War - WW Norton & Company

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ESSENTIALS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Chapter 8
War and Strife
War: The Data
• 14,500 armed struggles in history, depending on how
we define war
• Approximately 3.5 billion deaths
• Since 1816, between 224 and 559 international and
intrastate wars
• War incidence has declined after 1991.
• Number of battlefield deaths has declined by 80%
since 1991.
Is War Inevitable?
Realist Answers
• War can be managed but never eliminated due to
human nature.
• States exist in an anarchic system, with no
overarching authority to provide security or settle
disputes.
• States are thus insecure and must rely on self-help to
find security.
• Insecurity can lead to the “security dilemma.”
Irony of the Security Dilemma
• As one state seeks to ameliorate its insecurity, it
seeks power.
• Once state A gains power, it inadvertently makes state
B insecure.
• State B then seeks more power, which it might not
have otherwise done.
• As state B gains power, state A again becomes
insecure and seeks more power.
Irony of the Security Dilemma
• RESULTS: Vicious circle of power accumulation
Permanent condition of tension
Liberals: Is War Inevitable?
• Anarchy is a structural restraint.
• States can learn to cooperate because of self-interest
in the benefits of peace.
• International institutions act as cooperation enablers
by reducing transition costs and increasing cheating
costs—“cooperative competition.”
Liberals: Is War Inevitable?
• Benefits of cooperation will push more states to
become democratic.
• More liberal, democratic states = more peace
Radicals: Transcending War
• Capitalism turns human nature toward greed and
relentless, destructive competition.
• The state supports repressive forces of capitalism at
the expense of the majority of people, both
domestically and worldwide (imperialism).
• War will exist so long as capitalism exists.
• War can be eliminated through the triumph of
socialism, which fosters sharing of resources and
labor.
Constructivists: Reducing War
• Threats are socially constructed.
• Implications of material objects are socialized as
threatening.
• Different types of socialization can lead to different
outcomes.
 Example: United Kingdom versus Iran owning
nuclear weapons
Causes of War
Individual Level of Analysis
• Individual(s)—realists and liberals
 Personal characteristics of leaders
 Misperceptions
 Communications failures
Causes of War
Individual Level of Analysis
• Individual(s)—realists and liberals
 Characteristics of the masses
• St. Augustine—act of self-preservation
• Niebuhr—war is inherent to humans
• War as the unusual event
Causes of War
State Level of Analysis
• State and society—liberal and radical views
• Struggles over internal structures and characteristics
of states cause war.
• Liberals—democracy restrains leaders, provides
outlets for opposing viewpoints.
Causes of War
State Level of Analysis
• Disagreement about effect of capitalist structure
 Liberals say those states avert war, prefer trade.
 Radicals say this leads to competition among
social groups, stagnation, collapse, or the search
for external markets in diversionary war.
International System
as the Cause of War
• International system—realist and radical views
• Anarchy, no final arbiter of disputes
• System in state of nature (Hobbes)
• Realists—war is caused by states challenging
international hierarchy due to
 Changing state capabilities
 Changing distribution of power among states
International System
as the Cause of War
• Radicals—dominant states need to expand, leading
to war over resources.
Explaining Iraq’s
Invasion of Kuwait
• Individual Level
 Saddam Hussein was insecure and ruthless,
misinterpreted U.S. intentions, and miscalculated
Saudi Arabia’s interests.
• State Level
 Iraq had historic claims on Kuwait and it was in
Iraq’s national interest to seize Kuwaiti oil fields;
authoritarian governments are more likely to
choose war as the means to settle disputes.
Explaining Iraq’s
Invasion of Kuwait
• International Level
 Iraq believed invasion would not invoke a
response, UN Security Council lacked the
cohesion to act, and Arab League would not
condemn other Arab states’ actions.
War over South Ossetia, 2008
• Individuals
 Promises of Saakashvili election—sought to
bolster Georgian pride
 Putin promised force and aggressive diplomacy
• State/Society: no democracy
War over South Ossetia, 2008
• International
 Russia sought to keep out competitors and
maintain its position as the regional power.
 Georgia sought the greater power’s protection.
