Approaches to EU regional
integration
Regional Integration
Module of Political Science
Lecture 2
Schmitter-Malamud 2010
• All theories of European integration can be
placed on a two dimensional property
space formed by two variables :
• ONTOLOGY
• EPISTEMOLOGY
ONTOLOGY
• Refers to the difference between theories
that assume a process that reproduces
the existing characteristics of the member
states and the interstate system of which
they are a part, and theories that assume
a process that transforms the nature of
sovereign nation states and their relations
with each other
EPISTEMOLOGY
• Refers to the fact that, in gathering evidence to
monitor these processes some theories focus
primarly on dramatic political events
(ex:treaties) while other theories focus on
prosaic socio-economic-cultural exchanges
GREAT EVENTS
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GRADUAL PROCESSES
Regulationism
Realism
Intergoverm’sm
Fusion thesis
Liberal Intergoverm’sm
INSTITUTIONALISM
Policy network
analysis
Historical
Rational
l choice MULTI-LEVEL
(polycentric)
GOVERNANCE
Socio
logical
Neo-neo-functionalism
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
Incremental
federalism
Neo-functionalism
Functionalism
Federalism
Schmitter, Malamud (2010)
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
(A. Moravsick)
Shares the premise of realism that states are the
actors in processes of regional integration.
Proposes a two-stage theory to explain regional
integration expecially the big decisions (grand
bargains)treaties (The choice for Europe,
1998).
1° stage- a liberal (pluralistic) theory of the
formation of state’s preferences
2° stage- an intergovernmentalist theory of states’
bargaining
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
(A. Moravsick)
Stage 1 – State’s preferences formation: demand of
integration
A liberal (pluralistic) theory of state’s preference formation
National preferences arise in the domestic politics of nation states , from the
competition among national interest groups for political influence on the
government.:national preferences are the consequences of state-society
interactions.
Departure from traditional realism : states’ preferences, that guide
states’rational behaviour in negotiations, are not fixed but depend on
dynamic political processes in the domestic polity.
The most important preferences are socio-economic
Ex: CAP, Single Market and Single European Act
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
(A. Moravsick)
Stage 2- Interstate bargaining
Rational actors in a particular bargaining environment:
1) The situation is not coercitive: states enter volountary
in the negotiation and the decision rule is unanimity.
2) The situation is information- rich : there is a
widespread knowledge of the technicalities of the EU
policymaking and states have a lot information on
other state’s preferences.
3) The transactions costs are low because the time-frame
of negotiations is long and because there is a wide
possibility for issue-linkages, trade-offs and subbargains (multi-issue nature of EU cooperation)
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Stage 2- Interstate bargaining
What explains the outcomes of the bargainings?
Asymmetrical interdependence is the main factor. Some states have more at
stake than others and are more willing to reach an agreement and more
prepared to make concessions.
3 facors are likely to influence the outcomes:
1.
The value of alternative policy alternatives , relative to the status quo,
which underlies credible threats to veto (generates pressures to agree on
the recalcitrant state)
2.
The value of alternative coalitions which underlies credible threat to
exclude (even more powerful pressure on recalcitrant states )
3.
The opportunities for issue linkage or side-payments which underlie
pakage deals
Those who desire more the benefits of cooperation will concede more to get
them. The limits are in domestic policy: concessions : may create
domestic loosers and this limits the states’ willingness to concede .
Role of supranational organization (Commission or Court of Justice very
limited)
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
(A. Moravsick)
Outocomes :don’t trascend the nation state;
the nation state is not fundamentally
transformed
.
