Is There a Theoretical Divide in the Foreign Service?
Jon P. Dorschner
799 Words
The discipline of International Relations is divided into
theoretical groups that often compete for dominance.
International Relations originated in the thinking of
European “Realists,” and this group has dominated the
discipline since its inception. The rise of Liberal
theoreticians has threatened to overturn this dominance. A
third theoretical school, the constructivists, emerged in the
early 1990’s. While constructivists argue that they
constitute a third theoretical school, many Liberals believe
that constructivism is subsumed within Liberalism. These
Liberals argue that the two outlooks overlap to such an
extent as to be virtually indistinguishable.
Foreign Service Officers are professional practitioners of
International Relations rather than theorists. They usually
do not get involved in academic disputes. Despite this, the
Foreign Service cannot wholly escape the same theoretical
disputes and divisions that are much more apparent within
academic. The divisions within academia are reflected in the
Foreign Service.
Just as academics within International Relations are divided
between Realists and Liberals-Constructivists, Foreign
Service Officers are divided into two broad groups, the
generalists and the subject matter experts. The generalists
are aligned with the Realist school of thought and subject
matter experts subscribe to Liberalism-Constructivism.
Constructivists emphasize the importance of culture,
domestic politics, and powerful personalities. They argue
that because the Realists ignore or downplay these
variables, their analysis is often unable to explain how
foreign policy is devised. Subject matter experts within the
Foreign Service emphasize the same concerns.
Over the course of their careers subject matter experts make
it a top priority to understand the cultures within which
they operate as diplomats. To gain a broader understanding,
they focus on becoming fluent in the language of their host
country. They use this language ability to cultivate a broad
array of contacts from political parties, religious
organizations, academia, the media, and the arts. They
believe that without this deep and intense contact and
interaction, they cannot provide accurate analysis and policy
recommendations to American policy-makers.
Generalists, by contrast, subscribe to more traditional
Realist doctrines. They tend to see countries as opaque
“black boxes,” and dismiss the importance of cultural
variables. As realists, they believe that diplomacy consists of
the interaction of foreign policy professionals representing
“the state.” They do not see any reason to extend their
contacts much beyond the powerful players within the host
government.
The principal focus of generalists is government elites
within the Foreign Ministry, the office of the head of state,
and functionaries from other important ministries. Since
most policy elites around the world are now fluent in
English and conduct business in that language, the
generalists tend to de-emphasize the importance of
acquiring fluency in the host country’s language. As Realists,
they focus on power and cultivating power relationships and
tend to view these relationships as transcending cultural
differences. They view the powerful as exhibiting many of
the same traits regardless of country or region.
Liberals and Realists contend for supremacy within the
Foreign Service, just as they do in academia. However the
roles within the two professions are reversed. Liberals
dominate Academia, while Realists dominate the Foreign
Service. There are several reasons for this inversion.
Academics are primarily theoreticians rather than
practitioners. They are focused on devising the theory that
best explains how foreign policy is devised and the theories
that they believe will result in the best outcomes. Since they
work in the world of ideas, they prefer idealism to realism.
The Generalists within the Foreign Service view power,
competition, and self/national interest as the principal
factors determining both Foreign Policy and career success.
They are well aware that “knowledge is power,” and are
suspicious of subject matter experts and their extensive
country expertise. They also look askance at the tendency of
subject matter experts to “waste time” cultivating contacts
not clearly in positions of power within the host country
establishment. They also accuse some subject matter
experts of “going native,” and fear this will undermine their
commitment to American national interest.
But the most important reason why the Foreign Service
generalists remain on top is that their emphasis on power
and power-relationships enables them to successfully
maneuver complicated bureaucratic minefields. Generalists
focus on manipulating the system to their best advantage,
while subject matter experts place a higher priority on
successfully mastering the intricacies of a chosen culture or
region.
It would be a setback to American foreign policy if the
Foreign Service became the exclusive preserve of the
generalists. The United States would suffer serious foreign
policy reverses without the input provided by erudite and
sophisticated subject matter experts. A survey of US foreign
policy provides many examples of poor outcomes resulting
from decisions made by powerful Realists within the State
Department to ignore, overlook, or overwhelm input from
subject matter experts.