Going Nuclear
The Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear
Materials
Energy Law Presentation
Fall 2010, Professor Bosselman
Prepared By Lauren Bean
Time: 22 minutes
E: LaurenBean2005@gmail.com
Images, clockwise from the left: A.Q. Khan; A member of the Italian Mafia ‘Ndrangheta; Kim Jung Il; Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; Viktor Bout, a.k.a, the Merchant of Death
Presentation Structure
I. Actors
II. Procurement Methods
III.Points of Impact
IV.Security Challenges
V.Response
Overview
•
What is the nuclear black market?
•
Illicit nuclear trafficking is an enduring and pervasive threat to global security.
•
A Turning Point: The Fall of the Soviet Union and the Demise of the
Russian Nuclear Complex
•
Smugglers use traditional networks (transportation, communication, and
financial) to obtain and move nuclear materials.
•
The crossover of different violent actors and organizations represents a
particularly complex challenge for thwarting smugglers, who seek to acquire
a range of nuclear materials.
State Actors
Russia
•
Russian stockpiles are a primary source of nuclear materials purchased on
the nuclear black market.
•
Russia owns at least 950 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and
approximately 145 tons of weapons grade plutonium.
•
State efforts to protect nuclear stockpiles and thwart illicit procurement
efforts have been ineffective.
•
Stronger regulations and export controls are required, in addition to a
consolidation of stockpiles and data.
Iran
•
Iran’s nuclear weapons program has been in existence for more than three
decades.
•
Iran’s procurement regime is thought to be controlled by its top tiers of
government, including its Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics,
Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Education.
•
Iran, like Pakistan, has invested in foreign companies from Namibia to
Germany for the development of its nuclear weapons program.
•
In the last year, more than three arrests have been made for successful or
thwarted attempts to smuggle nuclear materials, technology and equipment
to Iran.
North Korea
•
North Korea is both a host country and supplier of nuclear weapons material.
•
International efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear aspirations have
been wholly in effective.
•
North Korea directly enabled the development of Syria’s covert nuclear
reactor program for the last two decades, which was subsequently destroyed
by Israel.
•
Most recently, North Korea has tested two (2) nuclear devices and may be
preparing to test a third device.
Pakistan
•
The history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and procurement program is
perhaps the most infamous.
•
Pakistan and North Korea (and India) have refused to participate in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an international treaty to limit the
proliferation of nuclear weapons; there are 189 countries that are party to the
NPT.
•
Pakistan has allegedly provided illicit nuclear materials to al Qaeda in
Afghanistan.
•
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, or A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist,
operated the most extensive illicit nuclear network to this day.
•
Pakistan is estimated to have 55-90 nuclear weapons and increasing
stockpiles of HEU and plutonium.
India
•
India is also a non-party to the NPT.
•
Although the U.S. has facilitated the develop of India’s civilian nuclear
energy program as agreed to within the civilian nuclear trade agreement,
India continues to illicitly secure items for its nuclear weapons program.
China
•
It is alleged that China continues to engage in illicit trade activities after
agreeing to halt illicit efforts in the 1990s following pressure from the United
States.
•
It is further alleged that China is using stolen U.S. plans and technology; in
1999, Congressional researchers declared China’s next generation of
nuclear weapons would likely integrate stolen US design information.
Non-State Actors
Terrorist Organizations
•
While terrorists may not have the readily accessible capacity to build a
nuclear explosive or nuclear weapon, ease of communication via the
Internet, the lack of strong international export controls, and the amount of
available nuclear materials suggests that the opportunity may be more ripe
today then it was just a few years ago.
•
Terrorist have already developed simple yet sophisticated systems for
transferring cash funds that could be used to purchase nuclear materials on
the black market. Hawala is an international covert banking system that
allows funds to be transferred into bank account without a paper trail.
•
Additionally, a growing willingness to cooperate with violent global
counterparts may provide a new avenue for terrorists and new source of
revenue for rogue state actors seeking purchasers.
Guerilla Organizations
•
Guerilla organizations such as the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia, has also sought nuclear materials on the black market.
