Lecturer:
Oddbjørn Knutsen,
Department of Political Science,
University of Oslo

Psychologist Milton Rokeach: a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is preferable to opposite or converse modes of conduct or end-states of existence.
Two types of values: terminal (end-state of existence) and instrumental (mode of conduct) values.
Personal and social values. People have values they want to emphasise in their own lives (self-centred) but also values they would emphasise in their social environment (societal-centred).
This differentiation can be expanded to different domains, and we can talk about, for example, family values, work values, bureaucratic values and political values.
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For Rokeach, a value is a basic and relatively stable element in a person’s belief system.
A value is a prescriptive belief wherein some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable.
Attitudes, which are often defined as a set of beliefs organised around a specific object or situation.
A value is considered to be a basic (prescriptive) belief that often influences a specific attitude together with other beliefs.
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Building on Rokeach and others, Shalom Schwartz identifies six formal characteristics that are the defining features of basic human values: a) Values are beliefs b) about desirable end-states or behaviours (modes of conduct) that: c) transcend specific situations or actions, d) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and e) are ordered by relative importance to form a value system f) The relative importance of values guides attitudes and behaviour.
Rokeach and Schwartz have their own value batteries and dimensions of more personal and social values
The focus here: Political values
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Terminal political values can be considered as end-states that individuals would like to see characterise the society as a whole and see implemented through the political system.
Instrumental political values are modes of conduct that are considered legitimate (or illegitimate) to influence political decisions, for example various types of political participation and ways of influencing political decisions.
In political science, the concept of values is at the core of David
Easton’s famous definition of politics as those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.
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The most well-known political value dimension
Ronald Inglehart: Materialist/post-materialist (MPM) value orientations.
Materialist values emphasise economic and physical security, such as economic stability and growth, law and order, and strong defence.
Post-materialist values emphasise self-expression, subjective wellbeing and the quality of life.
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Another way of conceptualising ’New Politics’ is represented by environmental versus economic growth values.
Environmental protections versus various trade offs
Scott Flanagan: Inglehart’s conceptualisation of value change combines two dimensions: a materialist/non-materialist dimension and a libertarian/authoritarian dimension.
Flanagan considers value change along the latter dimension as most important.
Libertarian values: autonomy, openness and self-betterment.
Authoritarian values: a broader cluster of values, which, along with concerns about security and order, includes respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance towards minorities, and conformity to customs.
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The libertarian/authoritarian value orientations are also the central components in Herbert Kitschelt’s important work on changes in the party systems of western democracies.
Immigration orientations
Are different orientations towards immigrants and immigration values or attitudes?
Perhaps they are included in the libertarian-authoritarian value dimension?
They might be considered as basic orientations which are close to values. Comparative research has shown that these orientations are closely related to and reflect basic values and beliefs about different conceptions of national identity, ethnicity and multiculturalism
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Religious/secular values
Christian values focus on the importance of Christian morals and principles in society and politics, and on traditional moral guidelines in school and society in general.
Secularisation is often understood as a process whereby mundane reality is less and less interpreted from a supernatural perspective, and secular values are based on more modern norms of morality that people want to decide for themselves without the guidelines of the church.
Religious/secular values tap these contrasting orientations.
Religious orientations:
One aspect is the religious beliefs that people hold
The other aspect is church-oriented religion or church religiosity.
The essence of this dimension is ‘church integration’: the more people participate in the relevant church’s rites and services, the more church-integrated they are.
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The Industrial Revolution gave rise to economic interest conflicts.
Economic left –right values or left–right materialist values.
These value orientations are economic in nature, and they refer in particular to the role of government in creating more economic equality in society versus the need for economic incentives and efficiency.
These value orientations incorporate value conflicts related to control, power and the degree of distribution of resources in the production sphere .
They include:
• The degree of workers’ control in the workplace
• state regulation of the economy versus private enterprise
• private property and the market economy versus state regulations
• the size of the welfare state
• economic and social equality versus the need for differentiated rewards for stimulating effort.
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Model for political values
Old Politics
Religious-secular values
Economic left-right values
New Politics
Materialist/post materialist values
Or a) Environmental versus economic growth and other trade offs and b) Libertarian-authoritarian values and c) Immigration orientations, values or attitudes?
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How to measure political values?
