Injunctions for FRAND pledged SEPs: The Quest for an Appropriate Test of Abuse under Article 102 TFEU Universität Wurtzburg, 21 January 2014 Arbeitsgruppe Wettberwerb und Regulierung Prof. Nicolas Petit, University of Liege (ULG) Nicolas.petit@ulg.ac.be Outline 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 2 Setting the scene Options for tests of abuse Selection rule “Testing” the tests Conclusion www.chillingcompetition.com I. 3 Setting the scene www.chillingcompetition.com Apple filing of design patents (January 2007) 4 www.chillingcompetition.com Apple filing of design patents (June 2007) 5 www.chillingcompetition.com Apple v Samsung litigation (2011) 6 www.chillingcompetition.com The global smartphone war (1) Patent owners enforce their IPRs and seek injunctions in courts across the world (ie to obtain removal of infringing products) Patent (unlicensed) implementers raise allegations of unlawful abuse as a counterclaim Difficulty 1: some patents are core to standardized technologies (though not all) => “SEPs” Difficulty 2: some SEPs are encumbered by a FRAND commitment 7 www.chillingcompetition.com The global smartphone war (2) Samsung patents over “method and apparatus for reporting inter-frequency measurement using RACH message in a communication system”, which is allegedly UMTS-essential “apparatus and method for encoding/decoding transport format combination indicator in CDMA mobile communication system”, which is allegedly UMTS-essential Motorola patents over 8 H.264 video codec standard (for X-Box) IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard (for X-Box) www.chillingcompetition.com The global smartphone war (3) Two types of cases De facto standards Formal standards adopted by SSOs Different types of proceedings National litigation (patent infringement): Samsung v Apple EU Commission investigations: Samsung (Apple is complainant); Motorola (Microsoft is complainant) Different types of allegations 9 “Competition law” defense Violation of a FRAND commitment as abuse (patent hold-up) The global smartphone war (4) The legal issue 10 What test of abuse? A priori, ITT Promedia v Commission, T-111/96 as confirmed by Protégé International Ltd v Commission, T-119/09 But rise of a new test => arguably abusive to seek injunctions against a “willing licensee” www.chillingcompetition.com Germany v Commission? German test EU test FSC in Orange Book Standard Can be abusive to seek injunctions against a “willing licensee” 11 Press releases in ongoing investigations (21 12 12) If offer that “cannot be refused” Has acted “as if” he was already a licensee in good standing (acts of fulfillment) Very “patentee friendly” No formal standard, no FRAND pledge No final determination of abuse Unclear if ruling under German and/or EU law May be abusive where SEPs are concerned and the potential licensee is “willing” to negotiate a license on FRAND terms More restrictive in scope FRAND and SEPs only But more “licensee friendly” Patent invalidity proceedings do not disqualify willingness Accepting third party determination qualifies willingness www.chillingcompetition.com Dusseldorf v Manheim? ECJ Reference by District Court of Dusseldorf Question by Manheim Regional Court to EU Commission Huaweï v ZTE: 5Q on “willing licensee”: 12 Is injunction v a self-proclaimed “willing” licensee an abuse in itself (#1)? Or must an OBS offer be on the table (#1)? If OBS offer is no prerequisite, but expressions of willingness suffice, how much evidence => mere statements (oral) or submission of “specific conditions” (#2) If an OBS offer is prerequisite, how comprehensive? => a draft contract, or less? (#3) If an OBS offer is prerequisite, how much fulfillment is needed, how far must the willing licensee go? => payment of royalties in account (#4)? Is there abuse under the same conditions if patentee seeks other types of remedies (damages, etc.) (#5) Judge Andreas Voß stays proceedings in Motorola v Apple, November 2013 Questions asked to EU Commission relate to what kinds of terms constitute a FRAND agreement. Motorola sought to impose on Apple a non-challenge clause, and later sought injunction Apple refusal “willing” or “unwilling”? www.chillingcompetition.com Commission v CJEU? Statements of Commissioner Almunia The Commission will “fully take account” of any guidance, but will not discontinue its investigations Use of Article 9 R1/2003 to trump judicial debate? Role of both institutions should be to set substantive standard for SEP injunctions N. Petit, “Injunctions for FRAND-Pledged SEPS: The Quest for an Appropriate Test of Abuse under Article 102 TFEU”, European Competition Journal, Volume 9, Number 3, December 2013 13 www.chillingcompetition.com II. 14 Options for tests of abuse www.chillingcompetition.com Available (Legal) Technology 15 Source Tests Existing case-law proof test • Abusive Litigation (ITT Promedia/Protégé International) => “wholly exceptional circumstances” • Abusive refusal to supply (Magill/IMS Health/Microsoft III) “exceptional circumstances” • Generic abusive anticompetitive foreclosure (Post Danmark) New test • Modified abusive refusal to supply (Emanuelson; Körber) • Abusive bargaining (Mariniello) • “Willing licensee” (Orange Book Standard or reconfigured test) Other • “Serious doubts” (article 9, R1/2003) 15 www.chillingcompetition.com III. Selection rule 16 www.chillingcompetition.com How to select the right test? 17 No criterion in the case-law Lawyers v economists Lawyers v lawyers Forms-based (Ortiz Blanco & Lamadrid) v effects-based (Marsden) Economists v economists 17 Legal certainty v economic welfare Minimize type I or type II errors? www.chillingcompetition.com “Consistency” as a selection rule? Consistency Set a test coherent with solutions applied in similar factual, economic and legal setting; Set a distinct test in unrelated