SMS and QMS For Airplane Maintenance JULY 28, 2010 Gerardo Hueto Outline Concept of Safety SMS QMS Integration or Coordination Example USC Concept of safety (Doc 9859) Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to persons or property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management. USC Safety Management System Definition A Safety Management System (SMS) is a set of integrated tools, policies, processes, and procedures used by corporate management to fulfill their responsibility to manage the safety risks associated with their organization’s operations as a part of its overall business. USC ICAO Annex 6 Requirements “…a safety management system acceptable to the State of the Operator that, as a minimum: identifies safety hazards; ensures that remedial action necessary to maintain an acceptable level of safety is implemented; and provides for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the safety level achieved.” “An accepted safety management system shall clearly define lines of safety accountability throughout the operator’s organization, including a direct accountability for safety on the part of senior management.” USC The components of SMS (ICAO) • • • • Safety policy and objectives Safety risk management Safety assurance Safety promotion USC What to include in an SMS? Flight Operations and Maintenance (ICAO) Other safety activities that could be included in SMS Personnel safety Environmental safety It may also include Dispatch, In-flight, Ramp, Fueling USC Maintenance SMS Acceptable level of Safety? Hard to define, but can use metrics Maintenance metric examples In-flight shut downs Rejected take-offs (mechanical) Write-ups after heavy checks Number of MEL items (or fleet rate) Flight delays due to maintenance? USC Maintenance Safety Metrics Should be numerical: Number of events/calendar time or departures Should have performance targets: % reduction of events in a certain period USC Hazard identification ICAO hazard identification is Flight Operations oriented Does not really focus on Maintenance hazards But hazards in maintenance can pose risk to safety of flight USC Maintenance - related accidents An airplane failure caused by Maintenance may be: Primary Cause of an accident. Contributing Factor to an accident. USC Example: primary cause Aloha Airlines - 1988 USC Example: primary cause Investigation findings: Hundreds of cracks undetected prior to accident Contributing factors: Lack of resources Fatigue Lack of training USC Example: primary cause Alaska Airlines Flight 261 January 31, 2000 USC Alaska Airlines Flight 261 Ascent from Puerto Vallarta 30000 Approximately 30 pounds Pulling Force Up to 50 pounds Pulling Force Pressure Altitude (ft) 25000 20000 Autopilot Disconnect 15000 Stabilizer Movement Stops 10000 5000 0 13:36:00 13:44:00 13:52:00 14:00:00 Local Time (PST) 14:08:00 14:16:00 Click on CVR Stabilizer moves beyond full nose down 30000 Above Maximum Airspeed 25000 Pressure Altitude (ft) Extremely Loud Noise 20000 First Dive 15000 “…kinda stabilized” Cleared to descend to 17,000 feet 10000 5000 Slats, Flaps Extended Slats, Flaps Retracted Sound of faint thumps Alaska Airlines Flight 261 Final 12 Minutes 0 16:08:00 16:10:00 16:12:00 16:14:00 16:16:00 Local Time (PST) 16:18:00 16:20:00 Recovered Jackscrew Assembly • Screw attached to horizontal stabilizer • Separated from acme nut • Nut thread remnants on screw Summary of Findings • Material and structural conditions did not contribute to the acme nut wear • No grease in working area of the screw • Grease not removed by ocean impact, exposure, or recovery • Jackscrew grease not contaminated • The wear is caused by sliding contact and is consistent with an unlubricated condition • Torque tube fractured by low cycle fatigue Lubrication: The Procedure • Gain access to the tail • Remove access panels Lubrication: The Procedure • Apply grease to acme nut fitting with grease gun until grease exits out top of acme nut FAIRING ACCESS PANELS GREASE GUN Lubrication: The Procedure • Brush application of “light coat of grease” onto jackscrew threads • Operate