They should be tapped by multiple indicators
General political issue items/questions can be used as indicators, in particular those who take the existing situation at a point of departure.
Do you want more or less of ..
But the distributions of such orientations are difficult to compare between countries
Ranking or rating? Both can be used
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Research questions related to the role of political values in determining party choice:
• The strength or the various value orientations
• The ordering of party voters along the various value dimensions
• Changes over time and comparative differences
• How social structure and value orientations determine party choice in combination.
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0,70
The impact of value orientations on party choice in Norway,
1969-2005
0,66
0,65
0,63
0,60
0,58
0,55
0,54 0,54
0,52
0,50 0,50
0,47
0,40 0,40
0,44
0,42
0,43
0,39
0,43
0,39
0,42
0,46
0,43
0,41
0,46
0,44
0,42
0,35
0,34 0,34 0,34
0,31
0,30
0,31
0,30
0,27
0,20
0,10
0,12
0,16
0,20
Econ. left-right
Moral-rel. values
Lib/auth. item
Lib/auth. index
Ecology/growth
0,00
1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
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Value orientations
Social structure
Party choice
Causal model for determinants of party choice
1.
Pure structural voting: The direct effect from social structure to party choice
2.
Pure value voting: The direct effect of value orientations on party choice (controlled for social structure)
3.
Cleavage voting: The indirect effect of social structure via value orientation to party choice
Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995): Specification of the Mair/Bartolini cleavage model.
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Inglehart (1984): From a class-based to a value-based pattern of political polarisation
More general: From social structure to value orientations (the general model, not only MPM).
The dynamics between social structure and value orientations with regard to determining party choice
Value orientations as the central, driving force?
Inglehart’s two hypotheses:
• Issue/value polarisation (associated with MPM)
• Group polarisation: A new axis of group polarisation caused by the new value-based polarisation. Education and social class play a new role alongside the old industrial polarisation
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Libertarian politics
Economicleftist politics
Economicrightist politics
Authoritari an politics
Figure 1. A two-dimensional space of party competition in advanced industrial democracies.
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Left-libertarian politics
Social structure and preference formation
(high education, women, symbol and client processing)
Libertarian politics high education symbol and client processing jobs in the public sector high skill, processing symbols and clients in the private sector
Economicleftist politics
(public and/or domestic sector, nonowners) administrative and manual public sector jobs high skill jobs in the inter - nationally competitive manufacturing and service sectors low-skill jobs in domestic services and manufacturing liberal professionals and corporate organization men petite bourgeoisie
Economicrightist politics
(private and/or internationally competitive sector, owners)
Authoritarian politics Right -authoritarian politics
(low education, men, symbol and artifacts and documents)
Figure 2. Ideology and occupational groups in advanced industrial democracies.
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The transformation of European social democracy
Libertarian
Politics
Left Libertarian
Politics
New main axis of party competition
Economicleftist politics
SD
1
SD ny1
SD ny2
SD ny3
W R
MC1
MC2 1
MC2 2
P
Old Main Axis of
Party Competition
Economic-rightist politics
Right-Authoritarian
Politics
Authoritarian
Politics
Figure 3. The competitive space in advanced industrial democracies.
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Social structure
Education
Value orientations
Libertarian/authoritarian orientations
Party choice along a new politics dimension
Group consciousness and identity
Identification with people with the same education level as the respondent
Felt conflicts between people with lower and higher level of education
Stubager cleavage
Ulike indikatorer for tilhørighet med mennesker på samme
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Source
Knutsen (2012) Conflict dimension in the West European party systems: A comparative study based on European
Values Study 2008
Paper prepared for presentation at the XXII nd
Political Science in Madrid, July 8 to 12, 2012.
World Congress of
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Table 2. Correlation between party choice and value orientations (eta-coefficients).
