RANDOMIZING DISTRICTS FOR REELECTION:
A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Scott Wentland
Assistant Professor of Economics
Longwood University
Peter Stone
Lecturer in Political Science
Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland)
Paper available at SSRN:
Or, e-mail me at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1767079
wentlandsa@longwood.edu
Puzzling Numbers

Approval Rating of Congress:
 Gallup
Poll:
 CBS News/NYT:
13% (Sept. 2012)
12% (Sept. 2012)
Puzzling Numbers

Approval Rating of Congress:
 Gallup
Poll:
 CBS News/NYT:

13% (Sept. 2012)
12% (Sept. 2012)
Re-election Rates:
 Senate
 2006:
79%
 2008: 83%
 2010: 84%
 House
of Representatives:
 2006:
94%
 2008: 94%
 2010: 85%
Hate Congress, Love our Congressman?


Why do we hate the Congress, but love our own
representative?
Perhaps the other districts are just not electing the
right people…
 What

if we just elected better representatives?
A Nobel prize winning economist has some
thoughts…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ac9j15eig_w&feature=share
Economists vs. Everyone Else


Why aren’t our Congressmen (or businessmen, or
administrators) doing what we want them to do?
Everyone else:
 Why
can’t we elect the “right” people?
 What we’ve got is bad/incompetent/ignorant people
 Solution: try to get the “right” people in the job
Economists vs. Everybody Else


Why aren’t our Congressmen (or businessmen, or
administrators) doing what we want them to do?
Economists
 What
are their incentives?
 Given their incentives, should we expect normal, selfinterested human beings to act any different?
 Solution: Change the institution. Change their incentives.
Congressional Incentives


Members of Congress generally desire to be
reelected
To be reelected, Congressmen are solely
accountable to their respective districts
 These
districts are geographically defined, and
Congressmen know who their constituencies are
Congressional Incentives

When a Congressman fights for his/her local
interests, such interests may not advance, or may
even be at odds with, the wider national interest
 Some
examples:
 Wasteful

pork-barrel spending
e.g. “Bridge to Nowhere”
 Various
subsidies and tariffs
 District-specific provisions and
earmarks in omnibus bills
Key Questions

Instead of going up for reelection in the same
district over and over, what if legislators did not
know who will be voting in their reelection
campaign?
 How

might their incentives change?
How might we align representatives’ interests better
with a more general, national interest?
A Thought Experiment


What if a Congressman had to campaign for
reelection in a different district than the one that
last elected him/her?
What if, for each Congressman and for each
election, we randomize the districts that would vote
on whether to reelect him/her?
 How
might this affect policy outcomes in a
representative democracy?
An Illustration of the Rule

An example using the U.S. House of Representatives
Jane Doe, a Congressman from Ohio’s 9th District is elected
in 2010
 In 2012, she and her challengers (decided by a primary)
draws California’s 21st district from a random lottery


She and her challengers campaign in the new district and will appear
on California’s 21st district’s ballot on Election Day.
Key Objectives

Explore the rule’s philosophical underpinnings
 Why

might this rule be desirable in principle?
Explore the rule’s economic implications and
consequences
 How
does our rule compare with the current system of
static geographically-based representation?
 In what ways would our rule improve upon the current
system?
Philosophical Underpinnings

John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 How
might individuals agree to just rules in a social
contract?
 A famous thought experiment:
 The
original position and veil of ignorance
 In setting up the laws of social contract, if individuals
were completely ignorant of who they are (e.g. place
in society, social status, abilities, intelligence, etc.), they
would be in a unique, objective position to agree upon
just rules for society
Philosophical Underpinnings

Introducing a veil of randomness
 The
veil of ignorance is merely a hypothetical construct
and does not exist in the real world
 Our rule, however, does resemble it as it places
legislators behind a different veil, a veil of randomness
Veil of Randomness



Representatives are blinded by a randomized
procedure
Representatives do not know to whom they will be
accountable in their next election
They will have no knowledge of the specific
political, economic, or cultural make-up of their next
constituency
 Why
craft rules/laws/policies specifically catered to
benefit one geographically define area at the expense
of others?
Economic and Policy Implications

We believe that, under certain circumstances, our
rule will tend to generate:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Pareto-superior and equitable legislation
Unanimous agreement on such legislation
Stability (i.e. prevent “cycles”)
Incentives to reverse inefficient past legislation
A more moderate legislature, ideologically
Creating Legislation & Logrolling

Representatives may logroll, or trade votes, to
secure concentrated benefits that their respective
constituencies care about most
 Example
A
district in NC may have a strong interest in tobacco, while
a LA district has a strong interest in sugar


The NC representative votes for a sugar tariff if
The LA representative votes for a tobacco tariff
Deals – Good Ones and Bad Ones

Legislative deals and compromises can be good or
“positive sum” for our economy/nation as a whole
 If
deals get made, don’t we all want to be included in
the benefits?
 If good deals get made, don’t we want these policy
outcomes to be stable?

