FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN
EXPLOSIVES MANUFACTURERS
37TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
5th JUNE 2013
BRUSSELS
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2
Item 1
Daniel Antille
CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS
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37th FEEM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
(DRAFT) AGENDA
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Chairman's opening remarks
Approval of the Agenda
Compliance with Competition Regulations
Minutes of the 36th AGM in Vienna
Report of the Executive Committee
Report of the Secretary General
7.
Coffee Break 30 minutes
D. Antille
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
D. Antille
H. Meyer
approx. 10h30 –
11h00
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37th FEEM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
(DRAFT) AGENDA
8.
9.
10.
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Security Issues at EU Level
IME Report
Reports of the FEEM Working Groups
Blasting Practise Working Group
Transport Working Group
H&S Working Group
2012/13 Financial Report
2012 Statistics
Election to the Executive Committee
Any other business
Date and place of the next meeting
Closure of the meeting
J. Foley
Ch. Ronay
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
H. Meyer
D. Antille
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Item 2
APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA
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Do I find your agreement to this Agenda?
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Item 3
COMPLIANCE WITH EUROPEAN
COMPETITION REGULATIONS
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COMPLIANCE WITH EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
As an Association, FEEM operates in strict compliance with
European competition Compliance laws. Respect for these laws is a
core value applying to all FEEM activities.
All participants at the FEEM AGM have been informed by the
Secretary General about prohibited discussion topics which apply not
only during meetings but also to social gatherings before and after
meetings. By signing the participation form, the participants declare
their adherence to the Competition Compliance Programme and
agree to comply with Competition Law.
The CEFIC competition law checklist for meetings has been handed
out to the delegates prior to this meeting.
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COMPETITION LAW COMPLIANCE (cont.)
Pay attention!
1. It is applicable to all FEEM activities!
2. Ignorance is not an excuse!
3. It is not just what you do, but, WHAT YOU ARE SEEN TO DO
that is important!
4. Competition authorities are very active in scrutinising cartels (e.g.
when leniency occurs) regarding companies and organisations
(they would not hesitate to open an inquiry).
5. They look for “traditional elements” of cartels but also
increasingly issues regarding standardization, intellectual
property, joint activities.
6. You see increasingly damage claims in Europe (collective redress)
regarding competition cases.
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ITEM 4
MINUTES OF THE 36TH AGM
Vienna,
31 May 2012
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The Minutes have been circulated to the Members in due course
immediately after the Meeting.
Do I find your agreement to these Minutes?
12
ITEM 5
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
by
Daniel Antille
President of FEEM
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THE 2012/2013 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Mr. D. Antille, President
Mr. B. Pougny, Vice-President
Mr. G. Facchinetti, Past President
Mr. S. Connolly
Mr. O. Greben (as of 27.2.13)
Mr. V. Huelamo
Mr. U. Sjöblom
SSE Group, Switzerland
EPC Groupe, France
Pravisani, Italy
Orica EMET, Germany
Austin Detonators, Czech
Maxam Group, Spain
Forcit, Finland
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ITEM 6
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
Hans H. Meyer
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FEEM AS AN AFFILIATE OF CEFIC
FEEM is an affiliated Member of CEFIC the European Chemistry
Federation. CEFIC is the Brussels based organization representing
the European chemical industry. CEFIC represents directly or
indirectly, about 29.000 large, medium and small chemical
companies which employ about 1.3 million people and account for
nearly a third of world’s Chemical production. CEFIC guides and
advises FEEM in matters related to




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EU Legislation & Integration
Contacts to relevant EU General Directorates
Transport & Logistics
General legal matters and advocacy
Competition compliance programmes
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PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN
DIRECTIVES
(Up-date as per May 2013)
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PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES
AGENDA
1. Directives 93/15 & 2008/43 - News since the last
meeting
2. REACH Up-date: Lead and lead compounds /
substances
3. Transport of ANFO in tank trucks
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
DIRECTIVES 93/15 &
2008/43
News since the last
meeting
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
STATUS OF PREPARATIONS BY PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING TRANSPOSITION OF
DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU
At the beginning of 2013 only 14 Member States had fully
transposed the amending Directive 2012/4; 4 Member States
had partially implemented the Directive and 9 Member States
have not yet communicated their measures to the
Commission. The Commission strongly encouraged those
Member States that had not yet transposed the Directive to do
so urgently, otherwise formal infringement proceedings, which
had so far been deferred, were likely to follow soon. To our
knowledge no infringement proceedings have been started so
far.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
UPDATE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ACTION PLAN ON ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF
EXPLOSIVES
The Commission (DG HOME) is producing a progress report by
the mid of 2013, which would contribute towards a review of the
plan. In parallel a review of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear) action plan was ongoing with a view to
developing a more coherent and streamlined approach with greater
synergies between CBRN and explosives security policies at EU
level in a future combined CBRNE STRATEGY. This had been
discussed at a strategic EU level conference on 2-3 October 2012 in
Malmo, the outcome of which would inform Council conclusions on
a new CBRNE agenda later this year, leading to a Commission
communication around mid 2013.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
RECAST OF DIRECTIVE 93/15/EEC
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States
relating to the making available on the market and supervision of
explosives for civil uses. Council Directive 93/15/EEC of 5 April
1993 on the harmonization of the provisions relating to the
placing on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses
has been substantially amended. In order to ensure the free
movement of explosives it is necessary to harmonise the laws
relating to making available explosives on the market. Presently a
package of nine Directives is regulating the European Explosives
Industry, e.g. 93/15, 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 (control of
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 2008/43,
2012/4). You will find the complete revised text of the
DRAFT DIRECTIVE on our website.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
UPDATE ON SCEPYLT, THE PAN-EUROPEAN
INFORMATION SYSTEM ON EXPLOSIVES CONTROL TO
PREVENT AND FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, AND ITS
FUTURE
The SCEPYLT system has been operational since October 2011.
Since then various functional, technical and documentary
improvements had been introduced. Currently 11 Member States
are connected to the system. However it was being used by only 3
Member States. Some indicating that they hoped to be ready to
use the system, some others indicating that although they were
ready they would not do so until their neighbours did. E.g. Spain
was unable to use the system since its neighbours were not doing
so. Spain also mentioned that it would like to see SCEPYLT
linked with the unique identification and traceability required by
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DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC.
Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
(SCEPYLT cont.)
The Commission intends that the system eventually be made
mandatory, but before that the system needed to be seen to be
operating well and being more widely used than currently. The
Commission had invested over 2 MILLION EUROS in the project
and there was a danger that all this would be wasted if the project
could not be taken further forward after the end of this year.