Regional integration may re-inforce the
nation state (A. Milward, The European
rescue of the nation state)
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Critiques
1. Focuses only on “history making
decisions” , neglecting ordinary, day-today, policy decisions
2. Overlooks the role of supra-national
actors (European Commission,
European Court of Justice)
GREAT EVENTS
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GRADUAL PROCESSES
Regulationism
Realism
Intergoverm’sm
Fusion thesis
Liberal Intergoverm’sm
INSTITUTIONALISM
Policy network
analysis
Historical
Rational
l choice MULTI-LEVEL
(polycentric)
GOVERNANCE
Socio
logical
Neo-neo-functionalism
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
Incremental
federalism
Neo-functionalism
Functionalism
Federalism
Schmitter, Malamud (2010)
NEOFUNCTIONALISM
Born in the 50s in an “exceptional political
context”(Rosamond) inauguration of the European
CommunitiesMonnet’s Strategy of integration in limited
but yet crucial functional sectors (CSC 1950)  mirrored
in some key assumptions of NFfunctionalism and
incrementalism rather than federalism and
comprehensive planning (Haas 1958)
Part of the behavioural revolution in social sciences :
testable ipothesis. Departure from early functionalist
approaches in IR (Mitrany) because it focus not only on
functional pressure but also on the purposeful actors
pursuing their own self-interest. Influenced by the
pluralist paradigm in American political science (Dahl,
Schattscneider, Bentley, Truman, Polsby, Downs, Lipset)
on the role of interest groups
NEOFUNCTIONALISM
Early theorizing:
E. Haas, The uniting of Europe (1958)
L. Lindberg, The political dynamics of
European economic integration (1963)
E. Has, Beyond the nation-state (1964)
Regionalism-Regional
integration (def.)
• Haas(1961) “process of how and why nation
states volountary mingle, merge and mix with
their neibourghs so as to loose the factual
attributes of sovereignity while acquiring new
techniques for resolving conflicts among
themselves
• + (Schmitter 2004) “by creating common and
permanent institutions capable of making
decisions binding on all members”
• TRANSFORMATION OF STATES
Neo-functionalism
Fundamental logic of NF explanation (Rosamond 2000):
Two or more states agree to work for integration in an economic sector
A and to do so appoint some supra-national burocratic agency.
While integration in A produce some of the expected benefits, the full
advantages of integration can’t be achived until economic sectors
closely linked with A are also drawn in the integrative process.
This mechanism is called spill over (functional spill over): integration in
one economic sector create functional pressures for further economic
integration within and beyond that sector and for greater authoritative
capacity at the European level.
The main drive of integration (in terms of pressures for both broadening and
deepening regional integration ) resides in the functional interdependence
between economic sectors .
Ex: coal and steel (ECSC)
single market-environment
Single-market -transports
But: single market- social policy?
NEOFUNCTIONALISM –
POLITICAL SPILL OVER
Along with functional pressure, integration is also
driven by the actions of deliberate integrationseeking agents.
Namely :
-Interest groups (trans-national interest groups)
-Supra-national burocracies (High Authority,
Commission)
POLITICAL SPILL OVER:
INTEREST GROUPS
Since economic integration generates an increase
in transactions between actors in the integrated
region the pressure of interest groups tends to
shift from the national to the regional level and
new transnational interest groups are formed and
pressure for further integration.
This regards in particular producers’ interests:
COPA (1958)
UNICE (1958)
But: ETUC only in the 70s ; transnational groups are
organizationally weak
Multi-level rather than shifted pressure politics
POLITICAL SPILL OVER:THE ROLE OF
SUPRANATIONAL BUROCRACIES
They become the first sponsor or further regional integration.
They develop strategies to promote deeper integration in a larger
range of economic sectors and for an increased
institutionalization of authority at the regional level.
They do so emphasizing the advantages of further functional
integration and sponsoring the emergence of transnational
pressure groups.
The logic is one of beurocratic politics (Downs 1964)
:beurocracy’s main interests are the expansion of their
competences and power and their budgets ; the main resources
they have are technical skills, information and strategic
capabilities (to forge coalitions of actors)
POLITICAL SPILL OVER:THE ROLE OF
SUPRANATIONAL BUROCRACIES 2
Leon Lindberg has specified the prerequisites of a
supranational authority to perform an integrative role.
Regional institutions are indespensable.
They must have competences that go beyond those typical
of the Secretariats of international organizations,
including the capacity to initiate social and economic
processes.
Their tasks should be inherently expansive : they are not
effective if they not generate tensions that could be
solved only with further action and they must have the
ability to attract new actors in their politics.
Political spill over –Impacts on
the domestic level
Given the benefits of integration, interest groups
pressure on national governments for further
integration.
Technocrats at the state level (high civil servants ,
economists in Ministries and the Central Bank
etc. ) are aware of the linkages and increasing
transactions emerging at the regional level. They
also pressure on governments for further
integration.
Epistemic communities and spill
over (Haas)
“Epistemic communities are associations of
professional experts in a particular field who,
because of the knowledge they have, have an
unusual influence on politicians and
bureaucrats, and are, therefore, able to
penetrate government departments and make
their ideas part of policy . . . They only operate in
fields of policy where science matters. In the
field of human rights, forget it . . . In
environmental politics, it matters a great deal”
Mediators of spill over
SPILL OVER –Def.
