Dr Bayo Adaralegbe
FCIArb (UK); FEI(UK); FCIS(UK); LL.M, Ph.D (Dundee)
Partner & Head, Energy Group
Babalakin & Co
Outline of Presentation
 Various influences that shape the contractual framework
of oil and gas activities
 Various international petroleum development agreements
in use; how they evolved and their conceptual differences
 Various petroleum development agreements in use in
Nigeria; the policies that shape their evolution, the
statutory framework that provides a basis for them, and
their conceptual differences
 Changes to expect under the current reform processes in
Nigeria’s petroleum industry-the Nigerian Content Act and
the PIB
Influences that Shape
Contractual Framework of
Petroleum Development
 Petroleum exploration and production activities influence
petroleum development contract forms
 These activities are borne out of fact that
 ‘crude’ oil and ‘natural’ gas resources lie far below the Earth’s
surface and therefore not easily accessible, unlike other
natural resources
 because hydrocarbon resources increase human life
expectancy they are very significant in modern world
and therefore affect their development
Extractive Nature of Resources
as an Influence
 Petroleum development activities require oil and gas
resources to be first searched for through readings that are
far from precise
 If at all found, these resources have to be converted from
‘primary’ state to ‘secondary’ state for consumption by
end user
Extractive Nature of Resources as
an Influence
 Extractive nature of oil and gas therefore results in different
phases:
 Exploration (seeking these natural resources based on
data reading)
 Production (getting them off the ground after finding
them)
 Transportation (moving them out of in situ state)
 Processing (converting them from a natural state to a
secondary state where they can be used)
 Disposal (making them available to end user)
Effect of Resources on Modern
Life as an Influence
 Hydrocarbon resources mainly responsible for cooking,
cooling, lighting, heating and transportation, apart from so
many other uses
 Referred to as ‘lifeblood’ of industrialisation for this
reason
 Such significance causes players from industrialised
countries to dominate petroleum development activities
globally, even though developing countries hold greater
reserves
Effect of Resources on Modern
Life as an Influence
 Such significance also causes host countries to play direct
role in development of petroleum activities for
nationalistic and for economic reasons
 This has resulted in an international political economy
that has in turn had an effect on petroleum development
arrangements
Contractual Framework of
Petroleum Development
Activities
 Three main types of contract forms:
 Upstream/ Exploration and Production contracts
‘Petroleum Development Agreements’
 ‘International Petroleum Agreements’
 Field/Service contracts at exploration phase of activity
 Contracts from production phase into midstream phase

Upstream/E and P Contracts
 International law vests ownership of natural resources in
sovereign state where it lies (UNGA Resolution 1803 of
1962)
 Municipal laws of virtually all sovereign states vest
ownership in sovereign state with notable exception of the
US(s.44(3) of Nigerian Const)
 Sovereign states therefore have to grant mining/mineral
rights, typically to IOCs from industrialised countries for
petroleum development
Participation Arrangements
 Single mineral right holder rare due to capital and
technology intensity of activities; third parties allowed to
acquire participating/working interests in mineral rights
through Operating Agreements(JOAs)
 Necessitates appointment of one of JOA members as
operator since they cannot all operate collectively
 Farm outs also allowed for assignment of part of mineral
right or participating interest for performance of obligation
 Unitization agreement used for joint development where
field straddles area belonging to more than one holders
Field/Service Contracts at
Exploration Phase
 A number of field/services contracts required at
exploration phase:




Seismic Survey
Rig Contractor
Rig Services Contractors
Supply of equipment
Contracts from Production to
Midstream Phase
 A number of contracts also required from production to
midstream phase
 FPSO
 Crude oil lifting
 Crude oil transport
 Crude oil sale
 Decommissioning of well
Contracts from Production to
Midstream Phase
 In specific case of gas development:
 Gas gathering and processing
 Gas balancing
 EPC agreement for construction of infrastructure
 Gas transportation
Pipeline transportation
 LNG transportation
 Gas sales

