LECTURE 5: SINGLE-PARTY REGIMES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Edmund Malesky, Ph.D., UCSD Authoritarian Institutions: An Exciting New Sub-Field in Comparative Politics 4 intersecting literatures Typology creation (most famously Geddes in 1999). Regime durability based on typologies (Geddes, Brownlee, Slater) Impact of institutions (legislatures/elections) in authoritarian regimes. Hold executives accountable allowing for longer duration (Ghandi and Przeworski) Are less prone to civil conflict (Ghandi and Vreeland) Grow faster (Wright 2008) Motivations for elections in authoritarian systems. Demonstrate regime strength to opposition (Geddes 2006, Magaloni 2008) Hold venal local leaders accountable (Geddes 2006) Opportunity for rent-seeking (Blaydes 2006, Lust-Okar (2006). Power-sharing arrangments with local notables (Boix and Svolik) Geddes Predictions based on Historical Data Military regimes last 8 years Personalistic regimes last 15 years Single-Party regimes last 22.7 Years In Southeast, Asia… SEA has been a focal point Single-Party Regimes Vietnam (1954 (1975)-Present) Laos (1975-Present) Cambodia (1975-1978; 1978-1991) Single-Party Dominant Regimes Singapore People’s Action Party (1954-Present) Malaysia’s United Malays National Organization (1957Present) Indonesia’s Golkar (1967-Present) Cambodian People’s Party (1997-Present) Philippines Nacionalista Party (1965-1972) Thai Rak Thai (2000-2006) SEA has been a focal point Military Thailand (at least once a decade since 1933 (except the 1980s) Burma (1962-Present) Personalist Dictator 1937-1945 (8) 1947-1958 (11) 1959-1973 (14) 1991-1992 (1) 2006-2007 (1) Philippines’ Marcos (1972-1986) Suharto? Mahatir? Lee Kwan Yew? Hun Sen? Sultunate (Monarchy) Brunei (1963 – Present) Southeast Asia has also been an enigma Burma, a military regime, outlasted a large number of personalist and single-party regimes. Triple-Hybrids are the most durable Remember, according to Geddes, personalist regimes are more resistant to democratization than military regimes. But SPDC outlasts Golkar. Some clearly authoritarian regimes (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia (for a time), Vietnam) seem to have a high degree of legitimacy according to World Values survey (Philippines and Burma are the exceptions) Descriptions for the peculiar regime so common in Southeast Asia Defective Democracies (Diminished Sub-Types) Delegative Democacy (lacking checks and balances) Iliberal Democracy (no rule of law) Clientelist (weak on programmatic party competition) The problem with “democracy with adjectives” is that it diminishes our understanding of the authoritarian realities within these countries. Descriptions for the peculiar regime so common in Southeast Asia Hybrid Regimes Semi-Democracy Semi-Authoritarian Semi-Dictatorship Gray Zone Genuinely mixed regimes situated in some gray zone between authoritarianisms and democracy. Descriptions for the peculiar regime so common in Southeast Asia Pseudo-democracy Disguised dictatorship Competitive Authoritarianism “the trappings but not the substance” “democracy as deceptions” “representative institutions without representative government” Recognizes these as instances of non-democratic government. Electoral Authoritarianism Focuses on a specific institutional aspect of a number of regimes. Hold regular elections for the chief executive and national assembly. Broadly inclusive (universal suffrage) Minimally pluralistic (opposition parties are allowed to run) Minimally competitive (opposition, while denied victory is allowed to win and hold seats) Minimally open (opposition parties are not subject to massive repression) Yet, they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than instruments of democracy. Electoral contests are subject to state manipulation so severe, widespread, and systematic that do not qualify as democratic. These regimes are neither democratic or democratizing, but plainly authoritarian, albeit in ways that depart from a traditional understanding of authoritarianism. Electoral Authoritarianism Which regimes in Southeast Asia count? (Why or why not?) Is electoral authoritarianism synonymous with single-party dominant? Is Vietnam an electoral authoritarian country?? Regular elections – check Universal suffrage – check Competition – check No overt repression – oops Pluralistic - oops But Laos, Burma, and Brunei