Decentralisation – what
challenges?
National Contexts: recognising & adapting
Decentralisation & Service Delivery: being realistic &
specific
Roger Shotton
Presentation for Danida Advisers
Copenhagen
15th November 2010
A. NATIONAL CONTEXTS
1. National Decentralisation Contexts: Overview
2. Political & policy contexts
3. Institutional contexts: sub-national state models
4. “Place” contexts: key urban & rural contrasts
5. Development partner contexts
1. National Decentralisation Contexts:
two key dimensions
• Two Factors: (A) political & policy frameworks; but also (B) historicallydriven “state paradigms” and “sub-national state institutions”
• Asia – (A) varies immensely; (B) also v diverse (more varied colonial &
state-building histories):– South Asia (India, Pak, BGD, Nep) – (A) “messy” multi-party
democracies (alternating with military) but very variable political and
policy drive to decentralise (NB even variety between Indian states);
(B) mostly well established local government systems (except Nepal &
Bhutan);
– Mainland South East Asia (Camb, Laos, VN): (A) authoritarian
regimes/one party states; (B) much newer decentralised SN State
systems (mix Napoleonic/Communist !); “fraternal” influences;
perverse fiscal systems; centralist but also pragmatic
– Indonesia: “big bang” decentralisation
• Africa – (A) varies immensely; but for (B) still strong influence of colonialimposed patterns: “British” and “Napoleonic” (French, Portuguese) state
models; (outliers: Nigeria, RSA, Ethiopia, Eritrea ..)
2. Political & Policy Contexts
•
•
•
•
Democratic decentralisation the most political of public sector reforms, and rarely driven by
“technocratic service delivery” concerns (although often sold on those grounds)
Political drive to decentralise may derive from a mix of political dynamics:
– Democratic upsurge (Mali, South Africa, Indonesia, Bhutan, Timor .. ?)
– Need to protect state integrity, pre-empt secession or defuse local frustrations (Ethiopia,
Indonesia, Mali, Nepal, Vietnam .. ?)
– Need to deepen political control by dominant party/faction and/or reward local
supporters (Cambodia, Pakistan/Bangladesh under military, Uganda, Tanzania, Nepal ..?)
– And also perceived failures in central gov’t hence drive for better local service delivery
and a more efficient and accountable state (Uganda, Vietnam, Nepal, Timor .. ?)
Political drive to (re-)centralise may come from: fear of LG control by opposition parties (or
warlords), national elite fear of loss of patronage, national security or fiscal problems etc..
Two corollaries:
– Prime focus on creating local elected bodies – far less on local admin. or financing
(causing problems for decentralisation of services)
– the drive may stall or reverse over time – pendulum swings (UK, Bangladesh, Malawi,
Uganda .. ?)
2. (cont.) Political & Policy Contexts
• The political drive for decentralisation is not monolithic or steady; but
there are also other dimensions of policy context, from Macro-policy to
Micro-policy:
a)
b)
c)
d)
Political drive or stance
Constitutional & legal framework
Regulatory framework (Ministerial decrees, ordinances, circulars..)
Official procedures & practice (finance, planning, budgeting,
monitoring, training ..)
• b), c), & d) often not in line with a), due to lags and technical
inconsistencies; and they may also be mutually inconsistent;
• Different countries have different traditions – eg in one party states, c) is
the key dimension;
• Change direction not always a) through to d) – sometimes change in local
practice d) can cause changes in b) and even Macro-Policy can be
reformed through Micro-Policy piloting (China, Vietnam, Laos) .. “crossing
the river by feeling the stones” !
2. (cont.) Macro-policy ------------------------- Micro-policy
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
a. Broad Policy
Direction
b. Statutory & Legal
Framework
c. Regulatory
Framework
d. Norms: prescribed
systems, procedures,
guidelines, practices
Official positions and
statements (eg Cabinet
papers) on such options as:
Constitutional and legal
provisions – their
adequacy, clarity,
consistency with broad
policy, existing laws,
internal consistency, on
·
The role, functions
and powers of local
governments;
·
Make up of
representative
councils and their
internal constitution;
·
Relations between
local legislature,
executive, and central
government;
·
Relationship with the
public, civil society
and traditional
authorities;
·
Relationship with
other tiers;
·
Relations with civil
servants;
·
Fiscal powers and
transfer
arrangements; etc.
