Runway Safety
Presentation to the
Canadian Airports Council’s
Operations, Safety and Technical Affairs Committee
Kathy Fox, Board Member
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
May 18, 2010
1
Outline
• About the TSB, our mandate
• TSB Watchlist
– Landing accidents and runway overruns
– Runway incursions
– Safety Management Systems
• Action Required
• Summary/ Discussion
2
About the TSB
• Independent organization investigating marine, pipeline,
rail and air occurrences.
• The CTAISB Regulations define which types of
occurrences (incidents or accidents) are required to be
reported to the TSB for each of the modes.
• Approximately 230 employees. Board consists of up to 5
Board Members, including the Chair.
3
TSB Mandate
To advance transportation safety in the air, marine,
rail and pipeline modes of transportation that are
under federal jurisdiction by:
•
•
•
•
conducting independent investigations
identifying safety deficiencies
making recommendations to address safety deficiencies
reporting publicly on investigations
It is not the function of the TSB to assign fault or
determine civil or criminal liability.
4
Landing accidents
and runway overruns
WATCHLIST
Risk of collisions
on runways
Safety Management
Systems
Emergency preparedness
on ferries
Passenger trains
colliding with vehicles
Operation of longer,
heavier trains
Controlled flight
into terrain
Fishing vessel safety
Data recorders
5
WATCHLIST
Issue:
Landing accidents
and runway overruns
Runway overrun, Air France Airbus A340, Toronto, ON
6
Runway Excursions
A Worldwide Challenge
Between 1995-2008:
• 435 landing runway excursions
(205 overrun, 230 veer-off) (1)
• Runway excursions (takeoff and
landing): 34 fatal accidents,
712 fatalities (2)
Sources:
(1) SMS Specialties, Report on the Design and Analysis of a Runway
Excursions Database, produced on behalf of the Flight Safety Foundation,
May 2009.
(2) Flight Safety Foundation, Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions, May
2009.
7
Approximate Runway Overrun
Accident Rates, 1990-2006
All Runway Conditions
Country
Number of
Accidents
Rate/Million
Landings
Number of
Accidents
Rate/Million
Landings
929,000
4
0.25
3
1.7
US
11,332,000
18
0.09
5
0.2
Rest of
World
13,683,000
37
0.16
20
0.6
Total - World
25,944,000
59
0.13
28
0.4
Canada
Annual
Landings
Wet Runway Conditions
Source: Jacobs Consultancy, Risk and Benefit-Cost Analyses of Procedures for
Accounting for Wet Runway on Landing, prepared for Transport Canada, July 2008.
8
Landing Runway Overrun Accidents Involving Airplanes
Over 5,700 kg in Canada, 1989-2006
Year
Location
Aircraft Type
Distance off
Runway End
1993
Tofino, BC
Convair CV440
150’
1995
Jasper/Hinton, AB
Mitsubishi
MU-300
255’
1998
Gander, NL
Antonov AN-124
200’
1998
Kasabonika, ON
BAe 748
450’
1998
Peterborough, ON
Dassault Mystère E20
236’
1999
St. John’s, NL
Fokker F-28
420’
2001
St. John’s, NL
Boeing 737
75’
2003
Mildred Lake, AB
Beech 300 King Air
Unknown
2004
Oshawa, ON
Shorts SD3-60
1500’
2005
Toronto, ON
Airbus A340
1,090’
2005
Hamilton, ON
IAI Astra SPX
200’
Total landing overrun occurrences involving airplanes over 5,700 kg: 46
Source: TSB database
9
Runway Overruns – A Complex Problem
Board Recommendations following Air France
Approach/landing standards: Establish clear standards limiting
approaches and landings in convective weather for all air transport
operators at Canadian airports. (A07-01)
Pilot training: Mandate training for all pilots involved in Canadian air
transport operations to better enable them to make landing decisions in
deteriorating weather. (A07-03)
Procedures: Require crews to establish the margin of error between
landing distance available and landing distance required before conducting
an approach into deteriorating weather. (A07-05)
10
What Else Can We Do?
“The severity of runway excursion
accidents depends primarily on the energy
of the airplane as it departs the runway,
and the airport’s layout, geography and
rescue capability.”
James M. Burin
Flight Safety Foundation
11
Board Recommendation on RESA
A07-06
The Department of Transport require all Code 4 runways
to have a 300 m runway end safety area (RESA) or a
means of stopping aircraft that provides an equivalent
level of safety.