Model
Contracts
 Developed by various petroleum bodies and covering all




phases
Avoid time spent on negotiations
Reduce transaction costs
Seek to achieve common standard in international industry
thereby improving general efficiency
Model contracts said to require no more than 20%
adaptation to peculiar situations
Professional Bodies that have
Produced Model Contracts
 Association of International Petroleum Negotiators(AIPN)
 Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen(CAPL)
 American Association of Landmen (AAPL)
 Leading Oil and Gas Industry Competiveness
LOGIC(formerly Cost Reduction Initiative in the New Era,
CRINE)
 United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association(UKOOA)
 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation(RMMLF)
Professional Bodies that have
Produced Model Contracts
 Petroleum Joint Venture Association(PJVA)
 Petroleum Equipment Supplies Association (PESA)
 International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC)
 Petroleum Services Association of Canada(PSAC)
 Petroleum Accountants Society of Canada(PASC)
 Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies (COPAS)
 International Association of Geophysical
Contractors(IAGC)
Petroleum Development
Arrangements and how they
Evolved
 Country where petroleum development originated and
international political economy shape types
 Petroleum development agreements began in form of one
paragraph Concession that granted mining/mineral rights
over large areas and for long durations in the USA where
land owners owned natural resources
 Developing countries that at that time where under
colonial rule, were influenced by this practice and granted
concessions in return for royalty and tax when they began
to find oil
Petroleum Development
Arrangements and how they
Evolved
 After many of these countries came out of colonial rule
UNGA Resolution 1803 of 1962 on ‘Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources’ was issued
 This led to nationalistic tendencies of these courtiers
 IOCs from developed countries were expropriated,
especially in Latin America, Middle East and North
Africa
 OPEC was borne out of this nationalism
Petroleum Development
Arrangements and how they
Evolved
 Developing countries could still not prevent IOCs from
involvement in their natural resources due to lack of
technical, managerial and financial capacity
 Hence next best option: state participation emphasizing
production, profit and control of countries over their
natural resources towards economic development through
 Better fiscal terms for the sovereign state
 Industrialization
 Technology transfer
 Development of local content
Petroleum Development
Arrangements and how they
Evolved
 Because of this constitution of many countries , especially
Latin American and Middle East states, prevented
foreigners from owning mineral/mining rights
 Resulted in new arrangements where developing countries
established NOCs vested with mineral/mining rights that
were then contracted out to IOCs to develop
Petroleum Development
Arrangements and how they
Evolved
 Risk Service Contracts emerged out of this where
developing states engaged IOCs as contractors in respect
of mineral/mining rights that they vested in their NOCs or
Petroleum Ministries
 Under this arrangement IOCs used their own capital
expenditure and operating costs to explore for petroleum
 IOCs only got reimbursed through a service fee if oil was
produced
 Sometimes IOCs were allowed to buy back part of oil
produced as consideration for service
Petroleum Development
Arrangements and how they
Evolved
 Production Sharing Contracts emerged out of this where
developing states engaged IOCs as contractors in respect
of mineral/mining rights that they vested in their NOCs or
Petroleum Ministries
 IOCs also used their capital expenditure and operating
costs to explore for petroleum under this arrangement
 Under this arrangement IOCs only got reimbursed
through a share of the oil produced
Petroleum Development
Arrangements and how they
Evolved
 Under this arrangement IOCs
 First received ‘cost oil’ to cover costs and expenses limited to a
percentage , and thereafter
 IOCs and NOCs split the oil produced known as ‘profit oil’ to
represent their return on investment
Types of Petroleum
Development Arrangements
 Concessions: used in 60 countries
 Production Sharing Contracts : used in 41 countries
 Risk Service Contracts: used in 4 countries
 Participation Agreements?
 Hybrid?
Petroleum Development
Arrangements: How they differ
 In Risk Service and Production Sharing Contracts the IOC
did not receive any reimbursement for their expenses or
any return on their investment if no oil was produced
 Hence both arrangements referred to as ‘sole risk’
 PSC and Risk Service Contract terms have to correspond,
and mirror back terms under original mineral/mining
rights of NOC in key areas such as area, duration,
revocation , etc
Petroleum Development
Arrangements: How they differ
 In modern practise licences/leases have taken over
from old concessions with significant modifications
 Only limited areas now granted
 Only shorter durations of between 20-30 years now
granted
 Sovereign state exercises direct control over petroleum
development activities



