Proliferation dangers with dual
purpose nuclear technology
Frank Boulton, Medact, UK
boultonfrank@gmail.com
www.medact.org
IPPNW Astana, Kazakhstan
28th August 2014
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Published June 2014
US Army War College
Published 2012
Cornell Univ Press
Published August 15, 2013
E Harrell, D E. Hoffman
Belfer Center
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Henry Sokolski 2014
Summary of ‘The Complete Proliferation Narrative’
(orthodox view – military, defense ‘experts’ etc.)
• Nuclear Weapon proliferation is manageable;
• Nations getting civil nuclear power plants should
not make their own fuel;
• Future Nuclear Power Plants can be made
proliferation-resistant by strengthening IAEA;
• Although several countries WILL get nuclear
weapons, this will not matter as they are not
useful except to deter use, which ‘we’ can
easily accomplish
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The reality
• Diversion and proliferation are NOT manageable
– Constant risks of diverting ‘civil atoms for peace’ to making weapons
• Strengthening IAEA safeguards can only go so far
– Little signs that this is getting serious consideration
• Effective action against violators never guaranteed
• Costs of NPP has never been, and never will be justified
– The world not only does not need nuclear power, it would be better off
with no NPPs
• There is NO logic or justification for possessing nuclear
weapons.
– Possession will always matter
– Human frailty means that nuclear war is inevitable while nuclear weapons
exist
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There is no “silver bullet” technology
that can be built into an enrichment
plant or reprocessing plant that can
prevent a country from diverting its
national fuel cycle facilities to nonpeaceful use.
Review of DOE’s Nuclear Energy R&D Program, 2008
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11998&page=50
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France
France has two kinds of nuclear materials:
those that are free for any use, and those that
can be used only for peaceful purposes under
international agreements …. France has the
options to use any free materials for our
military program
Michel Pecqueur; Chair, French Atomic Energy
Commission, 1978 -1983
France built between 63 and 250 nuclear
weapons using plutonium that was produced
in civilian power plants
Moving beyond pretense 2014
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Atomic Assistance (‘AA’)
• Nuclear technology is dual use in nature
• Despite concerns about proliferation, nuclear states
have regularly shared technology, materials, and
knowledge for peaceful purposes with others.
• Governments use peaceful atomic assistance as
economic tools of statecraft
• Nuclear suppliers hope they can reap the benefits of
foreign aid without undermining security. Such trade
• improves relationships with allies,
• limits the influence of adversaries,
• enhances energy security by gaining favourable access to oil
• Result - providing peaceful nuclear assistance
inadvertently helps to spread nuclear weapons
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AA cases resulting in weapons’
programmes
• U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran; 1957 to 1979
– helped by Johnny Walker!
• Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986
• French, Italian & Brazil exports to Iraq, 1975 to 1981
• U.S. cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008
• Research on why states considered NW programs
– countries receiving more AA more likely to pursue & get the bomb
– especially if they get into an international crisis after receiving aid
• In some of the ‘more stable’ countries, the interval
between AA and weapons pgm can be up to 25 yrs
– often after a change of regime, e.g. Pakistan (early 1950s to
late 1970’s)
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Conclusions 1
• Countries give AA mostly to further commerce and
foster trading relations
– Keep recipients on their ‘good side’
• Diversion to military use is a recognised risk but
such recognition is sublimated to ‘national interest’
• Several successful and some unsuccessful
diversions – only one country has genuinely
disarmed (S Africa)
– FW de Klerk 2014; Rautjärvi 2014. MCS vol 30 suppl 1
– Ukraine, Belarus & Kazakhstan deserve some commendation
• NPT ‘bargain’ of limited success,
– ‘home-enrichment’ etc is NOT prevented by NPT
• IAEA is poorly resourced already and woefully
unprepared for probable increased workload,
– lacks enforcement powers in spite of the ‘Additional Protocol’
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Conclusions 2
• A fundamental flaw in NPT thinking
– Civil Nuclear Energy (CNE) a safe compensation
(sop) to powers not possessing nuclear weapons
– While the classic “Three Pillars” philosophy of NPT
continues some NNWS will always hide their NW
ambitions behind ‘Atoms-for-Peace’ clothing.
• nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, peaceful use of CNE
• Meantime, the IAEA must be strengthened
– either itself or another agency given powers
• of enforcement, backed up by
• legal outlawing nuclear weapons, old and new
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Additional observations
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Civil nuclear power is
– Very expensive
– Very dangerous (proliferation, waste, health)
– Can be downgraded, but only with difficulties
(decommissioning technology, disposal and costs, etc)
– Is not needed
– Nuclear fusion prospects (ITER) remain far off
Renewables hold much promise but need radical and
very disruptive revolutions
–
–
–
–
in Economy
Technical infrastructure
Social attitudes
We cannot assume that Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS)
technology will provide reliable permanent solutions
• Which puts more pressure on Renewables and Nuclear sources
But we can develop a nuclear-free and excess GHGemission-free world for 10 billion or even more people
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Time line
1957 Accident at Windscale, Cumbria. IAEA established
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
1967 Israel acquires NWs 9 yrs after starting its weapons programme
1968 NPT opens to signature; into force, 1970: China & France accede 1992
1972 India’s first test
1972 – 75 Rasmussen report (NPPs ‘very safe’ but beware Tsunami ! )
1977 Sanctions applied to South African NW programme
1978 UNGA Session on Disarmament (Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of
mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race…. )
1979 USSR invades Afghan. US ↓ restrictions on Pakistan’s civil programme
TMI accident. South Africa’s first test
1986 Chernobyl
1987 Pakistan’s first test
1990 South Africa disarms
1991 Gulf War – sanctions on Iraq. STARTI by US & Russia (STARTII, 1994)
1997 Additional Protocol – IAEA ‘accountants to detectives (to door-to-door
salesmen? ’)
2003 N Korea withdraws from NPT
2005 US-India deal
2011 Fukushima; New START
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2013 New ‘Oslo’ process; work of UN’s “OEWG”
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New Start
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April 1, 2011. 437 nuclear reactors operating in 30 countries
July 1, 2014. 388 nuclear reactors operating in 31 countries
72 more under construction, 174 planned, 299 proposed
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generation_IV_reactor
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Chemistry of spent nuclear fuel 1
Fissile products of U235 & Pu239
Isotopes in groups of unequal sizes ,
somewhat smaller e.g. Sr90
somewhat larger e.g. I131, Cs137, and Lanthanides
These are often very radioactive and short-lived
Fast neutrons, which transmutate fuel (U238) to
Transuranic heavy metals, incl actinides e.g. Pu239
long half-lives & remain after fission products decay in the ‘spent
fuel cooling ponds
Pu239can be extracted from spent fuel
‘PUREX’ processing (Pu/U reduction/extraction with tributyl phos).
Not easy as the accompanying lanthanides etc. are so ‘hot’ and
lanthanides and actinides have similar chemical properties
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fission_products_(by_element)
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‘Once-through’ cycles
• In the ‘once-through’ cycles,
characteristic of USA practices, spent fuel
is sent for permanent disposal – ultimately
in ‘Geological Disposal Depositories’
• In UK, spent fuel is recycled and is
accumulating, originally for Pu bombs and
therefore very proliferation-prone: and also
for making controversial ‘MOX’ fuels which
are still causes for concern (technical to
NPP design, and proliferation-prone)
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Problems of spent fuel
• Short term, need to be cooled – which
failed in Fukushima
• Long term, safe storage
– Surface casks, for decades
– Geological disposal – but where??
• Recycle into Gen III and Gen IV NPPs
– Prone to proliferation
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Current UK Nuclear Generation and Planned to 2030
by NDA (“Nuclear Decommissioning Authority”)
Current nuclear capacity in the UK is
9.23GW. This is expected to decline
substantially as plants ‘end of life’
approaches in mid-2020’s.
8 new nuclear designated sites contained
within Nuclear National Policy Statement.
Firm site development plans for Hinkley,
Sizewell, Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside
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Windscale fire October 1957
Graphite overheated and fire
broke out
Air from fan fuelled fire
Nuclear contaminants travelled
up chimney
Filter (“Cockroft’s folly”) blocked
some but not all contaminated
material
Radioactive cloud spread over
UK and Europe
750 TBq (20,000 curies) released
incl 22 TBq Cs137 and 740 of I131
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Sellafield notoriety
– Fire 1957,
– THORP – grade 3 leak in 2005
– MOX quality fabrication in 1999 - £40m
compensation to Kansai
– >100 Tonnes Pu on site
• 10 – 20 thousand Nagasaki equivalents
• Between a third and a half of world military total
– Main waste storage site for UK
– Possible leukaemia cluster (also at Dounreay)
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Purpose of Windscale
To produce military Pu; then H3 for thermo-nuclear bombs, for which
the air cooling was reduced and led to the 1957 fire!
1952 First UK test of a nuclear weapon used 7Kg Pu, yield 25 Kt
‘Operation Hurricane’, on HMS Plym, a WW2 anti-submarine frigate
moored off Trimouille Island, W Australia
Fall-out as far as Rockhampton
But from where was the U
(3000 Km away)
mined for this Pu?
answer - Australia!
(TA Ruff, MCS 2014 vol 30 suppl 1)
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World Nuclear Exhibition
14 – 16 October 2014, Paris
TRADESHOW ACCESS PROGRAMME (TAP)
FUNDING OF £1,500 –
UKTI are offering 7 TAP grants to eligible SMEs
for this exhibition. Contact us for more details.
