Navy Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command
A Warfare Center of Excellence
Maritime Homeland Defense / Security
Mine Countermeasures
Presented to the 2011 Spring Regional Conference
of the Mine Warfare Association
11 May 2011
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Mr. Marvin Heinze
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NMAWC Maritime Homeland Defense
Our Discussion Today
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Mission / Requirements
Capability / Capacity
Exercises
Preparation
Related efforts
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Mine Warfare in the United States
…It happens…
• Lake Ponchartrain, 2004
– Floating IED discovered ivo visiting
dignitary
• Sacramento River, 1980
– “Patriotic Scuba diver’ closes the
shipping channel
• Chesapeake Bay, June 1942
– U-701 lays 15 magnetic mines
– 3 ships sunk
– 2 ships damaged
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MHD MCM Policy / Mission
• DoD is the lead MOTR agency for
mine countermeasures in the
Maritime Domain (NSPD41/MOTR)
• Navy has DoD maritime mine
countermeasure capability, implying
– MCMRON and MCM forces will be
needed to counter mine and UWIED
threats
– No civil authority MCM capability
• Specific domestic MCM Mission not
defined
– Interagency equities and priorities
– CONPLANs have general mission
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DHS will plan for the prevention and
detection of sea mining…(MOTR)
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USN MIW Operational Framework
COMTHIRDFLT
COMSECONDFLT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMFIFTHFLT
COMFOURTHFLT
COM NMAWC
VCOM NMAWC
CTF xx
USW COE
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
VCOM NMAWC
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MIW Battle Staff
(ASW + MIW)
SMCM
COMCMRON TWO
Class Advocate
COMCMRON FIVE
COMCMRON SEVEN
Deployable staff supports NCC MIW operations and training
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MHD/S MCM Response Capability
Command and Control
AMCM
• MIWC in San Diego
• MCM CDR in San Diego
• Rapidly deployable
• MH-53E in NORVA
• Limited capability
• Confined water
• Deployable
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UMCM
SMCM
• UUVs, Divers, MMS
• EOD PLT, MMS PLT
• Neutralization
• UUV PLT
• Rapidly deployed
• Confined water Capable
• Ships in San Diego
• Long response times
• Limited capability
• Confined water
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Today’s MHD/S MCM Response
Capacity
Initial
Follow on
• Leadership
• Leadership
– MIWC LNOs
– COMCMRON staff
• UUVs
– 2 X UUV PLT
• Mk 18 UUVs
• Divers
– 2 X EOD MCM PLT
– 1 X VSW Dive PLT
– NMAWC VCOM and staff
• Aircraft
– 4 - 6 MH 53E
– Various MCM equip
• Ships
– 2 - 4 Avenger class SMCM
• Marine Mammals
– MK 7/8 MMS
– 6+ dolphins
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Experimentation / Exercises
in MHD/S MCM
2008-2009
• 4 events in 2 years
– Change detection
– Experimentation
• Low Frequency Broad Band
• Synthetic Aperture Sonar
2010
• Bay Shield 10
– MCM CDR Training (MHS)
• Frontier Sentinel 10
– MCM CDR Training (MHD)
– Experimentation
• High clutter limits current mine hunting effectiveness
• Improving change detection techniques and procedures
– Use of data fusion center
• Advanced new sonar technologies
– LFBB Sonar for detection of buried mines
– Synthetic aperture sonar for improved target discrimination
• MHD MCM CDR training
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Exercise Bay Shield 10
Quick Look
2 Mines
Found
NMAWC OBJECTIVES
 Integrated training for MCMRON 2/DIV
 MCM planning and execution using Port
Folder and “change detect” tactics
Areas of MCM
ops
 Exercise MCM Force in MHS Mission
 Conduct MCM Ops within a multiagency Unified Command structure
Goods
 USCG/USN interaction and
integration
 MCMRON 2/NMAWC engagement
with the COTP/UCP
 Valuable CONUS MCMC training for
MCMRON 2/ DIV 31
 Preparations for Frontier Sentinel
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Others
 Large number of contacts
overwhelm mine hunting capacity
 Incident Command System
proficiency needed
 Limited UCP secure comms
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Frontier Sentinel 10 Overview
25 May – 11 Jun 2010
PURPOSE
Bilateral homeland defense/ security exercise to conduct
information / intelligence sharing, conduct mine
countermeasures operations, conduct sea trial experimentation,
conduct bilateral maritime defense planning and response to
synchronize the operational planning process.