Central mechanism is therefore functional
spill over:
Lindberg (1963) best known definition of SO
“A situation in which a given action related to
a specific goal, creates a situation in which
the original goal can be assured only by
taking further actions, which in turn create
a further condition and a need for more
action and so forth”
SPILL OVERSpill over  intrinsically expansive logic governing
processes of regional integration.
Prerequisite for spill-over to emerge is:
- That the m.s. economies are already reasonably
interdependent prior to the initiation of the integration
process (may not be the case outside Europe).
- Haas specifies that to set in motion this process the
sectors initially integrated must have some
characteristics: some sectors have more spill over
potential than others (low politics with a direct impact on
people lives) (ex: Coal and Steel in Europe 1950 vs
European Community for Defence which failed in 1954 )
Spill over and integration
The interpretation of regional integration of
neo-functionalists seems to describe (and
predict) a linear progressive phenomenon
: once started dynamics will be set in place
to continue the original impetus.
The development of European integration
between 1950 and the mid-Sixties seemed
to confirm this interpretation
Critiques to early
neofunctionalism
It’s a n=1 , ad hoc , theory explaining only the case
of European integration not a general theory of
regional integration.
It’s deterministic, the idea of spill-over postulates a
sort of automatic process, an in-built mechanism
, leading from integration to further integration.
It has been empirically disconfirmed by the
evolution of European integration after 1965: the
“crisis of the empty chairs” and the backlash of
the nation state.
Revision of functionalism :neo-neo
functionalism and the contribution of
P.Schmitter (1969- 2010)
P. Schmitter has worked to integrate the idea of
spill over in a framework focusing on a plurality
of possible actors strategies and spelling out the
conditions in which these strategies would be
employed.
Main effort to produce a general theory of
integration building on the European experience
Neo-neo-functionalism
• What makes the difference is what neoand neo-neo functionalism tries to specify.
• Its answer to whether “spill-over” into new
tasks or level of authority will occur is: it
depends! Not that it has to happen or that
it will automatically happen
• Any comprehensive theory of integration
should potentially be a theory of
disintegration.
• It should not only explain why countries decide
to coordinate their efforts across a wider range
of tasks and delegate more authority to
common institutions, but also why they do not
do so or why, having done so, they decide to
defect from such arrangements.
• (Schmitter 2005)
Crises and “critical junctures”
Integration process are not conceived
anymore as linear.
It depends on how crises are perceived and
on the strategies adopted by actors to
solve them .
Spill over? Not necessairly so…
• If …as a result of the consequences of trying to reach
these initial objectives, the performance of the regional
organization is inadequate, actors may be forced to
revise their strategies and to consider alternative
integrative obligations, i.e., they may re-evaluate the
level and/or scope of their commitment to regional
institutions and they may even come adopt a new set
of common objectives, e.g. change from economic to
political integration. “Transcendence” has been
accomplished in the exotic lexicon of this theory.
• This particular “success syndrome” is only one of
several possible outcomes … and not a very probable
one at that. They might just as well have chosen to
“spillback”… and withdraw from their original objective,
downgrading their commitment tomutual cooperation.
Neo-neo-functionalism:alternative actors’ strategies
Strategy
Definition
Increase both the scope and level of an actor
Spillover
committment
Spill-around
Increasing only the scope while holding the level of
authority constant
Buildup
Agree to increase the decisional autonomy of joint
institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas
Retrench
Increase the level of decision but reduce the scope
(debate on subsidiarity)
Muddle-about
Let the regional beurocrats debate: suggest and
expostulate on a variety of issues but decrease their
capacity to allocate values (soft law)
Spill back
Retreat on level and scope of authority (perhaps reverting to
the status quo prior to integration)
Encapsulate
Respond to the crisis by marginal modifications
Neo-neo-functionalism
•
Nevertheless, these neo-versions postulate an underlying
sequence (admittedly of indeterminate length) whereby organizational
roles, efforts at collective action, and actor conceptions of interest shift
from the national to the supranational level.
• This does not happen “automatically,” as in the original model, but
requires a considerable amount of political action and that is usually
associated with a crisis in the integration process. Its previous
functioning has failed to meet expectations,generated a distribution of
benefits that is not voluntarily acceptable and/or produced negative
externalities that can no longer be ignored.