Categorizing Wars
• Interstate war—between states, as they have
recognizable leadership and locations and formal
militaries
• Intrastate/civil war—between factions within state
over control of territory or institutions; many have
international repercussions; can last decades; high
human costs
Categorizing Wars
• Total war—massive loss of life, widespread
destruction; many participants, including multiple
powers; all available weapons utilized; civilians and
military targeted
• Limited war—may be limited by goals pursued, type
of weapons used, amount of resources used; targets
Explaining the Decline
of Total War
• Memories of World War II
• Nuclear war too costly
• Development of security communities
 Realists: rise of U.S. hegemony
 Liberals: democratic peace, economic
interdependence, international organizations
 Constructivists: people socialized into attitudes,
values, and beliefs in peace
How Wars Are Fought
• Conventional warfare—weapons can be limited in
time and space; precise targeting; easily available
 Problems: chemical weapons; indiscriminate
• Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear,
chemical, biological
 Problems: radiation, indiscriminate
How Wars Are Fought
• Unconventional warfare—ignores conventions of
war
 Guerilla warfare, revolutionary guerilla warfare,
asymmetric conflicts, terrorism
Going Nuclear: The View from Iran
• Iran has an “inalienable right” to develop nuclear
energy technology for peaceful purposes via Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
• Oil and gas will run out and refining capacity is very
limited; thus, an alternative energy source is needed.
• But Iran’s legitimate security threats from neighboring
countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel) plus fear
of U.S. invasion may push nuclear development.
Going Nuclear: The View from Iran
• Iran’s decision was propelled by U.S. invasion of Iraq
and its identification of Iran as part of “axis of evil,”
even after post-9/11 intelligence information
suggested otherwise.
• Based on historic U.S. interference in Iran’s domestic
politics, the population supports government policy.
Asymmetric Conflicts:
Battle Tactics
• Asymmetric warfare—between parties of unequal
strength; weaker party seeks to neutralize opponent
strengths by exploiting weaknesses
• Guerilla war—a “small war” often inspired by
nationalism
• Revolutionary guerilla war—defeat technologically
superior and well-equipped foe by exploiting
weaknesses; civilians protect guerillas; traditional
warfare concepts eliminated; win hearts and minds of
the people
Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare
• Elements of terrorism
 Act is political by nature or intent
 Committed by non-state actors
 Combatant or non-combatant targets
 Use unconventional means at unpredictable
places and intervals
Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare
• Motivated by political, religious, or economic goals
• Seek to instill fear to attain goals
Terrorism’s Transformation
since the 1990s
• Attacks have become more lethal.
• Choice of weapons has become more diverse.
• More efficient infrastructure for terrorist networks
 Example: electronic money laundering; funding via
illegal activities; Internet recruiting
Terrorism’s Transformation
since the 1990s
• Wider range of groups: nationalist, radical religious,
neo-Nazi, left-wing and right-wing
• State sponsors, such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea
Responses to Terrorism
• International level: conclusion of 12 conventions
designed to punish hijackers; protect infrastructure,
diplomats, and nuclear materials; and block financial
transfers
• State level: information sharing among states;
monitoring of financial flows; USA PATRIOT Act
Just War Tradition—
Jus ad Bellum
Just conditions for going into war
• Just cause: self-defense; defense of others; massive
violation of human rights
• Declaration of intent by appropriate authority
• Have intentions of ending abuses and establishing a
just peace
Just War Tradition—
Jus ad Bellum
Just conditions for going into war
• Must have exhausted all other alternatives
• Forces must be removed quickly after objectives are
achieved.
Just War Tradition—
Jus ad Bellum
Just conduct in war
• Distinguish between combatants and noncombatants
• Noncombatants protected from harm
• Violence proportionate to ends
• Undue human suffering avoided
• Individual responsibility for actions taken
Banning Landmines—
Evolution of Norms
• International campaign began in 1992
• Spearheaded by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs); coordinator was Jody Williams
• Argued weapons are indiscriminate and have an
unfair destructive impact on innocent noncombatants
• From arms control issue to human rights issue
• Constructivists: demonstrates impact of norms and
socialization in altering behavior of state and nonstate
actors
Key Questions about
Humanitarian Intervention
• How massive do human rights abuses have to be
before intervention is just?
• Who decides when a humanitarian intervention is
necessary? The United Nations? A coalition within the
region? Any powerful state?
• Is the humanitarian intervention occurring for
legitimate reasons or as an excuse to achieve other
objectives?
Key Questions about
Humanitarian Intervention
• Do states have a responsibility to protect (R2P)?
• How can some interventions be justified while other
situations cannot?
Can Military Intervention
Stop Genocide?