There seemed to be three possible options:
(1) A further grant if a Member State was willing to assume
responsibility for future project coordination;
(2) A contract between the system provider and individual user
Member States covering software maintenance and a help-desk
function;
(3) In the longer term, the Commission taking over responsibility for
the system.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
1. BELGIUM is using the system for transfers with the Netherlands
and Germany.
2. GERMANY explained that it was not using the system regularly
due to some problems (for example, the transfer document can
only be printed by the competent authority of the country of
origin).
3. FRANCE expected to start using the system during 2013 and was
arranging staff training with support from Belgium.
4. ITALY indicated that it had tested the system and that training of
staff at prefecture level was ongoing.
5. PORTUGAL wants to use the system soon once the latest version
had been installed. It would favour making a link with
traceability.
6. SWEDEN would like to join the system and has inquired about
the costs of joining the project (13.800 euros per participating
25
Member State).
Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
7. FINLAND has not yet decided whether it would join the project.
It had only a very limited number of transfers and the existing
paper system works well.
8. POLAND is ready to use the system, but would not do so until its
neighbours did. It doubted whether an electronic system would
be much quicker than a paper system and considered that a dual
system of paper and electronic systems would be unduly
burdensome. To be effective, the system should be made
mandatory for all Member States.
9. UK wants to use the system shortly. It saw the main advantage of
the system as improved security as it was easier to check the
validity of electronic documents.
10.IRELAND is interested to use the system and has suggested that
an impact assessment should be undertaken to assess the benefits
compared with the existing approval system.
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES
Compliance with essential safety requirements:
Because of the specific nature of explosives, the
Commission services (= Juridical Dept.) recommend to
apply the relevant general and specific essential safety
requirements to all ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES,
whether they are placed on the market or not.
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES
(EU Commission’s Recommendation)
Compliance with essential safety requirements (cont.):
AFFIXING THE CE MARKING:
Pursuant to Article 2.2 (DIR 93/15) if a company places an
explosive on the market, this explosive has to be CE marked.
Article 2.2 prescribes that “Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that explosives falling within the scope of this
Directive may be placed on the market only if they comply with on
the provisions of this Directive, are provided with the CE marking
described in Article 7 and their conformity has been assessed in
accordance with the procedures referred to in Annex II (different
approval modules). Therefore, if a company places an explosive on
the market, this explosive has to be CE marked.
28
CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.)
Placing on the market is defined as “any first disposal against
payment or free of charge of explosives covered by this Directive
with a view to their distribution and/or use on the Community
market”. According to the “guide to the implementation of
directives based on the new approach and the global approach”,
PRODUCTS BUILT FOR OWN USE ARE, GENERALLY, NOT
CONSIDERED AS BEING PLACED ON THE MARKET.
The Commission therefore suggests the following distinction:
In general, the explosives are placed on the market and have to be
CE marked if the quarry or mine company is responsible for most
aspects of the blasting operations while the explosives
manufacturer for example only pumps the explosive down the
holes and initiates the blast. In such a situation, the explosives are
for the use of the quarry operator and therefore have been placed
on the market;
29
CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.)
EXPLOSIVES ARE NOT DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN
PLACED ON THE MARKET IF THE EXPLOSIVES
COMPANY CARRIES OUT, AND HAS FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR, THE BLASTING OPERATIONS. In
this case, the explosives are for the use of the explosives company
in the provision of blasting services, rather than for the use of the
mine or quarry operator (although the quarry operator receives
the benefit).
To use the industry expression the quarry operator buys 'rock on
the floor / ground [of the quarry]'.
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.)
CONCLUSION
The general and the relevant special essential safety requirements
should in all cases also apply to explosives manufactured on site
which fall under the scope of the Explosives Directive. These
explosives should also be CE marked except in the ‘own use’ case
as explained above, where the CE mark is not required.
As far as the CE mark is concerned, Article 7.1 of the Explosives
Directive gives the possibility to affix the CE mark on an
IDENTIFICATION PLATE.
A practicable solution could therefore be to attach a
REMOVABLE IDENTIFICATION PLATE to the mixing truck.
It is also possible to carry the relevant documentation on the
mixing truck.
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WHICH NOTIFIED BODY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
ALLOWING THE MANUFACTURER TO CEMARK THE PRODUCT?
The affixing of the CE marking is also primarily the manufacturer’s
responsibility. However, when the CE marking appears on products
with an IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF A NOTIFIED BODY,
the notified body also assumes responsibility. The CE marking must
be affixed at the end of the production phase. The CE marking shall
only be followed by the identification number of the notified body if
the notified body is involved in the production phase. Thus, the
identification number of a notified body involved in conformity
assessment according to module B does not follow the CE marking.
It is therefore the notified body that carries out module C, D, E or F
(and whose identification number figures on the product together
with the CE marking) that assumes responsibility.
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CAN CERTIFICATES [for the different modules] BE
WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED BODIES, IF YES, AT
WHICH OCCASIONS AND HOW?
There are several aspects that need to be taken into account when
considering the validity and the possibility of withdrawing certificates:
- notified bodies are obliged to maintain themselves updated as far as the
development of the state of the art is concerned;
- notified bodies allow manufacturers to make use of the certificates not
only for the date when the certificate was issued;
- the manufacturer has the obligation to inform the notified body of all
modifications where such changes may affect conformity with the
essential requirements and where therefore a further approval is needed.
This obligation is also part of the ongoing licence agreement between
notified body and manufacturer;
- according to national civil law certification bodies usually have an
obligation of due diligence vis-à-vis the validity of issued certificates.
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CAN CERTIFICATES BE WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED
BODIES, if yes, at which occasions and how? (cont.)
In all cases it needs to be stressed that when a Notified
Body finds that requirements of the Directive have not
been met or are no longer met, it has to restrict, suspend or
withdraw certificates, approvals or other relevant
conformity assessment results, taking into account the
principle of proportionality and the risk involved, unless
compliance is ensured through the implementation of
appropriate corrective measures.
34
DUAL USE CONFLICT
In accordance with Article 1(3) first indent, Directive
93/15/EEC does not apply to explosives, including
ammunition, intended for use, in accordance with national
law, by the ARMED FORCES or the POLICE. How
should this exclusion be interpreted in the context of intraEU transfers to differentiate between commercial and
military explosives, for example in cases where a
commercial company supplies an explosive to another
company for further processing and/or incorporation into
a finished product destined for MILITARY USE?
35
DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.)
It should be first underlined that the exclusion in Article
1(3) of the Directive refers to the 'intended use'. In that
context a distinction needs to be drawn between
immediate use and possible eventual use for military
purposes. In particular, the eventual intended use may not
always be evident so that in the example quoted above the
first company may be unaware of the final use and may
have no control over this or the finished product placed on
the market or know the final consignee.