do not meet any of these criteria, so is there a spectrum of electoral authoritarianism. Laos has frequently cancelled elections Brunei last held universal elections in 1962 Burma last held elections in 1990 Menu of Manipulation How do electoral authoritarian regimes manipulate elections? (Case 2006) Restricting Civil Liberties Reserved Positions and Domains Exclusion and Fragmentation Disenfranchisement Vote Buying Intimidation Electoral Fraud Skilled versus Clumsy Manipulation Skillful: Softened inverse distributions between rulers and mass-public; maintain tight limits on civil liberties; gerrymandering. Societal grievances remained muted. Clumsy: Do not do anything to remedy reversing fortunes caused by economic change. Rashly seizing Prime Ministership (Thailand); Falsifying electoral tallies (Philippines); Repudiating elections directly (Burma). Limitations of Typologies The notion of typologies can be limiting for generating comparative leverage. Typologies allow us to demonstrate a correlation, but not the micro-logic to truly understand divergent outcomes. Within the class of semi-democracy/electoral authoritarianism there are qualitative differences that could brushed away. It would be better to have a continuous measure of institutional quality than ran the spectrum from highly authoritarian to highly democratic. But what dimension should the researcher privilege? Democracy is multi-faceted. Winning Coalition/Selectorate Theory BdM, Morrow, Silverson, and Smith 2003 was hailed as breakthrough, because it apparently solved the problem of typologies and provided a analytically useful continuous measure. Notion of selectorate was first employed by Susan Shirk (1994) in The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China BdM et al employed it in their seminal Logic of Political Survival Book has been hit with a raft of methodological complaints, but the logic is compelling. The Theory of W/S (S)electorate – the group of people in a society endowed with the ability to choose the leadership (W)inning coalition - a sufficiently-sized subset of the selectorate whose support endows the leadership with political power over the rest of the subset and the disenfranchised members of the population. “sufficiently-sized” is determined by a country’s institutional architecture. The W/S Ratio When W is small (relative to S), the least costly method of buying support from a coalition is through private goods (i.e. bribes, preferential access to land or government contracting). When W is large (relative to S), the cost of private goods is prohibitively expensive, and rulers are more likely to use public goods provision as a means winning acquiescence from other political actors. The authors test this theory empirically, finding that the size of W correlates strongly with a range of public goods provision measures, including transfers for education, health, and infrastructure. “Loyalty Norm” they also find that leaders with small W and large S survive longer, because the cost of buying off members is minimal. As W increases, buying members becomes more difficult and it is easy to defect to an alternative coalition. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INEQUALITY IN SINGLE-PARTY REGIMES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM AND CHINA Regina Abrami, Edmund Malesky, Yu Zheng Organization of Today’s Talk The Puzzle Comparative Analysis of Inequality Utility of Alternative Explanations Transfers and Equalization Political Explanations Future Implications The Puzzle Over the past two decades, no two economies have grown faster. But while economic inequality has been exacerbated in China, it has grown only moderately in Vietnam. Why? Estimated and Actual Inequality Growth 40 35 30 4 6 8 10 Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient 45 25 Natural Log of GDP Per Capita Simulated Kuznets Curve Predicted slope based on Kuznets Curve for Vietnam Predicted slope based on Kuznets Curve for China Actual slope 1993 - 2004 for Vietnam Actual slope 1993 - 2004 for China Kuznets simulations based on Higgins & Williamson 2 002:284 regression parameters for 1990s Kuznets Simulations based on Higgins and Williamson 2002 This is true regardless of the measure of inequality Panel 1: Indicators of Inequality China Vietnam Source Gini Coefficient in 2004 Expenditure Ratio of Top 20%/Bottom 20% Percentage of