Ministerial regulations,
directives, circulars, - their
adequacy, clarity,
consistency with nat. policy
& with legislation, internal
consistency, on
Officially endorsed or
accepted systems,
procedures, guidelines and
practices – their
consistency with a., b. & c.,
effectiveness, efficiency,
fairness, transparency,
reflection of best practices,
on such issues as:
Whether to constitute
elected local authorities at
all (ie. Devoln vs deconc.);
how many tiers;
what urban/rural
distinctions;
the nature of local political
representation;
what role local authorities
are to play;
role of sector minstries vs
area authorities;
what powers, staff and
fiscal resources to entrust
to them and how;
how they should relate to
parliament, to central
government, to civil
society, & to traditional
authorities;
what autonomy they
should enjoy;
what institutional
arrangements to support
them;
how policy debate to be
managed; etc..
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Channeling of funds to
local government;
Management & acctng
of local government
finances;
local taxes collection;
preparation of local
government plans and
budgets;
procurement
procedures & limits;
staff hiring and
management;
role of local committees
and how they are
constituted and run;
council business,
minutes,
communications, etc..
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
How to undertake local
consultation, plan
preparation and
budgeting;
Implementing
investments;
Organising community
self-help;
Dealing with the private
sector or NGOs;
Training and capacity
building;
Monitoring;
Communications; etc..
2. (cont.) Reforming the Policy Context: A Piloting Strategy
Macro policy ---------- Micro policy
a)
BROAD POLITICAL &
POLICY DIRECTION
b) & c)
LEGAL & REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
d)
NORMS: SYSTEMS &
PROCEDURES
Changed broad
Reformed legal &
political & policy
regulatory provisions for
positions & attitudes
local gov’t and local
on decentralisation
service delivery
& local government
Reformed procedures,
guidelines, & practices
for LG financing, public
exp mgm, training, etc
Using pilots to show
what can be done
and to reassure +
advocacy & advisory
work
Piloting/ refining local
innovations: PEM,
financing, capacity bldg
etc
Using pilot lessons to
inform changes +
advocacy & advisory
work
3. Sub-National State in Francophone Africa
SENEGAL
MALI
NIGER
BURKINA
Regions (11)
Regions (8)
Regions (8)
Regions (13)
Departements
(36)
Provinces (45)
BENIN
Departements
(34)
Cercles (49)
Arrondissements
Departements
(350)
Departements
(12)
Communes
(387)
Communes
(703)
Communes
(265)
Communes
(351)
Communes
(77)
3. (cont.) Sub-National State in Anglophone Africa
UGANDA
TANZANIA
ZAMBIA
MALAWI
GHANA
District
District
District
District
District
Sub-County
Wards
Area Dev
Committees
Area Dev
Committees
Zones
Parish
Village Dev
Committees
Village Dev
Committees
3. (cont) The Sub-National State: a contrast
Mali
Communes: 5,000 popn, directly
elected council, modest
general mandate functions, 1
clerk, modest resources;
oversight by Prefect
Cercles: 25-50,000 popn,
indirectly elected, consultative
& coordinating, v modest own
resources, no line dept
control; oversight by Prefect
Regions: 250-500,000 popn,
indirectly elected; consultative
& coordinating, v modest own
resources, no line dept
control; oversight by Governor
Uganda
S/counties: 10-25,000 pop,
directly elected, wide
service responsibilities, U/C
grant, few staff
Districts: 200-400,000 pop,
directly elected, many line
depts & staff, substantial
service responsibilities,
resources, & autonomy (but
this now reduced)
3. Institutions of the Sub-National State
District/sub-District Model
Reg/Dept/Commune Model
District Commissioner figure not omnipresent Strong Pefectural tutelle: advises, monitors
legality; approves/amends budgets; Chairs
inter-departmental committees
Large District as prime elected tier complex Small Commune as prime elected tier:
orgn; many staff; functions defined in Law 1 clerk; functions as “general competency”
(wide sectoral range) (plus focus on amenagement)
Districts support/monitor sub-Districts Levels non-subordinate; focus on interCommune cooperation
LGs as part of the State Tendency to distinguish Etat from
Collectivites Territoriales
LG Civil Service No separate cadre
Fiscal transfers understood & accepted Strong focus on Fiscalite’ Locale
LGs have own bank accounts Single Treasury/Caisse Unique**
Ward-based councilors Party list/PR system
Support/inspection by (often politically weak Tutelle by (often politically strong) Ministry
MoLG) Territorial Admin/Interior
Maison des Collectivites – common (weak)
3. (cont.) Acountability Challenges
District/sub-District Model
Reg/Dept/Commune Model
MULTI-TIER SUBNATIONAL SETUPS: TWO STEREOTYPES
3. (cont.) FINANCING PATTERNS
District/sub-District Model
Reg/Dept/Commune Model
UGANDA
BANGLADESH/CAMBODIA
centre
ministries
centre
ministries
$$
district
council
line depts
line depts
gov
reg/dept
council
commune
$$
s/district
council
3. (cont.) Some Implications of the Two Models
District/sub-District
•
•
•
•
•
Accountability: D councils remote •
from citizens; but (more/less) scope
for horiz. acctblty of line depts
Functions: broad inter- & intra•
sectoral range services & infra.