• Regardless of their initial intentions (and what they have placed in the
documentary record), the national actors have to reassess the level and
scope of their regional institutions.
• They can, of course, decide to withdraw from joint obligations (“spillback”) or they could try to survive without changing institutions (“muddleabout”), but the macro-hypothesis of neo- and neo-neofunctionalist
theory is that, under certain conditions, they will prefer to resolve these
crises by expanding their mutual obligations (“spill-over”), rather than
contracting or just reasserting them.
GREAT EVENTS
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GRADUAL PROCESSES
Regulationism
Realism
Intergoverm’sm
Fusion thesis
Liberal Intergoverm’sm
INSTITUTIONALISM
Policy network
analysis
Historical
Rational
l choice MULTI-LEVEL
(polycentric)
GOVERNANCE
Socio
logical
Neo-neo-functionalism
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
Incremental
federalism
Neo-functionalism
Functionalism
Federalism
Schmitter, Malamud (2010)
Regulationism, Fusion theory,
Policy network
Focus on policy-making
EU as “regulatory state” (Majone)
Institutional fusion or networks of actors in
policy making
No fundamental changes in the nature of
nations states
Institutionalism
A group of approaches; presently the mainstream
literature on the EU is institutionalistm.
They are mid-range theories rather than grand
theories, focusing on the political process and its
outcomes rather than on “the nature of the
beast”(Risse) (trasformation of the state or not) :
which justifies placing them in the middle of the
diagram.
Institutionalism
A number of versions of institutionalism that
share a common premise
“institutions matter”
But differ in the definition of institutions and their
role.
Various typologies of institutionalism. Most
commonly referred to is P. Hall’s, which
distinguishes 3 types:
-rational choice institutionalism
-historical institutionalism
-sociological institutionalism
rational choice institutionalism
Conceives institutions (formal rules and
operating practices) as systems of
constraints and opportunities for the
strategies of rational actors .
Es.
M. Pollack on supranational institutions
Tsebelis on veto points
F. Scharpf (and the MP school) Actor
centered institutionalism
Historical institutionalism
“history matters”
Central concepts are “path dependence”
and “increasing returns”
Explains inertia (of institutions or policies)
better than change
What is “Path dependence”?
I eat my peas with honey. I’ve done it all my
life. It makes ’em taste quite funny, but it
keeps them on the knife.
– an old Bostonian jump roping rhyme.
(Page , 2006)
“Path dependence” counters the idea of
functional adaptation of an institution or a
policy
Path dependence-def.
M. LEVI “Path dependence has to mean…that
once a country or a region has started down a
track, the costs of reversal are very high. There
will be other choices points, but the
entrenchments of certain institutional
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal to the
initial choice” (1997).
Preceding steps in a particular direction induce
further movements in the same direction.- this
lead to the notion of increasing returns
increasing returns -def.
P. Pierson (2000) “In an increasing returns
process the probability of certain steps along the
same path increase with each move along that
path. This is because the relative benefits of the
current activity compared with other possible
options increase over time. To put it in a different
way the costs of exit –of switching to some
previously plausible alternative-rise. Increasing
returns processes can also be described as selfreinforcing or positive feedback processes”
Path dependence in political
institutions and policy
The status quo bias of political institutions
Institutional arrangement are generally hard
to change. They are often designed to be
difficult to overturn (ex: unanimity rules in
the EU; supermajorities to alter
Constitutions)
SOCIOLOGICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM
Institutions are intended not only as rules (formal
or informal) but also as values, “habits of the
heart”, cognitive frames .
Normative dimension of institutional impact
Actors act not only following a logic of
consequences (Powell, Di Maggio) [rational] but
also following a logic of “appropriateness”.
Processes of institutional socialization and
learning.
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
It’s not a theory.
Rather is a description of the EU polity.
Elaborated on the experience of EU cohesion
policy post-1988.
Describes the interactions in policy making (both in
the policy formulation and the policy
implementation phases) of actors situated at
supranational-national-regional levels of
government.
EU integration calls for pluralism
of approaches
•.
•Peterson – Bomberg
(1999)
Type of
decision
“Best”
Theory
History
making
Policy setting
Liberal
intergovern
mentalism
Institutional
ism
Policy
shaping
Policy
network