What if legislators made bad or “negative sum”
deals?
 Isn’t
this what the (12% approval rating) Congress is all
about?
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example

With the current system, Policy A & B pass if
representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to
vote for them as an omnibus
Figure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A
Policy B
District 1
5
-1
District 2
-1
5
District 3
-1
-1
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example

With the current system, Policy A & B pass if
representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to
vote for them as an omnibus
Figure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A
Policy B
District 1
5
-1
District 2
-1
5
District 3
-1
-1
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example

With the current system, Policy A & B pass if
representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to
vote for them as an omnibus
Figure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A
Policy B
District 1
5
-1
District 2
-1
5
District 3
-1
-1
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example

With the current system, Policy A & B pass if
representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to
vote for them as an omnibus
Figure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A
Policy B
District 1
5
-1
District 2
-1
5
District 3
-1
-1
…but District 3 loses out
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example

With our rule, Policy A & B pass but for different
reasons
One unlucky representative may face District 3 in the next
election…
 They have an incentive to redistribute gains by adding a
Policy C to the omnibus bill

Figure 2 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
(with an Equitable Transfer)
District 1
District 2
District 3
Policy A
5
-1
-1
Policy B
-1
5
-1
Policy C
-2
-2
4
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example

Remember, our representatives are behind a veil of
randomness
 They
have little incentive to favor one district over
another
 Legislation will tend to be positive sum & Paretoefficient
 Generates unanimous agreement
Figure 2 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
(with an Equitable Transfer)
Policy A
Policy B
Policy C
District 1
5
-1
-2
District 2
-1
5
-2
District 3
-1
-1
4
Cycles

Under the current system, Policy A & B pass but this is
not a stable equilibrium.
Figure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A
Policy B
District 1
5
-1
District 2
-1
5
District 3
-1
-1

District 3 loses out and has an incentive to make a deal
with either District 1 or District 2, leaving one of them
out…

The districts who are left out always have an incentive to
“reign in on the parade,” creating instability and cycles
Cycles

With our rule, voting cycles need not exist
 All
representatives stand behind the same veil of
randomness and face the same incentives
 They have little incentive to pass legislation that leave
any districts out

Randomizing districts for reelection tends to
generate stable policy outcomes
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example

With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass,
despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X
Policy Y
District 1
5
-3
District 2
-3
5
District 3
-3
-3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example

With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass,
despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X
Policy Y
District 1
5
-3
District 2
-3
5
District 3
-3
-3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example

With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass,
despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X
Policy Y
District 1
5
-3
District 2
-3
5
District 3
-3
-3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example

With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass,
despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X
Policy Y
District 1
5
-3
District 2
-3
5
District 3
-3
-3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example

With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass,
despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game


Policy X
Policy Y
District 1
5
-3
District 2
-3
5
District 3
-3
-3
District 1 & 2:
District 3:
+4 (or +2 apiece)
-6
Explaining the 12% Approval

Among other reasons, we tend to dislike Congress
because they often make bad deals and produce
suboptimal policy
The deals don’t just extend to economic policy
 We can think of the “+4” and “-6” as utility, not dollars



“Negative sum” policy can be ideological, too
Legislators tend to get re-elected because they fight for
their respective districts
District 1 & 2: re-elected for “bringing home the bacon”
 District 3: re-elected for demonizing Reps. 1 & 2

Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example

With our rule, Policies X & Y will not pass
There is some probability (.33) a representative will draw
District 3
 Because this is a negative sum game, there is no way to
redistribute gains such that all districts are better off

Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X
Policy Y
District 1
5
-3
District 2
-3
5
District 3
-3
-3
Back to Friedman

“The way you solve things is making it
politically profitable for the wrong
people to do the right things.”
- Milton Friedman
Further Implications

Legislators will have an incentive look for
inefficiencies in past legislation (looking for negative
sum legislation)
 Undoing
negative sum legislation is, by definition, a
positive sum game
 Forward-looking, self-interested legislators will seek out
such inefficiencies and redistribute “free lunch” gains
across all districts
Ideology & The Median Voter

Under the current system, we tend to have a wide
spectrum of representatives ideologically
 An
extreme representative may simply represent a
more extreme district (i.e. the median voter in that
district is more extreme)
Figure 5 – An Eleven District Left/Right Preference Spectrum
Less Conservative/
More Conservative/
More Liberal
Less Liberal
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ideology & The Median Voter

With our rule, extreme candidates have the lowest
probability for reelection
 Because
districts for reelection are randomized, more
moderate candidates have the highest probability of
winning
Figure 5 – An Eleven District Left/Right Preference Spectrum
Less Conservative/
More Conservative/
More Liberal
Less Liberal
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Conclusions

Problems with our current system of representative
democracy are well-known


Our rule certainly does not solve all of them
We think our thought experiment does highlight some key
ways randomness can change incentives

Legislators that are behind a veil of randomness tend to create:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Pareto-superior and equitable legislation
Unanimous agreement on such legislation
Stability (i.e. prevent “cycles”)
Incentives to reverse inefficient past legislation
A more moderate legislature, ideologically
“The way you solve things is making it
politically profitable for the wrong people
to do the right things.”
- Milton Friedman