Please return the form to:
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raelene.wilcock@the-eic.com
EIC, 89 Albert Embankment, London, SE17TP
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IAEA, 1957
IAEA is autonomous, with a Board of Governors and a
General Conference of its 164 Member States. It
relates to the NPT, and reports to UNGA and UNSC
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IAEA Missions and Priorities
– Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
by its member states,
– Implementing safeguards to verify that nuclear
energy is not used for military purposes
– Nuclear safety: Promoting high standards
BUT
– It is not clear which should take priority
– No consensus on handling violators (IAEA & NPT)
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Iraq 1991 ( Gulf War 1 et seq )
https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Iraq/iraqindex.html
• Violations
– Undeclared nuclear materials and activities
• “Conclusive evidence" of a
– complex, comprehensive NW development program
– with broad-based international procurement
– continued attempts to conceal its true extent
• Nov 15 The first removal of HEU
• Some fresh fuel for the Soviet IRT 5000 reactor ‘of
concern’
- they couldn’t find it!
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Iraq 1991 ( Gulf War 1 et seq )
https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Iraq/iraqindex.html
• Feb 1992 Facilities to produce U feedstocks found at Mosul
- planned site of future production facility for UF4
• Fuel from Tammuz-2 reactor & pond sent to emergency storage
– pits in a farmland area a few miles from the Nuclear Centre.
• 400 tons (incl natural U & 6 gms Pu) declared during the 5th inspec’n
• Oct & Nov 1991 – special equipment for warhead assembly found
• Iraq's response to IAEA
– denial of clandestine activities until evidence became overwhelming,
– followed by co-operation.
As a consequence
– IAEA not confident that all prohibited activities have been disclosed
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Other IAEA performances in
safeguarding
• South Africa, as part of self-declared disarmament
• Iran (reported by Iranian opposition party)
• Libya (self-revealed by Gaddafi)
• N Korea (revealed by US satellites)
• S Korea (self-admitted fake certificates for reactor
parts, 2013-14)
• Degelen Mt (Semipalatinsk clear-up, 2000’s) Not
involved (trusted)
“The IAEA needs greater authority and better
technology”
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Additional Protocol 1997
including unintended consequences
• Encouraged S Korea to admit fake
safety certificates (?)
• But raises expectations in IAEA
performance without increasing
resources
• Might encourage fewer inspections of
countries signing up to it
• Signing up may confer ‘preferred
traveller’ status
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WILL MORE INSPECTIONS BE
NEEDED?
• In 2010 the IAEA conducted
– 1,750 inspections,
– 423 design information verifications, and
– 142 complementary accesses
– UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon visits Semipalatinsk with
IAEA Deputy Director-General Olli Heinonen.
• In 2012, IAEA had 1125 facilities under safeguards,
• By 2030,
– nuclear electrical generation may be 40 to 120% more
– and 10 to 25 new countries may get NPPs
• “We must do more with less without compromising”
– But UN policy is to maintain zero real growth in budgets
– So more materials inspected but by the same staff number
– In spite of 115 countries agreeing to be subjected to the AP
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The Madness of Semipalatinsk after 1991
At Degelen Mountain, Kazakhstan, in the wake
of the testings at Semipalatinsk, c 290 Kg Pu
was left in ‘bore holes’ easily available to
scavengers on site when, in the after-math of
‘9/11’, the US withdrew funds for clearing-up
by teams from Kazakhstan, US and Russia. The
IAEA was kept officially in the dark, according
to two former officials. 100 Kg more was
admitted later; even now, some remains. But
the clearing–up exercise was a very creditable
example of US-Russia-Kazak co-operation in a
spirit sorely needed now
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23327/plutonium_mountain.html
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How do we know that the IAEA’s safeguards system is not ripe for
catastrophic failure? Safeguards could be like a Titanic that has been
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lucky enough not to strike an iceberg
Energy sources at years 2000; and projected at the various RCP in 2100
(IPCC, 2013)
Figure 14: Energy sources by sector (van Vuuren et.al. 2011) http://www.skepticalscience.com/rcp.php?t=3
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HMS Dreadnought (UK)
coal-powered (oil later)
launched 1906 :
crew, 700-810
displacement 18,120 long tons
cost £2,000,000 (1906)
USN Gerald R Ford; Nimitz class aircraft carrier (USA)
launched 2013
nuclear powered
crew; 500 officers, 3,700 enlisted
displacement 100,000 long tons
cost $11,400,000,000 (2014)
HMS Victorious (UK)
launched 1993
nuclear powered
crew 160
displacement
18,000 tonnes
cost “at least £1.5 billion each”
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Arms race 1906 to 1914 – Dreadnought battleships
August 1914: ‘England’ vs Germany 34 - 24
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Top 10 Nuclear Power Countries in the World
http://www.whichcountry.co/top-10-nuclear-power-countries-in-the-world/
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THANKS
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