36
DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.)
A basic starting point for determining whether the explosive falls
within the exclusion in Article 1(3) would be whether or not the
explosive falls within the COMMON MILITARY LIST OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION* (the latest version of which was adopted
by the Council on 27 February 2012 (2012/C 85/01) (equipment
covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining
common rules governing the control of exports of military
technology equipment). In principle such explosives could be
regarded as military explosives. However the possibility of
possible dual use cannot be excluded and due regard should also
be paid as to who the consignee is. If the immediate consignee is
a commercial company, the rules of the Directive should apply up
to the point that it becomes clear that the ultimate use is military.
*www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control
37
37
DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.)
If the explosive is not on the Common Military List it
should be regarded as a commercial explosive and
treated accordingly unless the consignee is the armed
forces or the police. If the immediate consignee is a
commercial company, even if the explosive is expected
to be for military use, it should be regarded as falling
under the Directive until the point that it becomes clear
the final consignee is the military.
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38
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF SHOCK TUBES UNDER THE
DIRECTIVE?
Shock tubes are used to deliver the ignition impulse over
intermediate or short distances through a plastic tube, while the
tube itself stays fully intact and does not rupture. Due to the low
exterior effects of shock tubes upon ignition they are often
excluded from class 1 under Transport of Dangerous Goods
Regulations since, when not attached to a detonator, they are nonhazardous. As such they cannot be used for a blasting purpose and
do not show explosive properties and can be considered as similar
to the lead wires of electric detonators.
It follows that shock tubes as such should not normally fall within
the Directive's scope. When attached to the detonator to form a
detonator assembly (as a non-electronic detonator, for example)
they would however fall within the Directive's scope (for example
the proper functioning between the shock-tube and the detonator
39
cap would be part of the conformity assessment).
WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING
MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU
MANUFACTURING SITES UNDER COMMISSION
DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE
2012/4/EU?
Where manufacturing sites are located outside the EU,
the procedures of Article 3(5) of Commission Directive
2008/43/EC should be followed. However, in cases
where the overseas manufacturer is also established in
the EU, he could contact the national authority of the
Member State in which he is established or of first
import and obtain a single code for the manufacturing
site to be used for all imports into the EU. The
manufacturer established in the EU would assume
responsibility for compliance with the Directive for all
those imports, including in particular the obligations of
undertakings in relation to record-keeping.
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WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING
MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU
MANUFACTURING SITES UNDER COMMISSION
DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE
2012/4/EU?
In all other cases where the manufacturing site is located outside
the EU, the importer of the explosives will have to obtain a code in
accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3(5) of the
Directive.
To further reduce the administrative burdens, and also in cases
where the overseas manufacturer is not established in the EU, the
imports need not physically go through the location of the
importer or of the EU legal entity of the manufacturer, but any
point of entry, provided that they are handled in line with the
single authorisation for simplified procedures (SASP)/centralised
customs clearance used throughout the EU under customs
legislation, whereby the import paperwork is submitted in one
Member State, but the products can be shipped directly to another
Member State or States (with the customs authorities there not41
requiring additional paperwork).
HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE
UNDERSTOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION
DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC?
Chapter 3 of the Directive relating to data collection and recordkeeping provides that undertakings in the explosives sector collect
and maintain data relating to each explosive in their possession or
custody throughout the supply chain and life cycle until it is
transferred to another undertaking or used.
The end-user would be the last undertaking to take possession or
custody and to use the explosive, for example operating blasting
on site. In certain cases this could be the sub-contracting
company undertaking the blasting. In other words, those
responsible for the last place of storage on a site prior to use
should keep records from the time they take possession or custody
of the explosive until it is used.
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HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE
UNDERSTOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION
DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC (cont.)?
It should not however normally be necessary for records to be kept
on the individual person, such as the individual shot-firer, to
whom the explosive is given to use.
The end-user would not necessarily be the undertaking authorised
to carry out blasting on site. This would depend on whether they
have possession/custody when the explosive is used. In cases
where a subcontractor is operating all the blasting process,
including the bringing out and taking back of explosives from
storage, that undertaking would be perceived as the end-user and
assume responsibility for compliance.
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43
MARKING OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES IN
COMPLIANCE WITH DIRECTIVES 2008/43 AND
2012/4/EU
CARTRIDG
ED
EXPLOSIV
ES
PLAIN
DETONAT
ORS
MARKING
IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH 2012/4/EU FOR SMALL
(8.5MM OR LESS IN DIAMETER)
OR ODDLY SHAPED ITEMS THAT
CANNOT EVEN BE PARTIALLY
MARKED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3
ITEMS BIG ENOUGH TO
FULLY MARK – 2008/43
ARTICLE 4
SMALL ITEMS THAT CAN BE
PARTIALLY MARKED – 2008/43
ANNEX PARA 3
Mark full unique identification
on the cartridge and associated
label on the case (outer box).
No need to mark inner box.
Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site
code and electronic readable ID on the
cartridge and associated label on the
case (outer box). No need to mark inner
box.
Not included.
Mark full unique identification
on the detonator and associated
label on the case (outer box).
No need to mark wrapper or
inner box.
Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site
code and electronic readable ID on the
detonator and associated label on the
case (outer box). No need to mark
wrapper or inner box.
Mark detonator with country ID letters
and 3 digit site code. Mark full unique
identification and number of items on
the smallest packaging unit (wrapper).
Close the smallest packaging unit with
a seal so that disappearances in the
supply chain can be easily noticed.
N.B.: In this case 'full unique
identification' refers to the smallest
packaging unit, not the individual
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44
detonator.
MARKING OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES
ITEMS BIG ENOUGH TO
FULLY MARK – 2008/43
ARTICLE 4
SMALL ITEMS THAT CAN BE
PARTIALLY MARKED – 2008/43
ANNEX PARA 3
Mark full unique identification
on the booster and associated
label on the case (outer box).
No need to mark wrapper or
inner box.
Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site
code and electronic readable ID on the
booster and associated label on the case
(outer box). No need to mark wrapper or
inner box.
Mark booster with country ID letters
and 3 digit site code. Mark full unique
identification and number of items on
the smallest packaging unit (inner
box).
Close the smallest packaging unit with
a seal so that disappearances in the
supply chain can be easily noticed.
N.B.: In this case 'full unique
identification' refers to the smallest
packaging unit, not the individual
booster.
Mark full unique identification
on the spool/bobbin/reel and
on the cord every 5 metres.
Associated label on case (box)
if used.
Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site
code and electronic readable ID on the
spool/bobbin/reel .On the cord repeat
every 5 metres the minimum human
readable part (no logistics information,
no matrix/bar code). Associated label
on case (box) if used.
Mark full unique identification on the
spool/bobbin/reel and the smallest
packaging unit (box).
BOOSTERS
DETONATI
NG CORD
MARKING
IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH 2012/4/EU FOR SMALL
(8.5MM OR LESS IN DIAMETER)
OR ODDLY SHAPED ITEMS THAT
CANNOT EVEN BE PARTIALLY
MARKED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3
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45
ASSOCIATED LABELS
What should be on an “ASSOCIATED LABEL”? If a box contains
50 primers does the associated label have to state the unique
identifications for all 50 or can the label simply state something
like “Contains 50 primers”?
There is no need that the label contains all numbers of the items in
the box. The matrix/bar code should suffice. The related information
is available in the systems / database of the producer / distributor
and is transferred to the buyer via XML file. If police stopped a truck
and wanted to check a specific item number in connection with the
box, they should be able to scan the box themselves or obtain
information on the number and unique identifications of the items in
the box from the manufacturer or distributor. There should be no
need to print all item numbers on the box or the delivery documents.
46
46
LABELLING OF SPUs
If the primers are less than 8.5 mm in diameter and therefore the
SPU needs to be labelled, do all 50 unique identifications have to
be marked on the SPU?
No!
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47
MANUFACTURER’S NAME ON UNIQUE
IDENTIFICATION
Does the manufacturer’s name need to be in full or can it be
abbreviated (eg RHEMCO instead of Rhinoceros and
Hippopotamus Explosives Manufacturing Co) to assist the marking
of smaller items?
This has benefits and in any event the Member State will be able to
identify the manufacturer from their records using the 3 digit site
code.
This is a matter for the competent authorities in the Member State
issuing the code to judge on a case-by-case basis. If the abbreviated
name is a commonly known and recognisable trade name, this
should be acceptable; if the abbreviation makes it impossible to
identify the manufacturer it would not be advisable.
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48
THE TRANSFER OF EXPLOSIVES FROM ONE
NON-EU COUNTRY TO ANOTHER NON-EU
COUNTRY THROUGH EUROPE. Have products
got to be marked?
If the products are in transit only, i.e. if they do not
enter the EU customs territory and are kept under
customs control (bonded warehouse), the Directive
clearly does not apply. In other cases where the
products are imported into the EU customs territory,
this would be regarded as placing on the market and
the Directive's rules on marking would apply.
49
VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS (AI)
FEEM has developed a Guidance Note for a HARMONIZED
STANDARD CODING SYSTEM in order to minimise logistical
problems throughout the explosives supply chains in Europe.
The Coding System is primarily based on the GS1 STANDARD
using so-called Application Identifiers (AI). The applied
“Application Identifiers” will enable harmonisation by
recognising the format of a database in which the information is
being received in. This enables the explosives code structure to
be flexible. Individual fields within the overall code at different
positions with various lengths and combinations on alpha,
numeric and alpha-numeric characters are possible. The
Application Identifiers are not normally visible within a code, but
if they were, they are recognised by being two, three or four digit
numbers within brackets. These technologies are therefore
recommended to enable each individual explosives item to be
allocated a unique number for the purpose of tracing that item
50
throughout its life cycle.
VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS (cont.)
In the Annex to the Track & Trace concerning the Human
Readable Part of the Identification there is no mention of
Application Identifiers. Actually the Directive is very clear in this
respect; the requirement for the readable number is an
alphanumeric code containing details of the country, site
number and unique number. There is no reference to any
Application Identifiers being readable. However, some of our
member companies print the AI on their labels in order to make
it easier for a human to read the label and to facilitate key entry
in the event that the symbol cannot be scanned. Other members
are not printing the AI on the labels because they think that it is
illegal to do so because it is not mentioned in the Directive.
51
(cont.)
VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS
Is it illegal to print AI visibly on labels?
NO!
In the text of the modified FEEM Guidance Note we
have added: AI may optionally be printed (i.e. visual) on
the labels in order to make it easier for a human to read
the label and to facilitate key entry in the event that the
symbol cannot be scanned.
52
REACH / LEAD COMPOUNDS
53
REACH
On 20 August 2012 FEEM received a new LISTING OF
LEAD COMPOUNDS on the ROI* SVHC:
(*Registry of intention)
1. Lead Salt
2. Lead Tetroxide (Orange Lead)
3. Lead Salts C16-18
4. Trilead Dioxide Phosphonate
5. Diibasic Lead Phthalate (Phthalate(2-dioxotrilead))
6. Pentalead Tetraoxide Sulphate
7. Dioxobis(stearato)trilead
8. Tetralead Trioxide Sulphate
9. Lead Oxide (Lead Monoxide)
10.Basic Lead Sulphate (Lead Oxide Sulphate)
54
REACH
In December 2012 additional lead-compounds mentioned in the
ROI list have been added in the CANDIDATE LIST:



LEAD MONOXIDE
LEAD TETROXIDE
LEAD DINITRATE

The date of inclusion was 19.12.2012 and the documentary support
for inclusion is available at the Web of ECHA:
http://echa.europa.eu/candidate-list-table

These compounds commonly called LEAD PRIMARY
EXPLOSIVES are used in pyrotechnical mixtures and in fuze
heads and have been identified as substances meeting the criteria
of Article 57 (c) of Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 (REACH). This
identification has been based on their classification as toxic for
55
reproduction.
REACH
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SUBSTANCES AFTER THEY HAVE
BEEN ADDED TO THE REGISTRY OF INTENTION?
The authorisation process is divided into four stages and the
LEAD COMPOUNDS are now in the first stage which is the
Registry of intention (ROI). ECHA has been compiling Annex
XV dossiers for all the substances and after completion, it was
followed by a Public Consultation in early September 2012.
Stakeholders only had 45 days to respond and that is why it was
critical to provide crucial information that can be used during this
and other phases of the AUTHORISATION PROCESS.
From the LEAD COMPOUNDS 3 have already been added into
the Candidate List.
56
REACH
After the public consultation, comments received are
sent to the MEMBER STATES COMMITTEE (MSC)
and they will give an opinion as to whether a substance
will be added to the candidate list based on scientific
evidence available on whether the SVHC criteria* are
met. If there is a unanimous agreement by the MSC
then we can envisage that the Pb compounds will be
added to the candidate list between December 2012
and February 2013 and if there is no unanimous
agreement the date will be August 2013 since the
Commission will need to be involved.
