Firefighters Support
Foundation
Mass Violence Post-Response
Operations
-------Joint-Agency Response Efforts
Following Active Assailant/Active
Shooter Incidents
v1.0
About FSF
The Firefighters Support Foundation is a 501c3
non-profit organization whose primary
mission is to develop, produce and distribute
training programs to firefighters and first
responders. All of our programs are
distributed free of charge.
Joint-Agency Response Efforts Following Active Assailant/Active Shooter Incidents
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Permission
Permission is granted to reproduce or
distribute this material so long as the
Firefighters Support Foundation is
credited as the source
Joint-Agency Response Efforts Following Active Assailant/Active Shooter Incidents
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Accompanying Video
This PowerPoint presentation accompanies the
video presentation of the same title.
Joint-Agency Response Efforts Following Active Assailant/Active Shooter Incidents
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Presenter
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Introduction
• We have learned that a rapid, safe and successful response to
active shooter/active assailant incidents requires planning,
training and preparation
• These complex and demanding incidents may be well beyond the
traditional training and experience of the majority of first
responders and public safety agencies
• Continuing mass violence incidents have demonstrated the need
to prepare local, regional, state, federal and other agencies to
plan for and respond to these critical incidents
• These incidents are fast-moving, volatile and complex
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Introduction
• We have unfortunately witnessed a growing frequency of mass
violence incidents in the past several years
• A rigid, traditional response guideline or procedures is not and
will not be appropriate for future active shooter/active assailant
incidents
• Majority of these incidents can mirror military combat situations
so one option is to look to our military colleagues for ideas on
how they respond to similar events including training, planning,
squad and team tactics, etc.
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Course Goal
• To prepare public safety officials, emergency managers
and first responders with some basic tools and
information needed to develop or assess a multi-agency
mass violence response plan
• Do you even have a plan or even a concept?
• This planning process needs to be a joint fire, EMS, law
enforcement and emergency management effort to
ensure success
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Mass Violence
• The active assailant/active shooter threat continues to
be a current and emerging threat
• We have dedicated a lot of training for WMD over the
past 20 years BUT both the both threat and the practice
are evolving
• Majority of all attacks in the United States utilize
shootings and explosives
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Pre-Incident Planning
Critical agencies meet:
– Law Enforcement Agencies
– Fire Departments
– Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
– Hospitals
– 911/Communication Centers
– Emergency Management
– Schools/Colleges
– Key Partners
Target Identification:
– Critical Infrastructure
– Government (Local, State and Federal)
– High Profile or Controversial Businesses or Institutions
– Large Crowds/Venues
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Pre-Incident Planning (2)
• Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS, Emergency Management
and other officials all share some of the same priorities
during a mass violence incident (life safety and incident
stabilization)
• Interagency cooperation for an active assailant/active
shooter incident should be paramount
• These mass violence incidents can and have occurred
in metro, urban, suburban and rural settings
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Pre-Incident Planning (3)
• Preparation is the key to a mass violence incidents and that
includes a clear idea of your actions before the incident occurs
• The first step in your preparation is a review of your agencies
guidelines and procedures when responding to a mass violence
incident of any kind or type
• As with any multi-hazard assessment and planning process it is
critical to do a multi-agency exercise (tabletop or functional) to
bring all the key agencies together and rehearse the plan once it
has been completed
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Emergency Operations Plan
• Each community or jurisdiction needs to have a detailed and
comprehensive all-hazard plan or emergency operations plan
(EOP)
• These plans provide the community wide framework in
responding to any large scale incident or disaster
• According to FEMA “It is unlikely that any community can
anticipate specific AS/MCI (active shooter/mass casualty
incident) scenarios they may experience, but it is possible to
develop a generic plan that provides a model to apply in almost
every situation that arises”
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Emergency Operations Plan
• Prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from local
disasters, and ensure a coordinated and organized response
to those hazards
• Provides general guidance for EM activities, and set forth
the responsibilities of local governments and support
organizations for emergency operations in emergencies or
disasters
• Just as terrorism was added to emergency operation plans
mass violence/active shooter materials can be added as the