In terms of which well to drill, when and pace of operations
through a work programme
Better fiscal terms in favour of sovereign state
Periodic relinquishment of part of area granted
Petroleum Development
Arrangements: How they differ
 Industrialized states use licenses/leases more; PSCs and
Risk Service used more in developing countries
 PSCs more popular than Risk Service Contracts that are
only common in countries that have a lot of capital at their
disposal to pay for services
 Some countries use all these arrangements simultaneously
Petroleum Development
Arrangements: How they differ
 Licenses/leases:
 Exclusive right granted mineral/mining rights holder to explore for





petroleum , and if found, to dispose of in consideration for royalty, rent
and tax
In some countries a single license covers exploration and production
phases; in others separate licenses for exploration phase; license
granted for production phase only allowed when oil is found in
commercial quantities
Mining /mineral rights granted conceptually similar to profit a’prendi
in common law lease estate
Mining/mineral rights have both public and private law character
Mining/mineral rights vest legal title, but over petroleum resources
produced at well head
Sovereign state continues to own natural resources in accordance with
international law
Petroleum Development
Arrangements: How they differ
 Production Sharing Contracts
 E and P Company undertakes petroleum development
activities on behalf of holder of mining/mineral rights,
typically NOC
 E and P Company is contractor/operator, but not legal
owner
 Contractor bears sole risk of exploration activities
Petroleum Development
Arrangements: How they differ
 Risk Service Contracts
 E and P Company undertakes petroleum development
activities on behalf of holder of mining/mineral rights,
typically NOC
 E and P Company not legal owner
 E and P Company bears sole risk of petroleum
development activities
Petroleum Development
Arrangements: How they differ
 Rough conceptual analogy may be made between
petroleum development arrangements and real estate
projects:
 License/lease can compare to legal title holder of land
 PSC Contractor can compare with property developer
who is compensated with rent of specific floors as who
may have some equitable interest in property
 Risk Service Contractor may be likened to contractor
who develops property and who gets paid off for his
services without any legal or equitable interest in the
property
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria
 Ownership of petroleum resources in Nigeria
 “Notwithstanding the foregoing provision of this section the
entire property in…shall vest in the Government of the
Federation...”(s.44(3) Const.)
 “The entire ownership and control of all petroleum in…shall be
vested in the state ”(s. 1(1) Petroleum Act)
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria
 Ownership over what area?
 Nigeria as a coastal state:
 Nigerian state vested with entire ownership and control of all
petroleum in all lands (a)in Nigeria(b) under territorial waters
of Nigeria(c) that forms part of the Continental Shelf (d) that
forms part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria(s. 1 of
Act)
 “...sovereign and exclusive rights with respect to the
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea
bed, subsoil and superjacent waters of the Exclusive Zone shall
vest in the Federal Republic of Nigeria....” (s2(1) of the EEZ
Act)
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria
 Note A.G Fed. Vs A.G Abia & Ors to the effect that
Nigerian states(political subdivision) do not have claim to
offshore
 Note NDDC Act enacted before this case which refers to
“offshore of Nigeria Delta area”
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria
 Petroleum Act is main statute that deals with petroleum
resources and how they may be developed
 Petroleum Act only provides for development of petroleum
resources through phases of exploration, prospecting and
production
 Grants to companies registered in Nigeria separate rights
for each phase through a license /lease regime
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria: OEL
 Oil Exploration License right to ‘undertake exploration
for petroleum’ not exclusive
 over compact area not exceeding 5000 sq miles for a
duration to lapse by 31st Dec next; renewable 3 months
before end of period for a period not exceeding 1 year
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria: OPL
 Oil Prospecting Licence ‘exclusive right to explore and
prospect for petroleum’
 Explore and prospect implies oil drilling operations
 Since holder allowed to carry away and dispose of petroleum
won during operations
 OPL holder expected to drill to find oil in commercial quantities
to be able to qualify for OML
 over compact area not exceeding 1000 sq miles for a
period not exceeding 5 years including renewal; in case of
deep offshore minimum of 5 years aggregate of 10 years
through amendment in Deep Offshore Act
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria: OML
 Oil Mining Lease exclusive right to(a) ‘conduct
exploration and prospecting operations’ (b) ‘win, get, work,
store, carry away, transport, export’ (c) ‘otherwise treat
petroleum discovered’ (Para 11 of First Schedule to Act
 Note that section 2 of Act itself allows Minister to grant
only rights to search for, win, carry away and dispose of
petroleum
 Right to export absent (a)from principal law that
prescribes the scope of rights Minister may grant and(b)
from specimen copy of OML in law
 Is meaning of export consistent with ‘carry away’/’dispose
of’? If not can schedule expand meaning in principal law?
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria: OML
 over compact area not exceeding 500sq miles for duration
not exceeding 20 years
 Note “All oil mining leases deriving from an oil
prospecting licence shall be in compact blocks or units;
and where more than one block or unit is so derived,
each block or unit shall be the subject of a separate and
distinct lease”(Reg. 293) Petroleum(Drilling and
Production) Regulation)
 50% of area to be relinquished after 10 years of grant
 OML may be renewed indefinitely
 Note recent controversy over renewal of ExxonMobil’s blocks
Petroleum Development
Regime in Nigeria: OML
 Condition for grant of Oil Mining Lease:
 Minister ‘may’ grant ‘only’ OPL holder an OML
If oil is found in commercial quantity (10,000
barrels per day)
 If all conditions in licence satisfied
Two separate leases may be granted from single
OPL(Oil Prospecting Licences (Conversion to Oil
Mining Leases, ETC.) Regulations)
Note South Atlantic Petroleum v Min of Petroleum
Resources