Population Living on under $1 per day in 2004 Life Expectancy at Birth Infant Mortality (per 1,000 Births) in 2004 Adult Illiteracy Rate People without access to improved water source (%) Access to Primary School (lowest region) 2004 Access to Health Facilities (lowest region) 2004 47.25 11.37 10.8 72.5 23 90.9 23 57.79 61.1 37.08 6.24 8.4 73.7 16 90.3 15 99.3 96.6 ADB 2007 ADB 2007 ADB 2007 HDR 2007 WDI 2007 HDR 2007 HDR 2007 WDI 2007 WDI 2007 Panel 2: Changes in Inequality China Vietnam Source Annualized Growth in Gini since 1993 Annualized Growth in Expenditure Ratio since 1993 ∆Expenditures of Top 20%/∆Expenditures of Bottom 20% ∆ Percentage of Population Living on under $1 per day since 1990 ∆Infant Mortality since 1993 1.35 2.68 7.1/3.4 - 21.7 - 15 0.55 1.31 4.69/3.37 - 42.3 - 22 ADB 2007 ADB 2007 ADB 2007 ADB 2007 WDI 2007 Normal explanations of inequality fail to explain the differences Determinants of Inequality GDP per capita in 2004 (Constant 2000 US$) Average Growth in GDP (1993-2004) Exports as a Percentage of GDP in 2004 FDI Inflows as a Percentage of GDP in 2004 Population Density (people per square mile) Average Population Growth (1993-2004) Percentage of Population Urban Percentage of GDP from Agriculture Ethnic Fractionalization 2003 Percentage of Population from Dominant Ethnicity Cultural Fractionalization 2003 Dominant Cultural Influence China Vietnam 1323.14 503.27 9.88 7.53 34 68 3 4 139 264 0.89 1.45 39 26 11.8 20.4 0.154 0.223 92 86 0.154 0.21 Confucist Confucist Theoretical Predictions H1: ∆ Gini Vietnam > ∆ Gini China H2: Gini Vietnam > Gini China H3: ∆ Gini Vietnam > ∆ Gini China H4: Gini Vietnam > Gini China H5: Gini Vietnam > Gini China H6: Gini Vietnam = Gini China Source WDI 2007 WDI 2007 WDI 2007 WDI 2007 WDI 2007 WDI 2007 WDI 2007 WDI 2007 Fearon 2003 Fearon 2003 Fearon 2003 Kelley 2006 Major Political Explanation is Democracy Two major strands in the literature. Institutional checks on political elites (Muller 1988, O’Donnell 1994, Boix 2003, Bollen and Jackman 1985). Opportunities for participation by constituents who are negatively affected by economic policies (Muller 1988, Reuveny and Li 2003, Boix 2003, Chan 1997, Hellman 1998). Basically, institutional arrangements can redistribute political power to the economically disadvantaged, ultimately leading to more balanced economic initiatives (Lenski 1966, Lipset 1959). Can Major Indices of Regime Type Explain the Differences? Country Freedom House Freedom House - Civil Liberties - Political (2006) Rights (2006) Combined Polity IV Democracy Score (2006) Polity IV: Constraints on Executive (2006) Cheibub and Ghandi (2002) China 6 7 -7 3 1 Vietnam 6 7 -7 3 1 Country China Vietnam Bueno de World Bank: Henisz Political Geddes Mesquito, Voice and Constraints on Classification of Brooker Non-Democratic Smith, Siverson, Accountability Decision Authoritarian Regimes (2000) and Morrow (2006) Making (2004) Regimes (1999) (2003) -1.38 .5 0 Single-Party Non-Personalist Dictator -1.36 .5 .13 Single-Party Non-Personalist Dictator 0 10 20 30 40 The Proximate Explanation – Vietnam Spends More on Transfers 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year Chinese GDP Growth in Constant LCU Vietnamese GDP Growth in Constant LCU Chinese Total Expenditures over GDP Chinese Total + Extrabudgetary Expenditures/GDP Vietnamese Total Expenditures over GDP Differences in Transfer Regimes Year Equalizing Transfers to Provinces/GDP Development Investment/ GDP China Vietnam China Vietnam 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2.72% 1.37% 1.16% 1.40% 1.40% 2.21% 5.73% 5.00% 7.03% 5.53% 5.84% 5.25% 2.32% 2.63% 1.98% 2.04% 2.26% 2.22% 8.36% 8.44% 9.72% 9.24% 9.44% 8.84% Average 1.71% 5.73% 2.24% 9.01% Differences in Equalization Vietnam Year 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Pre-Transfer Revenue Per Capita Coefficient of Variation* 1.69 1.73 1.51 1.29 1.22 1.50 Expenditure Per Capita Provincial Revenue Provincial Expenditures Coefficient of Variation* 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.55 Income Elasticity** Income Elasticity** 2.23 2.89 2.06 1.77 1.74 2.26 0.82 0.92 0.61 0.73 0.59 0.83 Expenditure Per Capita Provincial Revenue Provincial Expenditures Coefficient of Variation* 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.73 Income Elasticity** Income Elasticity** 1.21 1.18 1.17 1.17 1.21 1.24 0.68 0.58 0.55 0.61 