12
Why a 300m RESA?
Stopping Distance Following a Runway Overrun (FAA 1975-1987 study)
Graph Source: ATSB, Runway excursions, Part 2: Minimising the likelihood
and consequences of runway excursions. An Australian perspective, 2009.
13
RESAs: ICAO Standards
Source: IFALPA Statement, Runway End Safety Areas (RESA)
14
Engineered Materials Arresting System
Successful Aircraft Stoppages
Date
Aircraft Type
Location
May 1999
Saab 340
KJFK
May 2003
McDonnellDouglas MD-11
KJFK
January 2005
Boeing 747
KJFK
July 2006
Dassault
Falcon 900
KGMU
July 2008
Airbus A320
KORD
January 2010
Bombardier
CRJ-200
KCRW
15
Stopping Aircraft Safely
16
WATCHLIST
Issue:
Risk of collisions
on runways
© Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Reproduced with permission
17
Runway Incursions
ICAO definition:
“Any occurrence at an aerodrome
involving the incorrect presence of an
aircraft, vehicle, or person on the
protected area of a surface designated for
the landing and take-off of aircraft.”
18
Runway Incursions
Canada:
• 3,831 runway incursions between 1999-2008.
Source: Transport Canada Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System
(CADORS)
Still images of runway incursion animations
© National Transportation Safety Board
19
Runway Incursions – Causes
• Lack of situational awareness –
air crews, ATS, ground
personnel
• Ambiguous or non-standard
communications/
phraseology
• Runway/taxiway geometry
and signage
• Lack of warning systems
Beech 1900, following runway collision with Beech
A90 King Air,
Quincy Municipal Airport, IL, USA.
© Scroggins Aviation, reproduced with permission
20
Runway Incursions
Potential Defences
• Runway status light systems
• Using “stop bars” in daylight/ good weather
• Avoid vehicles crossing in middle of runways
21
WATCHLIST
Multi-modal
issues
Safety
Management
Systems
Derailed locomotive,
Lillooet, BC
Touchdown short of runway,
Bombardier Global 5000,
Fox Harbour, NS
22
Summary
• These are complex and challenging safety
issues requiring many solutions from multiple
stakeholders.
• If persistent safety problems are not addressed,
there will be more accidents.
• An effective SMS can help operators identify and
mitigate the risks associated with landing
accidents and runway incursions
23
More Action Required
• Assess all Canadian Code 4 runways to identify
highest risks and take appropriate action to
mitigate these risks (e.g. lengthen RESA;
EMAS).
• Participate actively in runway incursion
mitigation (e.g. vehicle use of perimeter roads,
not crossing in middle of runway).
24
QUESTIONS?
25
26
References
Flight Safety Foundation, Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions: A Report of the Runway Safety
Initiative, May 2009.
SMS Specialties, Report on the Design and Analysis of a Runway Excursions Database, produced on
behalf of the Flight Safety Foundation, May 2009.
Jacobs Consultancy, Risk and Benefit-Cost Analysis of Procedures for Accounting for Wet Runway on
Landing, produced on behalf of Transport Canada, July 2008.
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Runway Excursions, Part 1: A worldwide review of commercial jet
aircraft runway excursions, April 2009.
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Runway Excursions, Part 2: Minimising the likelihood
and consequences of runway excursions. An Australian perspective, May 2009.
Mark Lacagnina, Margin for Error, Aero Safety World, August 2008.
IFALPA Statement: Runway End Safety Areas (RESA).
27
References
I.D.L. Kirkland et al., An Improved Methodology for Assessing Risk in Aircraft Operations at Airports,
Applied to Runway Overruns, Safety Science 42 (2004) 891–905.
D.K.Y. Wong et al., The Development of a More Risk-Sensitive and Flexible Airport Safety Area
Strategy: Part I. The Development of an Improved Accident Frequency Model, Safety Science 47
(2009) 903–912.
D.K.Y. Wong et al., The Development of a More Risk-Sensitive and Flexible Airport Safety Area
Strategy: Part II. Accident Location Analysis and Airport Risk Assessment Case Studies, Safety
Science 47 (2009) 913–924.
Kirkland et al., The Normalisation of Aircraft Overrun Accident Data , Journal of Air Transport
Management 9 (2003) 333–341.
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