As of March 6, 2012
THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR
POWER AFTER FUKUSHIMA
Paul L Joskow
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and MIT
(Based in part on a co-authored paper with
John E. Parsons
MIT)
The views expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of MIT, the
Sloan Foundation or any other individual or organization with which we are affiliated.
FUKUSHIMA I (Daiici) STATS
Unit
Capacity
(net MWe)
Design
Commercial Operation
1
439 Mw
GE Mark I
March 1971
2
760 Mw
GE Mark I
July 1974
3
760 Mw
GE Mark I
March 1976
4
760 Mw
GE Mark I
October 1978
5
760 Mw
GE Mark I
April 1978
6
1067 Mw
GE Mark II
October 1979
Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/50550192/NIRS-Fact-Sheet-on-FukushimaNuclear-Power-Plant and IAEA PRIS Data Base
2
About 160 miles
from Tokyo
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Japan_Nuclear_power_plants_map.gif
3
FUKUSHIMA I (Daiici)
Source: INPO 11-0005, page 2 (2012)
FUKUSHIMA I (Daiici)
dock
Artificial harbor
5
Source: INPO (2012), page 5
Source: INPO 2011
Simplified Sequence of Events
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
March 11, 2012 at 1446 JST a 9.0 earthquake about 110 miles from Fukushima (6.5 to 7.0 at plant -- about design basis for earthquake)
Operating units 1,2,3 (unit 4 in cold shut down) automatically scram, cooling rods are inserted, offstation power is lost, and emergency generators start as planned to provide emergency AC power
for cooling , monitoring and emergency equipment
March 11, 2012, at about 1527 the first of seven Tsunamis reach Fukushima
– Maximum height about 49 feet, exceeding design basis of about 33 feet
On-site emergency power lost completely for core cooling and waste fuel ponds and substantial
damage to site and flooding of reactor buildings
– Two workers on site killed after being trapped in a building after Tsunami and at least three
workers received radiation doses above criterion limits
– ~20,000 people in Japan killed by Tsunami itself
– Substantial destruction of building, transportation, electricity, and communications
infrastructure
Various efforts to restore cooling to cores and waste fuel pools ensued
Evacuations ordered out to 2km, 3km, 10km, 20km, seek shelter out to 30km, and transport and
food restrictions imposed
17 million curies of Iodine-131 equivalent radiation released into the air between March 11 and
April 5. (378.4 million curies released during Chernobyl accident)
High dose rates within the site and near site boundaries and selected “hot spots” further away.
Efforts to continue to control radiation releases and bring reactors under control proceeded for 8
months
December 16, 2012, all units declared to be in cold shut down, though not through standard
methods
Cleanup estimated at 40 years and yet to be estimated direct and indirect costs many billions of
dollars (TMI II cleanup was about $1 billion + replacement power for TMI 1 for several years, but
little indirect economic disruption)
Source: Joskow and Yellin (1980)
Radiation reading
(milliSievert)
Single dose, fatal in weeks
10,000
Chernobyl workers who died within a
month
6,000
Single dose that could cause radiation
sickness
1,000
Accumulated dose that could cause
cancer in 5% of people many years
later
1,000
Max radiation dose recorded on
Fukushima site/hr
400
Recommended limit for radiation
workers per year
100
Lowest annual dose at which any level
of cancer is clearly evident
100
Full Body CT scan
10
Natural background exposure/hr
2
Radiation per hour detected at
Fukushima site boundary on March 12
1
Chest X-ray
0.1
Various Sources
1 mrem/hr = 0.01 mSievert/hr
Initial Site Survey
Source: INPO (2011)
Source: Adapted from R. Hoetzlein (c) under creative common license
http://www.rchoetzlein.com/theory/2011/fukushima-radiation-regionaleffects-animation/
Direct Accident Consequences
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Earthquake and Tsunami major causes of loss of life and property damage
Fukushima accident has resulted in large cost of property damage to plant and large
plant cleanup costs. TEPCO effectively bankrupt
Dislocation costs for people evacuated and social costs for communities that still have
isolated pockets of high radiation, though most people have returned if their homes are
intact. Compounded by earthquake and Tsunami
Cleanup and decontamination costs for surrounding communities. 195,000 people
screened and 102 decontaminated based on IAEA screening criteria
No prompt fatalities and minimal latent fatalities from radiation are likely, but the latter
is uncertain
– Radiation did not reach Tokyo for six days
No effects on marine life yet identified
Seriously undermined confidence in nuclear power in Japan and a few other countries
– Emergency response, information dissemination, decision responsibility
– Effectiveness of Japanese regulatory system and connections between government
and industry
– Risks of nuclear power accidents in a region prone to earthquakes and Tsunamis
– What are the alternatives?