Position of Operator under Act
 No specific provision under Act
 Act seems to assume sole participation by mining/mineral
right holder and assumes holder shall also be operator
 Regulation 9 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation that
states: “The holder of an oil exploration licence, oil prospecting
licence or oil mining lease shall (a) appoint a manager resident in
Nigeria to supervise the operations under the licence or lease”
Petroleum Development
Arrangements in Nigeria
 Statutory lease regime serves as source of contractual
arrangements developed in response to government
policy on hydrocarbon development
 U-JVs created between IOCs (previously granted OMLs
before advent of state participation) and NNPC on behalf
of Nigeria to achieve state participation policy
 PSCs created between NNPC (as OPL/OML holders) and
IOCs to achieve state participation policy
 Risk Service Contracts between NNPC (as OPL/OML
holders) and IOCs to achieve state participation policy
Petroleum Development
Arrangements in Nigeria
 JOAs created between indigenous companies (as
OPL/OML holders) and IOCs to achieve indigenous
participation policy
 Farm outs created between IOCs (as original OML
holders) and NNPC under U-JV on one hand, and
indigenous companies on the other, to achieve
indigenous participation policy
U-JVs created pursuant to Lease
Regime
 Nigeria became OPEC member in 1970
 OPEC Charter provides for state participation for member
states
 Petroleum Act provides for:
“Participation by the Federal Military Government in the
venture to which the licensee or lessee relates, on terms
to be negotiated” (Paragraph 34(a) of Act)
U-JVs created pursuant to Lease
Regime
 NNPC Act also enacted allowing it joint ventures in
petroleum development activities
 NNPC Act stipulates partnerships in exploration generally
 “enter into contracts or partnerships with any company , firm or
person which in the opinion of the Corporation will facilitate the
discharge of the said duties under this Act”(s. 6(c) NNPC Act)
 “doing anything required for the purpose of giving effect to
agreements entered into by the Federal Government with a
view to securing participation by the Federal Government
of the Corporation in activities connected with
petroleum”(s. 5(g) NNPC Act)
U-JVs created pursuant to Lease
Regime
 Resulted in Participation Agreements and JOAs between