general framework for a community
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Incident Command System
• It is critical that the Incident Command System (ICS) should be
the command and control system implemented for all mass
violence incidents
• The impact of well-deployed and practiced use of the ICS among
providers who are likely to respond together cannot be
overstated
• Unified Command (UC) must be understood and practiced by all
responders for successful command and control
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Unified Command
• Each mass violence incident is a primary LE event but requires
immediate coordination between the LE on-scene commanders
and the fire/rescue/EMS on-scene commanders
• UC provides the proper vehicle for command and control of
mass violence incidents so responders should establish Unified
Command and a Command Post (CP) as soon as possible
• A well established incident command system (ICS) deployed
during the first few minutes of a chaotic mass violence incident
will help you successfully manage the incident for the next few
hours, days and even weeks
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Unified Command (2)
• Be realistic about ICS, not building a 20 page Incident Action
Plan or 30 box organizational chart in the first 30 minutes
• But over the next few hours and days it will be essential to
assign roles and responsibilities
• A shared understanding of priorities and restrictions
• A single set of incident objectives
• Collaborative strategies
• Improved internal and external information flow
• Less duplication of efforts
• Better resources utilization
• Media, Media, Media
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Unified Command (3)
• A single integrated incident organization
• Co-located (shared) facilities (CP, Staging, etc.)
• One set of incident objectives, single planning
process, and Incident Action Plan (IAP) once that
develops
• Coordinated process for resource ordering
• May be the one way to successfully manage these
type of fast moving incidents with multiple incidents
• Can be a struggle to establish unified command
initially
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Unified Command (4)
• Expensive mobile command posts are a nice tool to have and
may be on scene for days BUT:
• Past active shooter incidents have shown that having multiple
mobile command buses on scene is not an effective tool and
causes additional confusion and miscommunications
• If using buses, assign a bus for unified command and assign roles
to each subsequent bus
• Insufficient representation of key agencies in command post and
people leaving has also been identified as a major issue
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Command Post Operations
• According to the Hartford Consensus: “Optimal
outcomes depend on communication between public
safety responders. The response to an active shooter
event is a continuum that requires coordination
between law enforcement and the medical/evacuation
providers”
• The only way this can happen is rapidly establishing a
face-to-face unified command (UC) in these fast
moving and chaotic situations
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Command Post Operations (2)
• Initial units may establish a forward command post (CP) as the initial location
(may not be suitable for ongoing or larger command post operations)
• The unified incident command team may set up the command post in a more
advantageous location for overall command and control of the incident as it
grows in size, scope and scale
•
Some agencies may refer to this as a tactical operations center (TOC) for
initial units or internal/hot-zone operations. This is separate from the larger
scene command post (CP)
• These Incident Command System tools utilized will depend on the incident,
resources and location
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Victim Accounting
• Must account for victims on the scene, injuries, deaths, those
who may be lock-downed, relocated to safer or reunion areas,
and those transported to medical or other facilities
• During a school shooting it is essential that every child in the
school is accounted for and this can take some time
• This takes resources, and can take hours to identify and locate
every child or adult who has evacuated, is locked-down or
who is relocated to a safer area
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Secured/Cleared
• The location where the mass violence incident occurred will
need to be “secured”
• While “clearing” will take less than one minute per room with a
quick sweep
• ”Securing” is a lengthy slow, methodical process that can take
hours or even days and lots of resources
• You are checking for additional victims, explosives, & hazmat,
using K9, pole cams, etc.
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Multiple Scenes
• During an active shooter/mass violence incident you
may end up with multiple, complex scenes to manage
• This will require the Incident Command System (ICS) to
manage and coordinate
• These scenes could include the scene of the attack,
shooters residence, shooters vehicle, hospitals, family
assistance center, reunification centers for schools, etc.
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Complex Attacks
• Incident complexity continues to grow
• Shooters are enhancing their attacks with “Asymmetric
Warfare” tactics and weapons which can make the
attack similar to a terrorist attack or military operation
• These can include: body armor, automatic weapons,
homemade explosives, deploying smoke and gas,
barricades, etc.