(area, staff)
•
Fiscal decent’n: greater volume
resources – both dev & rec funding;
more complex grant structures
•
PEM: more scope to integrate
planning & budgeting, esp. rec.
side; but need to build on existing
systems
Some Institutional challenges: need •
to reform existing procedures;
internal OD; D-sub-D relations;
introducing social audit
mechanisms to reinforce
accountability
Reg/Dept/Commune
Accountability: C councils accessible
(but PR system may weaken); line
dept acctblty v problematic
Functions: narrow range (rel. more
infra.)
Fiscal decent’n: fewer resources –
mainly dev funding; single grant
mechanism
PEM: less scope to integrate
planning & budgeting, esp. rec. side;
but more free hand with new
systems
Some Institutional challenges:
addressing internal tech. weakness
of Communes; building links to
higher-level line departments;
introducing social audit mechanisms
to reinforce accountability
3. (cont.) Postscript on Napoleonic model:
the Single Treasury system (caisse unique)
Pros
• Reduced need for capacity
dev at LG level (esp. where
bank network undeveloped)
• In principle, reduced scale of
support to audits (but
maybe more difficult to
audit MoF Treasury offices !)
• If National Treasury enjoys
liquidity, LGs may benefit
(overdraft facility)
Cons
• High transaction costs for both
contractors and LG officials paperwork, travel .. (Cambodia)
• If National Treasury faces liquidity
problems, LGs may suffer (cash
shortage; other local priorities),
esp. at rural branch level;
• Treasury branches may suffer
overload in early phase of
decentralisation (Mali)
• Local Treasury officials may be
influenced by local notables to
spend on items outside approved
LG budgets (Laos)
4. CONTEXTS OF PLACE: URBAN-RURAL CONTRASTS
Factors
National political
weight
URBAN LGs
RURAL LGs
Strong
Weak
Local Political Likely more elite competition
dynamics
Policy & financing
framework for LGs
Mobilising citizen
“voice” for
accountability
LG access to gov’t
staff & technicians,
private firms,
NGOs (for supply)
Likely less elite
competition
Often less restricting (well
funded)
Usually very restricting
(poorly funded)
Easier (CBOs, NGOs,
proximity,information,
education)
Much harder (fewer
assocns, NGO, distance
& communication
problems, poor
education)
Much easier; usually many
gov’t tech. staff & also
private options
Much harder;
gov’t tech. staff as
“monopoly” (if present at
all)
5. Development Partner Contexts: Asia Illustration
COUNTRY
DECENTRALISATION SUPPORT: DP CONTEXT FACTORS
NEPAL
LARGE COUNTRY; MANY PLAYERS; ACCESSIBLE POLICY PROCESSS; NATIONAL
PROGRAMME UNDERWAY; MEDIUM GOV’T LEADERSHIP
BANGLADESH
LARGE COUNTRY; FEW PLAYERS; ACCESSIBLE POLICY PROCESSES; EMBRYONIC
NATIONAL PROGRAMME; MEDIUM-WEAK GOV’T LEADERSHIP
BHUTAN
SMALL COUNTRY; FEW PLAYERS; NOT-SO-ACCESSIBLE POLICY PROCESSES;
EMBRYONIC NATIONAL PROGRAMME; STRONG GOV’T LEADERSHIP; RESISTANCE TO
EXTERNAL ADVISORY ROLE
LAOS
MEDIUM COUNTRY; FEW PLAYERS; REMOTE POLICY PROCESSES; NO EFFECTIVE DP
COORDINATION; MEDIUM-WEAK GOV’T LEADERSHIP
CAMBODIA
LARGE COUNTRY; VERY MANY PLAYERS; REMOTE POLICY PROCESSES; EMERGING,
PROBLEMATIC NATIONAL PROGRAMME; WEAK GOV’T LEADERSHIP
VIETNAM
LARGE COUNTRY; MANY PLAYERS; REMOTE POLICY PROCESSES; NO NATIONAL
PROGRAMME; STRONG GOV’T LEADERSHIP
TIMOR
SMALL COUNTRY; FEW PLAYERS; QUITE ACCESSIBLE POLICY PROCESSES; EMBRYONIC
NATIONAL PROGRAMME; MEDIUM GOV’T LEADERSHIP
SOLOMONS
SMALL COUNTRY; FEW PLAYERS; ACCESSIBLE POLICY PROCESSES; EMBRYONIC
NATIONAL PROGRAMME; WEAK GOV’T LEADERSHIP
5. (cont) DP approaches to decentralisation:
