The Underwriting Cycle

Are Loss Reserves Reasonable in Light of Potential Underwriting Cycle

Biases?

December 2, 2011

PwC

Actuarial and Insurance Management Solutions (AIMS)

Agenda

Introduction

Pricing trends

Inspection of reserve adequacy

Implications on profitability

Slide 2

Introduction

Slide 3

What is the underwriting cycle?

Soft market

• Excessive capital

• Highly competitive

• Inadequate premiums

• Easing of terms & conditions

Hard market

• Less capital available

• Less competition

• Better price adequacy

• Stricter terms & conditions

Slide 4

How does the underwriting cycle impact reserves?

Pricing

Bias

Potential

Reserving

Bias

Slide 5

How does reserve adequacy impact pricing?

Potential

Pricing

Bias

Reserving

Bias

Slide 6

Inherent link?

Pricing

Bias

Reserving

Bias

Slide 7

Pricing trends

Slide 8

Pricing trends poll

According to MarketScout’s “Market Barometer

Report”, what is the average monthly composite P&C rate change for 2011?

a) +5% or more – happy days are here again b) 0% to +5% – rates are moderately up c) 0% to -5% – rates are moderately down d) -5% or less – where is the bottom?

Slide 9

Industry average rate changes

Source: www.MarketScout.com

Slide 10

Industry average earned rate index

Source: www.MarketScout.com

Slide 11

Industry average earned rate index

hard market

Source: www.MarketScout.com

soft market

Slide 12

Inspection of reserve adequacy

Slide 13

Reserve accuracy poll

At year-end 2010, what percentage of US P&C insurance companies’ hindsight reserves from year-end 2004 were within -10% to +10% of their originally recorded value?

a) 73% – isn’t it called actuarial “science”?

b) 52% – but on the other hand, there’s loads of judgment c) 37% – loads and loads of judgment d) 12% – but at least it can’t be negative

Slide 14

Percentage of companies with 2010 hindsight reserves within X% of initial recorded reserves

Companies with initial recorded reserves in excess of $1 million

Source: SNL, 2010

Calendar Within

Year End +/- 5%

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

14%

14%

19%

20%

17%

15%

15%

26%

39%

Within

+/-10%

26%

30%

34%

37%

35%

33%

37%

49%

64%

Within

+/- 25%

58%

64%

68%

67%

66%

67%

71%

79%

87%

Slide 15

Percentage of companies with 2010 hindsight reserves within X% of initial recorded reserves

Companies with initial recorded reserves in excess of $500 million

Source: SNL, 2010

Calendar Within

Year End +/- 5%

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

13%

11%

24%

29%

24%

22%

21%

35%

60%

Within

+/-10%

23%

32%

39%

49%

55%

48%

52%

71%

82%

Within

+/- 25%

51%

64%

77%

80%

88%

87%

92%

98%

98%

Slide 16

Percentage of companies with 2010 hindsight reserves within X% of initial recorded reserves

Companies with initial recorded reserves in excess of $1 million, ex 2000 & prior

Source: SNL, 2010

Calendar Within

Year End +/- 5%

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

20%

20%

20%

14%

13%

14%

14%

24%

37%

Within

+/-10%

38%

38%

38%

32%

28%

26%

29%

46%

63%

Within

+/- 25%

70%

70%

69%

66%

65%

65%

71%

79%

87%

Slide 17

Percentage of companies with 2010 hindsight reserves within X% of initial recorded reserves

Companies with initial recorded reserves in excess of $500 million, ex 2000 & prior

Source: SNL, 2010

Calendar Within

Year End +/- 5%

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

26%

30%

26%

16%

25%

22%

18%

30%

56%

Within

+/-10%

46%

47%

53%

41%

44%

34%

39%

59%

83%

Within

+/- 25%

72%

79%

84%

87%

85%

86%

90%

97%

98%

Slide 18

Percentage of companies with 2010 hindsight reserves within 10% of initial recorded reserves

Companies with initial recorded reserves in excess of $1 million – by line of business

Calendar

Year End

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Source: SNL, 2010

All

26%

30%

34%

37%

35%

33%

37%

49%

64%

Other Liab

Within +/-10%

CMP

14%

14%

21%

25%

28%

20%

28%

37%

59%

26%

30%

26%

29%

30%

30%

31%

47%

60%

WC

20%

21%

30%

43%

41%

39%

44%

59%

77%

PP AL

48%

50%

47%

41%

34%

40%

47%

53%

74%

Slide 19

Calendar year-end hindsight (redundancy)/deficiency

Emerged (redundancy)/deficiency as a % of initial booked reserves

Calendar

Year End

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Source: SNL, 2010

All

29%

22%

13%

4%

-2%

-4%

-4%

-5%

-2%

Other Liab

64%

57%

39%

18%

4%

-1%

-3%

0%

0%

CMP

26%

18%

7%

-2%

-4%

-9%

-10%

-6%

-4%

WC

28%

25%

18%

10%

3%

0%

1%

2%

1%

PP AL

3%

1%

-2%

-5%

-7%

-5%

-4%

-4%

-3%

Slide

20

Accident year hindsight (redundancy)/deficiency

Emerged (redundancy)/deficiency as a % of initial booked reserves

Accident

Year All Other Liab CMP WC PP AL

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Source: SNL, 2010

11%

18%

21%

9%

1%

-12%

-18%

-14%

-13%

-7%

-4%

-2%

26%

47%

44%

27%

23%

-8%

-26%

-22%

-16%

-7%

-2%

0%

15%

17%

23%

4%

-5%

-13%

-16%

-12%

-15%

-10%

-6%

-2%

23%

32%

34%

21%

8%

-8%

-19%

-20%

-13%

-4%

2%

1%

-4%

0%

2%

-1%

-3%

-9%

-10%

-9%

-6%

-3%

-3%

-2%

Slide 21

Accident year and calendar year hindsight emergence

Emerged (redundancy)/deficiency as a % of initial booked reserves

Source: SNL, 2010

Slide 22

Implications on profitability

Slide 23

The current market

• Lengthy soft market

• Potentially inadequate rates on recent accident years

• Possible optimistic pricing & reserving

• 5 consecutive years of reserve take-downs

• Calendar year operating results propped up by prior year releases

• Releases mask accident year profitability issues

• Erosion of reserve redundancies

• Weak macro-economic environment

• Low investment income

Slide 24

What drives the move from a soft to hard market?

According to the III, need the confluence of 4 criteria

1. Sustained period of large underwriting losses

2. Material decline in surplus/capacity

3. Tight reinsurance market

4. Renewed underwriting & pricing discipline

Slide 25

Prospective implications of underwriting cycle

• Is trouble ahead?

• Several consecutive years of inadequate rates

• Reserve redundancies used up?

• Low investment returns

• Market reactions before turn?

• M&A

• Coverage modifications

Slide 26

PwC Actuarial & Insurance Management Solutions

Scott Cederburg, FCAS, MAAA r.scott.cederburg@us.pwc.com

(678) 419-1539

Slide 27

Thank you

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