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Complex Attacks (2)
• The term “active assailant” is replacing active shooter as some
of these attackers use weapons besides a firearms
• These weapons of choice can be knives, arson/incendiary
attack, chemicals, homemade explosives (HME), vehicle attacks
or combination of these or others
• Several recent active shooter/active assailant incidents have
included the shooter going mobile on foot or in a vehicle and
attacking different
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Complex Attacks (3)
• It is important for potential Incident Commanders to recognize
that these incidents can require hundreds of responders and last
for days
• Most active shooter/active assailant attacks are over in 4 to 10
minutes but the response can take multiple operational periods
• This requires utilizing the Incident Command System (ICS) using
extensive command and control efforts via multiple shifts
• You will be integrating multiple local, regional, state and federal
agencies
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Major/Complex Incidents
FEMA has a definition of a major/complex incident :
• Involves multiple jurisdictions and/or agencies
• May involve multiple victims with injuries or fatalities
• Involves complex management and communication issues
• Requires experienced, highly qualified supervisory personnel
• Require numerous tactical and support resources
• Results in psychological threat/trauma
• Spans multiple operational periods (days, weeks, months)
• Requires extensive post-incident recovery efforts
• Draws national media interest
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Hospitals
• Comms centers should alert area hospitals as soon as a possible that a “mass
violence incident” has been identified to give these facilities time to prepare,
muster resources and activate their internal “disaster mode”
• Minor injured patients may directly self-transport to nearby local hospitals,
thus arriving and creating emergency department crowding before the
transportation of the more severely injured
• Dumping all patients at one or two hospitals could be moving the disaster
from the scene to the hospitals
• Command Post (CP) may ask for activation of the communities Multiple
Casualty Incident (MCI) Plan to manage the injured depending on numbers
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Staging Area
• Assign a Staging Officer as soon as possible -- do not wait until
there are 100 officers or firefighters on scene as it will be
difficult to play “catch up”
• Having a staging area and staging officer will greatly assist the
command post with assigning and ordering resources
• Staging area needs to be out of the danger area, and at a
location that has enough room and easy access
• Once established a secure staging area can be used for the
duration of the incident
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Staging Area (2)
• It is important to have only one staging area if possible
• There is no operational need for separate staging areas
for law enforcement and Fire/EMS
• In past active shooter/mass violence incidents,
multiple staging areas , if established, has led to
confusion and communication issues
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Emergency Operations Center
Community EOC should be activated as soon as possible for long
term response, recovery, management, investigative and support
efforts
EOC activated for some of the following reasons:
• Resources required beyond local capabilities
• The emergency is of long duration
• Multiple agency/jurisdictional involvement
• Unique or emerging problem(s) may require policy decisions
• A local State of Emergency is declared
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Prepare for:
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Elected Officials
Appointed Officials
Fire Services
Law Enforcement
Emergency Medical
Services
• Public Works
• Public Information
• Inspections
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Social Services
Animal Control
Hospitals
Finance
American Red Cross
Salvation Army
Transit Authority
Specialized Resources
Business/Industry
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Joint Information Center
• A JIC should be established involving all key agencies and players to manage
the local and national media efforts
• Each active shooter/mass violence incident is conducted real time under
intense news and social media scrutiny and public interest
• These large scale or extended events may necessitate the use of a joint
information system
• This should include all key response agencies and “target location”
representative such as school system rep, college rep or business
spokesperson
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Joint Information Center (2)
• Media may appear quickly and may aggressively
attempt to enter the incident area, command
post (CP)or other places to obtain direct
surveillance and communications with
survivors, family members and/or responders
• If you have not established a PIO very quickly
distraught family members or neighbors may
become your incident spokespersons
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Joint Information Center (3)
• PIO must have plans for media announcements
regarding a staging area for parents and relatives of
victims, especially in educational settings
• In these incidents, the scene can be quickly inundated
with parents, friends and bystanders
• Considerations should be given to assigning liaison
officers to support families of casualties in handling
media requests