*Very Persistent and very Bio-accumulative & Persistent Bioaccumulative and Toxic
57
REACH
LISTING OF LEAD COMPOUNDS ON THE ROI
SVHC:
LEAD TETROXIDE (Orange Lead) is being used in the
explosives industry in pyrotechnic mixtures. This
substance is mixed with silicon and other chemicals in
order to obtain a redox reaction during use of these
pyrotechnic mixtures. This kind of mixture is used in
delay elements in civil electrical detonators around
Europe and in the entire world. PB3O4 and silicon react
during use of delay elements. After detonation, the
chemicals inside the delay system react and the final
products are silica (SIO2), metal lead (Pb) and unreacted
silicon (Si).
58
REACH
BACKGROUND
The FEEM HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING
GROUP has reviewed the Annex XV dossiers
submitted by the European Chemical Agency at the
request of the European Commission, concerning the
above mentioned substances. These substances are
lead compounds having explosive properties and
applications. Some of FEEM member company
members produce these substances and every company
has expert judgement on the production, storage,
transport and use of these substances. These lead
compounds are incorporated in explosive items and the
final products (detonators, primers, etc) are only sold
for industrial applications.
59
REACH
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The risk to workers during manufacture is reduced by risk
management measures.
There is no exposure during handling and use of the final
explosive items.
There is no release to environment during use.
There are no significant emissions or releases from the
manufacture.
As a consequence of the above mentioned reasons, based on the
criteria formulated in Article 58 (3) REACH and the
corresponding score system prioritization, the inclusion of these
compounds in the candidate List (article 58) is not justified.
These substances do not meet the criteria because:
1. They are not PBT nor vPvB substances.
2. They have not wide spread dispersive uses.
3. Their production volumes are quite small.
60
REACH
HOW FEEM REACTS!
Since the 1st publications of lead compounds in
the ROI about 2 years ago FEEM had
numerous contacts with representatives of
ECHA, the MEMBER STATES
COMMITTEE, the International Lead
Association and CEFIC in order to prevent that
lead compounds will be subject to the so-called
“CANDIDATE LIST” or even worse that they
will be subject for AUTHORIZATION with the
consequence of a possible ban in the future.
61
REACH
REACH MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE
After our last meeting FEEM has drafted a letter to
explain why LEAD COMPOUNDS should not be
subject to AUTHORIZATION. This letter has been
distributed to the national members of the so-called
REACH MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE. A list of the
names and addresses of the relevant MEMBER STATE
COMMITTEE members had been handed-out to the
FEEM Working Group Members. All of our WG
members contacted their national MSC delegate.
62
REACH
This action has been an enormous success because we
have managed that ECHA has received numerous
comments either dircetley by FEEM MEMBER companies
or other European organisations or through their national
member of the so-called Member State Committee:
Here is a list of organisations which have actively
supported our proposal:
63
REACH
1. National Authority, RIVM, Netherlands
2. Associação Técnica da Indústria de Cimento, Portugal
3. Orica, Germany
4. Gremi d'Àrids de Catalunya, Spain (1st letter)
5. Individual, Belgium
6. Maxam, Spain
7. EPC, UK
8. COMINROC, Spain
9. ANEFA, Spain
10.Industry Association, Spain
11.Mineral Products Association, United Kingdom
12.DynITEC GmbH, Germany
13.Gremi d'Àrids de Catalunya, Spain (2nd letter)
64
14.Individual, Belgium (excellent letter)
REACH
E.g. the responsible UK officer Gary Dougherty , wrote in a
letter to ECHA that he thinks the lead compounds issues in
detonators was a done deal in that it was very unlikely that
these lead compounds will be included in the next stage.
Apparently he had attended an ECHA meeting in Helsinki
where the lead issue was raised and it was suggested that
they be excluded on the grounds of the small quantities
involved, which gives rise to a low score; careful control
during manufacture which also gives a low score; and the
small quantities of oxides of lead produced after detonation
were widely distributed and unlikely to cause harm. There
was no adverse reaction to this suggestion from the other
65
member states who attended.
REACH
The results of the prioritization should be available
sometime in June 2013 and unless there are drastic
changes to the conditions of manufacture or use of these
compounds in the future it is highly likely that will be
excluded for the foreseeable future – 10 years or more.
66
REASONS FOR NO-INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE
LIST
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
THERE IS NO WIDESPREAD DISPERSIVE USE
THE QUANTITIES USED ARE VERY LOW
NO SUBSTANCE CONTACT OF SUBSEQUENT USERS OF
EXPLOSIVE ITEMS AND NO EXPOSURE DURING
HANDLING AND USE OF FINAL EXPLOSIVE ITEMS
NO SIGNIFICANT EMISSIONS OR RELEASES FROM THE
MANUFACTURE
WORKER HEALTH RISKS ARE MINIMIZED AND
CONTROLLED BY REGULAR EXAMINATIONS
THE REPLACEMENT OF EXPLOSIVE LEAD
COMPOUNDS IN CURRENT PRODUCTS IS VERY COSTINTENSIVE AND REQUIRES A LOT OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
67
CONCLUSION
NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND
NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
1.
According to prioritization criteria included in Article
58 (3) for Inclusion of Substances in the Candidate List
of Substances Subject to Authorisation, the priority
shall be given to substances with
a) PBT or vPvB properties, or
b) Widespread dispersive use, or
c) High volumes.
68
CONCLUSION
NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND
NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
2.
It is absolutely clear that Explosive Lead Compounds do not
meet anyone of these priority criteria.
3.
Therefore, FEEM does not support the inclusion of Lead
Explosive Compounds in the List of Authorisation Substances.
4.
Finally FEEM requested ECHA to give the lowest possible
priority to Lead Azide, Lead Styphnate, Orange Lead and Lead
Picrate, because these substances represent no risks to workers,
users, and the releases to environment are quantitatively
negligible during manufacture, storage and transport.
69
NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE
LIST AND NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
Last week FEEM has distributed another letter to ECHA and
the INTERNATIONAL LEAD ASSOCIATION with technical
information and comments concerning the non-inclusion of
Orange Lead and explaining why the use of this substance in the
explosive sector should not be prioritized by ECHA for inclusion
in the Annex XIV (Authorisation List) of REACH. Even if
Orange-lead is included in the future in the mentioned Annex,
we propose that the use as “ingredient for delay elements in
explosive production” should be specifically included under the
heading “Exempted categories of use” of the Annex XIV.
70
Lead Compounds
FEEM would like to acknowledge the excellent contribution
from the Working Groups and its members. Special thanks go
to Jose Castresana from Maxam who has contributed
71
72
TRANSPORT OF UN 0331 (ANFO 1.5D)
IN ROAD TANKERS
The BAM proposal to the UN PANEL FOR
DANGEROUS GOODS (WP 15) to legalize transport of
ANFO 1.5d (UN 0331) in tanks has been accepted and
has been incorporated into the new 2013 ADR. However,
the original proposal to carry up to 30
m³ ( ≈24 tons) was not accepted. The volume is now
limited to 16 tons.