The value orientations are ranked according to the strength of the correlations
A. The Nordic countries eclr immigr
Denmark 0,573 0,401 libaut environm
0,304 0,234 relsec
0,118
Mean
0,326
Finland eclr
0,559 relsec immigr environm
0,402 0,374 0,312 libaut
0,256 0,381 eclr environm immigr
0,502 0,302 0,294 libaut
0,243 relsec
0,112
Iceland eclr immigr
0,536 0,437 relsec environm
0,420 0,273 libaut
0,233
Norway eclr
0,608 relsec immigr
0,374 0,356 libaut environm
0,255 0,248
Sweden
Mean eclr immigr
0,555 0,372 relsec environm
0,285 0,274 libaut
0,258
Explanations: relsec - religious-secular values eclr - economic left-right values libaut - libertarian-authoritarian values environm - environmental versus economic growth, higher taxation etc.
immigr - immigration orientations
0,291
0,380
0,368
0,349
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Table 2. Correlation between party choice and value orientations (eta-coefficients).
The value orientations are ranked according to the strength of the correlations
B. Central Western countries immigr libaut
Austria 0,489 0,378 eclr
0,332 relsec environm
0,291 0,191
Mean
0,336
Belgium environm
0,346 eclr immigr
0,345 0,327 relsec
0,327 libaut
0,271
Belgium party fam.
eclr immigr
0,335 relsec
0,443
0,319 relsec environm
0,306 eclr immigr
0,356 0,275 libaut
0,245 0,267 libaut environm
0,261 0,130 Germany
Luxembourg immigr environm
0,250 0,245 eclr
0,238 relsec
0,233 libaut
0,175
Netherlands relsec
0,556
Switzerland immigr
0,468 eclr immigr
0,424 0,391 libaut environm
0,348 0,214 eclr
0,389 libaut
0,338 relsec environm
0,332 0,329
Mean immigr
0,367 relsec
0,364 eclr
0,347 libaut environm
0,295 0,243
Explanations: relsec - religious-secular values eclr - economic left-right values libaut - libertarian-authoritarian values environm - environmental versus economic growth, higher taxation etc.
immigr - immigration orientations
0,323
0,294
0,293
0,228
0,386
0,371
Mean
0,323
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Table 2. Correlation between party choice and value orientations (eta-coefficients).
The value orientations are ranked according to the strength of the correlations
C. The Islands
Great Britain eclr immigr environm
0,342 0,281 0,233 libaut
0,179 relsec
0,141
Mean
0,235
Ireland relsec immigr environm
0,278 0,222 0,183 libaut
0,165 eclr
0,090
Mean immigr
0,251 eclr
0,216 relsec environm
0,210 0,208 libaut
0,172
Explanations: relsec - religious-secular values eclr - economic left-right values libaut - libertarian-authoritarian values environm - environmental versus economic growth, higher taxation etc.
immigr - immigration orientations
0,188
Mean
0,211
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Table 2. Correlation between party choice and value orientations (eta-coefficients).
The value orientations are ranked according to the strength of the correlations
D. Southern Europe eclr immigr
France 0,452 0,386 libaut
0,263 relsec environm
0,198 0,192
Mean
0,298
Greece libaut
0,324 immigr
0,430 eclr
0,278 relsec immigr environm
0,270 0,191 0,104 eclr
0,326 relsec
0,294 libaut environm
0,245 0,209
Italy
Spain relsec
0,397 eclr immigr
0,263 0,244 relsec environm
0,202 0,174 eclr
0,129 libaut environm
0,228 0,196 libaut immigr
0,128 0,074 Portugal
Mean eclr
0,290 relsec immigr
0,272 0,265 libaut environm
0,237 0,175
Explanations: relsec - religious-secular values eclr - economic left-right values libaut - libertarian-authoritarian values environm - environmental versus economic growth, higher taxation etc.
immigr - immigration orientations
0,233
0,301
0,266
0,141
Mean
0,248
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Literature.
Flanagan, Scott C. (1987): 'Value Changes in Industrial Societies',
American Political Science Review , 81:1303-1319.
Flanagan, Scott C. & Lee, Aie-Rie (2003): 'The new politics, culture wars, and the authoritarian-libertarian value change in advanced industrial democracies', Comparative Political Studies
36: 235-270.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1994): The Transformation of European Social
Democracy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1995): The Radical Right in Western Europe –
A Comparative Analysis.
Ann Arbor: The University Press of
Michigan.
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Stubager, Rune (2009): ‘Education-based group identity and consciousness in the authoritarianlibertarian value conflict’,
European Journal of Political Research 48 (2): 204-233.
Stubager, Rune (2010): ‘The development of the education cleavage: Denmark as a critical case’, West European Politics 33
(3): 505-533.
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