NNPC and IOCs allowing NNPC ‘undivided interest’ in
OPLs and OMLs previously granted exclusively to IOCs
under Act
U-JV structure seeks to vest joint legal ownership of lease
rights in both NNPC and IOC?
Unlike other countries, Nigerian statutory regime permits
IOCs to hold mining/mineral rights
However currently policy against granting these rights in
favour of IOCs
Rather, policy directs NNPC and indigenous oil companies
to hold these rights and for IOCs to be contractors
U-JVs created pursuant to Lease
Regime
 Six U-JVs currently exist between NNPC on one hand, and
Shell, ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Elf and Agip
 Although NNPC has between 55%-60% participating
interest, IOCs appointed operator under each U-JV
because
 IOCs were already operating before U-JV
 State of technical readiness in Nigeria
 95% of oil development in Nigeria estimated to be under
U-JVs
Farm Outs of Marginal Fields
 Farm Outs only possible where
 Lease holder seeks consent of President to farm out marginal
field out of its area
 President may ‘cause a Farm Out’ of a marginal field where
field unattended for period not less than 10 years
 In practice latter approach in use
 Farm outs between IOCs (as holders of OMLs) and NNPC
under U-JV, on one hand, and indigenous companies on
the other
 Act says government must be satisfied with farmee of
marginal field but does not stipulate who selects
Nigerian PSC Structure
 PSCs became popular from era of offshore
petroleum development activities in Nigeria due to
heavy costs involved
 Mostly in use in Nigeria today
 Government recently contemplated converting
existing U-JVs to PSCs to overcome cash call
problems created by section 162 of Const
 Deep Offshore Act contemplates NNPC(and not
Min of Pet) and Indigenous Companies as
OPL/OML holders, and describes IOCs as
‘Contractors’
Nigerian PSC Structure
 PSCs also describe NNPC as OPL/OML holders,
and IOCs as Contractors
 Nigerian PSCs are like Risk Service except for
NNPCs option to change Contractor at production
phase of Risk Service, and Contractor’s oil sharing
that is assured under PSCs
 IOCs under U-JVs made by government to set up
separate entities for PSC arrangements to avoid
ring fencing
Nigerian PSC Structure
 Under PSC IOC contracted to carry out petroleum
operations exclusively within contract area
 No recital that Minister’s statutory consent required
and obtained; but Minister’s ‘approval’ endorsed on
PSC
 No express statutory provision allowing PSC in
Nigeria
Nigerian PSC Structure
 IOCs remuneration dependent on production; production
can only happen if NNPC gets an OML; OML in turn
depends on NNPC meeting all its OPL conditions
 Hence, 30 years granted in PSC to cover OPL/OML
duration in lieu of NNPC undertaking to get OML
 Note that duration phased in other countries
 Question: what is legal basis for NNPC granting
duration beyond OPL?
 PSC terms mirror back OPL/OML terms like duration,
relinquishment; PSCs, OPLs/ OMLs relationship
more serious than sublease and head lease
 Note conceptual confusion in case law on PSC in
Nigerian Risk Service Contract
 Only notable case is between NNPC and AGIP over Agbara
Oil Field
 NNPC has right to take over operations, or replace IOC
Contractor with another at production phase
 Contractor reimbursed from proceeds of production for
exploration, development and production costs
 Contractor entitled to remuneration based on prescribed
formula that factors in volume and market price of crude
oil produced
Nigerian Risk Service Contract
 Contractor has option of taking prescribed quantity of oil
produced in lieu of remuneration
 NNPC controls operations through
 Approval of work programs
 appointment of subcontractors
 Approval of budgets and expenditure
 Contractor pays tax while NNPC is responsible for royalty
Nigerian Petroleum Development
Arrangements on Gas
 Petroleum Act defines ‘petroleum’ to include ‘crude oil’ or




‘natural gas’
Question: Can same OPL/OML cover oil and gas
development in light of disjunctive interpretation of ‘or’?
Currently, Nigeria gas development is incident of
associated oil
No statutory or contractual framework specifically for gas
development, and that takes its peculiar character into
account , especially in terms of longer time required for
development
Contractor to notify NNPC under PSC and Risk Service if
gas is found and another contract to be entered into for gas
Nigerian Petroleum
Arrangements: how they differ
 Distinguishing features may be identified through
parameters used by foreign investors to determine
investing in a country
 Nature of ownership granted
 Nature of protection available from this ownership
 Nature of fiscal regime
 Others
Nigerian Petroleum
Arrangements: how they differ
 Nature of ownership:
 Mining/mineral rights: under PSC and Risk Service legal
title vests solely in NNPC; IOC has legal title under UJC. NNPC’s legal title to mining rights under U-JV
debatable
 property used for operations: under PSC and Risk
Service title to equipment and property acquired for
operations transferred to NNPC at end of contract; title
vests jointly in IOC and NNPC under U-JV
 data: NNPC retains ownership all data , logs, reports,
information acquired in performance of contract under
PSCs and Risk Service; ownership vests jointly in NNPC
and IOC under U-JV
Nigerian Petroleum
Arrangements: how they differ
 reserves: Under U-JV IOC and NNPC entitled to book
reserves in proportion of their participation interest;
under PSC NNPC can book reserves, while IOC may
only book reserves to extent of its share of oil; under
Risk Service IOC may not book reserves except there is
agreement for buy back
 ownership of gas found: Under U-JV gas found belongs
jointly to IOC and NNPC; under PSC and Risk Service
gas found belongs to NNPC alone
Nigerian Petroleum
Arrangements: how they differ
 Nature of Protection:
 Expropriation: Under U-JV both IOC and NNPC
entitled to compensation; under PSC and Risk Service,
NNPC entitled. Based on wording of s. 44 of const, and
jurisprudence of international investment law, IOC may
also be entitled because of right to oil produced; IOC
may not be entitled under Risk Service
 Dispute Settlement: PSCs provide for arbitration in
accordance with ACA; Act provides for arbitration in
event of dispute from OML(s. 11; Para 14); note s. 251 of
const vests exclusive jurisdiction in FHC