You can find detail under chapter 4.3 “UN 0331
EXPLOSIVE, BLASTING, TYPE B in S2.65AN tanks”.
The transport is subject to special provisions according
to 4.3.4.1.3.
73
TRANSPORT OF UN 0331 (ANFO 1.5D)
IN ROAD TANKERS
The EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY has
started a discussion process whether it could be
worthwhile to investigate if there is a chance to
increase the transport volumes of Class 1 products in
general. The views of our members are controversial.
Initiated and financed by one of our members BAM,
Germany has started research work based on ANFO /
TNT equivalents to support the increase of ANFO
volumes in tanks above the 16 ton tier.
74
OTHER CHANGES IN 2013 ADR
MEMUs
1. CHAPTER 6.12
The requirements for bursting disks/pressure relief
devices in 6.12.3.1.2 and 6.12.3.2.2 have been reworded
so that they only apply to tanks for ammonium nitrate
UN 1942 or 3375, not for the fuel oil. Also it is the
Competent Authority of the country of use that must
now approve the bursting discs. New transitional
measure 1.6.5.14 allows continued use of tanks
approved before 1 July 2013 according to the previous
requirements.
75
OTHER CHANGES IN 2013 ADR
MEMUs
1.
CHAPTER 9
There have been editorial corrections to include reference to MEMUs
in the definitions of AT vehicles and ADR approval. EN 15207:2006
has been added to the reference standards for electrical connectors.
EX/III VEHICLE FIRE PROTECTION: A new Section 9.7.9 has
been inserted to require that EX/III vehicles carrying tanks are
equipped with automatic fire extinguisher systems for the engine
compartment and the load is protected from tire fires by metal
thermal shields. As no specific transitional measure has been
inserted, the standard six month transitional period will apply.
76
Coffee Break
30 Minutes
77
ITEM 8
SECURITY ISSUES AT EU LEVEL
by
Julian Foley
78
ITEM 9
IME Report
by
Chris Ronay
79
FEEM WORKING GROUPS
Item 10
THE FEEM WORKING GROUPS
80
FEEM WORKING GROUPS
4 FEEM Working Groups have
been active in 2012:
 HEALTH
AND SAFETY
 TRANSPORT
 BLASTING PRACTICES
 TRACK & TRACE TECHNICAL WG
81
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP
Members













Francois-Xavier Dugres, Davey Bickford, France
Jean-Paul Reynaud, Titanobel, France
Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland
Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany
Jaroslav Konarik, Austin Detonators, Czech Republic
Hans Karlström, Kimit, Sweden
Jose Castresana, Maxam, Spain
Pablo Guisante, Maxam, Spain
Walter Panchyrz, Orica, Germany
Thierry Rousse, EPC, France
Janusz Drzyzga, Nitroerg, Poland
David White, EPC, U.K.
Matti Vähäpassi, Forcit, Finland
82
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP
The Group has met two times since the 2012 AGM
•
•
on 26 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Republic
on 13 March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium
83
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP
The main subjects which were discussed are:

Trace & Track Directive
Hard & Software solutions in production & application
The IPPC process & the impact on explosives sites
 Elaborating the Best Available Techniques Reference
(BREF) documents concerning H&S
 Feedback on impact & consequences of IPPC to the
production sites
 New environmental requirements for IPPC production sites
REACH & Lead Issue
Learnings from incidents & unusual occurrences
Obligations of a producer under the new CLP regulations
Near misses & unusual occurrences
 Exchange of experiences & Learnings
84






BLASTING PRACTISE WORKING GROUP
MEMBERSHIP
Robert Farnfield
Nello Contardi
Frank Hammelmann
Marcos Perena
Knut Tanbergmoen*
EPC UK
Orica, Belgium
Orica, Germany
Maxam, Spain
Forcit, Norway
* as of September 2013
85
BLASTING WORKING GROUP
The Blasting Practice Working Group has met twice since
the last AGM 2012:
1.
2.
On 27 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Rep.
On 14 March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium
86
BLASTING PRACTISE WORKING GROUP
The main working subjects were:


Finalization of a new Technical Bulletin “Safe Operation
on the Bench”
Learnings from blasting related near misses & unusual
occurrences.
87
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP
Membership











Bengt Folkesson (Chairman), EPC Group, Sweden
Marlies Becker, Orica Europe, Germany
Francois-Xavier Dugres, Davey Bickford, France
Marcin Slimak, Nitroerg, Poland
Jon Jones, Austin International, UK
Ivana Jakubkova, Austin Detonators, CZ
Javier Lopez Amigo, Maxam, Spain
Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany
Jean-Paul Reynaud, Titanobel, France
Janusz Drzyzga, Nitroerg, Poland
Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland
88
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP
The FEEM Transport and Storage Working Group has met
two times since the last AGM in 2012.
on 25 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Rep.
 on 12th March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium

89
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP
The main working subjects were:
 Directives 93/15 & 2008/43 and its impact on the Supply
Chain Processes
 FEEM Guidance Note & XML fields & ISO Code
 Modifications to XML File Structure
 Modification of sub-levels of packaging in the FEEM
Standard Code
 Marking of Intermediates
 Requirement for Transporters to Maintain Records
 CLP Process & related Directives and Regulations
 Learnings from transport related incidents and accidents
90
ITEM 11 – 2012/13 Financial Report & Statistics
91
THE 2012 MEMBERSHIP
4 MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES




AUSTIN POWDER
EPC GROUPE
ORICA EMEA
MAXAM GROUP
92
THE 2012 MEMBERSHIP
15 INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
DAVEY BICKFORD, France
DYNAENERGETICS, Germany
EURENCO, Sweden
EXPLOSIA, Czech Republic
KEMPHOS OY, Finland
KIMIT AB, Sweden
NITROERG SA , Poland
MSW Chemie, Germany
OY FORCIT, Finland
POUDRERIE D’AUBONNE, Switzerland
PRAVISANI SPA, Italy
SOCIETE SUISSE DES EXPLOSIFS, Switzerland
SPREWA, Germany
TITANOBEL, France
WEATHERFORD, Romania
93
THE 2011 MEMBERSHIP
2 Federations

1 AFFILIATE: EASSP (European Association for Study
of Safety Problems in the Production and Use of
Propellant Powders)

1 ASSOCIATE: IME (Institute of Makers of Explosives)
94
FEEM 2012 RESULTS
95
2012 Finances
Income
Membership fees
2011
Budget 2012
Actual 2012
159.200
152.700
156.000
2.148
2.300
1.290
161.348
155.000
157.290
CEFIC Affiliation FEE
15.000
15.000
15.000
Working Groups &
General Administration
116.109
120.000
118.542
19.850
20.000
21.450
150.959
155.000
154.992
Other income
Total
Expenses
AGM Expenses
Total
Current year result
(+ 2.298)
96
2012/2013 Finances
INCOME
Membership fees
BUDGET 2013
ACTUAL 2012
152.700
156.000
2.300
1.290
155.000
157.290
CEFIC Affiliation FEE
15.000
15.000
Working Groups &
General Administration
120.000
118.542
20.000
21.450
155.000
154.992
Other income
Total
Expenses
AGM Expenses
Total
Current year result
(+ - € 0,00)
97
2012 Finances
As budgeted and forecasted the 2012 financial situation is
again healthy and balanced.