0.66 0.63 Ratio of Elasticities 2.73 3.13 3.40 2.42 2.92 2.72 China Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Pre-Transfer Revenue Per Capita Coefficient of Variation* 1.02 1.12 1.17 1.17 1.20 1.18 Ratio of Elasticities 1.77 2.05 2.13 1.91 1.84 1.97 Delving Further Vietnam has lower inequality than China. This is primarily due to transfers and the impact of those transfers on equalization. But transfers are only the proximate cause. What factors have led to greater transfers in Vietnam than in China? If politics is the science of “who gets what, when, and why,” then we need to do better than our blunt indices of regime type. “The Student is Instructing the Teacher” While Political Science sees no difference between the two regimes, Chinese journalists have highlighted many. Including: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Competitive elections in the Central Committee Increasing power of the Central Committee vis-à-vis the Politburo. Public commentary on Party Congress Political Report. Direct popular elections of National Assembly Televised National Assembly query sessions of government ministers. Decrees stipulating the public declarations of officials’ assets The market for Vietnamese land use rights certificates. On-line chat of Vietnamese officials and constituents Public participation in the legal drafting process, through an on-line portal. The Dog that Barked Hu Jintao issues an internal CCP document criticizing the Vietnam for moving “too quickly toward inner party democracy.” Old CCP idealogues are wheeled out to argue against the wisdom of pursuing a Vietnam-like path. Open Magazine declares that discussion of Vietnamese reforms has been prohibited by Chinese authorities. If differences between the two countries are so minimal as to be undetectable by comparative politics tool kits, why the hard-line response? Three Critical Differences between Elite Institutions in Vietnam and China 1. Central Committee is the primary decision-making body in Vietnam. In China, it is the smaller Politburo. • This means that larger coalitions need to be built for reforms. • Winning coalition is larger in Vietnam than China (BdM et al 2003). 2. General Secretary of the Party is far more constrained in Vietnamese decision-making than in Chinese. 3. Both inner-party and government elections are more competitive in Vietnam than in China. Respective Crises in the Late Eighties Drove Institutions in Opposite Directions In China, Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 led to a concentration of decision making among a small coterie of leaders in the Politburo and to the strengthening of party control over government institutions. In Vietnam, deaths of key leaders, economic crisis, and overstretch in Cambodia led to power vacuum and competition among several factions for control. These groups worked out a series of self-serving compromises, leading to a diffusion of power in key governing institutions. Institutional Flow Charts Chinese Polity Party Government General Secretary Standing Committee President Leading Groups Premier National People’s Congress Politburo Ministries & Commissions Central Committee Party Congress Vietnamese Polity General Secretary Politburo Party Government President Troika Prime Minister National Assembly Central Committee Party Congress Ministries Evidence for the Importance of the Central Committee in Vietnam The demise of the Politburo Standing Committee Rejection (by vote) of a standing General Secretary “The plenums of the CCOM are the location where the democracy and intellectualism of the body are brought forth in its discussions, decisions, and policies. It should not happen again that the Central Committee becomes an agency that grasps in its entirety (quán triệt) a master policy that has already been decided upon.” (Former Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet 2006). More frequent meetings and importance of the body. Special sessions of the Central Committee to resolve key political dilemmas. China Year Party Congress Central Committee Plenums 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 12th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th & 5th 6th 7th & 1st 2nd & 3rd 4th & 5th 6th & 7th 8th 9th & 1st 2nd & 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th & 1st 2nd & 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th & 1st 2nd & 