Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status
and Implications
Olli Heinonen
Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
19 November, 2013
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
Mining
Gcchine
Saghand
Milling
Gcchine
Ardakan
Conversion
Isfahan
Enrichment
Natanz
Fordow
Fuel Fabrication
Reactors
Isfahan
TRR
Bushehr
IR-40
Others, planned
Nuclear Infrastructure
 Iran has not adhered to the resolutions of the UN Security
Council, but continued to build the nuclear program
including the supporting infrastructure
- Iran continues to manufacture centrifuges and their
components
- Iran is increasing the production of key raw materials
(zirconium, heavy water, high strength aluminum), but
depending still on imports (maraging steel, instrumentation)
The net result: Iran is increasing its nuclear capabilities, but the
international community knows less about them
20 % UF6 Is Not Medium Enriched Uranium
!
Production of Weapons Grade Material
 Production of 1 Significant
Quantity (SQ) of weapons
grade uranium from
natural uranium requires
about 5000 Separative
Work Unit (SWU) of
enrichment effort
 SQ-- The approximate quantity of
nuclear material required to
manufacture the first nuclear
weapon taking into account the
manufacturing losses.
Nuclear Material Stockpiles
 Current stock of UF6
 Quantity of concern
- Natural uranium ca 425
- 10 metric tons
metric tons
- 3-5 % enriched uranium ca
7.1. metric tons
- 20 % enriched uranium ca
200 kg
- 1.3 metric tons
- 250 kg
Enrichment Capacity
 Natanz and Fordow 18500
IR-1 centrifuges
 Natanz 1000 IR-2m
centrifuges
 Total number of
centrifuges and rotors
produced and their
locations are not known
Break out Scenarios
 There are various scenarios available starting with feeding of
natural, 3-5 % or 20 % enriched UF6, in Natanz, Fordow, or
elsewhere to produce weapons grade, 90 % enriched uranium.
Break out Times for 90 % UF6
 Examples of scenarios
 Time required for one SQ
- Use all current centrifuges
in Natanz and Fordow with
natural uranium
- Use all current centrifuges
in Natanz and Fordow with
3-5 % uranium
- Use 6000 IR-1 centrifuges
as tandem cascades with 20
% uranium
- Use 3000 IR-2ms at an
unknown location
 6 months
 2 months
 2 weeks
 1-2 weeks
Need for Enriched Uranium
 Bushehr LWR has a contract for fuel with the Russians
- annual reload 20 tons 4 % enriched uranium
- requires 120-140000 IR-1 centrifuges to produce
- requires yellow cake imports
 Tehran Research Reactor
- 20 years ago Iran imported about 120 kg 20 % enriched fuel,
which is close to being consumed
- Iran has produced 410 kg 20 % enriched UF6 ( 274 kg uranium)
 Iran states that it plans for four additional research reactors,
but has not disclosed details
 Iran plans to build additional LWRs, but no plans disclosed
When the IAEA Rings Bells ?
 IAEA inspects Fordow and Natanz every one or two weeks
 Uranium stocks ( natural, 3-5 % and 20 %) in Isfahan are
inspected less frequently; monthly
 IAEA cannot provide assurances that all facilities and nuclear
materials in Iran have been submitted to safeguards
 IAEA does not have knowledge how much “yellow cake” has
been produced in Iran, and where these materials are
 IAEA does not have knowledge about the number of
centrifuges produced
Add Time to Uranium Clock
 Action at known locations
- Ship all 20 % uranium out
 Time gained
- 2 months
- Convert all 20 % uranium to
oxide form
- Convert all 3-5 % uranium to
oxide form (cannot be done in
next 3 months)
- Ship all 3-5 % and 20 % out
- Allow a limited enrichment
capability, 3000 IR-1 or 3000
SWU
- > 1 month
- > 2 months
- 6 months
- > 1 month depending how much
3-5 % and 20 % UF6 stocks left
More Leash to the IAEA
From the beginning of the interim agreement
 Iran to declare all the centrifuge rotors manufactured and
their current location
 IAEA allowed to monitor rotors and their manufacturing
 All nuclear material (UF6, oxides) in Natanz, Fordow, and
Isfahan under IAEA remote monitoring
 Iran to declared and allow the IAEA to monitor yellow cake
The Heavy Water Reactor Program
 The IR-40 reactor will be commissioned in
2014.
 Ill suited for isotope production though
claimed to replace Tehran Research Reactor.
 Will be able to produce plutonium enough for
one nuclear device/year.
 Plutonium available earliest in 2016/17, but
requires a reprocessing plant to be built.
Add Time to Plutonium Clock
 Suspend the construction of the IR-40
 Suspend production of fuel for the IR-40
 Place the key components and materials of IR-40 under the
IAEA monitoring (heavy water, fuel loading machine, pumps
of the primary circuit)
The Stakes Are high
 It is not only about Iran, but the credibility of the
nonproliferation regime and the authority of the UN Security
Council are being tested
 When looking at the past experiences a comprehensive initial
declaration is essential for the success of the interim
agreement