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Frontier Sentinel 10
Participants
US Navy:
COMSECONDFLT
COMCMRON TWO
HM14 DET
EODMU ONE & SIX
US Coast Guard:
SECTOR Hampton Roads
DOG (MSRT, MSST)
Canadian Navy:
JTF Atlantic
2 x MCDV
Fleet Diving Unit
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NMAWC
ONR
NOMWC
NMAWC OBJECTIVES
 Exercise TF 25 in MHD mission
 Train MCMRON TWO
 Conduct Sea Trial Experiments
 Improve confined waterways TTP
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Trident Fury 2011
Esquimalt, Canada
Overview
Objectives
-What: TF11 is a Bi-Lateral exercise
involving US and Canadian Forces.
- Conduct Bi-Lateral MCM operations
- Where: Esquimalt Harbor, Esquimalt
Approaches and Constance Banks
- Exercise interagency interoperability
- When: 02-13 May 2011
- Conduct integrated MCM operations
- Improve confined waters MCM tactics
- Evaluate MCMRON2 as MCMC
- Assess MCM capability and capacity
Participating Forces
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Homeland Defense
Port Surveys and MIW Port Folders
Baseline Survey
Port Folders
• Quick response guide for MCMC
• Port folders cover 17 DoD ports
Bottom Roughness
Bottom Sediments
– all complete as of Dec 2010
– bi annual updates started
• Posted on Enterprise Knowledge
Management (eKM)
Clutter Density
Doctrinal Bottom
Change Detection
Baseline imagery
New imagery
Results
• Port Folders accelerate port opening
• Change Detection reduces the number
of contacts requiring identification
• Change detection results:
– Eliminates 35-55% of mine-like objects
Contact in new imagery needs to be prosecuted
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– Reduces clearance time by ~30%
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Related MHD MCM efforts
• Naval Postgraduate School
– 2008 -“A Systems Approach to Defeating MIEDS in US Ports”
• Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee
– 2009 -“MIEDs in Ports and Harbors” study
• Center for Naval Analysis
– 2008 -“Mine Warfare Homeland Defense and Security”
– 2011 - “Mine Clearance in support of Homeland Security”
• NORTHCOM Capabilities Requirements Division
– 2011 – “Maritime Mine Countermeasures Study”
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MHD MCM way ahead
• Better define specific requirements
– Defense
– Whole of government
• Improve confined waters equipment
– Neutralization UUV
– One pass Detect to Engage
– Determine best MHD employment of MCM Mission package
• Assist DHS efforts to prevent mining
– Better threat awareness
– Effective surveillance
– Cooperative efforts with port entities
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Questions?
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Mine Warfare Direct Costs
USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS
SADAF 02- Moored Contact
Mine Cost Ship Damage
$1,000
$57 Million
USS TRIPOLI
LUGM I- Moored Contact
Mine Cost
$1,000
Ship Damage
$10 Million
USS PRINCETON
MANTA- Bottom Influence
Mine Cost
$10,000
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Ship Damage
$100 Million
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Mine Warfare Indirect Costs
• Economic/Political Effects
– 90%+ US trade transits US ports
– Significant cost
• Global Commerce Effects
– ~33% World trade transits US ports
– Significant effect on trade
• Power projection
– 90% of military sustainment by sea
– Significant effect on defense
operations
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