Consequently, the Executive Committee has decided that
the membership fees will remain unchanged in 2013.
98
ITEM 12 OF THE AGENDA
Statistics 2012
99
Explosives & Detonator Statistic 2012
For several years FEEM has managed a confidential
statistics service for its members. It acts as a trustee
company in compliance with competition laws. In order to
estimate accurate annual sales per product in Europe we
need from you all your best sales estimates from all the
countries your are represented in. We will consolidate your
data and give global figures of the European sales estimate
per product only to those companies which provided
figures.
The numbers are based on FEEM member’s input and
represent the arithmetic average of the reported country
numbers.
100
Explosives 2012
101
Explosives Statistic 2012
The volume of explosives consumed (not manufactured!)
in Europe (EU27 + Norway & Switzerland) in 2012
amounted to
553.000 tons
This is 11,5% lower compared to 2011.
102
TOTAL EXPLOSIVES EUROPE IN 2011/ 2012 (1.000 TONS)
640
620
600
580
560
540
520
500
- 11,5 %
624,8
553,0
103
EXPLOSIVES DEVELOPMENT 1995 – 2012
(1.000 TONS)
700
600
561
500
400 385
399 410
442 439440 450
477
587 584
602 586 588
621
553
497
353
300
200
100
0
Year
1995
Year
1997
Year
1999
Year
2001
Year
2003
Year
2005
Year
2007
Year
2009
Year
2011
104
EXPLOSIVES MARKET 2012 BY SHARES
Others
4%
ANFO
31%
(34%)
NG
8%
(10%)
Pack.
EMS
10%
(11%)
Bulk EMS
47%
(41%)
105
Explosives Consumption 2012 by Countries %
Norway
11%
Austria
1%
Bulgaria
6%
Estonia
5%
United Kingdom
8%
Finland
9%
France
8%
Sweden
19%
Germany
12%
Spain
9%
Romania
1%
Portugal
2%
Poland
7%
Italy
2%
106
Total Explosives 2012 by Countries Deviation %
30,0
B
E
20,0
10,0
I
T
D
F
I
S
W
P
O
R
22,8
6,4
0,0
-5,4 -6,6 -6,8
-5,7
-9,3
-11,2
-10,0
-20,0 -19,8
-14,1
-22,7-21,0
-30,0
N
O
R
-35,5
-40,2
-40,0
-50,0
Austria
-17,5
Estonia
France
Ireland
Poland
Spain
United
Kingdom
Switzerland
107
NG Products 2011/2012 (1.000 tons)
60
60
44,7
50
40
30
20
10
0
Year 2011
Year 2012
108
NG Products 2012 by Countries (%)
Czech Republic;
5
Switzerland; 1
Austria; 2
Norway; 15
Denmark; 2
Finland; 5
France; 5
Sweden; 11
Germany; 15
Spain; 12
Italy; 3
Poland; 12
109
Bulk Emulsions (1.000 tons)
258,1
260
250
240
230
219,5
220
210
200
Year 2011
Year 2012
110
Pumped Explosives 2011 by Countries (%)
Switzerland
1%
Norway
15%
Belgium
1%
Bulgaria
7%
Estonia
4%
Finland
13%
United Kingdom
10%
France
3%
Germany
5%
Ireland
2%
Sweden
29%
Spain
2%
Poland
6%
Portugal
2%
111
Cartridged Emulsions / Water Gels 2012 (1.000 tons)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
70,5
54,8
Year 2011
Year 2012
112
Cartridged Emulsions / Water Gels 2012 by
Countries (%)
Switzerland; 1,6
Sweden; 2,4
Spain; 3,7
Portugal; 7,6
Austria; 5,9
Bulgaria; 2,6
Belgium; 2,8
Czech Republic;
5,1
Poland; 6,7
Estonia; 8,2
Italy; 10,3
Germany; 8,3
Finland; 4,4
France; 13,4
113
ANFO 2012 / 2012 (1.000 tons)
ANFO (1.000 tons)
250
+ 0,6 %
200
217,2
172,7
150
100
50
0
Year
2011
Year
2012
114
ANFO by Countries 2012 (%)
Belgium; 1,9
Bulgaria; 4,6
Norway; 5,5
United Kingdom; 4,6
Estonia; 4,5
France; 10,4
Spain; 16,9
Poland; 4,9
Germany; 19,1
Greece; 7,3
115
Others 2011/2012 (Ammonites, Permissibles, Black
Powder et cetera) (%)
Bulgaria;
7,1
Spain; 19,6
Poland; 7,7
Italy; 9,8 Germany;
10,1
Czech
Republic;
25,4
116
Detonators 2012
117
Explosives Statistic 2012
The amount of detonators consumed (not
manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 + Norway &
Switzerland) in 2012 amounted to
61.132 units
This is 18% lower compared to 2011.
