose rivals 英航显然并没有排除
竞争对手
– So the theory of harm against BA’s travel agent
rebates should be rejected. 因此不应该认为英航行为对
旅行公司进行折扣的行为具有损害竞争的效果
11
The case for effects-based enforcement 案件的执行效果
Effects-based enforcement driven by clear theory of harm效果分析方法
是要认定明确的损害竞争的效果
Is capable of identifying abuses and dealing with them 也能够认定滥用
并对之进行处理

Reduces scope for false convictions – hence interventions that
protect competitors without making markets more competitive 减少错
误判断，因此减少那些只保护竞争者却不能是市场竞争更为激烈的措
施

Avoids clear anomalies of rule-based enforcement 避免明显的形式分
析所产生的错误

Ensures competition law interventions – in this case constraints on
firms competing on price – are limited to instances where clear
market failure exists 确保竞争法只干预（限制经营者进行价格竞争）
市场明显失灵的情形
12
Locations and contact
London
Brussels
The Connection
198 High Holborn
London WC1V 7BD
Telephone +44 20 7421 2410
Email: london@rbbecon.com
Bastion Tower
Place du Champ de Mars 5
B–1050 Brussels
Telephone: +32 2 792 0000
Email: brussels@rbbecon.com
The Hague
Melbourne
Lange Houtstraat 37-39
2511 CV Den Haag
The Netherlands
Telephone: +31 70 302 3060
Email: thehague@rbbecon.com
Rialto South Tower, Level 27
525 Collins Street
Melbourne VIC 3000
Telephone: +61 3 9935 2800
Email: melbourne@rbbecon.com
Johannesburg
Augusta House, Inanda Greens
54 Wierda Road West
Sandton, 2196, Johannesburg
Telephone: +27 11 783 1949
Email: johannesburg@rbbecon.com
13