factual, economic and legal settings Example: single branding agreements are lawful < 30% under Article 101 TFEU. Exclusive dealing under 102 TFEU should thus be per se lawful if tied market share < 30% Various facets of consistency 18 Internal consistency (test consistent with case law under applicable provision) Transversal consistency (test consistent with case law under other competition provisions) Constitutional consistency (test consistent with GPL and other core values) Economic consistency (test makes economic sense) www.chillingcompetition.com IV. “Testing” the tests 19 www.chillingcompetition.com Internal Consistency (1) All existing case-law tests are internally consistent How about the new ones? Abusive bargaining 20 Under Article 102 a) TFEU, what’s abusive is to set unfair price, not to adopt measures that may give rise to unfair price level (eg CJEU, United Brands) The problem stems from the decision to include the impugned technology in standard. But this is not a decision of the dominant firm Contrary to Commission policy under the Guidance Paper www.chillingcompetition.com Internal Consistency (2) “Willing licensee” => FRAND declaration means SEP owner must license all “willing licensees” “Contractual duty” variant “Moral duty” variant 21 But FRAND does not clearly give rise to contractual duty + not unlawful to breach a contract in EU competition law Trick 1 => FRAND to give rise to an “antitrust” duty to license? => Yet, need to prove Magill-IMS Health “exceptional circumstances” Trick 2 => FRAND setting is “exceptional circumstance” in itself => but not the case-law trend + Vesterdorf counterargument Weberian theory of abuse => false commitment, not intended to be honoured AstraZeneca => But AZ was an already dominant firm => here, patentee is not dominant at FRANDing stage Rambus? => article 9 decision, not CJEU-proof www.chillingcompetition.com Transversal Consistency No obvious transversal inconsistency of the various tests, absent case-law on collective injunction seeking But “willing licensee” test seems transversally inconsistent SEP owner’s FRAND commitment => No reliance value of unilateral pledges in competition law Prospective licensee => willingness of buyer to be ascertained on basis of exteriorized conduct (Bayer and VW case-law) => acts of fulfillment are needed, mere willingness declarations are not sufficient “Act of State” doctrine 22 Article 101 TFEU Merger control (GC, Gencor v. Lonhro) Article 9 of R 1/2003 Opinions of AG Jacobs in Albany and AG Léger in Arduino Is the culprit the court granting injunction? www.chillingcompetition.com Constitutional Consistency All tests impinge yet protect the “freedom to do business” All tests restrict the “right of access to courts” But one test pays heed to Article 47 EU Charter => ITT Promedia/Protégé International “King” of all rights, cannot be balanced as easily as other fundamental rights General principles of law (incl. EU law) 23 Willing licensee >< No implied waiver rule Willing licensee >< Principle of legitimate expectations (key notion of “sufficiently precise assurances”) www.chillingcompetition.com Economic Consistency Screening 24 Tests of abusive exploitation should be disregarded => black sheep of IO Abusive bargaining, or “holdup” theories => not mainstream economics www.chillingcompetition.com Hold-up as “exoticonomics” Formal rebuttal: G. Langus,V. Lipatov and D. Neven, “Standard essential patents: who is really holding up (and when)?”, mimeo Empirical invalidation Litigation costs are trivial (0,1% of Apple’s revenues in 2012) No empirical evidence: “In the recent case with Microsoft pursuing claims of hold-up against Motorola in the Western District of Washington, even Microsoft's experts …conceded under crossexamination that holdup was not necessarily a problem. Instead, they stated there was no evidence of hold-up and could not identify a single license that had been held up”. Empirical data (telcos, Darts IP) Empirical data (digital communications, Darts IP) Empirical Data (Samsung, telcos) Empirical data (Samsung, Digital Communications) Alternative Theories of exclusion are more robust (ie refusal to supply, abusive litigation, anticompetitive foreclosure) Yet, tests articulating a non price predation theory are not plain vanilla economics Complex to prove potential for anticompetitive exclusion => no good proxy to predict outcome of judicial proceedings (unlike in price predation) But “raise rival costs” at any rate Yes, but also raises the costs of Domco Does it harm rivals more (cos’ Domco has scale?) 30 Not sure in emerging markets Smartphone war is a conflict of giants Litigations costs are trivial (0,1% of Apple’s revenues in 2012) www.chillingcompetition.com V. 31 Conclusion www.chillingcompetition.com Brief Overview of Implications 32 Internal Transversal Constitutional Economic consistency consistency consistency consistency Refusal to supply + + – + Abusive litigation + + + + + + – + Willing licensee – – – – Abusive bargaining – – – – Anticompetitive foreclosure 32 www.chillingcompetition.com Worst-case scenario? CJEU dismisses reference CJEU adresses reference, but ruling à la Pfleiderer or Sot Lélos kai Sia v GlaxoSmithKline Legal uncertainty and high compliance costs 33 www.chillingcompetition.com Words of wisdom Josh WRIGHT, FTC Commissioner, recently made the point that antitrust in high-tech markets should be “disciplined by empiricism” Need for facts (ex post intervention is more adequate) IP enforcement strategies only abusive in “exceptional circumstances” GC, T-198/98, Micro Leader Business v Commission If law is to be made, this should be done with binding legal instruments, and reviewable decisions 34 Neither soft law, nor Article 9 decisions (Marsden) Wait for CJEU guidance? www.chillingcompetition.com Thank you 35 www.chillingcompetition.com 35