Question: What is the legal effect of arbitral provision in
statute?
Nigerian Petroleum
Arrangements: how they differ
 Fiscal Regime As a matter of concept NNPC and IOC
should be jointly liable for royalty and rent under U-JV;
Under PSC and Risk Service, NNPC alone should be liable
for rent and royalty based on language of Petroleum
Regulation
 As a matter of Nigerian law, Nigerian contract clauses and
practice situation unclear
 Petroleum (Drilling & Production) Regulation imposes
obligation on only “The licensee or lessee shall pay to the
Minister not more than one month after the end of every
quarter... (a) royalty at a rate...”(reg. 60 )
 Annual rent payable on OPL and OML (reg. 59)
Nigerian Petroleum
Arrangements: how they differ
 But note that Deep Offshore Act and PSC models imply
that IOC is also liable to paying royalty and rents “The
Corporation or the Holder, as the case may be, shall pay
all royalty, concession rentals....on behalf of itself and
the Contractor...”(s. 11(1)
 “The CORPORTION shall pay all Royalty, Concession
Rentals...on behalf of itself and the CONTRACTOR...”
(Clause 15.3 PSC Model)
Nigerian Petroleum
Arrangements: how they differ
 Others
 Decommissioning: Petroleum (Drilling &
Production)Regulation contemplates this but applies to
leaseholder.

IOC and NNPC jointly liable under U-JV ; NNPC solely liable under
PSC and Risk Service. Some(not all) PSCs impose obligation on
IOC to set up an Abandonment Fund for decommissioning or
provide security for this.
 Control: Under U-JV Operating Committee; under PSC
Management Committee
Nigerian Petroleum Regime:
Emerging Reform
 PIB expressly allows PSCs, Risk Service Contracts and other
forms of Petroleum Development Arrangements
 PIB restyles Oil Prospecting Licenses and Oil Mining
Leases as Petroleum Prospecting Licenses and Petroleum
Mining Leases
 Unlike existing system that was limited to Minister’s
statutory approval in relation to transfers of OPL and OML
interests, and that did not expressly cover JOA’s, PSCs,
Farm outs, etc, PIB requires consent in respect of all forms
of contractual transfers, including mergers and change of
ownership control situations
Nigerian Petroleum Regime:
Emerging Reform
 PIB creates very elaborate process for migration from PPL
to PML
 Mining rights to be granted solely for gas development
 Regime for gas development different from oil and also
more generous due to its peculiar character
 Export rights no longer part of mining rights granted under
the PIB
 Domestic gas supply mandatory
 Permit now required for gas export
Nigerian Petroleum Regime:
Emerging Reform
 PIB expressly creates provisions for operatorship
 IJV contemplated in place of U-JV
 NNPC’s character as NOC may change under PIB as it is
contemplated for privatization
 NNPC to continue to play role of NOC under PSCs
 PIB silent about IOCs right to obtain mining/mineral rights
directly
Nigerian Petroleum Regime:
Emerging Reform
 Increased indigenous ownership of mining/mineral rights
due to:
 Nigerian Content Act that stipulates ‘first consideration’
 Explicit marginal fields regime under PIB
 Marginal fields one of few areas where discretionary
allocations would be allowed
 Aggressive relinquishment regime in PIB