specific issues
• World Bank:
– Not monolithic: Social Fund vs CDD vs Urban/LG approaches
– Approach to LG grant support also varies
– Disbursement pressure often prevents LG institution bldg
• UNDP: local governance support interpreted v differently in diff
countries; current focus on “local capacity building” and link with
“localising MDGs”; South Asia social mobilisation programmes now
questioned
• UNCDF: local development through local government; piloting for
policy reform thro’ Gov’t procedures; move now to localise climate
change
• UNICEF/UNFPA: traditional sector-local CBO support, but now
trying to address the local government dimension
• National Programmes: major collective action challenge; varying
Gov’t leadership; many DPs unable to fully pool fund;
DECENTRALISING SERVICE
DELIVERY: A GOOD IDEA BUT …
1. Theory & Evidence
2. Being Specific on Services, Roles & Functions
3. Typical Problems: Roles & Functions, Financing …
4. Deconstructing “Local Capacity” challenges
5. Final points
The inadequate theory …
• Theory: “decentralised delivery of local public goods by local
government is more effective & efficient”, due to:
– Local knowledge of location-specific needs and priorities
(and danger of central blueprint delivery programmes)
– Local control of delivery
– Local ownership better ensuring O&M & durability
– Ensuring wider dispersal of finance, esp to rural areas
– Local resource mobilisation potential
– Local complaints easier to communicate
– Usual exceptions: scale economies, economic & fiscal externalities
& spillovers, etc..
• However, this may apply to local infrastructure .. but local
services are more complex …
• Need to unbundle and be specific
and the ambiguous evidence …
•
Many studies but all v case-specific or anecdotal:
–
–
•
Many questions, e.g. Health and Education outcomes [see Robinson , who notes need for “proper finance &
capacities”]
But also positive evidence on specific outcomes (pro-poor allocation priorities, procurement efficiencies,
staff absenteeism, user satisfaction ..) where the “right conditions” in place (discretionary funds, guidance,
incentives ..)
Basic methodological problems make inter-country/sector/temporal comparisons of doubtful
value:
– Shares of sub-national expenditure have almost zero meaning (what discretion ? China
vs Nepal/Timor)
– Decentralisation not “either/or”: many functions and many local institutions involved
(esp. in H and E)
– Wide variety of very diverse sectors -services & infrastructures
– Wide variety of country contexts (big/small; LG structures; etc.)
– The local bodies to which functions decentralised not always LGs
– Even if LGs, the “right pre-conditions” for effective decentralisation often not in place
(local discretion, adequate funding, technical support, etc.)
– The comparator often inappropriate and/or outcomes to may be due to many
extraneous factors [e.g. PE in Uganda]
– [Danida Nepal: “Is (local) democracy more efficient .. ?”]
Need to be specific
• Which Sector & Service ? A wide spectrum from Water – Roads –
Education – Health - big differences in:
– “technologies” and technical complexity
– Coordination & interdependence across & between levels
– Role of personnel management & supervision
– Relative importance of Recurrent & Investment budgets
– Funding & private sector roles
• Note also Administrative Services: permits, vital registration, etc.
• Which delivery functions ?
• To which sub-national institution ?
• What mode of decentralisation ? Devolution, delegation,
deconcentration .. ?