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Response of a Lifetime
• Your “response of a lifetime” could be the “report of a
lifetime” for the media
• There will be requests for dozens of interviews coming
very quickly
• Press statements and information should come from
the unified command via the PIO/JIC
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Response of a Lifetime (2)
• Initial reports from the media will be incorrect and
even farfetched
• PIO is non-stop, 24/7 effort on a critical incident
• Will need to provide more than 1 or 2 briefs a day
• Unified Command or EOC needs to consider a social
media team to “put the message out”
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Family Assistance Centers
• A FAC may need to be established near the site if possible to
communicate with family members of victims, injured and
fatalities
• Could be another school system facility, college facility or hotel
location
• Family assistance center plans includes custodial care,
reunification, guardianship, accountability, mortuary service
planning, and victim tracking
• “Eyes of the world” on your response from notification until
funerals and beyond (take care of vicitms)
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Family Assistance Center (2)
• Mass violence incidents may require facilities where
outside persons such as investigators, detectives, clergy
or counselors will interact with the “surviving victim
population”
• This may also be the location where death notifications
are provided to victims family members if time permits
• Try to avoid death notifications in front of public and
media
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Family Assistance Center (3)
• FAC should be readily identifiable, large enough to hold
and administratively process surviving victim
population as they are released to families, make
referrals to post-incident counseling services, and have
adequate traffic flow (buses may be used in large
incidents) and parking
• These locations are not open to the general public or
media and will require law enforcement security
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Post-Incident/Demobilization
• While stand down is an appropriate time to relax it also is the
best time to capture staff recollections of specific events that
may not have been well documented
• Obtain responder reports, missions and tasks performed
• This is also the time to account for equipment, personnel, pack
gear, complete records, and release staff back to duty or home
• A demobilization plan will include responder information
regarding debriefs, stress management briefings, and family
support information
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CISM/CISD Efforts
• CISM/CISD efforts should be considered for all victims and
responders
• Only use trained personnel for these activities and never
combine responder and victims CISM/CISD efforts
• Mental and physical health for responders remains a tactical
consideration throughout the incident
• It is possible that some of the responders know the aggressors
and/or victims and this could lead to serious issues and
complications
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Medical Examiner Operations
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Human Remains Recovery (Multi-Agency)
Morgue Services (Multi-Agency)
Family Assistance Centers (Multi-Agency)
Victim Assistance Teams (Multi-Agency)
Media/Joint Information Center (Multi-Agency)
Vital Records
Funeral Home Activities
Volunteers (Multi-Agency)
CISM/CISD (Multi-Agency)
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ICS Resources
• Use available NO COST resources
• Continue with FEMA ICS 100 & 200 classes for ALL responders,
classes are more effective than on-line sessions
• Street supervisors of all ranks should take the ICS 300 & 400
classes to give them a better idea on how to manage and plan
for large, more complex incidents and events
• Work with your local and state regional ICS instructors to
develop your own workshops on mass violence/active assailant
incidents
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Crisis Planning 101
• Contact your County Emergency Management Office or Emergency
Services Office if not engaged in active shooter/mass violence efforts
• Be familiar with your jurisdictions all-hazards plan/emergency operations
plan
• ICS, ICS, ICS, ICS
• Participate in “active shooter/active assailant” drills and exercises including
tabletops, functional and full scale
• Mass violence/active shooter incident specific training & exercises
• Trained and experienced “team” works better than the best written plans
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References
• USFA – Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department
Operational Considerations and Guide for Active
Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents
• IAFF – Position Statement: Active Shooter Events
• C-TECC – Evolution and Application of TCCC Guidelines
to Civilian High Threat Medicine
• Improving Survival from Active Shooter Events: The
Hartford Consensus
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Firefighter Support Foundation
Additional mass violence/active shooters
resources available from the Firefighters Support
Foundation:
• Active Shooters: Rapid Treatment Model
• Terrorism Response Preparedness and
Operations for Mid- and Small-Size Public
Safety Agencies
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BE SAFE!
Joint-Agency Response Efforts Following
Active Assailant/Active Shooter Incidents
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