The true European voter
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels
Seminar of European Ideas Network jointly with the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation (KAS), ‘The European Electorate’
Brussels, European Parliament, February 10, 2014
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
A true European voter?
1. One electorate or many: 28 second-order national elections?
2. One calculus of voting, or two?
National elections and European Parliament elections
3. One Person, two elections, one party, or not?
4. Summary/Conclusions
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Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization
1. One electorate or many: 28 second-order national elections?
Turnout in European Parliament Elections
100,0
90,0
MT 82,39
80,0
70,0
IT 73,6
54,7
49,5
40,0
30,0
IT 69,76
DE 56,76
60,0
50,0
IE 68,28
DE 65,73
MT 78,79
51,9
50,0
44,8
UK 32,35
UK 32,57
UK 36,37
41,8
41,4
31,2
32,2
UK 35,54
20,0
UK 24
SK 16,97
10,0
SK 19,64
0,0
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
2009
EU population
Cross Ctry Mean
Without compulsory voting
Min
Max without comp vot
Max with comp voting
Eastern Europe
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2004
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization
1. One electorate or many: 28 second-order national elections?
Turnout differences between countries, 2009
Turnout EP Elections 2009
All non-compulsory voting
Maximum
Malta
78,8
Minimum
Slovakia
19,6
Mean EU27
41,4
Mean Eastern Europe
32,2
Mean EU15
46,0
 High turnout differences ≠ one European electorate
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Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization
2. One calculus of voting, or two?
Hypotheses on the differences in voters‘
calculus
— “Voting with the heart”: The magnitude of sincere votingshould be
higher in EP elections; this is possible because voters do not
„have to pay attention to questions of government formation or
other consequences of election outcomes.”
Van der Eijk and Franklin (Elections and Voters, 2009: 135)
— “Voting with the boot”: Less important elections can be used as
barometer elections to signal dissatisfaction with the national
government’s performance.
— The more second-order an election is, the more important for
party choice is mobilization by parties and candidates.
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization
2. One calculus of voting, or two?
More voting with the heart?
Strength of determinants of vote choice
Results from panel data, German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)
National
EP
Party identification
0,48
0,66
Left-Right proximity
0,64
0,52
0,41
0,26
0,59
0,88
Voting with the heart
Voting with the boots
Government performance
Mobilization
Effect strength = standardized conditional logistic regression coefficients
 Little difference in determinants ≠ a different European voter
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization
3. One Person, two elections, one party, or not?
Vote switching
Vote national ≠ EP election
Vote switching from one national election to the next
24.3 %
35.0 %
Results from panel data, German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)
Turnout 2009 EP Elections
Turnout 2009 Bundestag Elections
43,3
70,8
 Two different electorates by composition
Partial electorate and consequence
Mean loss or win of governments’ parties compared to national election
Mean loss, win
Max loss
Max win
-8,7
-25,8
7,1
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization
4. Summary/Conclusion
Summary/Conclusions
— Differential mobilization leads to voting by a partial electorate.
— EP elections mobilize less not because less efforts of candidates, but
because of the number problem of representation in EP elections: less
candidates/ representatives for more voters.
— The partial electorate is more prone to protest in terms of voice.
— Protest seems to be less strategic than sincere.
— Whether exit (non-voting) is protest is unknown.
— The partial European electorate may resemble a European voter more
than the whole electorate by taking European aspects more into
account.
— Thus, parties which make a difference to the consensus of the
established parties can profit and have profited from the partiality of the
European electorate.
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Prof. Dr. Bernhard Weßels, WZB, Research Unit Democracy & Democratization