It could have been a lot worse! Tsunami way outside the design basis envelope,
information confused, and response protocols chaotic.
Lessons Learned
• Strong independent regulatory authority continues to be important even
though nuclear accidents are not good for business
• Cooperative industry peer reviews through INPO have been effective in
the U.S., but less effective elsewhere (WANO)
• Comprehensive emergency response systems with clear lines of authority
must be defined and tested
– Plant managers and on-site regulators must be given authority to respond
quickly to events
– Flexibility is needed to respond to events outside of the design basis accidents
envelope
– Defense in depth strategy based on design basis accident with a margin of
safety is sound
– Clear transparent protocol for providing information about the state of the
accident and measured radiation doses essential. Destruction of monitoring
equipment in and near site complicated response
• Upgrades will be needed to reduce the possibility of a complete loss of onsite power, monitoring of fuel storage ponds, pressure release systems,
and other attributes of existing plants
• Design bases must be reevaluated over time as new information about
earthquakes, floods and other potential accident pathways are identified
and appropriate retrofits made
WORLD OPERATING NUCLEAR PLANTS
By Type
BWR:
PWR:
Other:
92 (U.S. 35 of which 23 Mark 1)
269 (U.S. 69)
81 (47 CANDU or clones)
Source IAEA (March 19, 2011, PRIS data base)
19
368 GW
Plus 6 units in Taiwan
Includes: 7 units connected in 2011 (India, Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia)
4 closed in Japan, 7 closed in Germany,
Source: IAEA 1 Magnox closed in UK
Source: IAEA, December 2011
INTEREST IN “NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE”
• Mitigate CO2 emissions
• Carbon free base load technology with a great deal of experience
and high capacity factor
• 20% of U.S. generation, 15% of global generation
• Performance Improvements over time
– Capacity factors
– Safety indicia
• Technological improvements (Gen 3) to improve safety and safety
and reduce cost
• Energy security/diversity benefits
• Gain technological knowledge
• Public and NGO opposition on safety grounds appeared to have
dissipated
Effects on “Nuclear Renaissance”
•
•
•
•
It was unlikely that a lot of new nuclear capacity built in most OECD countries prior to
Fukushima.
In OECD countries with large existing nuclear fleets the action was on life extensions and
capacity uprates (South Korea and UK may be exceptions)
Fukushima helped to accelerate retirements and reduce even modest prospects of new build
in Europe in several countries so “mini” hoped for nuclear renaissance in these countries will
not take place
– Germany
– Switzerland
– Italy
– Spain
– Belgium
– Sweden (?)
– France (?)
Japan is a big global player and policy choices will be important but are still uncertain. All but
2 nuclear plants were not running as of March 4, 2012 as safety issues are considered and
government tries to pull its act together. Local governments oppose restarts until convinced
about safety.
Effects on “Nuclear Renaissance”
• No effects yet in the U.S. following initial 90-day NRC safety review, new
seismic grid, and staff assessment recommendations, but potential retrofit
costs could lead some plants to close earlier than anticipated especially if
natural gas and wholesale power prices remain low.