118
Total Detonators Europe 2012 (1.000 units)
70.000,0
65.000,0
74.202
61.132
- 18%
60.000,0
55.000,0
2011
2012
50.000,0
119
Total Detonators Europe 2012 (1.000 units)
45.000
40.000
35.000
30.000
Year 2011;
39.407
Year 2011;
34.224
Year 2012;
35.078
Year 2012;
25.088
25.000
20.000
15.000
Year 2012; 966
10.000
Year 2011; 572
5.000
0
Electric
Non-Electric
Electronic 120
Total Detonators Europe 2012 by shares
Electronic
2%
(1%)
Electric
41%
(46%)
Non-Electric
57%
(53%)
121
All Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000 units)
Austria; 1.554 Bulgaria; 808
Switzerland; 681
Czech Republic;
330
Estonia; 2.078
Finland; 5.020
Norway; 7805
France; 1.640
United Kingdom;
2.277
Germany; 7.449
Sweden; 6.511
Greece; 800
Spain; 6.514
Hungary; 266
Ireland; 128
Romania; 1.980
Portugal; 1.872
Poland; 10.716
Italy; 1.750
122
ELECTRIC DETONATORS 2011/ 2012 (1.000
UNITS)
34.224
35.000
25.088
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
-26,7%
10.000
5.000
0
Year 2011
Year 2012
123
Electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000
units)
Norway; 1.557
Austria; 849
Sweden; 1.392
Bulgaria; 150
Estonia; 1.909
Spain; 1.835
Finland; 2.500
France; 800
Romania; 1.500
Germany; 5.475
Portugal; 250
Poland; 4.751
Greece; 200
Italy; 1.000
Hungary; 255
124
Electric Detonators 2011/2012 (%)
Deviation from 2011
20,0
10,0
14,1
5,1
-4,6
-47,4
Ki
ng
wa
y
No
r
-13,6
do
m
en
Sw
ed
Sp
ain
l
rtu
ga
-19,9
te
d
-44,4
Po
d
lan
Ita
ly
Po
Ge
r
m
-24,5
an
y
an
ce
-16,7
Fr
Fi
nla
ia
nd
-6,8
-35,1
Un
i
-20,0
to
n
Au
-10,0
Es
str
i
a
0,0
-54,1
-30,0
-40,0
-50,0
-60,0
125
Non-Electric Detonators 2011 /2012 (1.000
units)
39.407
40.000
39.000
38.000
37.000
35.078
36.000
35.000
- 11 %
34.000
33.000
32.000
Year 2011
Year 2012
126
Non-electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000 units)
7.000
6.138
5.944
6.000
5.000
4.569
4.954
4.000
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.000
1.992
1.809
694 648
1.607
600 750
700
600
203
Sw
ed
en
ed
Ki
ng
do
m
No
rw
ay
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
Un
it
Sp
ain
ga
l
Po
rtu
an
d
Po
l
Ita
ly
Gr
ee
ce
an
y
Ge
rm
nc
e
Fr
a
Au
str
ia
Bu
lga
Cz
r ia
ec
h
Re
pu
bl
ic
Fi
nla
nd
0
127
Non-electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (%)
Deviation from 2011
60
50
41
37
40
23
14
14
20
5
Sp
ain
l
-9
-29
-40
Sw
Un
ed
i te
en
d
Ki
ng
do
m
No
rw
ay
Sw
i tz
er
l an
d
-25
Po
rtu
ga
d
Po
l an
-10
Ita
ly
Gr
ee
ce
y
Ge
rm
an
-20
Fr
an
ce
Au
Cz
str
ec
ia
h
Re
pu
bli
c
Fi
nl a
nd
0
-35
-60
-64
-80
-63
128
ELECTRONIC DETONATORS 2011 / 2012 (1.000
UNITS)
966
1.000
900
800
700
572
600
500
+ 69 %
400
300
200
100
0
Year 2011
Year 2012
129
ELECTRONIC DETONATORS BY COUNTRIES
2010 (1.000 UNITS)
180
165
160
165
140
140
123
110
120
100
80
60
42
40
20
11
10
22
20
10
21
15
Un
ite
d
Ki
ng
do
m
ed
en
Sw
Sp
ai
n
Po
rtu
ga
l
Po
la
nd
la
nd
Ire
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce
la
nd
Fi
n
Re
pu
bl
ic
Cz
ec
h
Bu
lg
ar
ia
um
Be
lg
i
Au
st
ri
a
0
130
Detonating Cords 2012
60,9
70
60
47,1
50
40
30
20
10
0
Year 2011
Year 2012
131
Boosters & Primers 2012
6.000.000,0
5.000.000
5.000.000,0
4.000.000,0
3.000.000,0
1.900.000
2.000.000,0
1.500.000
1.200.000
1.000.000
1.000.000,0
450.000
335.000
150.000
10.000
10.000
5.000
10.000
8.000
U
nd
ay
er
la
it z
N
or
w
S
w
ni
te
d
K
S
w
in
gd
ed
e
om
n
a
S
lo
va
ki
d
ol
an
m
G
er
P
an
y
e
nc
Fr
a
d
Fi
n
la
n
k
D
en
m
ar
ria
ul
ga
B
um
el
gi
B
A
us
tri
a
0,0
132
Explosive Production Sites & Staff 2012
6000
Staff; 5.475
Staff; 5.430
Sites; 102
Sites; 92
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Year 2011
Year 2012
133
Item 13 of the Agenda
ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
134
ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The FEEM President CARL-ANDERS LINDGREN from Austin
Explosives has stepped down from the Committee for personal
reasons. Austin has suggested co-opting OTTA GREBEN from
Austin Detonators to the Executive Committee according to
Article 7.2 of FEEM’s Constitution (CO-OPTION TO THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE). The Executive Committee has
agreed to this process at their meeting on 27 February 2013 in
Brussels.
According to the Constitution Otta Greben has to step down at
this meeting and is offering himself for election at this meeting.
135
ITEM 14
Any other business ?
136
NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE
FEEM has started into 2013 with a new, up-dated web
site. It is professional, has got a modern design and web
architecture and looks very nice. It is easy to operate and
to navigate.
You find the site under www.
feem-europe.com
feem-europe.eu
feem-europe.org
feem.info
137
NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE
Hit Counter (22.05.13)
Hits
Today
Visitors
34
Last 24h Last 7d Last 30d
95
326
1.443
Total
2.602
More than 50 countries have visited our homepage.
Surprisingly China and Ukraine are on the hit list. But also
countries like India, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Iran and many
African countries are regular visitors.
138
NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE
Countries
Amount
%
US
465
18
Germany
272
11
China
251
10
Ukraine
222
9
CZ
194
7
Spain
119
5
UK
115
4
France
108
4
Australia
101
4
139
ITEM 15
DATE AND PLACE OF THE NEXT ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
in
Warsaw, Poland
(in conjunction with the XVIII SAFEX Congress)
on
Wednesday, 21 May 2014
&
a Gala Dinner on Tuesday, 20 May 2014
at
Warsaw Marriott Hotel
Al. Jerozolimskie 65/79
00-697 Warsaw, Poland
Tel: +48 22 630 5240
Fax: +48 22 630 7332
Email: lukasz.samiczak@marriotthotels.com
Web: WarsawMarriott.com
140
Item 16 on the Agenda
CLOSURE OF THE MEETING
by our President
DANIEL ANTILLE
141
2013 AGM Brussels
Thank you very much for your kind attention and see
you next year in Warsaw again!
142