Unbundling the sectors & functions…
Sector
Intra-Sector Infrastructure &
Services
Delivery Functions
Water
Point facilities (rural); networked
facilities (urban) …
Regulations & standards;
Monitoring; Investment &
rehabilitation; routine maintenance
..
Roads
tracks & access roads;
village/district roads;
province/regional roads; national
roads …
Standards; Monitoring; Investment;
rehabilitation; routine maintenance
Education Pre-school; primary; secondary;
hostels; technical; university …
Health
Health posts; clinics; referral
hospitals; vaccination campaigns;
public health education …
Curriculum & standards; teacher
hiring, training & mgmt; books;
school investment & rehabilitation;
O&M; meals; inspection ..
Policy & standards; personnel hiring,
training & mgmt; drugs; cold chains;
investment & rehab of facilities;
O&M; inspection ..
Generalising: Types of Function
POLICY: setting overall service goals, standards,
norms etc and monitoring their implementation
(usually a central/higher level role)
PROVISION: arranging finance, planning, budgeting,
procuring, overseeing & overall being answerable
for service delivery (often a sub-national
government, or a service delivery unit – but
which)
PRODUCTION: actually designing, constructing,
operating & managing service delivery (usually
sub-national line agencies, service delivery units,
but also private sector, NGOs, and/or community
groups)
24
Institutional Actors
• Central Ministries: the sector Ministry, Finance,
Local Government ..
• Local Actors:
– Sub-National Government (at each tier): (a) elected
local bodies, (b) local line departments
– Frontline Service units: schools, clinics ..
– Non-state actors: (a) “Community bodies”:
village/area committees, user boards & servicespecific committees (PTCs, etc); (b) Specialist NGOs,
private firms
25
Putting Actors & Functions together
26
Roles & Functions: Typical Problems
• General:
– inconsistent legal or regulatory frameworks; unclarity, vagueness, or
overlap
– Excessive degree of “co-provision” of functions between levels, with
inadequate coordination
– “Competing” or duplicative sets of arrangements in place
• Central-local balance:
– Provision or production functions requiring local knowledge and
flexibility being handled too “centrally” - ie by central ministry or by
sub-national gov’t when could be handled more locally.
– Policy, Provision or Production functions which entail externalities or
scale economies, being handled too “locally” – ie by community group
or by local government when should be managed at higher level.
• Inadequate provision for technical support: Functions assigned to local
bodies where no effective access to gov’t or private technical expertise
• Lack of Accountability: Functions assigned to agencies which are not
subject to serious accountability – eg elected local governments sidelined.
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Financing: Typical Problems
• Funding: local government funding is often:
– Quite inadequate (unfunded mandate)
– Overly rigid (tied), so defeating the very local
discretion that justifies decentralising
– Inequitably allocated between LGs
– Delayed or unreliable
– Overly controlled by higher level (eg under single
treasury)
– Associated with overly rigid financial regulations (eg
on procurement)
– Without incentives for good performance
Deconstructing local “capacity” problems
• Beware viewing capacity problems as all “inherent” to LGs
• There are indeed “inherent” problems, esp in poor rural areas (personnel
gaps, quality, training, etc; “elite” capture; remoteness & communications;
etc.)
• But many constraints are externally imposed:
– Inadequate or perverse Financing
– Unclear roles, functions & expectations
– Unclear procedures & poor guidance for allow participatory
involvement, or for planning, budgeting, procurement, financial
mgmt, etc.
– Weak institutional arrangements for accountability or coordinating
between levels
– Inadequate arrangements to allow “hiring in” of gov’t or private
technical expertise
– Weak monitoring & ineffective incentives/sanctions for
performance
Decentralising Service Delivery – final points
• “Decentralisation of ..?” a misplaced question. Rather, how
best to assign different functions to: (a) each government
level (central and sub-national tiers) & (b) to “non-state”
(user groups, NGOs, private firms), to capture comparative
advantages of each ?
• If aim is to assign some functions to a “local body”, then
assigning to local elected governments has major advantages:
– Sustainability: (a) permanence & legality; (b) potential access to state
fiscal resources
– Accountability: (a) electoral plus interaction; (b) control over line depts
• But the playing out of these advantages depends on the level
of LG, and the type of Institutional context for LGs
• And these advantages only realised if the “capacity problems”
are addressed – but noting that many of these are more
systemic than inherent (see Bangladesh example)
30