• YES—Genocide Convention approves state action
 Force is the sufficiently fast response
 Warns others
 Coupled with humanitarian aid, most effective
Can Military Intervention
Stop Genocide?
• NO—Rarely involve state’s national interests
 Complex organization, costly
 Can be misinterpreted as neocolonialism
 Nearby countries better informed but unprepared
 Not effective deterrent, nonmilitary aid more
effective over long term
Realist Approaches 1:
Managing Insecurity
Balance of Power—states, as rational actors, make
decisions to increase their own capabilities and
undermine those of others
• Use of alliances to balance power both internationally
and regionally (external balancing)
• Increase military and economic capabilities to counter
potential threats (internal balancing)
Realist Approaches 1:
Managing Insecurity
Balance of Power
• Emphasis on relative versus absolute gains
• Most important technique for realists
Problems of Managing Insecurity
with Balance of Power
• The balance of power favors the status quo.
• When fundamental change occurs, the appropriate
response may provide balance.
• When power transitions are occurring, balance of
power is problematic.
Changes in NATO with Decline of
the Soviet Threat
• Increase in membership to 28 states
 2009: Croatia, Albania
• Enhance operational capabilities with new technology
• Create a rapid reaction force for crises
• Diversify tasks
• Engage in out-of-area operations
NATO’s Successful
Transformation
• Realists—achieved relative gains over Russia and
increased Western security
• Liberals—strengthened democracy in postcommunist states; institutional membership increased
security, improved economic and diplomatic
cooperation, and opened the door to other institutions;
institutionalized dialogue with Russia
• Constructivists—confirmed independent identity of
post-communist states; shows acceptance of, and
means to, further norms
Realist Approaches 2: Managing
Insecurity through Deterrence
• Goal
 Prevent the outbreak of war by credible a threat of
the use of force.
• Assumptions
 Decision makers are rational.
 The threat of destruction from nuclear warfare is
too great.
 Alternatives to war are available.
Deterrence in Practice
• States must build arsenals for a credible threat.
 If an alliance, such as NATO, is part of that threat,
the alliance must prove its cohesion.
• Information about the threat must be communicated.
• Leaders must be able to make rational decisions.
Deterrence in the
Twenty-first Century
• The rise of nonstate actors decreases the possibility
that deterrence will work.
• Nonstate actors do not hold territory, so a threat to
destroy territory is not effective.
• The presence of flexible, geographically spread
groups makes eliminating networks difficult.
Deterrence in the
Twenty-first Century
• Willingness to use suicide terrorism undermines
deterrence logic
• U.S. nuclear primacy may mean deterrence against
the United States is impossible.
Liberals Managing Security 1:
Collective Security
Assumptions of Collective Security
• Wars are caused by aggressive states.
• Aggressors must be stopped.
• Aggressors are easily identified.
• Aggressors are always morally wrong.
• Aggressors know ahead of time that the international
community will act against them.
Weakness of Collective Security
in Practice
• There is lack of commitment by some nations to act in
concert.
• Never works against permanent members of UN
Security Council due to veto power
• Difficulty of identifying aggressor
• It’s difficult to determine whether the aggressor is
always wrong.
Arms Control and Disarmament
Assumptions
• Fewer weapons means greater security.
• Regulate arms proliferation (arms control) or reduce
amount of arms and types of weapons (disarmament)
• Costs of security dilemma are reduced.
• Major agreements include bilateral, regional, and
global treaties covering conventional, nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT )
• Signed in 1968; in force since 1970;189 signatories
• States without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire
or develop them.
• States with nuclear weapons promise not to transfer
technology to non-nuclear states and to eventually
dismantle their own.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
“guardian” of the NPT, by means such as inspection
teams and information gathering.
Limitations of NPT
• Nuclear states outside the treaty
 Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan
• Inspections by IAEA can be difficult to conduct and
inspectors have been asked to leave.
• States can pull out of the treaty: North Korea
• Liberals acknowledge complete disarmament of all
types of weapons is unlikely (due to cheaters), but
pursue incremental disarmament.
Challenges to State-Centered
View of Security
• More intrastate violence and advancing technology
means that contain war are becoming less likely.
• Role of more private actors
 Piracy
 Outsourcing security tasks to private companies
 “Soldier-employees” do not always have national
ties to “state-employer.”
Rethinking Security
Are we moving from state (national security) to
human security?
• Human security includes
 Economic and social well-being
 Literacy
 Adequate health care
 Clean environment
 General personal safety
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