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th & 1st 2nd 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total Number Per Congress 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 6 1 36 6.00 Vietnam Total Legal Normative Percentage Citing Documents Central Promulgated by Committee Government Legislation Institutions 7.72% 285 9.68% 444 6.42% 483 6.53% 613 7.04% 952 6.62% 1057 3.84% 1093 5.02% 1354 4.55% 1495 5.13% 1677 6.87% 1892 6.46% 1949 5.14% 2586 3.91% 2682 4.85% 3030 5.01% 2817 5.53% 3203 6.94% 3877 7.42% 3330 5.36% 4217 4.49% 4073 3.67% 5116 4.44% 5426 4.37% 5260 3.74% 8341 2.47% 8815 67252 11208.67 5.51% Party Congress Central Committee Plenums 5th 1st, 2nd, & 3rd 4th 5th, 6th, & 7th 8th & 9th 10th & 1st 2nd, 3rd & 4th 5th 6th, 7th, 8th 9th & 10th 11th & 1st & 2nd 3rd 4th & 5th 6th & 7th 8th & 9th 1st & 2nd 3rd & 4th* 5th & 6th (A&B) 7th & 8th 9th & 10th 11th, 1st, 2nd, & 3rd 4th, 5th, & 6th 7th & 8th 9th & 10th 11th & 12th 1st, 2nd, & 3rd 4th & 5th 6th & 7th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 6 61 10.17 Total Legal Normative Percentage Citing Documents Central Promulgated by Committee Government Legislation Institutions 237 21.52% 165 26.06% 203 25.62% 249 26.91% 247 13.77% 249 20.88% 253 26.88% 261 27.59% 284 26.76% 383 25.33% 440 23.86% 428 27.80% 493 22.31% 633 21.33% 761 26.02% 1017 21.73% 963 1184 1175 1384 1312 1485 1207 1841 1803 951 24.82% 20.35% 19.32% 17.92% 18.06% 22.96% 22.78% 23.57% 22.68% 23.24% 18657 3109.5 23.08% -.5 0 .5 1 Vietnam’s Political Business Cycle 0 1 2 3 Years Since Last Party Congress Vietnam ( 1990 - 2006 ) China ( 1990 - 2005 ) 4 Checks on Executive Decision-Making Chinese Polity Party Government General Secretary Standing Committee President Leading Groups Premier National People’s Congress Politburo Ministries & Commissions Central Committee Party Congress Vietnamese Polity General Secretary Politburo Party Government President Troika Prime Minister National Assembly Central Committee Party Congress Ministries Diffusion of Responsibilities in Vietnam in 1992 Constitution Secretary General: Heads Party Apparatus, which sets general guidelines for the running of the state. Has appointment powers within the VCP Bureaucracy. President: Appoints ambassadors, signs international treaties, can introduce legislation in National Assembly, and chairs central military commission. Prime Minister: Executive, legislative, and most importantly… appointment powers over the ministers and provincial People’s Committee Chairmen. Roles are reinforced by leaders party rank and patronage possibilities. Competitiveness of Party Institutions Institution Nomination Procedures Outgoing CCOM Nominates Delegates at Congress Nominate Self Nomination Competition Number of Full Seats Number of Full Nominees Rejection Rate (Full) Number of Alternate Seats Number of Alternate Nominees Rejection Rate (Alternate) Representation of Subnational Officials Full Time Delegates Alternate Delegates China XVII Vietnam X Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 198 208 4.8% 158 167 5.4% 160 207 22.7% 21 46 54.3% 65 (32.8%) 68 (42.5%) 89 (56.3%) 15 (71.4%) Conclusions Vietnam’s institutional architecture is the key factor explaining differences in inequality in the two regimes. The finding has important implications for the study of authoritarian systems. We can do better than simple typologies. While Vietnam’s institutions have led to lower inequality, they also are playing a contributing role in Vietnam’s present difficulties fending off macroeconomic crisis. Finally, this is not an equilibrium by any means. China is aware of its deficiencies and has already begun to experiment with changes in inner-party democracy as a way of addressing them. The two most common characters in Hu Jintao’s speech at the most recent Party Congress were inequality and democracy. Extra National Assembly Elections Type of Election Nomination Self-nomination allowed in Vietnam (236 total self-nominees; 101 in HCMC alone; only 1 was elected). Candidates per Seat Direct Elections in Vietnam Tiered Indirect Elections in China through local Congresses in China China 1.2 for National People’s Congress Elections Vietnam ranges from 1.67 to 2 depending on the electoral district. Rejection 12 Nominees of Vietnamese Central Authorities were not elected in the 2007 elections. All rejections occurred in wealthy provinces