• “Nuclear renaissance” was concentrated in developing countries before
Fukushima and that is not likely to change much as a result of Fukushima
–
–
–
–
–
–
China
India
Russia
Eastern Europe
Middle East
Turkey
• Global future of nuclear driven more by economic and technical issues
than safety concerns
IEA 2010 REFERENCE CASE PREFUKUSHIMA
July 2010
REGION
2007 Nuclear (Quads)
2035 Nuclear (Quads)
Growth Rate
annual %
OECD North
America
9.6
11.3
0.6
OECD Europe
9.1
11.2
0.8
OECD Asia
3.9
7.1
2.1
OECD TOTAL
22.6
29.5
1.0
Non-OECD Asia
1.2
9.8
7.7
Non-OECD Europe/Eurasia
3.0
6.3
2.7
Non-OECD Total
4.5
17.5
4.9
Source: IEA IEO (2010)
2011
Excludes 7 reactors completed in 2011
Source: IAEA, December 2011
CONSTRUCTION INITIATION
YEAR
NUMBER
2004
2
2005
3
1
2006
4
0
2007
7
1
2008
10
0
2009
12
0
2010
15
0
2011
2
0
Source: IAEA
DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
1
U.S. LICENSE RENEWALS
units (as of 12/15/11)
APPROVED
71
UNDER REVIEW
14
EXPECTED
18
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute
CALLENGES TO NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE
• Nuclear is more expensive than advertised and less competitive
with cheap natural gas driven by shale gas
• Failure so far to price CO2 emissions
• Subsidies and mandates for renewables
• Deregulation of generation in about half of the U.S. and in Europe
and parts of Canada
– Active U.S. projects in regulated states + federal loan guarantees
• Safety concerns in some countries (Europe; Japan is a big question
mark)
• Slower demand growth expectations
• Costs of meeting new safety criteria
• Costs and complexity of good safety regulatory infrastructure for
countries seeking to enter nuclear power sector
• Proliferation concerns
• The future growth of new nuclear plants was and is primarily in
developing countries creating many institutional challenges
Nuclear vs. Alternatives
Joskow and Parsons, Daedalus, Fall 2009
31
Nuclear vs. Alternatives
with CO2 Emissions Prices
Joskow and Parsons, Daedalus, Fall 2009
32
Natural Gas Futures Prices
(Henry Hub, December 30, 2011)
$/mmBtu
February 2012
$2.974
June 2012
$3.182
June 2013
$3.866
June 2014
$4.241
June 2015
$4.481
June 2016
$4.732
Source: NYMEX, December 30, 2011
2008 Total Electricity Supply: 4,123 billion KWh
2035 Total Electricity Supply: 5,167 billion KWh
Growth rate of electricity consumption: 1%
Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2011
URANIUM PRICES (U3O8)
1988-2011
Source: The Ux Consulting Company, LLC ©
http://www.uxc.com/
UF6 PRICES
2004-2011
Source: The Ux Consulting Company, LLC ©
http://www.uxc.com/
STATUS OF COLs FOR NEW U.S. NUCLEAR
UNITS
(as of February 17, 2012)
STATUS
# of Units
COL AWARDED
2 (Feb/2012)
ACTIVE APPLICATIONS
6 ( 2 of which
are likely soon)
SCHEDULE BEING REVISED
9
SCHEDULE SUSPENDED OR NO SCHEDULE
13
[COL = combined constructions and operating license]
Source: NRC, Trade Press, Press Releases
Nuclear Power and CO2 Emissions in
the U.S.
• Nuclear power accounts for 20% of U.S. electricity generation and
has become a highly reliable dispatchable source of electricity
• Most models currently assume all existing units will get 20-year life
extensions, some with increases in capacity plus modest (6% to 8%)
new capacity by 2035
• 2035 is a misleading year to end a forecast related to nuclear power
since between 2035 and 2055 essentially all of the 20-year life
extensions expire.
• With little new construction a significant fraction of U.S. generating
capacity that does not produce CO2 will be gone by 2050 or so.
• What will replace it?