jackscrew “through full range of travel” BRUSH Jackscrew Lubrication: Alaska Airlines Interval Extension YEAR 1987 1988 1991 1994 Alaska Airlines Interval Manufacturer's Recommended Interval 1996 0 1000 2000 3000 FLIGHT HOURS 4000 End Play Check: Alaska Airlines Interval Extension YEAR 1985 1988 1996 Manufacturer's Recommended Interval 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 FLIGHT HOURS Example: primary cause Loss of pitch control due to the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly’s acme nut threads caused by excessive wear due to insufficient lubrication. Contributing factors Airline extended lubrication interval and FAA approval of that interval. Airline extended end-play check interval and FAA’s approval of the interval. Acme nut zerk fitting was clogged with hardened grease residue. USC SMS and QMS Quality is the degree to which a system consistently meets specified requirements, satisfies stated needs, or produces desired outcomes USC SMS and QMS ICAO Document 9859, Section 7.6 SMS focuses on the safety, human and organizational aspects of an organization (i.e. safety satisfaction); while QMS focuses on the products and services of an organization (i.e. customer satisfaction) ..”ICAO safety management SARPs included in Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11 and 14…are limited to SMS. There are no ICAO requirements…with regard to QMS, with the sole exception of a requirement for approved maintenance organizations (AMO) in Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 8” USC SMS and QMS Quality Control Quality Assurance Rejection Review Findings Review Quality Review Process Quality Review Board Reliability Review Board USC SMS and QMS Acceptable level of Quality? Metrics Nature of rejections/findings Operational Both should be numerical and have performance targets AloQ alignment with AloS? Coordinated Metrics, Risk Matrix Shared Objectives USC SMS and QMS Options Integrate or Coordinate Pros / Cons In a Large Carrier QMS reviewed by CASS (Continued Analysis and Surveillance System) SMS can be integrated or coordinated with CASS USC RISK MATRIX PROBABILITY SEVERITY CATASTROPHIC CRITICAL MARGINAL A I B C D SEVERE SEVERE E 2 II HIGH III MEDIUM 2 3 4 3 4 5 LOW NEGLIGIBLE IV LOW 3 4 NEGLIGIBLE 5 5 30 RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX Potential Consequence of the Incident Increasing Probability A Rating Env'ment Assets No injury Zero Effect Zero damage 1 Slight injury Slight Effect Slight damage < US$ 10K 2 Minor injury Minor Effect 3 Serious Localised injury Effect 4 Single fatality 5 Multiple fatality 0 People Major Effect Massive Effect Reputation B Unknown but Known possible in in aviation the aviation industry industry D reported > 3x / yr. in Comp. E reported > 3 X / yr. in location No Impact Slight Impact Minor damage < US$ 50K Limited Impact Local damage < US$ 250K Industry Impact Major damage < US$ 1M National Impact Extensive damage > US$ 1M International Impact 3 gh u ro -MS h T E e HS g s a l k an ma ure M or ed ris e N oc at r r p po on r o cti c in du ure re eas m le b a er l to In 2 1 USC SMS Presentation.ppt C happened before in Company 31 Example: SMS and QMS Coordination Source Findings / Audits ASAP Self Disclosure MSR Risk Level Average Low High Corrective Actions In-Progress Closed Jul 20XX Rolling 20XX 7/5 3 241 / 96 11 2 4 1 40 20 0 g u A O ct c e D b Fe r p A n u J Jul 20XX Rolling 20XX 2 2 3 2 1 3 Jul 20XX Rolling 20XX 16 3 417 * Rate per 1000 Revenue Departures Qty Distribution Risk X X 1.2.3 Maintenance Log / Recording Requirements 1.2.1 Airworthiness Release or Log Book Entry X 1.2.2 Major Repairs and Alterations Records Low Medium High Analysis: Correlation between findings, safety reports, and operational events Action Items: Who: USC Due: Status: SMS and QMS: Education and Training Prior to Implementation During Deployment Phase Ongoing after SMS is in Place Dealing with Interfaces Vendors Other Operational Areas Providing Feedback To Individuals To Other Departments USC SMS and QMS Questions? 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