•
In an effort to combat nuclear procurement operations, the Colombian
government implemented the first counter-nuclear arms unit to prevent illicit
activity.
•
To date, Colombian officials have uncovered email communications
indicating FARC’s illicit operations. However, for reasons discussed in
subsequent slides, thwarting these operative before they secure goods is
extremely difficult.
Organized Crime
•
The Italian mafia, which includes both Cosa Nostra (Sicilian safia) and
‘Ndragheta (Calabrian mafia), represent a unique case study.
•
The Italian Mafia is known by some as the “Ecomafia” due to their
environmentally-unfriendly modus operandi. For example, the ‘Ndragheta will
load derelict cargo ships with high-level nuclear wastes and used reactor
cores and sink them off the Mediterranean and African coasts, charging a
revenue for their services.
•
Italian officials estimate that more than 600,000 tons of radioactive waste
have been deposited on the floor of the Atlantic Ocean and along the coast
of the Western Sahara.
•
Mafia target the nearby seas of countries with weak or nonexistent
governmental structures such as Somalia. A group of Somali pirates,
however, capitalized on the mafia’s waste-dumping activities and brokered a
joint piracy business at the port of Eyl.
Rogue Individual
Actors
A.Q. Khan
•
Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan (a.k.a. A.Q. Khan), built and
operated the largest nuclear black market for nearly three decades before
his dramatic arrest by an international coalition of officials in 2004.
•
His network spanned three continents and sales of sensitive nuclear
technology components, materials, and design data were sold to the most
dangerous regimes, including Iran, North Korea, and Libya; Iran, excluding
Pakistan, was Khan’s first major client.
•
It has been documents that Khan traveled to Afghanistan in the late 1990s
and early 2000s and there are concerns that he has sold nuclear designs to
terrorists, including Al Qaeda.
•
Khan remains a national hero to his country of Pakistan.
The Merchant of Death
•
Viktor Bout, a Russian arms dealer, has become notoriously known as “The
Merchant of Death.”
•
Bout is accused of selling arms to countries from Afghanistan to Libya. He is
also accused of arming the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Sierra
Leone, and Rwanda. The estimated value of his arms empire is US $6
billion.
•
Furthermore, he is accused of conspiring to kill American citizens.
•
He was arrested in 2008 in a joint Thai-U.S. sting operation called
“Operation Relentless” and awaits trial. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
has stated that Bout could not have acquired the weapons system he did
without the complicity of the Russian government and military.
II. Procurement Methods
Procurement Methods
•
Most procurement operations are intended to arm already proliferant states.
•
Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan are currently at the center of the illicit
procurement market.
•
A combination of operatives willing to sell nuclear materials and buyers
willing to pay cash drives the nuclear black market.
•
Export controls only curtail a small percentage of the types of goods that
might be acquired by nuclear actors (e.g., entire reprocessing or enrichment
plants). Actors can still acquire valuable subcomponents or “dual use”
goods that are not subject to export controls.
•
Countries with weak governmental infrastructures and export controls
become major transshipment conduits for nuclear actors.
The Simple Scheme
•
Direct Order to Supplier by Nuclear
Program or Operative ; Direct
Inquiry to Proliferant Country by
Supplier
•
The Supplier believes that the
purposes of the order are legitimate
and the transaction is conducted
with ease.
•
This letter is A.Q. Khan’s nuclear
bomb offer to Iraq’s Saddam
Hussein, translated by the Institute
for Science and International
Security (ISIS).
A Complex Scheme
•
Multi-Company Supply Chain
Domestic
Trading
Company
•
Foreign
Trading
Companies
Supplier
Some trading companies are unaware of the nature of these activities;
others are aware.
A Deceitful Scheme
•
Nuclear actors convince manufacturing companies to purchase goods for
them.
•
Or, in an effort to circumvent export controls, actors will engage off-shore
companies to purchase equipment, materials, and technology under a civil
nuclear arrangement guise. These companies will then ship the items to their
country, sometimes via a circuitous route. Off-shore companies may be a
post office box, a trading company, or a major institution involved in
producing legitimate goods for legitimate usages.
•
A.Q. Khan has said that his gas centrifuge program depended largely on a
number of off-shore “front” companies, including companies in Japan and
Singapore.
III. Points of Impact
Russian Stockpiles
•
The largest inventory of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium are
located in Russia.
•
Smaller stocks are located in Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
•
Much of Russia’s materials are contained in the form of nuclear weapons,
but some of it (an estimated 600 tons) is stored in non-weapon form at an
estimated 50 different storage sites.
•
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the former Soviet
Nuclear Complex, numerous successful or thwarted theft attempts have
been reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other
watchdog organizations such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative (the chart on
the next slide shows incidents from 2009).
Illicit Procurement and
Trafficking Incidents
IV. Security Challenges
Security Challenges
•
The primary challenge to state governments, intelligence agencies, or
cooperative global law enforcement and intelligence efforts is detection.
•
The amount of materials available and the willingness of operatives,
compounded by the number of trading and manufacturing companies (some
or most of whom are not equipped with internal intelligence detection
programs), makes tracking such operations nearly impossible.
•
New suppliers and emerging technologies are simplifying both the
procurement methods and nuclear develop and design methods.
•
The crossover of different violent actors, all of whom have developed
particular methods by which they avert officials, presents a more daunting
challenge. “Following the green” has become increasingly difficult.
V. Response
Export Controls
•
Experts have called for a universal export control system (David Albright,
Author of Peddling Peril).
•
Export controls, however, are generally disfavored by industry.
•
Additionally, some countries do not have any existing export control system,
despite the United Nations Resolution 1540 which mandates all countries to
develop controls.
•
Moreover, coordinating a universal export control system among countries
with different goals, companies with competing interests, and individuals
may not be a feasible option.
A Legal Framework
•
In order to deter potential operatives, governments must prosecute major
export violations.
•
However, a comparative law analysis indicates that export control, evidencesharing, and access to foreign witness testimony laws vary among countries.
•
Furthermore, the crime of illicit trade activity receives a mild penalty in some
countries.
•
An effective international legal regime must begin with some consensus
regarding the nature and penalty for export crimes.
Diplomacy
•
Diplomacy as a stand alone tool will not be effective with countries such as
Iran and North Korea, as has been shown by recent events.
•
However, with those countries that share similar interests (e.g. India and the
U.S.) diplomacy can have an impact.
•
For example, Israel, which rivaled Pakistan with its procurement program,
halted its illicit activities under pressure from the U.S. (although allegations
still surface regarding illicit activities).
Industry Cooperation
•
Enhanced corporate awareness is critical to ending illicit procurement efforts.
•
Companies are often resistant to information-sharing efforts with intelligence
agencies or other officials because of potential prosecution concerns and
concerns regarding export penalties.
•
Companies are often unable to detect suspicious or illicit efforts to purchase
goods because staff are not trained intelligence analyst with access to a
breadth of important data.
•
Attempts by agency officials to provide companies with key data are often
out-of-date before they reach the desks of company staff.
Early Detection
•
U.S. intelligence efforts have been relatively effective at detecting illicit
activity; however it took U.S. officials and other nations decades to topple
A.Q. Khan’s network and analysts are still unraveling his intricate web of
suppliers and purchasers.
•
Participant states of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) can be
consistently engaged to prohibit transnational trafficking. Again, this would
require greater consensus on the crime of illicit trade and a developed
system of export controls.
•
Suppliers, manufacturers, and trading companies must be trained to detect
suspicious activity when it arises, and intelligence agencies must work with
companies to develop a realistic system to facilitate information-sharing
across industry lines transnationally.
Conclusion
•
The illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is a complex scheme composed of
several states, many actors, and a complex system by which materials are
traded.
•
Global counter-arms efforts alone will not be sufficient to topple the nuclear
black market ; industry buy-in is required.
•
Stronger export controls coupled with the backing of participant countries is
required, in addition to a more consistent application of the laws against
these crimes.
•
Still, countries who seek to acquire nuclear weapons programs and actors
who seek to disrupt global security with nuclear materials will continue to
challenge international officials and agencies.